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Franklin L. Lavin

Former US Ambassador to Singapore

U.S. Foreign Policy at the Dawn of the 21st Century



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the Kyoto Protocol*

SIGMA IOTA RHO



SPRING 2008

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OF
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LETTER FROM THE EDITOR

Dear Readers,

It is with great pleasure that we present the tenth edition of the Journal of International Relations. As with all previous years, we have strived to increase both the quality of this year's Journal, as well as its reach to Sigma Iota Rho (SIR) chapters across the U.S.

We are glad to have received a record number of submissions this year, for which we would like to thank all who submitted their work. These came from many different campuses, and covered a plethora of engaging issues. It was with much difficulty that we narrowed the final number down to six. Cost and space limitations prevented us from publishing additional worthy articles.

It is also our honor to feature a commentary on American foreign policy by an eminent veteran of international affairs, the Hon. Franklin L. Lavin, whose experience ranges from being U.S. Ambassador to Singapore to being Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade. His piece is a source of insight and instruction for all concerned about American foreign policy. We thank him for his contribution not only to this edition, but also to the Journal's nascent tradition of bringing professional voices to its student discourse.

The discourse of this edition reflects today's growing interaction of disciplines and geographic areas. While each article has a very distinct topic, all grapple with intersections in the world of international relations. The Hon. Franklin Lavin's commentary highlights the impact of domestic attitudes on foreign policy. Rachel Doelling and Benjamin Power's articles focus on the intersection between states, while Michael Zanchelli and Kristin Sulewski's articles deal with the intersection between state and international regime. Nada Zohdy's paper, on the other hand, shows the intertwining of different disciplines. Finally, Patrick Shea examines the intersection of academic construction and political reality. Together, these articles give an indication of the staggering scope of the field that is international relations.

I would like to thank the University of Pennsylvania's Student Activities Council for contributing to the funding the Journal. I would also like to express my gratitude to Dr Frank Plantan, National Director of SIR, Donna Shuler, Administrative Director of SIR, and Dr. Tomoharu Nishino, faculty advisor to the journal, for their invaluable guidance and assistance. But most of all, I would like to thank my Journal Board members for their superb work and dedication, without which this edition would not have been possible.

Sincerely,
Huanying C. Koh
Editor-in-Chief
Epsilon Chapter, Sigma Iota Rho
University of Pennsylvania



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SPECIAL FEATURE:

U.S. Foreign Policy at the Dawn of the 21st Century

FRANKLIN L. LAVIN

Former US Ambassador to the Republic of Singapore

Americans are ambivalent about foreign policy. The question of how active the U.S. should be in international affairs is likely to provoke heated debate on and off campus. There are several fundamental philosophical questions Americans have to grapple with before they can define their foreign policy and even after these issues are addressed comes a pressing socio-political hurdle.

But let us examine the philosophical issues, the first of which is definitional. Many Americans do not favor international actions per se, but will support those international initiatives that are analogs of domestic policy: anti-poverty programs, trans-national collaboration on the environment, and other quality of life issues. With no disrespect to these worthy initiatives, they are often only peripherally related to the core foreign policy considerations of war, peace, and international stability. So the first philosophical question is whether Americans are comfortable dealing with international issues for which there is no domestic analog.

A second philosophical issue is one that emphasizes process. Many Americans take a bureaucratic or administrative view toward foreign policy, that it is primarily a matter of working through international structures. The premise in this case would be that for a country to operate outside of these systems would be a matter of recklessness or -- at best -- bad manners. This view has a natural appeal for those nations that lack the capacity to act on their own,

and indeed constraint of more powerful countries can be viewed as a mechanism for smaller states to enhance their own power. Regardless of the utility of international organizations, any history of the twentieth century will reveal they fall short of a substitute for foreign policy on the key issues of war and peace. I do not mean in this brief essay to criticize an entire school of international relations theory but simply to observe that international organizations seemed to perform at their best when their mission is aligned with the national interests of the constituent members. So NATO did a superb job of deterring Soviet aggression in Europe, enjoying broad and deep support from its member states. But that same NATO, now larger and wealthier, has a very difficult time deploying even modest forces to Afghanistan. The second philosophical question is whether Americans can remember that international organizations are best viewed as means to an end rather than as an end in themselves.

A third philosophical challenge is isolationism. The U.S. has a limited international tradition. Isolationism has a strong appeal in the U.S. and is currently heard the loudest in the economic sphere, with protectionist themes echoing through the current presidential contest. The third philosophical question is whether Americans want the world to be shaped by other countries and forces, or whether America should exert leadership and help shape outcomes as well.

So American foreign policy practitioners have to sort through the appeal of the definitional issues, international structures, and incipient isolationism. Beyond these philosophical challenges, there is the socio-political challenge of the immediacy of American political mindset. Americans frequently think of foreign policy only in terms of ameliorating a problem, not as an ongoing obligation of statecraft.

Thus a requirement of political leaders is to remind the American public of the necessity of U.S. leadership in a turbulent world. That this role will have costs and errors associated with it is unavoidable. But the cost of not providing leadership, of allowing others to shape the world in which we live portends far greater costs.

Americans have the ability to respond when attacked. In

those instances, we have shown we are willing to make sacrifices and sustain a commitment over an extended period of time.

But what if there has been no dramatic event to crystallize public opinion or to dramatize the cost of isolationism? Action in this instance requires leaders to help shape a consensus. Some of the better examples of American leadership – The Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe, or the Reagan Doctrine to support anti-Communist movements – took place when the conflict was not hot but cold.

The U.S. cannot allow itself to be in an international position in which the sustainability of action is determined by short-sighted analysis – because costs are sometimes immediate and graphic and benefits are sometimes vague and long-term.

The core foreign policy challenges of this century: integrating an ascendant China into the international system; defeating Islamic terrorism; ensuring rogue states do not develop a nuclear capability – all require long-term commitments. These challenges hold the prospect of set-backs, errors, and even international criticism. The United States will have to devote considerable acumen and resources to these challenges: persuading allies to join the cause, applying the right mixture of carrots and sticks, determining when soft power might be insufficient and hard power must be brought to bear. Does the U.S. have the wherewithal to undertake this journey?

We had a somewhat similar task during the 40-odd years of the Cold War. The rectitude of the U.S. position was unassailable, as was the necessity of American leadership. Yet at many of the particular steps we can find fault – admittedly in hindsight – with decisions made. At times we failed to live up to our own ideals or did not adequately assess the trade-offs of a particular action, or got trapped in extraneous issues of a side theatre of the conflict. On top of this, it seemed that almost any action by the United States that did not ring with immediate success or was inspired by purely noble goals would be met with a chorus of anti-American protests. Yet the U.S. prevailed, the west prevailed, and the world is better because of the collapse of the Soviet Union.

A similar set of struggles may face the U.S. this century, some-

times with lower stakes than the Cold War, but sometimes arguably with higher stakes. And we might find it harder to support a domestic political consensus because of the absence of an immediate threat.

It is my hope that the students of foreign policy dedicate themselves not just to a better understanding of the fundamental principles of this discipline – the sources of instability in the international system. It is my hope that you also spend some time working on the vital issue of how to sustain as broad public support as possible for U.S. international leadership, this despite costs and criticisms.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

The Honorable Franklin L. Lavin has had a long and illustrious career with the US government. From 2005 to 2007, he was Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade. Prior to that, he served as the US Ambassador to Singapore from 2001 to 2005. Under the George H.W. Bush administration, he was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Asia and the Pacific. During the Reagan Administration he served in the White House as Director of the Office of Political Affairs, assisting President Reagan with the management of domestic political issues, most notably with then-Vice President Bush's candidacy for President. He also served on the Reagan National Security Council Staff under National Security Advisers Carlucci and Powell as Deputy Executive Secretary. In this capacity, he was responsible for planning state visits and summit meetings, including the Reagan-Gorbachev Summit in Reykjavik.

Government careers aside, the Hon. Franklin Lavin has also worked as a banker and venture capitalist in Asia. He served in senior banking and management positions, primarily within Citibank and Bank of America.

Brazil's Contemporary Foreign Policy towards Africa

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In recent years, Brazil has emerged as both a regional power in Latin America and a so-called “middle power” within the broader international community. Brazil’s foreign policy aims to enhance this intermediary role in world politics. As such, Brazil’s current administration has begun rejuvenating the nation’s relations with the African continent. In addition to further developing cultural and economic ties between the two regions, Brazil places a particular emphasis on strengthening its recently formed alliance with South Africa. The focal point of Brazil’s relationship with Africa is designed to increase the international bargaining power of the states involved and provide a forum within which to elevate the interests and concerns of the “Global South.” Thus, the overarching themes of Brazil’s current foreign policy towards Africa include the strengthening of overall connections and diplomatic relations with the continent and the fostering of an alliance with South Africa, as well as augmenting trade between the two regions and working together to improve international security.

Brazil’s desire to cultivate close relations with African states constitutes one of the top priorities of the country’s current foreign policy agenda. This aim is not altogether new for the nation, however. A “Third World-like foreign policy” emerged during the Cold War, and South-South cooperation continued to increase under the Cardoso administration of the 1990s.¹ Solidifying a connection with Africa also seems somewhat natural for Brazil. For example, the countries share a common language and a similar colonial past

with the other African nations that speak Portuguese; it also claims the largest black population in the world next to Nigeria.² The main reason for President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's decision to pursue African connections, however, lies in his political approach of advancing "autonomy through diversification." This tactic attempts to reduce the inequalities of power in global politics by establishing South-South alliances and agreements with non-traditional partners. Thus, the Latin American country perceives its African neighbors as viable alternatives to reliance on great powers such as the United States.³

The Lula administration has demonstrated its growing interest in Africa in numerous ways. Brazil has obtained seats, for instance, at the conference tables of organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).⁴ Also, Lula himself has made four tours of Africa since his election in 2003. His total number of visits to seventeen countries on the continent exceeds the number of such excursions of all the previous Brazilian presidents combined. Lula has established 112 treaties between Brazil and 37 African nations during his first term; these treaties constitute nearly half of Brazil's total treaties with those states. In addition, Brazil hosted the Brazil-Africa Forum in 2003, which was followed by Lula's participation in the fifth conference of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries a year later. Through these efforts and several others, the Brazilian government has shown its unprecedented willingness to make a firm commitment to Africa.⁵

Brazil's nascent alliance with the African regional power of South Africa exemplifies its intentions for South-South collaboration and constitutes the second overarching theme of its foreign policy. The two nations gathered in 2003, along with India, to form the trilateral partnership of the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA), otherwise known as the G-3.⁶ This joint venture involved the promotion of certain shared interests among the countries (i.e., their commitment to democratic institutions and values), their efforts towards social and economic development, and their dedication to multilateralism as a means of influencing global decision-making.⁷

Specific issues that the group addresses include foreign trade, international security, technological cooperation, and incentives for tourism.⁸ Furthermore, the nations plan to develop "a strong negotiating power through a 'soft balancing' strategy" in order to amplify their joint endeavors within international institutions like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations (UN).⁹ Although the results of this partnership remain uncertain, Brazil's involvement with South Africa represents the faith the country places in Africa's contribution to achieving certain political ambitions.

Brazil has assumed the role of the driving force behind IBSA. The organization now stands as the vanguard for cooperation among developing nations in today's environment of increasing globalization. Also, Brazil's relationship with South Africa in particular has been "at the center of its negotiating strategy" within IBSA for establishing trade agreements.¹⁰ The nation has thus chosen South Africa as its primary African ally, a political bond preempted by the strong personal relationship between Brazilian and South African leadership dating back to the previous decade.¹¹ Hence, much of the country's policies towards Africa consist of Brazil's interaction with and support for South Africa through this forum.

The third theme of Brazilian interaction with Africa involves the encouragement of trade and business between the continents. Indeed, Brazilian business leaders accompanied President Lula on his tours of Africa and then organized "parallel business forums to negotiate contracts." Accordingly, commerce between the two regions soared from \$5 million in 2002 to \$12.6 million in 2005. Brazil's most valuable imports from Africa include oil, minerals, and agricultural products, while the country's most important exports to the continent consist of sugar, meats, and manufactured goods.¹² Between the years of 1999 and 2003, South Africa's Brazilian imports alone more than tripled and its exports to the country increased as well.¹³ Such interactions characterize the combination of Brazil's long-standing aim of economic development with its more recently articulated objective of lessening its dependence on richer nations.

Additional trade developments are currently underway in certain regional organizations. For example, the Trilateral Busi-

ness Council has been created to facilitate commerce amongst the members of IBSA.¹⁴ A Free Trade Agreement (FTA) has also been proposed to promote trade and relations between the countries of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), which includes South Africa, and the Common Market of the South (Mercosur), to which Brazil belongs.¹⁵ The negotiations for this preferential trade agreement have made little progress, however, due in part to the fact that the regions of SACU and Mercosur produce similar products at the same time of the year and compete in the same markets. Mercosur could technically utilize the FTA to improve its access to the markets of the United States and Europe while also launching more trade initiatives in other areas of Africa, but its higher production rates and lower costs may undercut SACU's ability to compete.¹⁶ Such problems provide Brazil, and other countries, with the opportunity to apply multilateralism in a search for feasible solutions.

Finally, Brazil's foreign policy towards Africa also focuses on enhancing international security. Brazil has renounced nuclear weapons programs and has "become fully committed to non-proliferation regimes," as has South Africa.¹⁷ Furthermore, the country believes in the utilization of multilateral institutions as a means of ensuring regional and global security. The navies of both Brazil and South Africa, for example, are involved in an arrangement across the Atlantic Ocean known as Atlasur. Hosted by South Africa in 2002, Atlasur provides an opportunity for naval interaction among the countries, as well as the exchange of information and technology.¹⁸ Brazil's main objective, however, involves advocating for the reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which the nation asserts should be larger and more inclusive.¹⁹ Brazil's desire for a permanent seat on the Council, a goal that dates back to the Cardoso administration, has led the state to enlist the support of the other IBSA members in this endeavor for reform. All three countries originally offered to support each other in their quest for permanent regional seats on the UNSC, although South Africa has since stepped down from its candidacy due to its regional alliances within the African Union.²⁰ Thus, these examples demonstrate Brazil's acknowledgement of the importance of cooperating with Africa in striving

towards collective security.

