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Former Prime Minister of Spain

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JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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
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
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
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Dear Readers,

It is my distinct pleasure to present to you the thirteenth edition of the Sigma Iota Rho Journal of International Relations. This edition, I believe, marks the completion of a banner year for our Journal. Along with greatly expanding the scope and quality of the undergraduate research contained in our print edition, we recently completed the launch of our new online edition of the Journal, which will allow us to broaden our appeal to Sigma Iota Rho chapters—and international relations scholars—across the world. This Journal has continually been the best way to reach out to some of the best international relations undergraduates there are, and our new website will greatly support that mission in the years ahead.

We are also excited to include a reflection on the core values necessary for moral political leadership from the incomparable José María Aznar, the former Prime Minister of Spain. During his time in office, Prime Minister Aznar brought to his country significant economic reform, major European Union integration, and a more vigorous role abroad. We are honored to feature him as our headliner this year, and are certain that our readers will benefit from his unique perspective on effective leadership in contemporary world politics.

The articles selected in this edition offer original analyses of some of the most important issues in the discipline of international relations. From Charmaine Hung's astute analysis of the relevance of human rights in the relationship between the United States and China to Lorein Abenheim's fascinating portrait of the HIV crisis as a function of social inequality, these exemplary articles are the work of undergraduates attempting to understand the political world around them in new and novel ways. Altogether, these outstanding contributions give an indication of how wide-ranging and interdisciplinary the field of international relations really is.

I would like to thank the University of Pennsylvania's Student Activities Council and our generous sponsors for making this year's edition of the Journal possible. I would also like to express my gratitude to Dr. Frank Plantan, Executive Director and President of SIR, Ms. Donna Shuler, Administrative Director of SIR, and Dr. James McGann, faculty advisor to the Journal, for their invaluable guidance and assistance. But most of all, I would like to thank my fellow Editorial Board members for their superb work and dedication, without which this edition would not have been possible.

Sincerely,

Samuel C. Barrett
Editor-in-Chief
Epsilon Chapter, Sigma Iota Rho
University of Pennsylvania

Dear Colleagues,

As this thirteenth edition of the Journal of International Relations goes to press, I have just approved the establishment of the 110th chapter of Sigma Iota Rho, the International Honor Society for International Studies. At the International Studies Association Annual Meeting in Montreal last month we met with visitors from around the world and received requests for new chapter kits from 42 institutions. From these developments, it is clear that SIR is becoming recognized as an important vehicle for advancing students academically and professionally. It is also apparent to me that SIR chapters are playing a bigger role in bolstering the presence of international studies, global studies, and international relations programs in all their myriad forms on campuses wherever one exists.

Even a cursory survey of the daily press reveals that the *raison d'être* of Sigma Iota Rho has never been more important than it is today. The urgency to know how the world works is not a mere academic challenge but a life skill that will advantage those who develop the analytical skills and experience to succeed in the future. In a world where the problems of war and peace and international commerce defy easy explanation and touch our lives even though we are thousands of miles removed, it is incumbent upon all of us as teachers and students to remind ourselves that we are educating ourselves to be citizens of the world.

As a result of SIR's growth, we are beginning to experience some common growing pains. Our website and the handbook are constantly in need of updating, and unlike the nineties when it was easy to recruit a student eager to show off their skills to create and maintain the website, we now must hire out. This, on a tight budget, is difficult. But we expect that by the time classes reconvene in the fall there will be a "new and improved" website to facilitate our work and to support the activities of the local chapters. Watch too in the year ahead for our new SIR Reader in International Politics in conjunction with the Council on Foreign Relations.

Finally, please keep encouraging your students to submit manuscripts and volunteer to serve on the editorial board of the Journal. It is an amazing experience and resume item, and allows us to extend the journal's reach and recognition every year.

Best regards,
Frank Plantan
President

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
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Preparing the Next Generation of Leaders Looking to the Future, Lessons from The Past

BY JOSÉ MARÍA AZNAR
FORMER PRIME MINISTER OF SPAIN

The world is changing with astonishing speed. New onrushes of ecologic and economic forces have altered the tenor of global social relations. We live in a time where various changes, insecurities, and hope are increasingly interacting across the world. The fall of the Berlin Wall, first, and the emergence of international terrorism, later, have intensified the tests that young generations have to face. Moreover, the global financial crisis reveals certain functions of the economic system and, with it, the values that lie inherently underneath it — most notably, freedom and democracy. Overall, old problems have not disappeared, and yet new ones continue to arise. Thus, the 21st century truly demands new and credible leaders to guide people through these challenges and opportunities.

I have often expressed my concern about what the future might hold if there is no strong and real leadership to cope with the complex global concerns of today. Of the various issues afflicting the international community, the economic crisis, the threats to global security, and various human rights abuses must remain a priority, as they threaten some of the fundamental tenets of liberal democracy. We need great leaders, who utilize their authority to promote democratic principles, especially in times of crisis when people are more prone to choose the easiest path. A leader must be able to draw on moral principles during troubling times to enact policies reflective of his objectives. Moreover, a leader must overcome the current political correctness and paralysis that prevents one from taking a tough stance on defending traditional Western values, as he might fall prey to two of

the major threats to the survival of our society – both which are grim, and neither are democratic. The first is cultural relativism, where any wrong in society can be justified by the mere assumption that moral norms are fluid in nature, deviating with different standards across the world. The second is fundamentalism, a fanatic “retribilization,” which guarantees parochialism and exclusivity.

Throughout the 20th century, figures such as Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Margaret Thatcher and the Pope John Paul II remained committed to their principals and ideologies, and thus did not hesitate when the moment came to defend their policies and perspectives. Although they represent different political parties, all of these leaders demonstrated a strategic will and dedication to a defined set of principles. This is particularly true for another personality who left an extraordinary mark in international history: Ronald Reagan. In February, we celebrated the first centennial of his birth, but we should also acknowledge that seven years after his death, the “Reagan legacy” remain applicable in today’s time.

Referring to his administration’s ideological battle against the Soviet Union, Reagan once remarked, “Above all, we must realize that no arsenal, or no weapon in the arsenals of the world, is so formidable as the will and moral courage of free men and women. It is a weapon our adversaries in today’s world do not have.” It is that moral purpose that Reagan refers to that we miss in many of today’s leaders. He convinced the people that there was an alternative to injustice and abuse, and that morality had to be placed above popularity. His strong belief in values like freedom, self-reliance, democracy, faith, and justice became the compass for millions of people. Reagan truly believed everything he said and he showed it to the entire world, with facts: from the tax cut that gave the American market, to the fight against the “evil empire,” by means of which he transmitted to many the moral strength needed to continue their struggle for freedom.

A good leader must govern with the main determination to change the wrongs around him. During the Cold War era, Reagan stood as one of the primary figures advocating for a change in moral discourse, saying that “we must have the courage to do what we know is morally right.” During a decade of growing cynicism, Reagan continued to promote domestic and foreign policies that defied traditional approaches. Given the United State’s proximity and limited Soviet resources and capabilities to project its influence in the Western Hemisphere, Central America remained seemingly peripheral for Cold War policy in the 1940s. By the early 1980s, however, Reagan quoted the Truman Doctrine as he exhorted American congress to stop a fully-fledged Communist offensive in Central America. In 1983, he created the Reagan Doctrine, which justifies American intervention in Nicaragua so that, according to his speech at a joint session of Congress, the Soviet Union “does not infect its neighbours through the export of subversion and violence.” Although the region remains rather distant from the crux of east-west divisions,

Central and Latin America stood as one of the most important battlegrounds in the 1980s, while still hosting some of the surviving Communist regimes today – one of the historic ironies of the Cold War. Reagan was determined to confront this issue, among others, in his fight against Communism, while bolstering the American image.