Generally, Brazil's contemporary foreign policy towards Africa is that of deepening connections and cooperation. The Lula Administration has made several efforts to prioritize African ties as part of its broader aim to enhance South-South collaboration. IBSA provides the most significant medium for such interactions, especially those of Brazil with its primary African ally, South Africa. Brazil engages IBSA and other regional organizations to further its foreign policy objectives of increasing trade with Africa and working with the continent to promote collective security. Thus, both Brazil and Africa recognize the symbiotic value of their relationship by helping to solve each other's problems and augmenting their status within the asymmetric power structure of the international system.

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The Berlin Connection: Locating German-Iranian Relations within Current Understandings of Post-Unification German Foreign Policy.

BENJAMIN E. POWER

University of Michigan

RIISING TENSIONS OVER IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

International tension over the progression of Iran's reputed nuclear weapons program has been steadily escalating since US President George W. Bush declared Iran to be a member of an "axis of evil" in 2003. While most nations are in agreement that a nuclear-equipped Iran would destabilize the Middle East, the United States has been the most active nation in advocating for stringent UN sanctions and pressuring the EU-3 (Britain, France, and Germany) to adopt their own set of economic sanctions against Iran. As discussion has evolved in various international institutions and diplomatic channels there has been increasing frustration over Germany's reluctance to take a more active stance against Iran over its nuclear program. Indeed, Germany is considered to be in the best position to influence the Iranian regime due to their prime diplomatic and domestic leverage positions. The current German stance with respect to Iran's nuclear weapons program and the complex intricacies of current German policies help to inform current debate over the best paradigm through which Germany's post-unification foreign policy may be analyzed.

AN UNDERSTANDING OF GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY PARADIGM

Prominent political scientists have recently begun to evaluate the optimal conceptual framework for examining trends in German

foreign policy decisions and the predicting future policies. Of particular prominence in these discussions has been postulation over whether Germany is best analyzed from a policy paradigm dominated by neorealism or post-Westphalian/neoliberalism.¹ The Berlin Republic's membership and active advocacy of the UN, NATO, and EU, and the voluntary acceptance of containment and restriction implicitly signaled by such, is frequently alluded to in recent literature as indication that Berlin has moved towards community empowerment in pursuit of milieu goals. To this point, Bulmer asserts "Germany has pursued, in a more strategic sense, broad-based and diffuse milieu goals, directed at shaping wider considerations of inter-state interaction and, above all, cooperation beyond national boundaries."² Indeed Germany has been of prime importance in shaping the policy and institutional infrastructure of the EU, which has in turn actually created an environment where many of the German states (Lander) are demanding a bargaining seat at the EU level.³ Germany has strengthened the EU to the point where in some ways it has subordinated state policies to supranational interests.

Political scientists such as Harnisch and Maull label Germany a "civilian power"⁴ due to the apparent transfer of sovereignty and desired attainment of community-based and collective goals. Immediately following unification many political scientists expected, as John Mearsheimer did, "a unified and full sovereign Germany to retreat from its post-war commitments to NATO and the EU, both of which were artifacts of the cold war itself."⁵ This and other neorealist predictions on German policy clearly did not come to fruition, indicating that civilian power is perhaps the most accurate paradigm with which to understand post-unification German policies.

This paper seeks to present a view of Germany as a "civilian power" whose recent foreign policy with regard to the state of Iran *can* be viewed as consistent with post-Westphalian norms, but is *better* viewed as being driven by neorealist economic considerations that are conveniently served by tactically appealing to international institutions. Thus, the willingness of Chancellor Angela Merkel to work within the confines of international law and diplomacy in resolving rising Atlantic tensions with Iran must not be seen as naively

subordinating national considerations for supranational consensus but rather as a situation of convenience that suits the economic and socio-political interests of Germans.

A RAPIDLY ESCALATING SITUATION

Recent American news reports have been full of stories covering the Western powers' suspicion of Iran's intent to enrich uranium to build nuclear weapons capability. In May 2006 the five permanent UN Security Council members adopted a formal resolution endorsing the five member states and Germany's offer of diplomatic and economic incentives and demanding that Iran suspend all uranium enrichment programs by August 31. In December 2006, after Tehran's failure to comply, the Council imposed sanctions on Iran's trade in sensitive nuclear technology and, along with Germany, passed UNSC Resolution 1747 in March 2007 intensifying the previous sanction package.⁶ Because Russia and China insisted upon a significant moderation of Resolution 1747 before they would vote for it, the US Treasury Department subsequently took an additional harder line of enacting unilateral trade restrictions on American companies doing business in Iran and has urged the EU-3 to adopt similar trade restrictions. Germany has taken a staunch position of non-cooperation with Britain and France on the proposal for EU-3 restrictions and has instead called for a return to diplomatic discussions within the United Nations. It is precisely this refusal to enact economic sanctions or take a hardened stance that has aggravated Germany's allies because Russia and China, two permanent members of the UNSC, have stated that they will veto future UNSC resolutions which contain harsher measures. Germany's ambivalence with regards to unilateral EU trade restrictions against Iran and advocacy for UN-based conflict resolution is a fascinating scenario which serves to inform the current debate within political science as to how to best understand German post-unification foreign policy.

GERMAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN

Germany and Iran have a long history as trading partners and economic allies. This relationship has had a significant impact on

the German state's seemingly ambivalent diplomatic posture. In the 1970s it was Germany's Kraftwerk Union (a Siemens subsidiary company) that designed and built the Bushehr Nuclear Facility which is today suspected of being the headquarters of Iran's nuclear weapons program. In 2006 German companies exported \$5.7 billion worth of goods to Iran, which included turbines for power plants, water-treatment systems, monorails, and windmill farms.⁷ As Iran's second-largest provider of imported products Germany stands to wield the greatest influence over the Iranian regime. While Berlin has not cooperated to the full extent its western allies hope for, "Germany's Economics Ministry has scaled back the export credit guarantees it issues for trade with Iran, to \$1.2 billion last year from \$3.3 billion in 2004. But German companies still exported \$5.7 billion worth of goods to Iran in 2006, up from \$5 billion in 2004."⁸ Angela Merkel and her ministers have indicated that the current changes in credit policies are the extent to which Berlin will accommodate Washington's pressure tactics and that she will "not bend to US pressure to impose extra sanctions."⁹

While the German government has to a certain degree acquiesced to its allies' pressure with regards to Iran, the German business community has been preoccupied with strengthening economic ties to Tehran. Indeed, running parallel to the UN sanctions on sales of nuclear-related technology to Iran, German exporters held a conference on September 17, 2007, to discuss emerging investment opportunities in Iran.¹⁰ Currently there are over 1,700 German companies doing business in Iran (including large conglomerates like Siemens and BASF); it is no surprise that the stance of the Federation of German Industry (BDI), a powerful German union and lobbying group, is "to keep negotiating with Iran."¹¹ Indeed, the opinion of many Germans is that "if the Germans stop exporting...the Chinese will do it – this entire system of embargoes and sanctions will be meaningless."¹² Fear of Chinese business incursion is well-founded as Chinese exports to Iran increased 44 percent in the first quarter of 2007 as some German companies reduced their Iranian business under excessive pressure from the US Treasury Department.¹³

Critics of the American government's pressure tactics have

speculated that the critical business niche recently vacated by Germany's largest banks, Commerzbank and Deutsche Bank could drive Iran closer to nations that are less sympathetic to U.S. efforts to pressure Tehran, specifically China and Russia.¹⁴ Iran has increasingly turned to Beijing's state-controlled Bank of China for international transactions.¹⁵ Additionally, the China Petrochemical Corporation, known as Sinopec, signed a \$2 billion agreement to develop Iran's Yadavaran oil field.¹⁶ Russia already provides substantial business for Iran, even directly through the nuclear program by providing significantly advanced technology for the Bushehr plant and the bargaining for production of Iranian nuclear material on Russian domestic soil. While one cannot criticize German government and industrial leaders for being resentful of American pressure to relinquish profitable business ventures to the Chinese and Russians, it is important to note that Angela Merkel's position of preferring UNSC-based action rather than EU-3 action ensures that the diplomatic discussions over Iran will receive the input of the very same countries that are competing for Iran's business. Thus Iranian ports will remain open for German businesses that do not have substantial American investments (and are not under the sphere of influence of the US Treasury Department).

GERMAN DOMESTIC SOCIO-POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

Economic relations alone are not enough to explain German reluctance to take a hard-line approach to Iran. There are strong political and social ties between the two domestic populations, which, in addition to feeding strong economic interest, account for a German foreign policy that does not reflect the foreign policy of a "civilian power".

The American-led effort to derail Tehran's nuclear program is among several political factors that serve to further complicate Berlin's foreign policy posture towards Iran. Indeed the very nature of the diplomatic front perceived as one of American belligerence conjures memories of the complex relations between the US and Germany after World War II. As Andrei Markovitz writes:

For Germany...the United States was a liberator, occupier, role model, protector, ally, rival, and bully all rolled into one. Beneath the surface of German-American relations lay powerful feelings of partnership and submission, gratitude and jealousy, friendship and rivalry. For German youth, the United States represented both the combatant in Vietnam and the bearer of liberal democracy and Western values, both the power behind a stultifying status quo and the underwriter of its blessed political stability.¹⁷

While this complex relationship still informs the current perception of American policies the German government occasionally distances itself from the US and moves closer towards stronger partnerships with the members of the European Union. Perhaps most illustrative is the fact that in the 2002 German Chancellor elections the Iraq War dominated the debates and inevitably led to the election of the anti-war candidate Gerhard Schröder. Overwhelming German opposition to the American-led Iraq War in 2002 was influenced by many characteristics including the political maturity of the 1968-generation that opposed the Vietnam War and the chauvinistic bypassing of the United Nations by the United States. Post-invasion discoveries of a complete lack of a functional nuclear weapons program would inevitably seem to vindicate German opposition to the Iraq War and influence the current decision to rely on diplomacy with Iran, a situation with many parallels to Iraq in 2002.

While the German public's antagonism towards American belligerence is understandable, it seems superficially counterintuitive that Germany would sympathize with a Muslim country given the Germany's problems with its own large and increasing Muslim immigrant minority. The sympathy is not relegated to the Muslim minority, though:

Iran's radical Muslim leader Ahmadinejad enjoys a considerable support base among white Germans. Germany's fascist NPD party enthusiastically supports Ahmadinejad and the Tehran regime for their Holocaust denial and their calls for Israel's destruction...NPD's office in Leipzig announced its members'

intentions to rally in support of Iran during Iran's game against Angola...¹⁸

While the overwhelming majority of Germans do not support the NPD or other radical right political parties, it is not surprising that the warm business relations between Tehran and Berlin find a parallel in the socio-political environment. If Germans voted in 2002 in opposition to the Iraq War it is possible to conclude that they now acknowledge their prime negotiating position over Iran and wish to preserve the status quo by maintaining strong relations with Iran on all fronts.

The legacy of collective guilt creates very strong reactions to the questioning of Germany's reluctance to fully support action against the anti-Zionist Iranian regime. Many have asserted that "Germany's behavior towards Iran is a clear sign that for all its Holocaust memorializing, for all its anti-Nazi legislation and for all its protestations of friendship with Israel and the Jewish people Germany has not learned the lessons of the Holocaust."¹⁹ Several possible reasons for German reluctance to the Iran question have already been discussed, however, understanding the impact that these statements have on the collective German psyche will serve to bolster the argument made in this paper. Lars Rennsman has stated that "since reunification, a strongly polarized political climate on the issue of collective identity and guilt" has emerged, and that "because most social groups initially react defensively to questions of collective guilt" it is likely that Germans will react to questions about Iranian policies that harken back to the Nazi era by "tending to project identity problems related to national guilt onto others."²⁰ Thus, it is logical to conclude that the multitude of public statements that imply continuity between current Berlin policies towards Iran and Nazi policies has actually served to reduce German empathy towards the US.

CONCLUSION

The central argument explored in this analysis is that though the majority of Germany's most recent foreign policy movements

have been motivated by post-Westphalian considerations which seek to strengthen international law and the promulgation of milieu-driven policies (particularly the development of the EU), the Federal Republic's relations with Iran are driven by economic calculations strengthened by domestic political and social ties. Merkel's insistence on UN-based diplomatic action reflects a desire to see international law determine collective decisions but must also be seen as a move to ensure that Iran's ports remain open for German business. The choice of using one international institution over another raises an interesting question: if Berlin chooses to strategically appeal to certain international diplomatic organizations at because the outcome will be more favorable than other organizations, is this the behavior of a "civilian power" or a neorealist power?