Moreover, a leader needs a strong conviction and a defined set of values of “good” and “bad.” Throughout his administration, President Reagan reaffirmed his conception of “good” by associating it with Western ideology — peace, free trade, limited government, and democracy. By asserting American identity, he distinguished its threatening forces as Socialist ideology, branding the Soviet Union and its satellite states as the “evil empire.” In doing so, he took a simple message and, repeating it assertively, reached people’s hearts and minds, just as Churchill’s rhetoric had accomplished a couple decades before. In 1946, Churchill had proclaimed that an “iron curtain” had descended upon Eastern Europe, a metaphor, which ultimately materialized in concrete as the Berlin Wall. Dedicated to his principals of “right” and “wrong,” Reagan demanded the dismantling of the wall to promote peace and the spread of Western ideology. In 1987, he stood at the Brandenburg Gates in Berlin, urging Gorbachev that, “if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization, come here to this gate,” and ended his speech with the renowned words, “Mr. Gorbachev, Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!”

A leader should not fear adversities, but rather should face them with clarity and master them with a firm grip. Reagan often proved that he would stand by his beliefs, even during difficult periods. He was committed to his actions against Colonel Qaddafi’s (at that time, Libya stood as one of the most active states in giving shelter to terrorist organizations) with an air strike. As Margaret Thatcher remarked, writing about President Reagan’s legacy, he demonstrated to the world that “strength, not weakness, leads to peace.” For Reagan’s strengths, specifically his relentless dedication to the principles of democracy, resulted in ending the Cold War

More than 20 years later, we are now confronting similar social challenges that globalization is imposing. In this vein, democracy undergoes a constant test to prove itself as the only political system that respects human dignity and the rights of the individual. Moreover, there are currently more than 3 billion people involved in the global economy seeking the same levels of participation as they see in their counterparts. At the same time, though, traditional morals are declining and our identities are merging with others in an effort to create a homogenous one. Thus, as the world is evolving at a rapid rate, with increasing interactions, it is important to have and maintain solid principles and worthy aims.

During the last financial crisis, certain groups and countries have blamed the market, and with it democratic ideals, for the current breakdown. However, the lack of leadership and the decisions formed under amoral principles have been the real detonators of the actual situation. The major central banks fostered an irresponsible policy by injecting excessive liquidity in the market, flooding the economy with money that has lower purchasing powers. At the same time, governments contributed to increasing debt and deficits by increasing public spending. The economic system did not demand private economic actors to be accountable and responsible for their activities. Thus, media outlets that produce a constant source of self-criticism prove to be useless. Rather, we need a prompt reaction and a firm leadership to undertake the necessary reforms – reforms, which must be based on free market principles, on the support of private initiative, and the promotion of better regulations.

The current crisis is not just an economic crisis; it contains political and socio-cultural roots. Citizens strongly feel that political leaders should take action against the causes of social distress and the obstacles to their happiness. To obtain progress in growth and wealth, governments must promote peace, freedom, and prosperity among countries. European and American leaders are responding to the crisis without a common and farsighted project. The lack of a shared policy is allowing those who oppose free and open societies to take advantage of this situation. They are being encouraged to combat ideas like liberty, market economy, and liberal democracy.

For this reason, it is more necessary than ever to pursue a common policy that is realistic and responsible, which must be committed to economic progress through competition, innovation, and balanced budgets. President Reagan's legacy taught us that we must deeply believe that social, economic, and foreign agendas should not operate mutually exclusive of one another. Rather, there must only be one agenda based on the principles of limited government, individual freedom and responsibility, peace through strength, and Western values. Thus, I strongly believe that leaders should implement a free transatlantic market without barriers between Europe and the United States: a true economic area of prosperity, as an indispensable response to the current economic crisis. The liberalization of the transatlantic market regarding services, capital, and knowledge is necessary to improve the competitiveness of the European Union and of the United States. This area should be kept open to those countries willing to join in to serve as a forum of stability in today's uncertain times.

Moreover, I believe that the Atlantic link that Ronald Reagan so valiantly defended should be extended to the international community. Today's world demands a strong commitment to the defense of freedom against the threat of totalitarianism, global terrorism, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Hence, we have


to lend support to the democratic forces that are fighting against the different forms of despotism and dictatorship in Latin America. Additionally, we must defend Israel's right to exist and cannot abandon it to its fate of the adversary countries surrounding it. We share the same roots, values, interests, ambitions, political system, prosperity-oriented economy, and basic goals to live in peace. The events that we are witnessing in many Arab countries should be a matter of common concern for America and Europe. Both sides of the Atlantic must work with a common agenda and resolve to make this unrest the dawn of freedom and opportunity and the sunset of tyranny and autocracies. Ronald Reagan knew that the desire for democracy is universal and that the force of freedom is mightier than the sheer violence of oppression. His legacy as a leader is a source of inspiration for many who are witnessing these changes with hope rather than fear.

We need strong leaderships to make ourselves stronger. We must strongly and deeply believe in our hearts on the values that underpin civilization: respect for the individual, protection of human life and dignity, support for open democracies and the promotion of freedom, tolerance and fundamental rights.

About José María Aznar

José María Aznar served as Prime Minister of Spain from 1996 to 2004. During his term, Aznar played a major role in returning Spain to the world stage, instituting reforms that sparked both economic growth and decreased unemployment. Aznar was also instrumental in Spain's integration into the European Union, and was a staunch supporter of international efforts to curb terrorism. Today, Aznar serves as President of the Spanish think tank *Fundación para el Análisis y los Estudios Sociales* (Foundation for Analysis and Social Studies) and is a Distinguished Scholar at Georgetown University. In December 2010, he was inducted as a lifetime member of Sigma Iota Rho during a visit to the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia.

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A Wary Dalliance: How Human Rights Issues Heighten the Ambivalent Relationship between the United States and China

BY CHARMAINE HUNG
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Abstract

This paper discusses the ambivalent nature of Sino-American relations, and how human rights issues accentuate the competing priorities of each country in their dealings with the other. Each country desires a dalliance with the other for economic and security purposes, but at the same time keeps each other at an arms length to preserve its domestic ideals. For the United States, leaders understand that the country must formulate a long-term, strategic policy to take into account China's growing global importance, but simultaneously cries foul of China's consistent human rights abuses. For the People's Republic of China (PRC), party leaders desire global recognition as a world power but fear exploitation by Western nations and threats to its national sovereignty. In a way, the relationship's ambivalence is due to each country's competing realist goals and domestic ideals. Examples of human rights issues, including Tiananmen, Tibet, intervention in Yugoslavia, Most Favored Nation treatment, and WTO admission, are then presented to demonstrate how competing interests affect Sino-American relations.

Introduction

The normalization of diplomatic relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China (PRC) formally began on January 1, 1979, with the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, when the

U.S. transferred diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing and embassies were formally established in both capitals. But this official normalization of diplomatic relations was merely part of a larger US-China 'grand bargain' that had been built slowly over the course of the 1970s and continued into the 1980s; President Richard Nixon and Chairman Mao Zedong, followed by President Jimmy Carter and Supreme Leader Deng Xiaoping, gradually constructed an improved relationship through a series of high-level exchanges that helped stabilize Sino-American relations for nearly two decades, from 1972 to 1989.¹ The terms of the bargain dealt with many policy issues, among them Taiwan, U.S. security alliances in the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere, cooperation with respect to third parties (such as Afghanistan in the 1980s), trade, and human rights. Its consequences were far-reaching: it was agreed that the status of Taiwan was an issue best placed in the background until the far future, allowing leaders to sidestep a problem for which they had no answer and focus on cooperation elsewhere, given the strategic imperative for Sino-American cooperation; Beijing downplayed its anxieties regarding the US-Japan security alliance and American pacts elsewhere, seeing them in the service of containing the Soviet Union throughout much of the period; and the Soviet threat allowed leaders in both states to downplay the two countries' deep differences in the realm of human rights in the service of the more pressing objective of opposing Moscow. But the events in Tiananmen in 1989 marked the end of this 'grand bargain' and aggravated tensions within the US-China relationship, which has had an uneven history to the present day.

It has become a common cliché of post-Cold War analysis of this relationship that the gradual warming of Sino-Soviet relations in the later 1980s, capped off by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, simply removed the imperative strategic reasons in both nations for subordinating latent frictions in the US-China relationship. Various developments accompanying the end of the Cold War in the relevant period have certainly enabled the increase in tensions following the normalization of relations – or rather, dramatically weakened the rationale for suppressing them. Since then, recurring cycles of amity and enmity have characterized Sino-American relations, and the recurring question of how both nations can effectively manage a relationship whose hallmark is a mix of competitive and complementary interests is still debated.

However, such a realist explanation, while powerful, leads to a focus on relatively short-term events and obscures broader currents of change in the period under study. Sino-American relations are embedded in a wider structure of relationships at the global and domestic levels, and embrace areas other than bilateral concerns about the global strategic balance. This essay argues that the explanatory factor for the ambivalent tenor of US-China relations lies in domestic politics, with the

¹ Richard Madsen, *China and the American Dream: A Moral Enquiry* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 26.

values and perceptions found in ideologies and opinions of the citizenry of each nation conflicting with the other. Policymakers and leaders managing US-China ties attempt to reconcile increasingly complex domestic politics with foreign policy goals, this in itself providing enough reason for an uneven relationship. Each country desires a dalliance, an involvement or relationship of sorts, with the other for economic and security purposes, but at the same time keeps each other at an arms length to preserve its domestic ideals. For the United States, leaders understand that the country must formulate a long-term, strategic policy to take into account China's growing global importance, but simultaneously cry foul of China's consistent human rights abuses. For the PRC, party leaders desire global recognition as a world power but fear exploitation by Western nations or threats to its national sovereignty. In a way, the relationship's ambivalence is due to each country's competing realist goals and domestic ideals, only heightened with the injection of human rights issues.

Conceptions of Human Rights

Historically, although human rights have played an increased role on the international agenda since the end of the Second World War (particularly due to the creation of the United Nations), it was not until the 1970s that human rights elements explicitly came into the foreign policy of the U.S. and other states, as well as other regional bodies. Specifically, Rosemary Foot, professor of International Relations of the University of Oxford, notes that legislation from 1974 and the election of President Carter "closely identified with a concern for international human rights" and allowed human rights to become "embedded in US bureaucratic procedures" at an earlier stage than most other countries.² This rise of the human rights agenda has been compounded by the rise in importance of non-state actors within the system who also have an interest in human rights: both the UN and a large number of NGOs, notably Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, are now actively involved in espousing a very liberal, western conception of human rights, which ties closely with those that the United States supports.

Turning to the concept of human rights itself, there has been constant debate about whether there exists a set of universal human rights. The existence of internationally recognized human rights norms has been constantly placed in contrast with standards that vary by culture and level of development. Developed, western countries have often pointed to the existence of documents like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as evidence that there is a set of rights that is deserved by every person, while less-developed nations counter that these covenants are products of democratic nations trying to impose an inherently 'western' view on others. In light of this debate, the United States certainly believes

² Rosemary Foot, *Rights Beyond Borders: The Global Community and the Struggle over Human Rights in China* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 172.

in a universal set of human rights, focusing especially on liberal democratic rights such as freedom of speech and self-determination. China, on the other hand, sees inherent and natural rights in a different way. The country has endured a series of cataclysmic events in the twentieth century alone, some of which include the pre-unification civil wars, the Japanese invasion during World War II, the Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution. As a result, the Chinese people place a high value on fostering development, cohesion and strength. In an attempt to understand the peasants' conception of human rights, Anne Thurston, scholar and China specialist at Johns Hopkins, once asked if they believed that there was something they deserved or felt had a right to have. She noticed that many responded without hesitation, "Yes, roads."³ This revelation emphasizes that many believe that natural rights are those that pertain to order and economic advancement. The PRC, thus, has a priority of attending first to social stability and then to the matter of civil and political rights. As a result, much of what seems like a violation of human rights to Americans is interpreted as necessary responses to social order in China.

Although human rights issues play a different role for each country in its relation with the other, they are effective in reflecting the ambivalent relationship between both countries. Sino-American relations consist of a balancing act between competing priorities, a sort of double-edged sword in decision-making. For the United States, relations with China consists of the struggle to uphold democratic, American ideals and morals without alienating China by humiliating its leaders or feeding anti-Western nationalists. For the PRC, relations with the United States are strained by the opposing impulses to gain international recognition as a world power while at the same time retain national sovereignty and avoid exploitation. Human rights issues, thus, play an enlightening role in shining a light on the opposing desires confronting both countries.

US Ambivalence towards China

Defender of Democratic Ideals

Turning first to the United States, the country has always felt a special responsibility to nurture and promote its core values and principles. The American national experience has created a sense among its people that their values of democracy and freedom are universal, global entitlements, and that the United States has an obligation to promote those values abroad: the fall of the Soviet Union and Mikhail Gorbachev's declaration of the end of the USSR in 1991 had been seen as a vindication of Americans' belief in the universality of democratic values;⁴ as a

³ David M. Lampton, *Same Bed Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 111.

⁴ James Man, *About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton* (New York: Vintage, 1999), 13.

result, it is no surprise that there emerged a contradiction between the growing importance of ties with China and the moral sensibilities of the United States. This sense of American obligation is fortified by a sense of self-interest that increasingly emerged in the twentieth century: when US values or interests were under assault in the far corners of the globe, the conflicts often grew until the United States was drawn into them from the sidelines. Thus, it is better to intervene early rather than be drawn into large-scale conflict later, under more disadvantageous circumstances – a central lesson drawn from both World Wars. But what Americans may view as prudent involvement may be viewed by others (such as China) as unwarranted and unwise intrusion. Another part of the American self-conception is that power confers responsibility, as suggested by President Clinton’s statement in his second inaugural address that “America stands alone as the world’s indispensable nation;” this recurring formulation of his administration reflects a deeply held national belief that the unique capacity to act at a great distance from its borders creates a moral imperative to do so.⁵ Public opinion polling in 1999 by Potomac Associates revealed that Americans, in general, rated maintaining peace and stability as their primary goal, followed closely by the twin priorities of seeking economic benefits from trade, and working to improve human rights in Asia.

Human rights, thus, remain high up on the agenda of China policy. Congressmen, lobbyists, human rights groups alike were outraged with Tiananmen, forced prison labor, cultural repression in Tibet, arrests of dissenters and many others; as a result, they fought hard for legislation and punitive measures against China, including economic sanctions and severing of high-level diplomatic communication, hoping that these actions would encourage PRC leaders take stronger measures in improving human rights.

China as Crucial Ally

However, on the other hand, taking too strong a stance against China could backfire against US interests. Decisions regarding the PRC are linked in complex ways to other policy issues and domains in foreign policy. Economically, China holds more than \$1 trillion in US assets, mainly in US Treasuries. Chinas holdings of US debt can be seen as leverage, with the threat to dump its assets or stop buying more. Moreover, the United States has directly invested billions of dollars in China, from thousands of American companies big and small.⁶ With the United States leading the high-income economies and China leading the emerging-market countries, they both represent the two largest economies (measured in GDP) in the world. Moreover, because China holds a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, the United States needs China’s assistance on other important issues such as economic cooperation, environmental reform and Korean nuclear proliferation. As a result,

⁵ Ibid. 40.