ENDNOTES

1. Neorealism is a political paradigm in which states seek their own interest and will not subordinate their interest to another's. Conversely, neoliberalism is a political paradigm where transfer of sovereignty to international institutions and adherence to international law are paramount importance and often take primacy over a state's short-term (material) interests.
2. Sperlin, James. "The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic: The Very Model of a Post-Modern Major Power?" *German Politics* 3 (2003): 1-34.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. A Civilian Power is commonly understood as being guided by "the transfer of sovereignty to international or supranational institutions, a policy of abnegation when faced with conflict between norm-compliant behavior and the maximization of some material interest, and the pursuit of "civilized" international relations."
5. Ibid.
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Darfur, Sudan: The Question of Genocide

MICHAEL ZANCHELLI

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW ON THE CONFLICT IN THE SUDAN

Darfur, which literally means “land of the Fur,” stretches across the northwest region of Sudan and is roughly the size of France.¹ For the past two decades, Sudan has been immersed in a civil war that initially began over limited natural resources in the mid-1980s and has since grown in intensity and complexity. To exacerbate the already extreme violence in the region, a number of political disputes arose between the Arab and Fur tribes over localized political power. The “Arab Alliance” was formed in 1986 and the Sadiq El Mahdi government began to supply arms to Arab militias from Darfur and Kordofan. In 1989, the previously sporadic fighting evolved into a full scale conflict between the Fur tribes and the Arab militias. Throughout the 1990s, the government of Sudan (GOS) also known as the Khartoum government disregarded natural resource allocation, did not establish or enforce any clear rule of law, and failed to address socio-economic development issues in the region, all of which further aggravated the conflict.²

In 2003, the Khartoum government was working to negotiate a peace deal to end the two decades long civil war in the south of Sudan with the help of the African Union (AU) and neighboring states. As noted previously, the war had been devastating to the region and the pending peace deal included considerable compromise for the distribution of administrative power and natural resources.³ In the process of the peace agreement negotiations, the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) felt

marginalized and subsequently began a series of successful attacks against specific government buildings and infrastructure. The SLA and JEM were initially comprised primarily of members from the Fur, Masaalit, and Zaghawa tribes but grew to encompass members of other smaller non-Arab tribes in the Darfur region. The Khartoum government, troubled by these attacks, began to back various Arab militias which collectively have been dubbed the "Janjaweed." Since 2003, the Janjaweed has committed atrocities both against the SLA and JEM themselves, as well as on the towns where the rebels gained support. To this day, the conflict originating out of the 2003 failed peace agreement has resulted in the loss of somewhere between 100,000 and 400,000 lives, the displacement of close to 2 million residents of the Darfur region, and countless rapes of Darfuri women and children.⁴

There are a number of distinctions to be made, however, between the inter-tribal conflict that had persisted throughout the 1990s and the present developments in Darfur. Most importantly in the context of determining whether genocide is taking place, the present day conflict "has developed serious racial and ethnic overtones and clearly risks shattering historic if fragile patterns of co-existence."⁵ An apparent divide has grown since 2003 that sets Arab militias and the GOS in opposition to Africans from the Fur, Massaleet, and Zagawa communities.⁶ It has also become increasingly difficult for tribal and ethnic groups outside the conflict to claim neutrality as the fighting has engulfed vast areas of land.

Defining Genocide

The question what constitutes genocide has been the subject of a great deal of debate since the inception of The Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNGC). Closely akin to the right to life, the prohibition of genocide exists as a fundamental human right. Where the right to life exists as the right of individuals, the prohibition of genocide as stated in the UNGC is the "right to life of human groups, sometimes spoken of as the right to existence."⁷ Often, genocide scholars and academics make the claim that the definition of genocide put forth in the UNGC is too

restrictive, especially in regards to the limited protection of various victim groups. Kurt Jonassohn observes that the UNGC definition of genocide was unacceptable “for one very simple reason: none of the major victim groups of those that have occurred since its adoption fall within its restrictive specifications.”⁸ Genocide scholars have often taken it upon themselves to modify this definition of genocide in an attempt to distinguish the crime of genocide from crimes against humanity or to narrow or expand what constitutes as intent of the group inflicting genocide. Gerard Prunier, in “Politics of Death in Darfur,” further limits the definition of genocidal intention to “a coordinated attempt to destroy a racially, religiously, or politically predefined group in its entirety.”⁹ Conversely, Kurt Jonassohn argues that genocide is constituted by “one-sided killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator.”¹⁰

In this particular analysis of the fact situation in Darfur and the determination of the crime of genocide, I will use the definition of genocide as stated in the UNGC and clarified with decisions and opinions rendered by the International Criminal Tribunals of Rwanda (ICTR) and the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). If I am able to persuasively conclude that genocide is in fact occurring in Darfur using this restrictive definition, it will both bolster the argument that genocide is occurring and establish an understanding of the genocide in Darfur within an international legal framework.

The actual definition of genocide in the UNGC exists in Article II, which reads:

Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group

In analyzing the Darfur fact situation in light of this definition, there are three main criteria emphasized by the language of Article II which I will use to determine whether or not genocide is occurring. The first is the criteria of membership to a group that is protected under the UNGC. Secondly, members of this group must have experienced certain acts of harm at the hand of an opposition group enumerated by the UNGC. Finally, these acts against members of a certain group must be carried out with the intent to destroy an entire group or a portion of this group.¹² The determination of genocide under the UNGC in a given situation is dependent upon the satisfaction of these three criteria.

GROUP MEMBERSHIP AND VICTIMIZATION IN DARFUR

The first question in the determination of genocide concerns whether or not the victims in Darfur are part of an “ethnic, racial, or religious group” that has been specifically targeted.¹³ What then does it mean to be included in an ethnic, racial or religious group and how are these groups to be defined? Although there is no further clarification on this matter in the UNGC, the two ad hoc criminal tribunals established in the wake of the Rwandan genocide and the atrocities in the Former Yugoslavia have shed some light on the particulars in defining these victim groups. The ICTR, in the Akayesu case, established that racial groups were comprised of individuals who had common “hereditary physical traits often identified with a geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or religious factors.”¹⁴ The ICTR also held that “members [who] share a common language and culture” comprise an ethnic group.¹⁵ Furthermore, the ICTY recognized that both objective and subjective criteria must be used in the determination of whether a certain group falls under the protection of the UNGC.¹⁶

Under the UNGC, a number of tribes in the Darfur region that

have been the victim to civilian attacks qualify as racial and ethnic groups. A 2004 State Department report on Darfur found that there was "a pattern of abuse against members of Darfur's non-Arab communities, including murder, rape, beatings, ethnic humiliation, and destruction of property and basic necessities" perpetrated by Arab militias backed by the GOS.¹⁷ These non-Arab communities are comprised of the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masaalit tribes, all of which speak the distinct Nilo-Saharan language, whereas the Arab communities speak Arabic.¹⁸ Each of the tribes existed prior to the creation of the state of Sudan, and "share a common language, culture, and ethnic identity."¹⁹ Subjective evidence also supports the claim that these tribes can be classified as ethnic and racial groups under the UNGC. Each of the three tribes maintains their identity as black and a separate ethnic group from Arab Sudanese.²⁰ Using both objective framework put forth in the UNGC and subjective interviews from members of the tribes, it is clear that the victims in Darfur meet the criteria to be a group or groups protected under the UNGC.

ACTS OF HARM CRITERIA

The second primary criteria for the determination of genocide is that these victim groups must have had certain harmful acts committed against them. The first of these acts is the killing of members within the group. In the 2004 State Department document of atrocities in Darfur, refugee interviews were conducted with members of the Fur, Masaalit, and Zaghawa tribes who had fled the region. 61% of the respondents claimed to have witnessed the murder of a family member, and roughly two-thirds said they had been witness to aerial bombings that had destroyed their village and claimed the lives of their neighbors.²¹ In total, an estimated 50,000 deaths in Darfur were perpetrated by the Janjaweed and the government of Sudan from 2003-2004.²² The civilian attacks have not ceased, and the number is undoubtedly much higher after two additional years of the conflict. The second act contained in the UNGC is the "causing of serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group."²³ According to the 2004 State Department report, there developed "a pattern of abuse against members of Darfur's non-Arab communities, including

murder, rape, beatings, ethnic humiliation, and destruction of property and basic necessities."²⁴ Furthermore, 21% of the interviewees reported that they had either been subjected to or personally witnessed a beating of an innocent civilian by the GOS or Janjaweed.²⁵ The third enumerated act is "deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part."²⁶ The ICTR has found that this does not specifically mean the immediate death of members of the group, but rather acts that "ultimately seek [the victim's] destruction."²⁷ From February 2003 to August 2004, a total of 405 villages had been completely destroyed and 123 villages considerably damaged. There have been consistent aerial bombing raids of specifically non-Arab villages by the GOS and there are now roughly 2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). There is also substantial evidence that the GOS has been instrumental in blocking humanitarian aid to these IDPs. The GOS, in response to a violent act committed in the Kalma IDP camp, stopped the humanitarian aid for 50,000 civilians.²⁸ These actions on the part of the GOS and Janjaweed clearly qualify as the third category of harmful action.

The fourth act, as stated in the UNGC, is "imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group."²⁹ Rape with the intent of preventing the birth of non-Arabs has been widespread in the Darfur region since 2003.³⁰ According to the 2004 State Department report, 16% of the respondents had either been firsthand witnesses to a rape, talked to an individual who had been raped, or had been raped themselves.³¹ According to *The Washington Post*, interviews with two dozen women who had been raped by members of the Janjaweed yielded that the rapes were "a systematic campaign to humiliate the women, their husbands and fathers, and to weaken tribal ethnic lines."³² In the Fur, Masaalit, and Zaghawa tribes, the ethnicity of children is determined by that of the Father. Sawela Suliman was raped in front of her father by a member of the Janjaweed and she quoted her rapist as saying "Black girl, you are too dark. You are like a dog. We want to make a light baby."³³

It is not necessary for all of the acts stated in Article II to occur, but rather a situation can be considered genocide if only more than

one of the acts have taken place. The harmful actions perpetrated by the Janjaweed and GOS meet four out of the five criteria for the enumerated action standard stated in the UNGC and thus the situation in Darfur can certainly be considered to meet the more general criteria of genocidal acts.

Intention and Genocide

The third and final requirement for a situation to be determined genocide is the intent of the perpetrating party to destroy the victim group wholly or partially.³⁴ There are a number of difficult questions that arise in examining the question of intent. Specifically, by what means is the intent of the perpetrator to be determined? Decisions rendered by the ICTR and ICTY have provided some clarity to this question and are applicable in the specific situation in Darfur. The extent of the violence and atrocities committed, verification of methodical planning, and verbal or written declarations by the perpetrators are all precedent for determining genocidal intent.³⁵ In finding genocidal intent, actions on the part of the perpetrators can also infer intent.³⁶

There is a substantial amount of evidence of actions that infer genocidal intent, as well as statements made by the Janjaweed that imply their objective of destroying certain non-Arab ethnic groups at least in part. The 2004 State Department report found that about one-third of the refugees interviewed reported hearing "racial epithets" while their villages were under attack.³⁷ Janjaweed and GOS soldiers, who often attack village in collaboration, are consistently said to yell "Kill the slaves; Kill the slaves!" and "We have orders to kill all the blacks."³⁸ Furthermore, a significant proportion of the refugees interviewed did not speak Arabic, the language of the Janjaweed and GOS soldiers, so it is likely that there was considerable underreporting of the ethnic and racial slurs made when their villages were being attacked.³⁹ To further substantiate the claim that the Arab militias were specifically targeting non-Arab tribes, a U.N. Fact-Finding mission found that destroyed non-Arab villages were often adjacent to "unharmful, populated and functioning 'Arab' settlements," some of which were less than 500 meters away.⁴⁰ As mentioned previously, rape is also frequently used as a means to destroy

and undermine the existence of the three tribes. One international aid worker noted that “the pattern is so clear because they are doing it in such a massive way and always saying the same thing” in reference to the numerous rapes of women in these tribes.⁴¹ A prominent official and international aid worker in Darfur also observed that “these rapes are built on tribal tensions and orchestrated to create a dynamic where the African tribal groups are destroyed” and “they are doing it in a massive way.”⁴² Given the specific nature of civilian targets, racial and ethnic slurs used in the attacks, and the systematic and widespread nature of the rapes in Darfur, it is clear that there exists genocidal intent on the part of the Janjaweed and GOS.

Under the UNGC, the genocidal acts must be taken out in a way that is intended to destroy a certain group or groups at least in part. As of 2004, estimates indicate that 50,000 innocent lives had been lost due specifically to the violence,⁴³ and upwards of 500 villages had been either entirely destroyed or significantly damaged.⁴⁴ At the beginning of the genocide, there were 6 million individuals residing in Darfur and there are now approximately 2 million IDPs due to acts carried out by the Janjaweed and GOS.⁴⁵ The current situation in Darfur undoubtedly satisfies the criteria of intent to destroy a group at least in part, if not whole. Furthermore, the situation in Darfur meets the three general criteria for genocide as stated in the UNGC.

IMPLICATIONS OF GENOCIDE

There is frequent discussion and deliberation over whether genocide is occurring in Darfur in large part due to the historical and emotional overtones associated with the crime. William Shabas notes that in determining varying degrees of crime, “the crime of genocide belongs at the apex of the pyramid.”⁴⁶ Historically, states have expressed reservations about signing the UNGC because of the potential obligations associated with it.⁴⁷ Although the determination of genocide in Darfur reinforces the claim that action by the international community must be taken, regardless of “whether it’s genocide, or crimes against humanity, or war crimes, it’s a horrible humanitarian situation that needs to be addressed.”⁴⁸

Presently, there has been a mandate to extend the stay of the weak and ill-equipped African Union (AU) peacekeeping force for an additional 6 months. The peace agreement signed between the GOS and only one rebel group in May of 2006 has been breached and the UN Security Council passed resolution 1706 on August 31 which called for a force of 20,000 UN peacekeepers. Resolution 1706, although theoretically must be accepted by the GOS, has not yet been in practice and the humanitarian crisis has only worsened.⁴⁹ The resolution was established under the enforcement chapter of the UN Charter, and thus Sudan is subject to the provisions of the resolution despite claims that a UN force would constitute an “invasion.”⁵⁰ The Khartoum government has not only been a bystander in the genocide occurring in Darfur, but it has played a significant role in perpetrating murders, beatings, and rapes of innocent civilians in the region. It has neglected its state responsibility in its support and direct assistance in the genocide. The dispatching of a UN peacekeeping force would set a positive precedent in deterring future genocide and end, at least in part, impunity for the atrocities in Darfur. The international community must take a generally stronger role in deterring and preventing further genocide in Darfur, and reduce the divide between “never again” rhetoric and substantive action.

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Understanding U.S. Withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol

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INTRODUCTION

Multilateral efforts to reduce global climate change are extremely complex due to the fact that such agreements often require neither global nor environmental policies, but rather domestic, economic ones. While a state's ratification of the Kyoto Protocol would mean the adoption of an international policy aimed at reducing emissions levels and trapping greenhouse gases, abiding by the treaty requires the implementation of domestic programs to transform existing energy sources that are vital for economic progress and stability. Thus, environmental goals must be achieved through economic means, a relationship that creates a potential need for the weighing of national interests between the two different arenas. When considering the prioritizing of issues that is likely to occur in such circumstances, one must also recognize that one arena – the national economy – is likely to produce more short-term visible achievements or failures, while the other arena – the environment – is one that requires a more long-term outlook. Understanding the complex domestic implications of international environmental policies and examining disagreements in the international bargaining process is necessary in order to comprehend President Bush's motivations for withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001. More specifically, domestic US actors' strong perception of the unfairness of and the economic threat posed by the Protocol helps explain why Bush was never likely to accept it. A further examination of Bush's tendency

towards unilateralism, his disregard for environmental policies, and his strong desire to achieve short-term personal goals related to energy policy helps to explain Bush's complete withdrawal from all international negotiations on global climate change.

BACKGROUND ON KYOTO

As the 1980s came to a close, the world began to accept what was becoming a consensus among scientists: that greenhouse gas emissions caused by human activity were having potentially harmful impacts on global climate patterns. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was an interdisciplinary group of international scientists, economists, diplomats, and policy-makers created in 1988 to examine the science behind, impacts of, and possible response strategies to the phenomenon of global warming.¹ The IPCC endorsement of the theory of global warming encouraged multilateral efforts to address the problem. In early 1989, President George H. W. Bush applauded the IPCC and announced US support of climate change negotiations.² The UN General Assembly responded by establishing the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on Climate Exchange (INC) in December 1990.

In June 1992, the INC presented the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to world leaders and environmental NGOs at the "Earth Summit" in Rio de Janeiro. The UNFCCC was in essence a voluntary agreement under which industrialized nations agreed to strive for reduced greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. The United States was the first to ratify the treaty, followed by over 150 countries. Despite such overwhelming support, it was clear by the first round of UNFCCC party talks in 1994 in Berlin that voluntary measures would not be enough for marked improvements and greenhouse gas reductions, and that legally binding agreements would be necessary.³

The Kyoto Protocol, negotiated by over 100 countries and presented at the third session of UNFCCC party talks in December 1997, marked the first set of legally binding commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The Protocol requires the world's 38 industrial states to collectively reduce emissions levels of four main greenhouse

gases – carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and chlorofluorocarbons – by 2012 to 5.2% below 1990 levels.⁴ Issues of disagreement during negotiations were the specific reduction requirements of each country, whether emissions trading and joint implementation programs were acceptable, and whether developing countries would be required to undertake similar emissions reductions.

The US agreed to a 7% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from the 1990 base year (the figure was 8% for the EU, 6% for Japan). Environmental experts of the Clinton administration argued that this level would actually be less due to the Protocol's acceptance of "carbon sinks," which are environmental sources that remove CO₂ from that atmosphere, as credible sources of emissions reductions.⁵ The United States strongly advocated emissions trading and joint implementation programs, which would also facilitate reaching emissions reductions goals, but such concessions were not included in the Protocol until July of 2001, after the Bush administration had officially rejected the treaty.

The US also had strong feelings on the third point of contention: the participation of developing countries in the mandatory reduction of greenhouse gases. Exclusion of such countries from participation, especially the rising industrializing nations of India, China, and Brazil, was seen as not only unfair, but also as counterproductive in achieving the world's goal of overall emissions reductions. The developing world argued in response, however, that it does not have as big of a responsibility to combat global warming because it has not played a significant role in the historic atmospheric build-up of greenhouse gases.⁶ Despite this ongoing disagreement and the exclusion of the developing nations from mandatory emissions reductions, President Clinton signed the Kyoto Protocol on November 12, 1998.

THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

After receiving President Clinton's signature, the Kyoto Protocol was not sent to the US Senate for ratification because he knew it would be rejected. In July of 1997, five months before negotiations began at Kyoto and 16 months before Clinton signed the agreement,

the US Senate passed the Byrd-Hagel Resolution by an overwhelming vote of 95-0. The Resolution stated that the United States would not accept any binding commitments to climate control and emissions reduction treaties that lacked participation of developing countries or that threatened the US economy.

Congressional demands for developing country participation are related to arguments discussed earlier regarding the unfairness and ultimate ineffectiveness of total emissions reductions without their involvement. Economic apprehension existed because as was also previously discussed, environmental policies require the alteration of significant economic sectors, such as energy, manufacturing, and transportation. Members of congress grew concerned about consequent threats to such industries and, by extension, the economic well being of their voting constituents. While Clinton understood that the treaty face imminent rejection due to its failure to incorporate developing countries, his administration still sought to demonstrate the manageable economic impacts of Kyoto, emphasizing that it posed no threat to the economic stability or productivity.⁷

It was in this context that George W. Bush became President of the United States and began formulating his administration's agenda for climate control, emissions reductions, and participation in the Kyoto Protocol. Like former President Clinton, President Bush knew that he had no hope of successfully passing the Kyoto Protocol through the Senate because it still did not have developing country participation. In fact, Bush agreed that the Protocol was "unfair" to not include developing countries and cited that as a major reason for opposing the treaty's acceptance.⁸ Furthermore, despite the arguments of the Clinton administration, Bush had serious apprehensions about the Protocol's potential negative impacts on the national economy, as will be discussed later in the essay. It is, therefore, not surprising that Bush did not try to dispute the Senate's ultimate decision to reject ratification.

In addition to the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, other Congressional barriers prevented a successful ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and emissions regulations. The Senate was experiencing an even 50/50 split between Democrats and Republicans, thus making it difficult

for Bush to wield overwhelming political influence on the matter, even had he wanted to support Kyoto. Furthermore, the split necessitated caution when dealing with Senate Republicans because he needed their support in passing major tax-cut legislation proposed during his campaign. Bush was aware that strong Republican opposition existed to the Protocol, and even to any sort of domestic regulation of carbon dioxide emissions. Four particularly vocal Senators with whom the White House was very concerned were Chuck Hagel of Nebraska, Larry Craig of Idaho, Jess Helms of North Carolina, and Pat Roberts of Kansas. The delicate balance in the Senate and Bush's higher prioritization of other domestic policies placed these four Senators in a prime position to influence Bush's decisions on emissions reductions, an issue to be further discussed later on.

Despite congressional opposition to Kyoto, it is necessary to acknowledge that the Senate was still very active in promoting emissions regulations and further multilateral negotiations. After Bush's withdrawal from Kyoto, Senator James Jeffords, then R-Vt, had 14 co-sponsors, including three Republicans, in his introduction of the Clean Power Act of 2001. Its sponsors criticized President Bush for dropping carbon dioxide from his emissions control plan; accordingly, the Act sought regulation of carbon dioxide emissions. Other proposed initiatives of the 2001 Act include the Comprehensive and Balanced Energy Policy Act to transfer emissions control technology to developing countries, as well as the Climate Change Policy and Technology Act to establish a National Office of Climate Change Response within the Executive Office of the President.⁹ Even more significant, however, was the unanimous (19-0) support from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations approving a nonbinding amendment to a State Department bill that requested a return to multilateral negotiations on climate change. The bill asked that Bush either propose specific, acceptable alterations to Kyoto, or initiate an entirely new binding multilateral agreement.¹⁰ Thus, while Congress may never have adopted Kyoto as it was, there exists sufficient evidence that they did want progress on not only domestic emissions reductions, but action against adverse climate change at the global level as well. Congressional opinions and involvement are therefore

insufficient to completely explain Bush's withdrawal from the Protocol and rejection of multilateral negotiations on climate change.

Bush's Additional Criticism

The Byrd-Hagel Resolution, Bush's support of congressional criticisms, and strategic opposition to emissions reductions in the Senate can definitely be cited as major barriers in Kyoto's adoption, but they are insufficient explanations for Bush's withdrawal from the Protocol. Rather, it is necessary to also examine Bush's own criticisms of the Protocol, as well as the sources of these criticisms, in order to comprehend his ultimate withdrawal from multilateral climate change negotiations.

While Bush understood congressional doubts and fears, he also articulated new arguments against the Protocol. He argued that a binding multilateral agreement could become a threat to American sovereignty. If the US had to rely on buying emissions credits from other nations, he explained, it would leave the country economically vulnerable and open to exploitation.¹¹ Thus, we can see that Bush also viewed Kyoto as problematic from a national security point of view. It is necessary to consider, however, that emissions credits trading and joint implementation programs were not yet a part of the Protocol when the US officially removed itself from negotiations. While many nations, such as Japan and Russia, refused to join the agreement until these points of negotiations had been included, Bush's discussions of sovereignty helped to indicate that he saw any further multilateral binding agreements as futile.

Bush's worldview and track record in office help to shed valuable insight into his feelings on multilateral agreements and their impact on the formulation of his foreign policy. In addition to withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol, President Bush also rejected US participation in the International Criminal Court (ICC) and opposed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). These actions, along with almost unilateral US action in the War in Iraq, are evidence for what Richard Hass has referred to as "à la carte multilateralism."¹² The Bush Administration sought to create ad hoc coalitions of the willing, meaning that it will cooperate with other states only if they are willing to pursue American goals and interests. Daalder and Lind-

say explain how Bush's worldview helps to explain this à la carte multilateralism:

"Bush's unsentimental diplomacy flowed directly from his core beliefs. If all states pursue their self-interest, if power matters above all else, and if American virtue is unquestioned, then US foreign policy should not be about searching for common policies. Rather, it should be about pushing the world in the direction Washington wanted it to go, even if the initial reaction was resistance."¹³

In fact, the Bush administration received much resistance and criticism from abroad regarding its withdrawal from Kyoto. In a survey of British, French, German, and Italian citizens, over 80% of respondents in all countries disapproved of Bush's withdrawal from the agreement.¹⁴ While attending the sixth round of Kyoto talks in Bonn, Germany in July of 2001, Bush faced extreme opposition and negative feedback from national leaders of the EU.¹⁵ Tony Blair's chief science advisor warned that the Bush Administration was "ducking its responsibility as the world's only superpower" in its refusal to accept Kyoto and combat climate change, which he referred to as a global threat bigger than international terrorism.¹⁶ In fact, the director of the Environmental Protection Agency, Christine Todd Whitman, also warned President Bush that he must show a commitment to issues of global climate change or risk alienating many key US allies.¹⁷ Such criticisms from abroad and warnings from Whitman, as well as similar concerns expressed by Secretary of State Colin Powell,¹⁸ were obviously not enough to deter Bush's withdrawal or encourage him to change his stance on unilateral action. Thus, one can see how Bush's worldview and approach to foreign policy likely played a significant role in his rejection of Kyoto and complete withdrawal from all multilateral climate change agreements.

Another reason for Bush's opposition to Kyoto is his doubt of the accuracy of scientific evidence pointing to global warming. Bush has argued that "sound" scientific information is not available¹⁹ and even expressed serious skepticism about the causes of global warm-

ing during his campaign.²⁰ Bush rejected the validity of scientific research published by such reputable, well-established, and well-funded research bodies as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the National Academy of Sciences (NSA),²¹ and even a report from the Environmental Protection Agency in 2002, which was published after Bush's withdrawal from Kyoto. In a speech on global climate change and the NSA report in June of 2001, Bush commented that

“the Academy’s report tells us that we do not know how much effect natural fluctuations in climate may have had on warming. We do not know how much our climate could, or will change in the future. We do not know how fast change will occur, or even how some of our actions could impact it . . . And, finally, no one can say with any certainty what constitutes a dangerous level of warming, and therefore what must level must be avoided.”²²

Despite Bush's skepticism, the EPA's "US Climate Action Report 2002" argued that, "greenhouse gases are accumulating in the earth's atmosphere as a result of human activities, causing global mean surface air temperatures to rise". Bush was angered by its publication, blamed it on "the bureaucracy", and argued that it used inconclusive and unreliable evidence.²³ Whatever the reliability of evidence used in the report may be, the EPA's publication, and others like it, indicate that many domestic actors are critical of Bush's rejection of the dangers of global warming and man's role in exacerbating this phenomenon.

In fact, the American people also have strong feelings on global warming – they believe in its existence and sense a need to address the issue. A survey completed in 2003 by the University of Oregon found that 92% of Americans had heard of global warming, 75% were "somewhat or very concerned", 90% thought the US should reduce carbon dioxide emissions, 88% supported the Kyoto Protocol, and 76% said that the US should work to reduce emissions regardless of the actions of other countries.²⁴ Yet despite this seemingly overwhelming domestic acceptance of global warming and support

for Kyoto, only 20% of American people knew of the US' withdrawal from the Protocol in 2001.²⁵ It becomes necessary to consider, therefore, why public opinion did not play a larger role in Bush's, or even Congress', position on Kyoto.

BUSH'S ECONOMIC AGENDA

As the Bush Administration took power, economic concerns carried more weight with the American public than issues of global climate change. The US was in a period of economic recession and an electricity supply crisis in California receiving national attention increased worries related to the security and stability of the nation's energy supply. Thus, the White House and Bush's domestic agenda was heavily related to these two issues. It must be examined, however, to what extent these two issues were truly motivations behind Bush's rejection of the Kyoto Protocol in comparison with to what extent they were merely used as justifications for domestic policies that were in opposition to the agreement.

Bush's attention to the state of the national economy is not unexpected, especially given the emphasis that Clinton placed on the economy and the immense growth experienced by the US in the 1990s. It also expected due to the nature of the American political system. The lives of everyday citizens can be drastically impacted by the health of the national economy, and politicians, especially the President, are largely held accountable for its success. A desire to get re-elected therefore creates strong incentives for Presidents to be very focused on short-term economic goals likely to produce quick benefits and thus more votes on Election Day. Bush was therefore very concerned about the short-term economic repercussions of Kyoto.

In the few speeches he did make regarding the agreement, Bush heavily stressed the threat that the treaty posed to the national economy.²⁶ He explained that Kyoto would cost over \$400 billion to the national economy by 2010 and a loss of 4.9 million jobs, figures much higher than those projected by the Clinton administration.²⁷ It is necessary to consider, however, that Bush's speeches presented the worst-case scenario as to the possible detrimental impacts of Kyoto on the economy. His \$400 billion figure originated from the 2002

findings of the Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality. Yet the Energy Information Administration, an independent agency of the Department of Energy, reported a figure of only \$397 billion in 1998, while that same year the Council of Economic Advisors estimated costs to be as little as \$7 billion to \$12 billion a year.²⁸ In addition to short-term economic planning in the interest of gaining short-term results, therefore, Bush's heavy emphasis on the economy in his public speeches and presentation of worst-case scenario data was partially because he knew voters would relate to such arguments and thus be more likely to support his rejection of the Protocol.