⁶ Zachary Karabell, “U.S.-China Friction: Why Neither Side Can Afford a Split,” Time Inc, 2011. <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1960606,00.html>.

the United States cannot afford to alienate such an important 'ally.' Too harsh a stance in regards to human rights could lead to backlash in the PRC that would not only be detrimental to America's economy and security, but also strengthen anti-reformist and anti-western nationalists in China. Thus, in regards to human rights issues, the United States struggles to express outrage that would seem credible to Americans yet not humiliate Chinese leaders.

China's Ambivalence towards the United States

Fear of Exploitation

Like the United States, China is also motivated by its domestic and national interests; however, China does not have such a benign understanding of US behavior as American citizens do, in the past or present: China's 19th and 20th century experience has been entirely different from that of the United States'. For much of that period it had been the playground for foreign intervention and encroachment, marked by warring factions and numerous self-inflicted tragedies; however, several overarching beliefs have held China's people together: the sense of a long and glorious past, unjust treatment at the hands of foreigners from 1840 to 1949 (and beyond), a desire to regain international respect and quality, and an imperative for territorial reunification. China's 'century of humiliation' during the imperialist era created a deep sense of victimization among the Chinese people, shared by leaders and citizens alike. As a result, regarding relations with the United States, there is fear of manipulation in international security terms, subversion in political and ideological terms, and exploitation in economic terms.

There is a strong feeling amongst leadership in China to keep a wary eye on Sino-American relations in fear that Western nations will attempt to threaten territorial and national sovereignty. Leaders in the PRC believe that the United States is trying to prevent or delay the emergence of a competitive power that could challenge its hegemonic position, thus using human rights as a tool to wantonly interfere in the internal affairs of another country. Regarding human rights, Beijing has signed more international conventions than Washington, the latter holding back because of clauses that are seen to run counter to America's domestic laws.⁷ This self-proclaimed promoter of advancing human rights has displayed continuing inconsistencies in behavior and an unwillingness to give priority to international law. As a result, it may not seem far-fetched to hear Chinese Finance Minister Liu Zhongli comment in 1994 that "the U.S. maintains a triple standard. For their own human rights problems they shut their eyes. For some other countries' human rights questions they open one eye and shut the other. And for China, they open both eyes and stare."⁸ America's unilateral economic sanctions, violations of state

7 Foot, *Rights Beyond Borders: the Global Community and the Struggle over Human Rights in China*, 97.

8 Lampton, *Same Bed Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations*, 111.

sovereignty, and public condemnation associated with the punitive measures taken against China are interpreted as the United States manipulating China for its own strategic purposes. China, then, struggles to both participate in this global regime while at the same time prevent the same regime from controlling its domestic affairs.

Desire for World Recognition: "Charm Offensive"

Though Beijing continues to view Washington with a wary eye, it has looked outside its borders, making considerable gains in altering its image across the globe, from threat to opportunity, from danger to benefactor. This transformation has allowed China to suggest to the world that it can be a great power. Drastic changes in the country itself have set the stage for China to exert soft power around the world. It has witnessed growing economic dynamism, a surge in nationalism, a new Chinese middle class knowledgeable about the world, and a vastly more sophisticated leadership that recognizes the need for public diplomacy to protect its domestic and international interests. Across China's cities, business-people, academics, students and other intellectuals began to consider whether China should abandon playing defense with the rest of the world and develop a more aggressive foreign policy. Combined, these factors have created pressure for China's new international engagement, as more modern, proud Chinese citizens desire a state that plays a large role on the global stage.

Just as the Chinese public started to consider a more proactive foreign policy, China's leaders also were becoming more confident and knowledgeable about the world. They understood that as their country continued to grow and open its borders, it could not avoid transnational problems, like HIV and drug trafficking, that would require global cooperation. This began what is often called China's 'charm offensive,' a foreign policy strategy based on the concept of China as a benign force in global affairs. Since the Tiananmen Square Incident, China has been given the reputation as "Asia's hothead and biggest bully;"⁹ as a result, leaders are mindful of the need to win over the international community by displaying that China poses no security threat. The core of this 'peaceful rise,' Chinese leaders explain, is to promote goodwill and standing within the international community, to prove that the country's rise is not meant for aggrandizement.

To emphasize this peaceful rise, China has sought to become a full and equal member in the world community by joining international governmental and non-governmental organizations and regimes, including those that focus on human rights. By early 1997, China had acceded to nine UN human rights conventions

9 Bruce Gilley, 'When 'Sorry' is the Hardest Word: China's Past Aggressions in Asia Continue to Thwart its Great Power Ambitions and Role as a Responsible Regional Leader', *The Asian Wall Street Journal*, January 2 2001.

and by 1998 two crucial major covenants on human rights.¹⁰ Also, China has been involved in a number of UN peacekeeping operations and has also taken part in denouncing various countries such as South Africa and the USSR in its flagrant human rights abuses. These engagements with the system show both an acceptance of some of the norms which the United States has played a key role in championing to international society, and a willingness to engage in debate over others; the Chinese political system is engaging in a sort of “selective adaptation” where it chooses to accept some global norms that are easy to adapt to legally.¹¹ Beijing’s participation in the human rights regime signals its acceptance that such domestic matters are a legitimate subject of international concern. Moreover, adherence to human rights norms has come to be associated with a state’s political legitimacy, an attribute that most governments would want to acquire. Thus, these actions are consistent with China’s desire to be a responsible major power.

Examples of Ambivalent Sino-American Relations

Tiananmen Square Incident 1989

There are various human rights issues that have revealed the opposing impulses for both countries in the US-China relationship. The Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989 is one of the most enlightening events that shed light on relations, and is also considered one of the main turning points in the relationship. The incident and resulting turmoil in other Chinese communities resulted in the global televised suppression of students, workers, and Beijing citizens by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The application of raw force followed by a chilling manhunt for dissidents seeking to escape persecution caused shock and outrage in America. Before the incident, American popular opinion of China had been highly favorable, with 72% of the population having a ‘favorable’ perception of China.¹² The televised violence constituted a blow to American popular perception of China, with the favorable view dropping to 34%. There was strong pressure on the US government to act, and the administration responded by imposing unilateral economic sanctions (including the suspension of military-to-military cooperation and police equipment sales as well as the recommendation for indefinite postponement of new international financial agency loans to China), and cutting diplomatic communication between the two countries. The president at the time, George H. W. Bush, was criticized by both human rights activists and Congress for taking too lenient of a stance against the PRC government; however, President Bush understood the strategic importance of China and refused to enact harsher

10 Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1997; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1998; Convention against Torture; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; Convention on the Rights of the Child; member of UN Commission on Human Rights.

11 Pitman B. Potter, “Selective Adaptation and Institutional Capacity,” *International Journal*, Vol. 61, No. 2, *Global China* (2006): 398.

12 Lampton, *Same Bed Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations*, 20.

sanctions and thus potentially isolating a prominent ally.