Despite Bush's argument that Kyoto would have extremely negative impacts on the national economy and industrial productivity, many companies and industries welcomed emissions regulations and government action on climate control. The Pew Center, a group of 32 multinational corporations, including Boeing, International Business Machines, and Du Pont, heavily criticized Bush's withdrawal from Kyoto as "a profound disappointment and, potentially, a serious setback to international efforts to address the very real threat of global climate change."²⁹ Within the chemical sector, a split also existed between companies over support for Bush's actions.³⁰ Furthermore, some argued that a lack of binding emissions regulations could be potentially harmful to the long-term success of the national economy because competitors would be more likely to formulate innovative climate-friendly technologies. Despite this opposition to withdrawal and the potential benefits that certain companies and industries would receive from Kyoto's binding emissions reductions, Bush's actions regarding the Protocol were more in line with the desires of energy and electric-utility sectors.

Electric-utility companies feared high compliance costs that might result from Kyoto, and began strongly lobbying Congress and the President in the 1990s to reject the agreement. Multiple oil and energy companies within the US also expressed wide criticism of the Protocol. ExxonMobil issued a statement arguing that the treaty would result in little environmental benefits along with high economic costs.³¹ Given that many top level White House officials, including Bush himself, had strong ties to the American oil industry,

as well as the fact that Enron, an energy company that opposed the Protocol, was the single largest contributor to the Republican Party in the 2000 elections, it is not surprising that Bush perceived extreme negative economic consequences from Kyoto.

BUSH'S ENERGY PLAN

The Bush energy plan was also a large barrier to the acceptance of the Kyoto Protocol. This plan was strongly influenced by the Administration's strong ties to oil and energy companies. Bush's energy policies thus sought to increase domestic fuel supply and production—something that would undoubtedly prove beneficial for domestic oil companies. The President appointed Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham as leaders of the National Energy Policy Development Group. This group was an 'energy task force' for the investigation of options and the development of strategies to reduce rising energy costs and increase domestic energy production. Dick Cheney personally had strong ties to oil and energy companies, and some argue that the task force was "dominated by fossil fuel and nuclear industry interests."³² Additionally, Cheney's strength as a Vice President is almost unprecedented.³³ The appointment of Cheney to lead the task force thus increased the likelihood that the proposed policies would be in line with the wishes of the oil and energy industries, as well as the chances that Bush would be willing to accept whatever proposals the energy task force developed.

The ultimate findings of the task force proposed policies that would fundamentally contradict Kyoto and its goals. While Bush's energy plan, released in May of 2001, called for the increased domestic production of fossil fuels, the Kyoto Protocol's attempts to regulate emissions reductions would conflict directly with such goals. Any policy limiting carbon dioxide emissions would prohibit increased reliance on fossil fuels and coal. As a result, Bush not only withdrew from Kyoto, but, amidst much controversy, also abandoned his campaign promise to begin carbon dioxide emissions regulation. The rejection of carbon dioxide emissions was in fact a direct result from the pressure of oil and electric companies on both Congress

and the President. As oil and electric-utility groups feared high compliance costs and forcefully lobbied Congress, four strong Republican Senators, as was previously mentioned, stepped forward to discourage the President from both carbon dioxide regulations and accepting Kyoto. Hagel, Craig, Helms, and Roberts cited the potential economic dangers of carbon dioxide regulations and the Protocol and strongly emphasized the Protocol's threat to the President's energy policy, which the Senators argued should receive much higher priority. In response to Congressional pressure encouraged by lobbying firms, key White House aides further pushed the President to move away from carbon dioxide emissions. Nicholas Calio, the White House legislative liaison, warned Bush of the dangers of angering Republican Senators due to the delicate balance of the Senate, as was previously discussed. Furthermore, White House economic advisor Lawrence Lindsey, along with the leaders of the energy task force, Cheney and Abraham, helped to convince the President that the energy policy should take priority and that carbon dioxide emissions regulations, being counterproductive to that goal, should be abandoned.³⁴

It is not surprising that Bush would strongly consider policy recommendations from Cheney and Abraham, given his presidential leadership techniques. Bush was confident that his advisors understood his vision, and he was confident in their ability to design and advise policies that were most in line with his goals. As a result, he uses his cabinet as a sounding board, to which he delegates specific tasks.³⁵ After delegating the energy task force to Cheney and Abraham, therefore, it makes sense that he would be highly responsive to their input on energy and its impacts on the national economy.

It must be considered, however, that despite strong support to halt emissions cuts, there were some advisors who were strongly in favor of stronger emissions regulations whom Bush obviously did not listen to. The most notable among them was Whitman, whose position as Director of the Environmental Protection Agency was elevated to cabinet status under Bush. Just days before Bush's announcement to abandon his campaign pledge to regulate carbon di-

oxide emissions, Whitman made a public speech reasserting Bush's campaign emissions reduction plan, and her continued support for it.³⁶ Thus, it is clear that Bush's cabinet was split, conflicting in the policies they envisioned for him, but that in the end he chose to prioritize his energy and economic policies over his environmental policy.

BUSH'S ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

Beyond siding with Cheney, Abraham, and Lindsey on the choice to not enforce carbon dioxide emissions, Bush has made other actions indicating that he accords environmental policy a relatively low priority. His promotion of oil drilling in Alaskan forests for his energy policy not only shows the importance he gives to his energy goals, but also that he is willing to sacrifice national parks and permit severe environmental degradation in order to achieve them. 2002 saw significant fiscal resource restrictions for environmental policy as Bush proposed a 13% budget cut for the enforcement division of the EPA.³⁷ Such cuts make it harder for the EPA to monitor firm practices and enforce environmental regulations of any kind. Many environmentalist groups have recognized and lamented the Administration's overemphasis on energy policy and general disregard for environmental issues. John Coequyt of the Environmental Working Group commented, "This is what happens when you stack the administration with oil, gas, and coals guys."³⁸

Bush's environmental policy has sought to transfer regulatory power from the federal to the state level. In general, it has sought to deregulate the environmental sector, allowing market mechanisms to solve environmental problems. This approach emphasizes the importance of technology in achieving more environmentally friendly practices, and market-created incentives to produce such technology. Such incentives are based mostly on a pollution credit-trading scheme, which would potentially promote research and development through firms' efforts to gain profit from surplus credits. However, many are skeptical of this voluntary, market-based approach. Bush's Climate Leaders and Climate VISION program both promote tech-

nology research, but they do not demand participation or even emissions reductions.³⁹ Thus, the number of firms participating would be small, given the incentive for firms to free ride off of the technological progress and emission reductions of others. Net increases of greenhouse gas emissions therefore persist. Under such institutional conditions, it seems therefore unlikely that significant strides will be achieved under the Bush Administration to effectively reduce emissions and drastically increase the use of environmentally friendly technologies. Furthermore, while the energy task force did propose the emissions regulations of certain chemicals and gases, carbon dioxide and greenhouse gases were not among them. Thus, any government enforced reductions and regulations will not address what has been acknowledged by a majority of the scientific and global communities as the major source of recent climate change and global warming, which is the steady build up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.

CONCLUSION

Before even taking office, multiple forces were at work influencing President Bush's likelihood of implementing the Kyoto Protocol and binding emissions reductions. Just as the Senate's opposition to the Protocol prohibited Clinton's ratification of the treaty, so too did it inhibit Bush upon entering office. Furthermore, Bush's agreement with the Senate on its reasons for opposing the Protocol as well as his worldview and scientific opinions also contributed to Bush's lack of support for the treaty. After entering office, however, a delicate political balance in the Senate along with strong oil and energy lobbyists with close ties to the White House required Bush to prioritize his domestic agenda between issues of the national economy, energy, and the environment. The prioritization of energy over environmental policy shows the importance of the Administration's ties to the oil and energy industries, and also highlights the importance that Bush placed on the short-term health of the national economy. Furthermore, a lack of strong policies to develop the use of environmentally friendly technology thus far in his term shows that, overall, Bush's withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol must have been

based on more than dissatisfaction with the particular stipulations of the treaty. President Bush's focus on the short-term economy, his scientific opinions, and especially his ties to domestic oil and energy industries have led him to be generally disinterested in combating harmful greenhouse gas emissions and rising global temperatures, and thus explain Bush's complete withdrawal from any international negotiations on the issue.

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How to Rebuild: Understanding the Importance of Culture and Economics in Reconstruction Efforts in Iraq

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Over four years after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, what had initially appeared as a swift and successful military conquest to overthrow a dictator and capture a capital city has now devolved into a rather ugly mess, causing many to question the initial decision to invade. Blood has been shed extensively and unnecessarily on both sides: while thousands of US soldiers have lost their lives, hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians have also died. The deposition of a dictator who wielded absolute control over the society prior to the occupation has necessarily created a great power vacuum, and a lack of central control serves to exacerbate the tensions between myriad ethnic and religious groups within the extremely heterogeneous population. Although some estimates suggest that the US has spent up to one trillion dollars waging this war thus far, instability and volatility are nonetheless rife.

Given the situation, these questions inevitably pose themselves: how did we get to where we are now, and where can we go from here? This essay seeks to analyze the two critical variables of culture and economics in the current Iraq situation as understood through the two primary theoretical perspectives of Liberal Internationalism and Cultural Internationalism; other theoretical perspectives will be discussed in a secondary manner as well. Three stages of development will be considered for this analysis: the rationale behind the policies that instigated the conflict; the implications of

the policies that continue to perpetuate the conflict; and the possibilities for long-term resolution.

PART ONE: RATIONALE BEHIND THE POLICIES THAT INSTIGATED THE CONFLICT

Employing a combination of various theoretical approaches when examining the nature of war and the conditions for peace is critical in order to understand the overarching ideologies guiding contemporary policy decisions and to appreciate the relevance of such decisions in a broader context. In the case of the invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration was driven to initiate the conflict by two main ideologies: Neo-Realism and Neo-Conservatism. Cheney embodied the former, while Bush himself embodied the latter. Cheney's worldview was heavily influenced by the doctrine of Thomas Hobbes on the inherently evil nature of mankind. At the onset of the war, he believed that "that the world is a dangerous place, that diplomacy can be a trap, that force is sometimes the only choice".¹ Such convictions made him staunchly determined to topple Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein with the invasion of US troops in March 2003.

Although Bush was equally if not more vehement in his determination to send troops to Iraq, his worldview was shaped somewhat differently. His guiding doctrine was drawn from the following Neo-Conservative mentality: because the nature of mankind is hostile, the world must be governed by strict moral codes. These morals must be perpetuated and propagated by the strongest global force, the United States. Therefore, the US is not only permitted to instigate preemptive military action, but instead has the necessary moral *imperative* to root out undemocratic, repressive regimes abroad and replace them with a form of democratic governance. The Neo-Conservative position can be described in this way:

Contemporary US neoconservatives are characterized by advocacy of ambitious unilateral military and political intervention by the United States in promoting liberal democracy. Their strong rejection of cultural and moral relativism, and their tendency to portray past US foreign policy failings in terms of acquiescence to these perceived ills, translate into a morally-infused discourse of politics in

which the US stands as a paradigm of the good and virtuous, while the tyrant stands for the forces of evil...The willingness of the US to deploy its armed forces around the world for the sake of liberal democracy becomes, for them, the crucial determinant in world politics. Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay characterize neoconservatives as 'democratic imperialists' on this basis, a term that many of them would not shy away from using.²

This Neo-Conservative mentality, therefore, considers that the US has been entrusted to fulfill a messianic mission to export democracy to Iraq and, in doing so, establish a stabilizing factor and democratic archetype for the rest of the Middle East. Neo-Conservatism, combined with the Hobbesian Cheney vision, granted the administration resolute determination to topple Saddam Hussein from his position of pre-eminent power. Understanding these guiding ideological factors helps explicate this statement: "Almost messianic in their conviction, Bush and most of his top advisers have frightened or perplexed their European allies and many opinion-makers in the United States".³

These two guiding doctrines are what compelled US policy-makers into war, despite the overwhelming lack of evidence that Saddam, as a dictator, posed any direct threat to the top priority of US national security, which was an assumption made by the Neo-Realist perspective. Nevertheless, myriad ostensible motives were provided to the public as lucid evidence of the necessity of invasion, when such arguments were in fact mere moral justifications.

Months earlier, the warmongers uttered 'regime change' as a justification for the war. This was considered too crass, and it briefly made way for 'Iraq has links to terrorism,' a very short-lived justification. This gave way to 'Rid Iraq of WMD.' A UN inspection team was set up, and it was clear from the beginning that this was meant to fail. Once the UN didn't lend its imprimatur to justify the war, and given the fact that many Europeans sought to continue the inspections regime, then another justification was necessary. Now, 'Let's liberate Iraq' - in other words, a euphemism for 'regime change' - was concocted without much reflection.⁴

A final critical factor that must be added to this analysis of the reasons policymakers instigated the Iraq war is that of oil. Disclosed publicly on *60 Minutes* after the war began was an extremely revealing National Security Council document that was composed in the early infancy of the new Bush administration which “showed plans for the post-invasion dispersal of Iraq’s oil assets among the world’s great powers, starting with the major oil companies”.⁵ Such evidence is only one of many items that have surfaced as time has passed since the initial military conflict serving to indicate that the motivation for war was not to grant freedom to the people of Iraq but rather to pursue imperial US interests through the lucrative exploitation of abundant natural resources. This economic dimension is not only critical to understanding the underlying motivation behind war; it will later reappear in the analysis on the current implications of policies that continue to perpetuate the war and the possibilities for long-term solution, guided by the Liberal Internationalist perspective that places a heavy emphasis on economic implications.

Nonetheless, Americans assented to war. The theoretical perspectives driving policymakers for war have already been outlined to explain how they were unequivocally convinced of the necessity of war despite lacking sound evidence or valid justification. What is even more perplexing, however, is that fact that two other parties involved, although not direct instigators themselves, were equally supportive of war without having any factual evidence to support such a belligerent conviction. These were the American public and the majority of the American academic intellectual community. The ways in which these two communities were convinced not only of the necessity of invasion but also of the nobility of such military pursuits will subsequently be explored.

In March 2003, a Gallup poll revealed that the majority of Americans, by a margin of 2-to-1, supported an invasion of Iraq in order to depose its dictator, whether or not the United States military action was condoned by the United Nations.⁶ The media played an essential role in rallying the public support that legitimized the executive decision to invade. The messianic message of bestowing democracy and the virtues of Western civilization to a backwards

people was pervasive prior to the conflict and during its early stages. This rhetorical strategy found in the media quickly and overwhelmingly justified the invasion in the minds of Americans. Referring to the military conflict as "Operation Iraqi Freedom," along with deceitful claims that Saddam should be held accountable for 9/11 – which certainly capitalized on a deeply sensitive issue for the American people – or that he posed a direct threat to the lives of Americans because of his build-up of devastating weapons of mass destruction, embodied this ideological understanding and thoroughly guised the underlying motivations for going into Iraq.

Furthermore, researchers who have investigated the connections between the media, misperceptions and the Iraq war have noted that, remarkably, "when the United States failed to find the expected evidence that would corroborate the administration's assumptions that prompted the war, the majority continued to support the decision to go to war."⁷ Although these researchers insightfully uncovered the misperceptions prevalent in the media and recognized their ability to persuade the public, they did not consider the implications of deeper, underlying perceptions embedded in society. This essay will subsequently argue that the most potent underlying perception found in American society that helped legitimize the war for policymakers, the American public, the media, and the intellectual community alike was Orientalist ideology.

While policymakers can often justify their military decisions for the masses by evoking moral justifications, the community of experts, academics, and intellectuals – especially those in fields such as international relations – should, by nature, be less susceptible to falling into such a trap and more wary of unthinkingly buying in to unjustified claims. Nonetheless, when such individuals are also indoctrinated with bias and even overtly racist ideologies that are also prevalent in their academic realms, they too can easily lose sight of the truth for which they are constantly in pursuit. Such a phenomenon can be even more detrimental because prejudices held by academics can seem to be legitimized with pseudo-scientific truths. Applying the theoretical perspective of Cognitive Psychology elucidates the ways in which the overwhelming majority of Americans –

namely the public, the policymakers, and the intellectuals, and those driving the media – was convinced that it was the “right thing” to invade Iraq when, over four years later, many now regret that such a decision was made. According to the Cognitive Consistency Theory, upon which the this perspective in International Relations is based, all individuals possess limiting theoretical paradigms or “boxes” in their minds, such that individuals have the tendency to selectively consume only the information that is consistent with the preconceived notions they possess, which shape their “boxes”. These “boxes” are the dominant worldviews by which we understand relations between nations. Robert Jervis, the leading scholar of the Cognitive Psychology approach to international relations, summarizes this idea on the nature of the human mind: “People seek strong justification for their behavior... People want to minimize their internal conflict. This leads them to seek to believe that the reasons for acting or deciding as they did were overwhelming.”⁸

The critical, guiding ideology that has shaped the worldviews or “boxes” of all four American entities mentioned above is the doctrine of Orientalism. Orientalism is founded upon a stark dichotomy between “us”, the people of the West or the Occident, and “them”, the people of the East or the Orient. As such, it largely revolves around the fabricated notion of “otherness.” Orientalists hold a firm conviction in the superiority of Western values and culture, to the extent that they often feel obligated to bring their “civilization” to the backward societies of the East and, in particular, the Middle East. The most commonly held Western conceptions of the Orient include visions of exotic and erotic women and brutal and barbaric men who live in a land shrouded in mystery. The majority of individuals living in this perceived Orient are Muslims, so notions of Orientalism also extend to how Islam is perceived. As one scholar put it: “The history of Orientalism begins with the history of Islam.”⁹

This doctrine is directly reflected in the Neo-Conservative belief that the US’ global mission is the democratization of Third World nations. Edward Said, the most renowned scholar on Orientalism, posits a direct connection between such ideology and the Iraq War. He makes the powerful argument that “without a well-organised

sense that the people over there were not like 'us' and didn't appreciate 'our' values - the very core of traditional Orientalist dogma - there would have been no war."¹⁰ Once again, the media plays a critical role in perpetuating such ideology and enabling its penetration of the American psyche. In a sweeping manner, conviction in these statements wholly excuses unjustified military occupation, especially when this military action is portrayed as the fulfillment of a providential destiny.

Pervasive looting of ancient and highly treasured cultural relics occurred in Baghdad soon after the city and its former dictator, Saddam Hussein, fell in early April 2003. The damage was so extensive that one report noted that, "almost all state institutions, universities, libraries and research institutes were harmed."¹¹ Then US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, gave a press briefing during the time that the American media was publicizing the widespread looting and civil unrest in Iraq. When questioned whether the apparent anarchy that was being reported from the streets of Baghdad would undermine US liberation efforts, Rumsfeld remarked,

"The images you are seeing on television you are seeing over, and over, and over, and it's the same picture of some person walking out of some building with a vase, and you see it 20 times, and you think, 'My goodness, were there that many vases?' (Laughter). 'Is it possible that there were that many vases in the whole country?'"¹²

Such a sarcastic and dismissive remark coming from the Secretary of Defense blatantly reveals a profound ignorance about the cultural and historical context of Iraq, such as the fact that Baghdad was in fact considered the intellectual and cultural capital of the world for centuries at a time when Western Europe was steeped in the Dark Ages. Some may argue that Rumsfeld, whose governmental capacity and foremost concern was the interest of US security, need not be concerned with secondary, inconsequential issues like culture. Such a stance was particularly advocated by Neo-Realists and Neo-Conservatives. Unfortunately, however, Rumsfeld is not the only US

official to have made such remarks. John Agresto, who was initially appointed as Senior Advisor to the Iraqi Minister of Higher Education, was questioned by an Associated Press reporter about whether his complete lack of expertise in Middle Eastern society and culture had contributed to the broader failure in Iraq. In response, he laconically remarked, "You don't need that to see that they need chairs."¹³ Once again, it becomes evident that some officials who had been appointed to guide Iraq into a new, glorious and democratic era post-US invasion, not just politically but also culturally, nevertheless accord no importance to the understanding of cultural context. When Western culture is deemed inherently superior to all others, logic says that the examination and understanding of "inferior" cultures is therefore unnecessary. This idea of Western cultural dominance, that is highly conducive to the neglect of cultural context, is precisely rooted in Orientalist ideology.

An alternative understanding to cultural context is presented by an international group of intellectuals who together comprise the Iraqi Observatory. These intellectuals are scholars on the Middle East but come from various national backgrounds. In reference to the pervasive looting that ensued in Baghdad immediately after the US invasion, they noted that,

"While there had been a tremendous international outcry for the archaeological museums and the ancient past of Mesopotamia- things that fit more neatly into the trajectory of the heritage of 'our Western Civilization,' a similar outcry for that past most present in the lives of contemporary Iraqis, the heritage of the Islamic, Ottoman, Arab- colonial and post-colonial periods was absent altogether."¹⁴

This, too, is indicative of a residual Orientalist mentality once again not only amongst misguided leaders and the masses whose complacency legitimizes the decision for unjustified war, but also among the intellectual community within the US. Edward Said points out that the majority of American "academics" were just as supportive of the war as the general public when neither party had any solid,

convincing evidence that their safety or national security has been directly jeopardized in any way.

It is surely one of the intellectual catastrophes of history that an imperialist war confected by a small group of unelected US officials was waged against a devastated third world dictatorship on thoroughly ideological groups having to do with world dominance, security control and scarce resources, but disguised for its true intent, hastened and reasoned for by Orientalists who betrayed their calling as scholars.¹⁵

The group of intellectuals who comprised the Iraqi Observatory further noted that additional motivation for their visit to Iraq to report on the intellectual conditions and state of cultural artifacts was because they sensed that

“stories coming out of Iraq were being told, for the most part by people ill-prepared to do so; individuals whose sense of Iraqi, Arab, and Islamic cultures was shaped by a narrow partisan political agenda, and in some cases a racist and Orientalist discourse.”¹⁶

These international intellectuals were able to recognize that all policies aimed at the economic, political and cultural development and reconstruction of Iraq “must first pass through the prism of American national interests in Iraq and the Middle East.”¹⁷ Once again, by applying the principles of Cognitive Psychology one is able to recognize that this prism is the worldview lens or “box” in the minds of Americans that is formulated by preconceived notions, a particular paradigm which prevents the penetration or absorption of any information that appears to be contrary.

It is of critical importance to recognize that although Watenpugh, one of the Iraqi Observatory intellectuals, is an American academic, his other colleagues come from and have experience in different nations, including France, Canada, and Jordan. It could be argued that, precisely because of their international composition, this group of intellectuals was able to recognize the preconceived Ori-

entalist notions that guided US policymakers, the public, and other intellectuals into advocating war. Intellectuals who are only rooted in their domestic traditions and have little or no contact with counterparts from other nations are much more susceptible to falling prey to any biased ideologies that might be dominant in their nation and their field. In contrast, intellectuals who interact on a transnational basis with others are able to perceive issues in a new light. The very fundamental principle of the Cultural Internationalist perspective in International Relations Theory rests upon these ideas.

Although Cultural Internationalism is certainly relevant to this discussion, in order to more thoroughly understand the importance of the critical variables of culture and economics in the invasion and subsequent reconstruction of Iraq, it is beneficial to examine more than one different theoretical perspective. In doing so, one can move beyond the necessarily limited knowledge that is received from employing a single framework in an attempt to understand the situation in Iraq in a broader sense.

Specifically in terms of Cultural Internationalism, the primary strengths of this theoretical framework have been elucidated above with the example of the cosmopolitan group of Iraqi Observatory intellectuals and the critical role they played in moving beyond Orientalist discourse and calling for the restoration and protection of cultural artifacts. However, a primary critique of Cultural Internationalism is that, while it focuses on transnational communication between intellectuals, it fails to acknowledge the importance of incorporating the masses and the average citizens of different nations into this effort of transnational and intercultural communication. Communication on multiple levels, right down to the grassroots level, would likely be more successful in forging a solid global civil society upon which international morality and international law could then be based. The case of Iraq also demonstrates that many national "intellectual" communities, which Cultural Internationalism engages, are easily swayed into subscribing to the presiding ideology of their field, even when such an ideology, like Orientalism, is distorted. Eugenics, which hit its pinnacle in the United States during the early 20th century, is another example of how fallible and prejudiced

speculation can be disguised as legitimate scientific knowledge that then serves to justify racial oppression, colonization or imperialism. Nonetheless, the hope in applying the Cultural Internationalist approach is that by truly reaching out to intellectuals from other cultures, intellectuals will be able to move beyond limited and biased discourse, instead of becoming even more staunch in their slanted beliefs – a phenomenon known as the Boomerang Effect in Cognitive Psychology – when they are challenged by individuals coming from other intellectual traditions.

The notion of transnational communication on multiple levels, engaging both intellectuals and non-intellectuals alike, is emphasized by the Liberal Internationalist perspective and embodied in its critical notion of complex interdependence. However, the origins of this intellectual movement must be considered in order to comprehensively understand what presiding ideas these new concepts were rooted in. The Eugenics movement, as was previously alluded to, hit its pinnacle at the inception of Liberal Internationalism. Thus, Liberal Internationalism emerged with a tremendously Eurocentric vision that emphasized the importance of Westerners uniting on the basis of their common “civilization”, which among other things included religion, heritage and culture. Liberal Internationalism thus demeaned the importance of investigating the different cultural contexts out of which policies in other nations emerge. Complex interdependence was used to promote multi-channel communication between Western nations with a perceived shared heritage, but not across “civilizations.” As such, the traditionally understood concept of complex interdependence that is derived from the Liberal Internationalist perspective is insufficient in helping improve the Iraqi situation. Iraq is not only considered not only a non-Western civilization but moreover a part of the “Orient,” and hence the polar opposite of Western values and way of life. Liberal Internationalism would thus set little store by investigating the cultural context of this nation.

PART TWO: IMPLICATIONS OF POLICIES THAT CONTINUE TO PERPETUATE THE CONFLICT

Instead, Liberal Internationalism places economics at the cen-

ter of its analysis of any situation, and this dimension is also critical when attempting to navigate the current situation in Iraq. Before the invasion in 2003, Iraqi civilians had suffered twelve years of economic hardship. After the end of the Persian Gulf War, severe economic sanctions were placed on Iraq by the UN. These sanctions prevented the transportation of essential goods, such as medical supplies, to most Iraqis, who were already living an austere life under a repressive regime. In order to not entirely isolate Iraq from the international economic community, the UN established Oil for Food (OFF) Program in 1996.¹⁸ Although this was an honorable attempt to assuage the poor living conditions of the majority of Iraqis, government corruption prevented civilians from reaping the benefits of this policy. By 2003, Over 60% of the Iraqi population was dependent on government rations for their survival.¹⁹ In essence, the economic situation facing the average Iraqi was quite grim at the onset of the 2003 invasion.

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which was entrusted with the admittedly daunting task of reconstructing Iraq after the military conflict had formally ended, considered economic reconstruction as central to its efforts. Although granted extensive authority, the CPA has still been somewhat constrained in its efforts at Iraqi economic reform. However, not enough effort has been made to consider the unique contextual situation facing Iraqis and how the best prescription to revive the Iraqi economy can be subjective and should be unique to the Iraqi situation. The open market policy promoted by the CPA in Iraq was modeled after transition economies of Eastern Europe and central Asia during the 90s.²⁰ The heavy emphasis on a market economy and economic freedom is likely a direct reaction to the socialist state that existed under the reign of Saddam and the Ba'ath Party and was very much characterized by state-ownership of the factors of production.