China, on the other hand, viewed the sanctions as an attempt to weaken the PRC at a time when it was politically unstable, and believed that since the incident was a domestic event, the United States had no right to interfere in the internal affairs of the country. Americans thought they were striking a blow for the Chinese people against a repressive elite, whereas Chinese (intellectuals and the working class alike, not to mention leaders) quickly concluded that the US sanctions simply functioned as one more attempt to hinder China's economic development. As Washington pushed for sanctions to punish these human rights infractions, it simultaneously pushed for market opening policies and protection of intellectual property rights, the same combination of commercial pressure and high-minded rhetoric that the Chinese had experienced prior to 1949. To Americans, these drives for commercial access and respect for property rights represented a legitimate demand for a 'level playing field' for foreign investors, rule of law, and reciprocal access to offset the ever-growing trade deficit. For the Chinese, this was but a recurrent pattern: Americans articulate high principles, but simultaneously seek to turn China's weaknesses to their commercial advantage. In a July 1989 meeting in Paris between Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and Secretary of State James Baker, Qian commented, "You know that China is not afraid of pressure. U.S. actions to pressure China have harmed China. China will not yield to pressure."¹³ That China's most visible dissident, Fang Lizhi, had also been taking refuge in the American Embassy since the June crackdown only reinforced Chinese leaders' distrust of Washington. This issue of state sovereignty and territorial integrity is an important international norm that China began to call upon to reframe the nature of human rights.

Human Rights Abuses vs. National Sovereignty: Tibet

National sovereignty has always been one of the key necessities in China's dealings with the United States—the Chinese had issued warnings to Washington time and time again to stay out of Chinese politics and internal affairs, especially in the realm of human rights issues. The issue of Tibet and the human rights concerns surrounding the conflict is one of the most glaring issues in the relationship. In late 1987 to early 1989, there had been a series of disturbances in Tibet that resulted in the direct firing on demonstrators and the establishment of martial law. Initially, the United States, upon hearing of the violence, feared that harsh commentary against Chinese actions would strengthen conservative officials in Beijing who hoped to slow economic reform efforts in the country. However, the United States ultimately responded by bringing the Dalai Lama to Washington, who presented a five-point peace plan. In turn, many officials wrote to Chinese officials, requesting them to consider the ideas outlined in the plan.¹⁴ Moreover, the Senate conditioned

¹³ Lampton, *Same Bed Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations*, 111.

¹⁴ Foot, *Rights Beyond Borders: The Global Community and the Struggle over Human Rights in*

supply of further weapons and high-technology exports to China on confirmation that Beijing would resolve the human issues in Tibet. This response by the United States enraged Beijing, who accused the United States of trying to break up the Chinese state by offering support to the Tibetan ‘separatists.’¹⁵ Because China regards Tibet as a core strategic concern (allowing Tibet independence or a high degree of autonomy would encourage other areas like Xinjiang, Mongolia and Taiwan to do the same), these accusations strengthened the view that the United States wanted to create a weak and divided China. Moreover, American response was another instance where it was interfering in China’s internal affairs and encroaching upon its sovereignty and territorial integrity. In the Chinese view, Tibet is an area in which Americans have no concrete, legitimate interest, and as a result, has no say in how China chooses to deal with it.

UN Intervention in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)

This concern of China’s national sovereignty became all the more pressing with NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia. When the 1999 ethnic cleansing by Serbs of Albanians in Kosovo Province generated pressure amongst America and its European allies to intervene, Beijing saw the violence as a domestic conflict and was unwilling to support a UN-sanctioned intervention. However, the United States and European allies turned to NATO as an instrument of intervention—NATO began bombing targets in the FRY without UN authorization to force President Slobodan Milosevic to stop his ethnic cleansing. Moreover, during these bombings, five US bombs hit the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, killing three PRC citizens and outraging the Chinese public. President Bill Clinton later apologized for the bombing, stating that it was accidental; however, large demonstrations erupted in the United States and NATO countries’ consular offices throughout China, and China’s UN ambassador described the entire situation as “a gross violation of the United Nations Charter, international law and the norms governing international relations.”¹⁶ The entire situation showed Beijing that the United States was putting humanitarian intervention above state sovereignty and was willing to use bilateral security alliances as tools to achieve its goals (even if the area of interest was outside the area of NATO). As a result, China feared that this doctrine could be applied to potential secessionist movements in Tibet, Taiwan, and Xinjiang, which would weaken its regime.

Most Favored Nation (MFN) Treatment

Though China feared that the United States could potentially use NATO as a weapon in undermining its national sovereignty, Chinese leaders knew that the economic ties that bound the two countries together served as a strong deterrent

China, 104.

¹⁵ David Shambaugh, *Beautiful Imperialist* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991), 57.

¹⁶ “World: Europe Embassy Strike ‘a Mistake,’” BBC News, 1999. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/338557.stm>.

to action. Foreign trade rose from \$38.1 billion in 1980 to \$69.99 billion in 1985 and \$325 billion in 1997, a pace that outstripped world growth levels. By 1999, China had become America's fourth largest trade partner and multinational companies held large shares in the Chinese domestic market (Coca-Cola held 26% of the soft drink market by 1997).¹⁷ Thus, it was no surprise when economics began to be tied to human rights issues between the countries. Many in the United States looked at the Chinese reliance on the US market and foreign direct investment, and assumed that the threat to limit Chinese exports provided them leverage with respect to their grievances with China. As a result, the United States began to use economic sanctions as a form of punitive action, or as a threat, to China's human rights record. However, as discussed previously, finding the balance between harsh and too harsh (and thus resulting in backlash) was a fine line. This was evident in President Bill Clinton's linkage between human rights and the Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariff treatment for China. Each year, under the terms of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, the president had to inform Congress of his intention to extend MFN tariff treatment to a "non-market" economy.¹⁸ Having come to power charging Bush with "indifference to democracy" and having "coddled the dictators and pleaded for progress," the central China policy commitment that Bill Clinton made in the election campaign was that he would find a way to link Chinese access to the American market with the improved treatment of its citizens. President Clinton then issued Executive Order 128590, establishing seven human rights-related factors as conditions for extension of MFN treatment for China.¹⁹

However, this action proved too harsh and resulted in considerable backlash. By publicly articulating the threat and setting a deadline, it necessitated an alteration of patterns in internal PRC governance and created public humiliation. No government can permit its internal political affairs held hostage to tariff levels of another nation, especially if the government (like China) regards nationalism and sovereignty as one of its central tenets. The linkage proved incapable of succeeding not only because the President failed to take account that he needed China's help on critical international issues like forging peace in Cambodia, but also because he encountered opposition from influential multinational corporations that had a large stake in the Chinese market. Moreover, China sought to ensure that no other major strategic or economic allies would join the United States were MFN to be withdrawn, and sought ties with America's economic competitors of Japan and Western Europe by flaunting potential lucrative contracts. Germany landed \$3 billion in Chinese contracts in 1993, and Premier Li Peng offered some of China's projected \$1 trillion expansion in trade to France. China was able to isolate the United

17 Bin Yu, "The Study of Chinese Foreign Policy: Problems and Prospect," *World Politics*, 46(2): 235-61, 1994, 250.

18 Rosemary Foot, *The Practice of Power: U.S. Relations with China since 1949* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 47.

19 Factors included: Free emigration; prison labor exports; observance of the UN Declaration of Human Rights; protection of Tibet's distinctive culture; humane treatment of prisoners; allowance of international radio/television broadcasts; and release of prisoners held for nonviolent expression of political/religious beliefs.

States from its traditional allies—if it were to withdraw MFN status, no other nation would follow suit. By mid-1994, President Clinton rejected the linkage of human rights conditions with MFN extension, showing how delicate the balance was between fulfilling American morals and threats to sovereignty in its relations with China.

World Trade Organization (WTO) Membership

Another event that links human right issues to economic relations between the United States and China is the debate regarding Beijing's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). For accession, China was willing to make far-reaching concessions in agricultural services, telecommunications, and general market access, demonstrating the country's desire to take part in the world community.²⁰ However, President Clinton decided not to proceed with the agreement at that time in part because many labor groups and human rights activists called for improved labor standards and conditions to be tied to the agreement. Like the controversy surrounding MFN extension, Clinton's decision to postpone the agreement strengthened opponents of WTO entry in China who argued that the United States was more interested in keeping China down than in reaching a deal. Again the opposing impulses of each country in relations with the other were at play.

Conclusion

Beijing's entrance to the WTO, MFN extension, unrest in Tibet, and Tiananmen are all examples of human rights issues that have been incorporated into policy decisions in Sino-American relations. The already ambivalent relationship is heightened with these issues, since they exaggerate even further the competing priorities facing each country in dealing with the other. While the United States seeks to find a response that assuages idealists at home without offending Chinese officials, China seeks to pursue global participation without allowing its national sovereignty to be threatened. This complicated network of decisions does not seem to become any less complicated in the near future, especially with China currently involved in economic agreements with certain African regimes notorious for human rights abuses. What is clear, though, is that if the United States desires to encourage China to make progress on its human rights record, it must turn not to punitive measures that cause nationalistic sentiments to flare, such as economic sanctions, but to methods that play upon towards the country's desire to become a full member of the global community.

This issue is also all the more prevalent with the recent awarding of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo. Currently serving an 11-year jail sentence for subversive behavior, Liu, 54, has spent more than two decades campaigning for improved human rights and political reform in China, and is often seen as the foremost symbol of the human rights struggle. China, in response, is leading a 19-nation boycott, those of which include Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq, of the ceremony

²⁰ Man, About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton, 32.

awarding Liu the prize, stating that calls to free Liu are tantamount to meddling in its internal affairs. From Beijing's perspective, recognizing or expressing concern for a criminal duly convicted of subversion in the country's judicial system violates its sovereignty. Moreover, China has made clear that it considers any honoring of Liu as a sore spot with its relations with other countries. The United States, thus, may see its diplomatic efforts to garner Chinese cooperation on certain global concerns adversely affected. It is particularly sensitive for the Chinese leadership when the United States says something implicitly critical of China, and President Obama's praise for Liu as an "eloquent and courageous" supporter of human rights and democracy did not go unnoticed. Bonnie Glaser, analyst with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, commented that "from the Chinese point of view [the awarding of the prize to Liu] looked like a coordinated and proactive U.S. effort to put pressure on China."²¹

Because the relationship between the United States and China may well be the most important bilateral relationship in the world, the United States must learn to promote improved human rights without embarrassing or threatening party leaders in China. In the past, approaches have ranged from threats and confrontation to passivity, without a coordinated policy. The key to improved relations over human rights requires the United States to take a non-ideological approach that is pragmatic and goes beyond "easy rhetoric."²² China must also, in essence, be convinced that greater democracy and improved human rights are to its own best interests and integral to becoming the respected world player it strives to become. In light of the increased tension from the Nobel Peace Prize awards, the United States must make an effort to acknowledge the profound challenges that China faces and reinforce positive changes rather than punish. By understanding China's respective needs and appealing to its interests, leaders may make not only substantial progress on human rights and human rights-related foreign policy, but also on changing the status of future Sino-American relations to one that is far less ambivalent.

21 Kyle Colona, "Will Nobel Peace Prize Strain US-China Relations?" suite101.com, 2010. <http://www.suite101.com/content/will-noble-peace-prize-strain-us-china-relatons-a296809>.

22 William F. Schulz, "Strategic Persistence: How the United State Can Help Improve Human Rights in China," Center for American Progress, 2009. http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/01/china_human_rights.html

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Charmaine Hung is a junior at the University of Pennsylvania, majoring in International Relations and Economics. She has interests in the economic developments of East Asian countries, especially China, Hong Kong, and Japan, in the post-financial crisis. She is fluent in English and Cantonese, proficient in Mandarin and Spanish, and is also studying Japanese in order to further understand the evolving political relationships and diplomacy between these three countries. Charmaine is currently studying abroad for the academic year at Oxford University and hopes that her experiences in England will help to enrich her academic career and goals.



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A Game-Theory Analysis of US Efforts to Curb the Colombian Cocaine Trade

BY SAUMIL JARIWALA
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Abstract

In the United States, efforts to disrupt the cocaine trade have centered on coca eradication in nations such as Colombia. In spite of funding increases for eradication initiatives, cocaine production levels in Colombia did not decrease between 2004 and 2009. Current US intervention strategy involves fumigating coca fields with herbicidal spray; the most herbicide is dispensed to the areas with the most coca cultivation. While this approach seems valid from a conventional viewpoint, it does not consider the motivations of individual farmers and thus results in an improper allocation of funding. By approaching the scenario from the level of the farmer as opposed to a nationwide perspective, this problem can be solved using game theory, a branch of mathematics that can be used to determine the optimal choice for rational actors in a given competitive scenario. For this analysis, Colombia was broken down into smaller regions called departments, and regional data on coca production from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime was utilized to determine estimated payoffs to Colombian farmers by region for coca and a licit alternative, coffee. The results of the analysis suggest that coca production levels in Colombia can be significantly decreased with only modest increases to herbicidal spraying: fumigating approximately 4,000 more hectares could eradicate almost 19,000 hectares of coca. More precise figures on coca cultivation and more accessible information on the export value of licit crops could yield a more accurate analysis.

Introduction

In 2007, the number of Americans twelve years and older addicted to cocaine reached 2.1 million, a little under 1% of the population. Every day, 2,500 Americans use cocaine for the first time.¹ Approximately 42% of 12th graders mentioned in a US survey that they had “fairly easy” to “very easy” access to cocaine.² These alarming numbers only begin to reveal the growing cocaine crisis in the United States. The US—which is responsible for approximately 60% of the world’s illegal drug consumption—has taken the lead in efforts to curb the cocaine trade, both domestically and abroad.³ Of the two possible ways to reduce the amount of cocaine consumption—reduction in demand and reduction in supply—the United States has primarily targeted the latter, specifically through intervention in Colombia, the world’s largest producer of the coca crop since the 1990s. During the Clinton administration, the United States gave Colombia 860 million dollars worth of aid—three-quarters of which was used by the government for Colombian military development—in a program known as “Plan Colombia.”⁴ By equipping the Colombian police force and military with drug eradication equipment, the United States hoped to stop coca production at its source by targeting cocaine-selling guerrilla groups and coca-growing communities. Since then, the US has loaned Colombia growing sums of money to combat the cultivation of coca, with a large percentage of funds still devoted to improving Colombia’s security forces.⁵ Although the US government has been partially successful in reducing the cultivation of coca in Colombia, production figures from 2001 through 2006 still hovered at 1997 levels, despite increased funding and greater efforts to eliminate the coca crop. As a result, UN Office on Drugs and Crime Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa claims that even greater funding is what is needed to solve the coca problem.⁶ Through a game-theory analysis of the Colombian farmer, this paper attempts to explain how the United States can better use its resources in Colombia. With a greater understanding of the Colombian farmer’s choices and relative payoffs, the UN, United States, and Colombia can better allocate their resources to greatly reduce the illegal coca trade.

Currently, the United States allocates its funds in Colombia from a “top-down” perspective: it distributes the most herbicidal spray to the area that grows the most coca. While this may be the best approach by conventional wisdom, this course of action

1 Results from the 2007 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: National Findings, Rockville, MD: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2008.

2 L.D. Johnston, P.M. O’Malley, J.G. Bachman, and J.E. Schulenberg, *Monitoring the Future, National Results on Adolescent Drug Use: Overview of Key Findings* (Bethesda, MD: National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2009).

3 Results from the 2007 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: National Findings.

4 C.P. Rydell, J.P. Caulkins, and S.S. Everingham, “Enforcement or Treatment? Modeling the Relative Efficacy of Alternatives for Controlling Cocaine,” *Operations Research* 44 (October 1996): 687-695; “Alternative Development in the Andean Area: The UNDCP Experience,” 2001.