The instability and violence that erupted after the invasion and that continues to plague the nation are certainly impediments to economic development. In fact, the poor economic conditions many Iraqis currently face have fueled insurgency and have likely catalyzed individuals who would otherwise be moderate into suc-

cumbing to more radical behavior. In 2003, one man from Sadr City, who was frustrated at his failure to find employment, succinctly described the brutal reality that many Iraqis continue to face:

“I haven’t been working at all for the last two weeks. If I stay like this for another week my family will starve, and if someone comes along with \$50 and asks me to toss a grenade at the Americans, I’ll do it with pleasure.”²¹

Statements such as these clearly demonstrate the ability of economic hardship to directly and potently motivate extremist behavior. Beyond Iraq, the economic hardship that plagues so much of the Middle East today must be seen as a critical factor in explaining the rise of extremism and anti-Americanism. The US must be cognizant of the long-term implications of its actions, including the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and how such decisions can not only destabilize Iraq and promote civil unrest in that nation, but can also fuel Anti-American sentiment throughout the region and the globe, severely undermining all efforts at combating the “war on terror.”

PART THREE: THE POSSIBILITY FOR A LONG-TERM SOLUTION

It is crucial for the success of any reconstruction efforts in Iraq that such efforts are homegrown; lasting and self-sustaining change can come only from within. Economic reform is necessary for the success of any state-building efforts. Although the US certainly has a necessary role to play in reconstruction efforts – given it was the sole instigator of the 2003 invasion, single-handedly toppling the former Iraqi regime and creating the dire conditions which Iraqis currently face –

“the US must not be seen to predetermine whether Iraq should be a Western-style democracy, cannot expect to handpick who can be elected, and should not force sensitive economic decisions such as whether to privatize Iraq’s state-owned enterprises.”²²

If the US is to successfully assume a supportive role in the redevelopment of the state of Iraq, it is absolutely crucial to consider and contemplate the historical and cultural contexts in dealing with political, social, and economic reformation.

Finally, applying the approach outlined by Edward Carr of the Liberal Internationalist Perspective, one could argue that the attention which must be paid to economic reconstruction in Third World nations like Iraq is not only beneficial for the security and stability of the underdeveloped nations themselves. Nor is such reconstruction solely beneficial for nations like the US by directly removing a prime motivation for extremism in an increasingly interconnected world. Even beyond these two benefits, reconstruction efforts are vastly beneficial for the entire global order in the long run because it is only once the extreme economic disparity between the First and Third World is addressed that there can be a true sense of international morality, whereby morality is equally defined by all, and not just those wielding the most military and economic power. Finally, it is such international morality that can form a stable foundation upon which effective international law can be based.

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US Foreign Policy and the Resurgence of Economic Sanctions

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Despite the Bush administration's "stay-the-course" rhetoric, there has been a subtle, but calculated shift in recent American foreign policy. Departed are the "with us or against us" attitudes and policies. In their stead, diplomacy has regained its importance and multilateralism is no longer seen as a nuisance. Along with this shift, the use of sanctions has once again become a prominent foreign policy tool for the United States.¹ Most recently, the US has worked in concert with other nations, through the United Nations, to sanction countries such as Sudan, North Korea, and Iran. While the shift to multilateral collaboration in international relations has been welcomed by most, the reinvigorated use of sanctions might be puzzling, as sanctions are often deemed as a highly ineffectual foreign policy tool. While there is by no means a definitive scholarly consensus on the issue of the effectiveness of sanctions, a plethora of experts have questioned their utility.² This paper will examine the context in which scholars judge the success of sanctions. Using this context as an analytical foundation, I will examine why policymakers continue to use sanctions, drawing conclusions from US implementation of sanctions against Haiti in the early 1990s.

Let us first examine the reasons for using sanctions and the associated goals by which their effectiveness can be evaluated. To explain the motivations behind using sanctions, an understanding of the foreign policy goals in the minds of policymakers is necessary. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (hereafter referred to as HSE) define the utilization of sanctions as an attempt to "encompass changes

expressly and purportedly sought by the sender state in the political behavior of the target state.”³ In turn, HSE judges effectiveness by the “contribution made by sanctions (as opposed to other factors, such as military action) to a positive outcome.”⁴ To determine the “outcome,” or foreign policy objective, HSE relies on the (admittedly unreliable) discourse of the sanctioner. Subsequently, scholars have generally adhered to the HSE definition that sanctions are deliberately implemented to deter, alter, or revise a state or group’s political, military, or economic behavior that the sanctioner deems inappropriate.⁵

With these goals and motives of sanctions established, scholars began to take a macroanalytical evaluative approach to determine the effectiveness of sanctions. The HSE study found that the US had a 35% success rate for its sanctions from the end of World War II to 1990. While this number has been interpreted both optimistically and pessimistically, further academic investigation favors the pessimists’ argument. Marinov found that HSE only arrived at the rate of success because the US often lowered their political expectations for sanctions’ success.⁶ Thus, effectiveness becomes difficult to put into context when the sanctioners’ definition of success is transient. Others have questioned the methodology of HSE and have concluded that their success rate was artificially inflated by their methodology. Pape directly challenged the validity of HSE’s results, concluding that only 5 of the 115 sanctions cases (4%) from 1945 to 1990 could be deemed successful.⁷ He pointed to other foreign policy tools - such as threat of military involvement or actual military involvement - used in conjunction with sanctions that ultimately proved to create success in foreign policy terms. Following Pape’s logic, in the instances where the US had to resort to other means besides sanctions to achieve American foreign policy objectives, sanctions would be deemed ineffective. This argument is often used in evaluating American sanctions against Haiti in the early 1990s. The ultimate goal of restoring democracy was achieved, but only after military force was threatened and eventually employed. There has been no conclusive evidence that sanctions contributed to this goal. Pape’s analytical input is important because it questions

the relationship between the success of foreign policy goals and the effectiveness of sanctions. It is conceivable that the goals behind the sanctions imposition could be achieved without sanctions being effective. Taking all this into consideration, rating the effectiveness of sanctions is difficult because they are rarely used in isolation.

If one took Pape's study to heart, and believed that less than 5% of sanctions were successful, it becomes difficult to comprehend US policymakers' use of such a tool. Even if the policy makers assessed the HSE study to be closer to reality than Pape's, this still does not sufficiently explain the central role of sanctions in US foreign policy.⁸ If sanctions are not effective in deterring or modifying behavior, the US must have other standards in measuring sanction success. In other words, the US implements sanctions not only to deter or modify behavior, but for other purposes that go beyond on the HSE context of effectiveness. Thus, while sanctions might not be effective in accomplishing the "positive outcomes" designated by the macro-analysis referenced above, the distinctive characteristics of sanctions may provide benefits outside of the HSE definitional realm. In fact, HSE acknowledges that there is a significant limitation in determining the actual outcomes sought by sanctions: reliance on the discourse of policymakers.⁹ Policymakers have little motivation to be ingenuous or coherent when discussing foreign policy, thus it is not surprising that when policymakers articulate one foreign policy goal, they may actually have another in mind. Thus the answer to why policymakers use sanctions, even though they are largely ineffective, "lies less in the ignorance of government officials than in the naiveté of the research on ...sanctions."¹⁰

The debate over what outcomes sanctions are intended to attain is almost as contentious as the debate over the effectiveness of sanctions. This definition directly affects evaluation of the effectiveness rate. Scholars who advocate for a more strict definition of the motivations that drive the implementation of sanctions have a more pessimistic view of their effectiveness.¹¹ Conversely, those with a looser interpretation, generally have a more favorable view of the utility of sanctions.¹² Therefore, establishing a theoretically sound definition of what exactly sanctions are intended to accomplish is

imperative to the evaluation methodology.

As mentioned above, HSE defined the foreign policy goals behind sanctions as the modification of the behavior of the target country. This definition has been the foundation for many macro-analyses of sanctions' effectiveness.¹³ In their study, where a case has more than one objective, "cases are classified according to the most difficult objective."¹⁴ The most difficult objective is, by default, attempting to modify a target government's behavior. However, when conducting a preliminary examination of cases of US sanctions implementation, it is apparent that other foreign policy goals can be pursued through the use of sanctions besides the modification of a target government's behavior. American policymakers continue to maintain sanctions on Cuba because, even though these are predicted to have negligible effect on the government's behavior, they serve the useful purpose of appeasing the influential Cuban-American voting bloc.¹⁵ Recently, in response to increased repression against democracy movements, the US ratcheted up sanctions against Myanmar, even though sanctions' success is highly in doubt without the support of the UN Security Council.¹⁶ These sanctions are viewed more as a means of registering the US's official contempt towards the Myanmar government than as a viable method of modifying its behavior.

The US has been more successful in soliciting compliance from the Security Council on imposing sanctions on Iran for its refusal to cease its nuclear program. These sanctions, however, are limited in nature, and allow the Iranian government to continue to benefit from oil rents. Given this, sanctions are not expected to pressure Iran into modifying its behavior, especially since the potential benefits of becoming a nuclear power exceed the costs from the sanctions. Sanctions are unlikely to neither "resolve the crisis nor add effective value to existing sanctions."¹⁷ However, despite their inability to modify Iranian behavior and resolve the "nuclear impasse", sanctions can bring benefits to the United States. Firstly, the United States is not only able to register its disapproval of Iran's transgressions, but officially registers a multilateral condemnation through the UN Security Council. Secondly, sanctioning Iran demonstrates to the

domestic and international public that the United States will deal seriously with potential terrorist threats. Finally, by implementing multilateral sanctions, the United States is exhausting its options, bringing military engagement closer to fruition.

The above discussion is designed to demonstrate that sanctions are capable of fulfilling other foreign policy goals beyond modifying the behavior of a target government. In the cases mentioned, sanctions were almost certainly utilized not to modify a target government's behavior, but to fulfill less explicit foreign policy goals. Understanding this is useful in expanding the HSE definition and changing the conventional context of evaluating sanctions. Therefore, sanctions are designed to not only modify a target government's behaviors, but can be implemented to save face for the sanctioners, to satisfy domestic and international constituency concerns, to act as a formal registered protest, to send a signal to other potential targets, to exhaust all foreign policy actions before military engagement, to support the US grand strategy, or to achieve other foreign policy outcomes.¹⁸

When factoring in all these goals, it becomes more difficult to macro-evaluate sanctions, especially when attempting to quantify a goal such as "saving face." An earlier study by Hufbauer and Schott admitted that their macro-analysis did not consider the effectiveness of sanctions in terms of satisfying domestic concerns, even though these domestic policy concerns are "often more important" to policymakers than the prospects of modifying a target's behavior.¹⁹ Quantitative limitations prevented this study, as well as the HSE study, from exploring multiple foreign policy goals in evaluating effectiveness. Deciding to quantify the decision to impose sanctions based on only one intended outcome per case was necessary to keep the empirical methodology manageable. However, the basis for selecting *which* outcome was highly questionable. The selection was based on whichever outcome was deemed most difficult. Since modifying the behavior of another government is the most difficult of foreign policy goals, it became the standard foreign policy objective of the HSE study. HSE, and the studies that mirrored its methodology, based the evaluation of effectiveness of sanctions on

the most difficult of the “outcomes,” regardless of whether or not this foreign policy goal was deemed to be the most important by the policymakers who implemented the sanctions.

The decision to select a standard for the evaluation of sanctions based on difficulty rather than importance has created a gap in sanction research that makes it too dissimilar from actual policymaking. Political scientists would like to have their research be more involved and influential in the public debate over policymaking.²⁰ Perhaps, if research and methodology better reflected policymaking reality over quantitative compatibility, political science would find itself more relevant. In the case of sanctions, research and evaluation should first recognize and consider that sanctions are often implemented to accomplish multiple “outcomes” that reside outside of the purpose of modifying a target. Some sanction experts vehemently refuse to expand on this definition because it “not only hinders theory building,” but “departs from science altogether.”²¹ In reality, the expansion of the “outcomes” possibility only makes the methodology more difficult, but not impossible. Basing an evaluative study on outcomes that policymakers would not even consider the most important motivation seems a gross inconsistency. This is not to argue that simplification is not invaluable to the evaluation of sanctions. However, the outcomes policymakers actually have in mind when implementing sanctions need to be reflected in the macro-analytical evaluations. Therefore it is the most important rather than the most difficult outcomes that must be used to evaluate sanctions. This will create a better understanding of why policymakers utilize sanctions even though they prove ineffective in modifying a government’s behavior.

A careful analysis of the implementation of sanctions against Haiti in the early 1990s not only demonstrates that multiple goals are prevalent in the decision-making process when implementing sanctions, but that modifying behavior was not the most important factor. This case therefore provides invaluable evidence that sanctions are implemented for reasons beyond the HSE default “outcome” of modifying the target’s behavior.

With the culmination of the Cold War in the early 1990s and

the undeniable momentum of the Third Wave of Democratization, the US became not only the standard bearer of free market economics but also the global promoter of popular governance. With the end of the Cold War, the US found itself without a grand mission, such as the struggle against communism had given it. Without an overall mission, the hegemonic power faced limitations in influencing nations at a low cost. A clearly stated mission of promoting democracy provided the US with diplomatic influence in international affairs.²² On the surface, the US took its position as the promoter of democracy as a moral necessity, but in reality it became a cost effective way of promoting its national security and economic interests abroad. The costs of promoting these interests remained low as long the US was convincing in its role as the leader of democracy sponsorship.

In a speech before the Council of the Americas, President George H.W. Bush depicted American efforts of democracy promotion in the Western Hemisphere as an intensive battle. Declaring the “day of the dictator over,” the president called leaders in Latin America to work with the US to build a new “partnership of democratic rule.”²³ These allegorical references to battles and other struggles are an important signal to the leaders of these fledging democracies and to the rest of the world that the US is capable and willing to sacrifice much on the behalf of democracy.