5 I. Vascius and A. Isacson, “The ‘War on Drugs’ meets the ‘War on Terror’,” *The Center for International Policy*, Feb. 2003.

6 “Colombia Coca Survey for 2006,” June 2007.

makes one major and invalid assumption: that the only way to stop coca production is by destroying as much of it as possible. Colombian farmers grow the coca crop not because they want to create large amounts of illegal cocaine but rather because it is the most profitable economic decision for their livelihood. If growing licit crops became more lucrative than growing illegal alternatives like coca, then Colombian farmers would gradually defect to the more profitable crops: the licit ones. By understanding that each Colombian farmer is self-interested and not necessarily interested in the success of all Colombian farmers, the scenario can be reduced to a game that pits an individual Colombian coca farmer—representative of the group as a whole—against the US and its drug eradication efforts. Thus, a game-theory approach lends itself well to this situation, as it is a strategic interaction between two or more parties that want to maximize their own gains, sometimes at the expense of other players. Because both the Colombian farmer and the Colombian government want to maximize payoffs, game theory is applicable to the analysis of the Colombian coca scenario.

Background

Coca cultivation in the Andes is rooted in tradition. Primarily in the region around Bolivia, the coca leaf is an integral part of the Andean life, whether chewed for cultural, religious or simply recreational purposes.⁷ In Colombia, however, the growth of the coca bush is a rather novel occurrence that has its origins in the rise of the illegal cocaine trade.⁸ After it is harvested, coca leaf can be transformed into coca paste with the addition of sulfuric acid and certain combustibles. Following a variety of chemical reactions—including acidification, oxidation, and neutralization with a base—the coca paste becomes cocaine base.⁹ The illegal drug known as powder cocaine is actually cocaine hydrochloride, a compound that can be easily synthesized from cocaine base. By the end of this transformation process, the value of the cocaine has risen from one dollar per kilogram of raw coca leaf to 1,762 dollars per kilogram of wholesale powder cocaine.¹⁰ The source of this highly addictive drug is the plant *Erythroxylum coca*, which is generally grown in the lower altitudes of the Andes and matures within 18 months of planting.¹¹ After this growth period, the coca bush averages about three to six harvests a

7 "Colombia Coca Trade," Trade and Environment Database, Jan. 1997; C.J. Allen, *The Hold Life Has: Coca and Cultural Identity in an Andean Community* (Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1988); R.B. Smith, "Coca in Bolivia," *Geographical Review* 67 (January 1977): 22-33; C. Gutierrez-Noriega, and V.W.V. Hagen, "Coca: The Mainstay of an Arduous Native Life in the Andes," *Economic Botany* 5 (June 1951): 145-152; R. Martin, "The Role of Coca in the History, Religion, and Medicine of South American Indians," *Economic Botany* 24 (October 1970): 422-438.

8 F.E. Thoumi, "Illegal Drugs in Colombia: From Illegal Economic Boom to Social Crisis," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 582 (Jul. 2002): 102-116.

9 "Colombia Coca Survey for 2006" and G.D. Lee, *Global Drug Enforcement* (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2003)

10 *Ibid.*

11 "Colombia Cocoa Trade"; "Cocaine Production's Effect on the Environment in Colombia," Schaffer Library of Drug Policy.

year and produces approximately 1,446 kilograms of coca leaf per harvest.¹² Compared to other lucrative alternatives, such as coffee, coca is a rather high-yielding and fast-growing crop. This further complicates US intervention efforts, as only a few bushes are needed to produce a substantial amount of cocaine.¹³

The Colombian police and armed forces have reduced the coca supply primarily through two direct methods of involvement: aerial fumigation and manual eradication. Manual eradication involves the deployment of troops into coca-rich regions and the uprooting of all coca bushes in the area. This process is only efficient on a small-scale, can be used only in easily-accessible locations, and puts the troops in danger; for these reasons, manual eradication is limited to a small scope.¹⁴ However, manual eradication is very effective: after coca bushes are removed by manual eradication, it takes approximately eighteen months until another set of illicit crops can fully mature.¹⁵ In addition, manual eradication specifically removes drug-producing crops, not legal crops.¹⁶ Aerial fumigation, also known as aerial spraying, involves the dispensing of an herbicide—usually a variant of the Monsanto product Roundup—in a targeted region to kill any coca crops growing in a particular area. Aerial fumigation is useful as it inexpensively destroys large swaths of coca with little effort, but the process often acts as a sword in places where a scalpel is needed: aerial fumigation removes both illicit and licit crops in an area, and it simply destroys one harvest of the coca plant instead of the entire bush.¹⁷ Because it is inexpensive and relatively simple to apply, aerial spraying is the premier method used by the United Nations, the United States, and Colombia to curb coca cultivation in Colombia.

In this model, we have assumed that every farmer is faced with the decision to grow either the illicit coca crop or the common licit alternative coffee. In Colombia, growing illicit crops can be nine to ten times as lucrative as growing legal alternatives such as coffee. However, because coca is such a labor-intensive crop, coca cultivation requires about three times as much labor as coffee cultivation.¹⁸ Thus, the decision to grow coca over other licit alternatives is ultimately a financial decision and not one based off of lack of expertise or convenience of labor.

Introduction to Game-theorytic Analysis

Game theory allows a mathematical analysis of interactions between two ideally

12 "Colombia Coca Survey for 2006."

13 "CIA -- The World Factbook -- Colombia," The CIA World Factbook, May 2009.

14 "Colombia Coca Survey for 2006."

15 P.M. Franko, *The Puzzle of Latin American Economic Development* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).

16 "Colombia Coca Survey for 2006."

17 *Ibid.*

18 H. Sanabria, *The Coca Boom and Rural Social Change in Bolivia* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1993).

rational groups with distinct interests, whether cooperative or diametrically opposed. Put simply, game theory is a branch of mathematics that allows two agents to optimally obtain resources in a given competition or scenario. Whenever two parties are concerned with maximizing their gains and minimizing their losses, a general branch of game theory known as minimax game theory is often applied. The major stipulation of this theory is fulfilled in this simulation: that the payoffs used must have constant values and be independent of any particular strategy. While the created game has overarching similarities to a minimax game, some of the underlying assumptions for minimax game theory do not apply to this model, rendering some of the tools of this subfield of game theory inapplicable.¹⁹

Mathematics has previously been used to analyze the Colombian cocaine trade. Research—in particular much work by Daniel Mejia—focuses on all stages of the problem, from coca cultivation through interdiction, trafficking, and ultimately consumption.²⁰ One paper by Mejia et. al in particular utilized game theory to analyze drug production and trafficking—a separate phase of the cocaine trade—through an advanced game with multiple stages and rational actors.²¹ Much of the current research involves using mathematics to analyze the economic effects of certain policies: for example, how crop subsidies would affect supply and demand. Our research is distinct in that it proposes a new outlook on the situation, a reassessment of the roles of individual Colombian farmers.

As a preliminary approach to the problem, a two-player, two-strategy game was created in which a single Colombian farmer is interacting with a coalition of the UN, the United States government, and the Colombian government. The Colombian farmer has two choices: either to grow the coca crop on his plot of land or to grow a licit alternative, simulated here as coffee, Colombia's largest licit agricultural export.²² The farmer is limited to playing only these two pure strategies. The government coalition is also limited to two pure strategies: to either aerially fumigate only coca crops or do nothing. The payoff for the farmer is crop revenue, evaluated as US dollars per hectare for the sake of universality. The payoff for the government, however, is the number of coca plants, evaluated as coca leaf revenue per hectare. By minimizing the amount of coca grown, the United States is limiting the supply of cocaine which is its ultimate goal in giving foreign aid to Colombia. In this model, the game is played under idealized conditions, as both the farmer and the government coalition have more strategies and the opportunity to use mixed strategies in real life. Minimax game theory cannot be applied here because one player is aware of the other's moves and payoffs. In the game,

19 D.W. Read and C.E. Read, "A Critique of Davenport's Game Theory Analysis," *American Anthropologist* 72 (April 1970): 351-355.