Two years after this speech, the military overthrow of the democratically elected Haitian president threatened this “democratic partnership.” It might at first seem strange that this setback in a small Caribbean nation would prompt US action. In order to understand why the US felt compelled to act, Erving Goffman’s sociological depiction of embarrassment is key. Goffman found that entities became embarrassed in social organizations when their “incompatible definition” of themselves became present before others.²⁴ In simpler terms, embarrassment is created when your projected self-image is in jeopardy because your actions do not live up to your image’s standard. As the self-proclaimed leader of democracy, the US felt tremendous pressure to live up to its own standards in the eyes of the domestic and international world. After vowing to fight for democracy in its hemisphere, the US was confronted with a challenge

from a military junta in Haiti. The US's embarrassment of allowing democracy to retreat only 400 miles off the coast of Florida was a cost too great to bear for policymakers. The US had to live up to its self-definition as the world's leading democracy promoter. If this image was tarnished at all, the US would find it difficult to promote its own security and economic interests at low costs under the guise of democracy promotion. As Secretary of State Christopher stated, "in diplomacy, images matter."²⁵ He believed that it would be the "ultimate hypocrisy for the United States to claim that it supported democracy" and not attempt to restore President Aristide to his elected office.²⁶ The military takeover of Haiti thus required a measured response to eliminate international and domestic embarrassment. A sanction-based strategy offered the US a low-cost, highly visibly *attempt* at democracy restoration in Haiti. In sum, maintaining the US image as a democracy promoter was the primary foreign policy goal behind the sanctions, and the one that was most important to American policymakers. Modifying the behavior of the government was only a secondary goal, though still important.

During the crisis in Haiti, the US was beginning its tenure as the global leader of democracy promotion in the post-Cold War era. This had significant implications on how the US responded to the military coup that ousted the legitimately elected Haitian president. The US had three viable options in dealing with the embarrassment of democracy's retreat in Haiti in 1991. The first policy option available to the US was to ignore the situation in Haiti. American officials could have condemned the coup, but they would have accepted the results. This would have had no immediate material effect on the US, but it would have involved "accepting an ideological and humanitarian defeat."²⁷ Goffman would have agreed with this assessment; inaction by the US would have created embarrassment. The US would have faced too much embarrassment as the leader of democracy to let a state at its doorstep defy the global hegemony's grand mission. By ignoring the situation in Haiti, the US would have undermined its efforts at promoting democracy in other parts of the world. Ultimately, this would have threatened the US' image as global democracy promoter.

The second option available to the US was to invade Haiti immediately after the coup, and forcibly put the legitimate Haitian president back into power. Following this strategy would have instantly eliminated the social embarrassment for the US. These actions would have been consistent with the rhetoric of President Bush and other policymakers. However, by eliminating its source of embarrassment, the US would have faced other international and domestic pressures. Firstly, the US would have undoubtedly been criticized for not exhausting all options before resorting to force. This would have put the US's self-image as a benign hegemony into doubt. Secondly, the use of force to promote democracy has been criticized on many fronts.²⁸ Studies have demonstrated that military intervention has no positive effect on democracy levels in a given country.²⁹ Finally, using military force would have meant incurring significant material costs. The Bush administration may have weighed the costs of embarrassment and the cost of military interventions, and decided that the latter outweighed the former.

The last option was to implement sanctions, which was ultimately what the Bush administration decided to do. The Bush administration wanted to keep ideological and material costs to a minimum, while employing a highly public tactic. Sanctions would allow the US to do just that, making it a distinctive foreign policy tool. Sanctions are a highly visible policy choice without the extensive use of human or financial resources. Imposing sanctions would give the impression that the overthrowing of a democratically elected leader would be unacceptable, saving the US from embarrassment. Assuming that US policymakers understood the limitations of sanctions, their implementation must have been focused on building the US' reputation as a democracy protector, rather than on actually changing the situation in Haiti. Sanctions may bring the "the sender political benefits," even if there is a "strong likelihood that the parties will fail to achieve the declared objective."³⁰

Exploring secondary outcomes, the US may also have wanted to exhaust all other options before turning to military engagement. If the US proceeded from diplomatic negotiations directly to military options without imposing sanctions, they would have been open to

the domestic and international criticism that military force may have been avoidable. In his analysis of sanctions in Haiti, Rose asserts that the sanctions policy did give US policymakers the ability “to say that all options other than force were being actively pursued.”³¹ President Clinton stated exactly this when he announced to the world that the US was preparing to invade Haiti. He pointedly noted that “[t]he nations of the world have tried every possible way to restore Haiti’s democratic government peacefully.”³² Given that imposed sanctions were having no effect on the settlement of the Haitian crisis, the option of military intervention gained greater legitimacy.


Democracy was ultimately restored in Haiti in 1994, but this does not necessarily mean that sanctions were a success in modifying behavior. The prevailing argument among scholars is that the restoration of democracy in Haiti would not have come to pass without the threat of force and the ultimate authorization to forcibly remove the coup leaders from power.³³ Sanctions themselves were insignificant in their ability to modify the behavior of the coup leaders. It was not until US warships were on their way to Haiti that the modifying behavior objectives were achieved. The necessity of military action proves sanctions’ “ineffectiveness.”

It would be difficult to know if US foreign policymakers agree with this assessment, but reexamining the motivations behind sanction implementation will shed some light on this issue. The US imposed sanctions on Haiti because US policymakers wanted to be seen as actively promoting democracy restoration in Haiti. The US was concerned with democracy in Haiti, because the US was the global democracy promoter in the post-Cold War era, and Haiti’s crisis caused embarrassment to the US. As Secretary of State Christopher declared, the US “sought to consolidate the gains of democracy, not simply for the people of [Haiti], but throughout the hemisphere and the world.”³⁴ The global democracy promoter image was essential for the US to promote its security and economic interests abroad at a low cost under the banner of a grand mission. Sanctions were initially used in Haiti because they were a low cost strategy with high publicity. They enabled the US to add to its image with little economic and political effort in the short-run. In sum, the

US implemented a low cost strategy in Haiti that bolstered the US image so as to facilitate US relations abroad.

However, mere implementation cannot always be deemed a success. Initially, sanctions in Haiti proved to be valuable in promoting the US image as the global democracy promoter. However, they were ultimately ineffective, not only in modifying behavior, but also in bolstering the US' image as a democracy promoter. In order for the US to maintain its image as the global democracy promoter, it needed to initiate policies that would demonstrate results quickly. The influx of Haitian boat people and the encroaching mid-term elections put pressure on the Clinton administration to resolve the issue quickly, far more quickly than it would take for sanctions to be effective. The Clinton administration became visibly "frustrated with [the] lack of success [of sanctions] and the effect that this was having on public opinion, both within the US and around the world."³⁵ Given the growing publicity of the Haitian crisis, the US was forced to increase its efforts in Haiti, or endanger their image abroad as the global democracy protectorate.

In the end, the US used military force to restore democracy in Haiti. The need to resort to military force reflected not only the ineffectiveness of sanctions in promoting democracy, but also their inadequacy in bolstering the US' image as a democracy promoter. Sanctions in Haiti exhibited undemocratic characteristics. They harmed the already diminutive middle class, destroyed production capabilities, reduced educational opportunities for children, and restricted access to health care.³⁶ Although the US was ostensibly trying to promote democracy in Haiti, its sanction strategy was "mortgag[ing] democracy's assets" within this Caribbean nation.³⁷ The US was therefore no longer able to bolster its global democracy promoter image with this low cost sanction strategy. Policymakers began to realize this both from the inadequate outcomes of the Haiti case, and from other cases where sanctions were implemented in the name of democracy. This explains why, as the 1990s progressed, there was not only a decrease in the number of sanctions implemented, but why sanction imposition related to democracy nearly disappeared, as can be seen in Figure 1 below.



Haiti's example shows that sanctions are a low-cost, highly visible strategy that can add to the US grand mission image in the short-run. On the other hand, long-term success depends on how the characteristics of sanctions compliment or contradict the image of the US. When the US tried to promote its image as the global democracy leader, the undemocratic and ineffective characteristics of sanctions began to contradict this image. Sanctions were quickly exposed as being inefficient in restoring democracy, and policy makers eventually resorted to other foreign policy methods.

Today, the US is reviving its strategy of using sanctions to bolster its hegemonic mission of combating terrorism. While this strategy was largely ignored after the initial onset of the global war on terror, the US has again come to rely on sanctions for at least three reasons. First, the US wants to continue to demonstrate to the world America's resolve as the global leader in the war on terror. Second, the US wants to demonstrate that it is not reliant solely on its military capacity, but can implement a more patient foreign policy. Third, military options are severely limited while forces are committed to Iraq and Afghanistan, so the US is forced to use other, less costly options, especially as popular support for military action

wanes. As long as this grand mission of fighting terrorism remains prominent in American foreign policy, expect the recent increased use of sanctions to continue under the current Bush administration. Sanctions may not be effective in accomplishing the most desired objectives of modifying behavior in a target country (or group), but sanction can provide other positive “outcomes” that can support the grand hegemonic mission. How well the US lives up to its self-image in this grand mission determines how easily it can promote its security and economic interests abroad in a cost-efficient manner.

In conclusion, this paper attempted to broaden the sanction debate to better reflect the thought process of policymakers. First, sanctions can be implemented for reasons other than modifying a target government’s behavior. Second, modifying behavior is not always the most important motivation for policymakers to implement sanctions. While this study did not try to replicate the HSE macro-analysis of sanctions with this broader definition of sanction context, future research should be dedicated to quantifying policymakers’ decisions based on importance rather than difficulty. This will lead to a better understanding of why policymakers utilize sanctions. And, as the Haiti case study demonstrated, even with a broadened perspective of motivations behind sanctions, there is no guarantee that the outcomes will always be evaluated favorably.

ENDNOTES

1. It is important to note that after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States immediately implemented, and continued to enforce financial sanctions. However, it is only recently, that the Bush administration has promoted multilateral trade sanctions. This paper is concerned with this latter type of sanction.
2. Haass, Richard. “Sanctioning Madness.” *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 76, No. 6, Nov/Dec (1997): 74-86; Drury, A.C. “Revisiting Economic Sanctions Reconsidered.” *Journal of Peace Research* 35(4)(1998): 497-509; Pape, R.A. “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work.” *International Security* 22(2)(1997): 90-112; Pape, R.A. “Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work.” *International Security* 23(1)(1998): 66-78; Marinov, Nikolay. “Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?” *American Journal of Political Science* 49(3)(2005): 564-576; Gibbons, Elizabeth. *Sanctions in Haiti*. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999; Malloy, Michael (2007). “Study of New U.S. Unilateral Sanctions.” 2007. USA Engage and the National Foreign Trade Council. <http://www.

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3. Hufbauer, G.C. J.J. Schott et al. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. 2. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990: p2. (referred to as HSE hereafter.)
4. Ibid. p41.
5. The definition of sanctions in the following studies is fairly consistent with the HSE study; Haass 1997; Pape 1997 Marinov 2005; Drury 1998; O'Sullivan, Meghan. Shrewd Sanctions. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003.
6. See Marinov 2005.
7. See Pape 1997.
8. O'Sullivan (2003) describes how the US is utilizing sanctions more and more in its foreign policy strategy in the global war on terror.
9. HSE p39.
10. Lindsay, James M. "Trade Sanctions as Policy Instruments: A Re-examination." International Studies Quarterly 30(2)(1986): 153.
11. See Pape 1997.
12. For a looser contextualization of the definition of sanctions see: Baldwin, David A. Economic Statecraft. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985; and Baldwin, David A. "The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice." International Security 24(3) (1999): 80-107.
13. Pape (1997) used the fundamental definition of HSE to structure his study, with one distinct difference in their evaluations. HSE considered any partial attainment of the US foreign policy goals a success, while Pape only considered a case a success if the foreign policy goals were fully attained.
14. HSE: p38.
15. O'Sullivan pp. 23-24; Purcell, Susan K. "Cuba." Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy. Ed. Richard Haass. New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1998: p35 -56.
16. Baker, Peter. (2007) "Bush Announces Sanctions Against Burma." Washington Post 25 Sep-2007.
17. Guldimmann, Tim. "The Iranian Nuclear Impasse." Survival 49(3)(2007): 169-78.
18. In the Iran case, sanctions support the image of the US as being proactive in the war on terror. In the Haiti case, as we will see, sanctions were used to support the US image of being a democracy supporter.
19. Hufbauer, G.C. and J.J. Schott. "Economic Sanctions and US Foreign Policy."

Political Science and Politics 18(4)(1985): 727-735.

20. For more discussion on this topic see: Jervis, Robert. (2002) "Politics, Political Science, and Specialization." Political Science and Politics 35(2)(2002): 187-189; and Lepgold, Joseph. "Is Anyone Listening? International Relations Theory and the Problem of Policy Relevance." Political Science Quarterly 113(1)(1998): 46.
21. Pape (1997): p95. These strong words were in reference to David Baldwin's "loose contextualization" of sanctions in *Economic Statecraft* (1985). In fairness, Baldwin's definition does not extend much beyond the HSE, adding only economic "outcomes." Baldwin responds to Pape's misinterpretations in: Baldwin, David A. and Robert A. Pape "Evaluating Economic Sanctions" International Security 23(2)(1998): 189-198.
22. Diamond, Larry. "Promoting Democracy" Foreign Policy 87(Summer)(1992): 25-46
23. Department of State Bulletin. "Presidential Speech: Commitment to Democracy and Economic Progress in Latin America." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of May 8 1989.
24. Goffman, Erving. The Presentation of Self. DoubleDay Books, 1959.
25. Christopher, Warren M. In the Stream of History. Stanford University Press, 1998: p176.
26. Ibid. p176-177.
27. Rose: p78.
28. Diamond 1992; Art, Robert J. "A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy after the Cold War." International Security Vol. 15, No. 4 Spring(1991): 5-53; Meernik, James. "United States Military Intervention and the Promotion of Democracy." Journal of Peace Research Vol. 33, No. 4 (Nov)(1996): 391-402; Haass, Richard. "Military Force: A User's Guide." Foreign Policy 96(1994): 21-37.
29. See Meernik (1996).
30. Gibbons: p77.
31. Rose: p68.
32. Speech quoted from Christopher: p180.
33. See Pape (1997); Haass, Richard *Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy*. Ed. Richard Haas. New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1998: p6; and Gibbons (1999).
34. Christopher: p182.
35. Ibid. p178.
36. For more details on the unintentional consequences of sanctions in Haiti, see Gibbons (1999).
37. Ibid. p96.

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