20 See Herschel I. Grossman and Daniel Mejia, "The War Against Drug Producers," NBER Working Papers 11141, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 2005 and Daniel Mejia and Carlos Esteban Posada, "Cocaine Production and Trafficking: What Do We Know?" World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4618, May 2008.

21 Danie Mejia and Pascual Restrepo, "The War on Illegal Drug Production and Trafficking: an Economic Evaluation of Plan Colombia," Documentos CEDE 005123, October 2008.

22 "CIA -- The World Factbook - Colombia."

the government coalition is aware of the farmer's actions, as the government can aerially survey the farmer's lands, and it acts after the farmer does. Since one player is aware of the other's actions, certain techniques from minimax game theory cannot be used, as that player could take advantage of the greater information he has to improve his payoff.²³ If the coalition of governments knows that the farmer is going to grow coca—perhaps from conducting an aerial survey—then it will aerially fumigate his crops, but otherwise it won't bother. This preliminary game uses data that are too nonspecific to provide specialized and actionable results, but nonetheless it is useful as an introduction to this game-theory analysis and as a generalized simulation of the scenario.

$$\text{Revenue}_{\text{Coca}} = \left(\text{Average Yield in } \frac{\text{kg}}{\text{hectare} * \text{year}} \right) \left(\text{Average Colombian Price in } \frac{\text{US Dollars}}{\text{kg}} \right)$$

$$\text{Revenue}_{\text{Coffee}} = \left(\text{Average Yield in } \frac{\text{kg}}{\text{hectare} * \text{year}} \right) \left(\text{Average Colombian Price in } \frac{\text{US Dollars}}{\text{kg}} \right)$$

$$\text{Expenses}_{\text{Coffee}} = \left(\text{Average Yield in } \frac{\text{kg Coffee}}{\text{hectare} * \text{year}} \right) \left(\frac{\text{lb Coffee}}{\text{kg Coffee}} \right) \left(\text{Production Cost in } \frac{\text{US Dollars}}{\text{lb Coffee}} \right)$$

$$\text{Expenses}_{\text{Coca}} = \left(\text{Average Yield in } \frac{\text{kg Coca}}{\text{hectare} * \text{year}} \right) \left(\text{Production Cost in } \frac{\text{US Dollars}}{\text{kg Coca}} \right)$$

Other mentioned values include Effectiveness_{AF} the average effectiveness of aerial fumigation in destroying coca fields. When fields are aerially fumigated, farmers only profit and incur cost from the crops that survive, so Revenue_{Coca} and Expenses_{Coca} become the following.

$$\text{Revenue}_{\text{Coca}} = (1 - \text{Effectiveness}_{\text{AF}})(\text{Average Yield})(\text{Average Colombian Price})$$

$$\text{Expenses}_{\text{Coca}} = (1 - \text{Effectiveness}_{\text{AF}})(\text{Average Yield})(\text{Production Cost})$$

(SEE FIGURE 1 IN APPENDIX)

With proper data, the game can be evaluated to provide a meaningful solution. In 2006, coca leaf was sold for an average of one dollar per kilogram, and the average annual yield was 6300 kilograms per hectare per year.²⁴ The coffee crop's price was set at \$199.22 for 125 kilogram bags, and the average yield in Colombia was 450 kilograms per hectare per year.²⁵ The values marked as expenses in the matrix are the cost of

23 D.W. Read, 351-355.

24 "Colombia Coca Survey for 2006."

25 L. Pinzon and E. Mello, Colombia Coffee Semi-Annual 2008, USDA Agricultural Service, 2008; J.A. Duke CRC Handbook of Alternative Cash Crops 1993: CRC Press.

production of these crops, which includes cost of seeds, herbicides, pesticides, fertilizers and wages.²⁶ Literature values place the average production cost per pound of coffee at \$0.80. Not enough information was available to generate a specific dollar value for coca leaf production expenses, but data from Bolivia suggest that, on average, production costs expend 30% to 35% of coca leaf revenue.²⁷ For this analysis, we use 30% as our benchmark.

$$Revenue_{Coca} = \left(6,300 \frac{kg}{hectare * year}\right) \left(1.0 \frac{US Dollars}{kg}\right) = 6,300 \frac{US Dollars}{hectare * year}$$

$$Revenue_{Coffee} = \left(450 \frac{kg}{hectare * year}\right) \left(\frac{199.22}{125} \frac{US Dollars}{kg}\right) = 717.192 \frac{US Dollars}{hectare * year}$$

$$Expenses_{Coca} = 0.30 * Revenue_{Coca} \frac{US Dollars}{hectare * year}$$

$$Expenses_{Coffee} = \left(450 \frac{kg Coffee}{hectare * year}\right) \left(0.45359237 \frac{lb Coffee}{kg Coffee}\right) \left(0.80 \frac{US Dollars}{lb Coffee}\right) = 163.293 \frac{US Dollars}{hectare * year}$$

(SEE FIGURE 2 IN APPENDIX)

(SEE FIGURE 3 IN APPENDIX)

The government coalition’s strategy of not aerielly fumigating is iteratively dominated by the aerial fumigation strategy, leaving a 1x2 matrix. When we eliminate the lower payoff for the farmer, there remains only one solution: aerielly fumigate and grow coffee. This value from the model is counter to what actually occurs in Colombia, as the results suggest that coffee is slightly more lucrative than coca. If this were true across the board in Colombia, this would mean that it does not make rational sense for farmers to grow coca in Colombia. If we suppose the model is valid, the question is then raised of why some Colombian farmers do indeed cultivate coca. We propose a simple explanation. To simulate this game over time, it is simply played for every year in the simulation. Using the solution we found earlier, the result is a payoff of 553.899*t to the farmer, where t is equal to the number of years. However, if the government coalition does not always choose the optimum payoff—if it makes a mistake one year—the resulting total payoff for the farmer would be different. If the government does not aerielly fumigate the crops one time in 100 years, then the average expected payoff for growing coca is 568.008, a value higher than 553.899.

(SEE FIGURE 4 IN APPENDIX)

26 “Colombia Coca Survey for 2006.”

27 Sanabria, *The Cocoa Boom and Rural Social Change in Bolivia*.

While it is unlikely that the government coalition would make a mistake if it monitored only one farmer, the likelihood of this error becomes more pronounced as the analysis is extended to a greater and greater number of farmers. In addition, the analysis becomes more relevant: the actual scenario in Colombia involves the monitoring of thousands and thousands of farms, not just a single plot of land. The analysis becomes even more useful when the values used are more specialized. The values used thus far have been Colombian national averages. By centering games around specific regions, this analysis can take advantage of more precise values that take the geographic and economic differences between each region into account.

Region-by-Region Analysis

As the simulation is limited to regions of Colombia, however, the information states of each player change. In larger regions, the coalition becomes less informed about what crops are planted where, and limited resources prevent the conducting of unlimited aerial surveys. In larger regions, the single Colombian farmer from the initial simulation is replaced with a group of Colombian farmers. While each farmer may be aware of what the government is doing to his particular plot, each farmer makes a decision independent of what is happening to other farmers and their respective plots. As a result, each player is unaware of the specific actions of the other, although knowledge of the other players' motivations remains. Once the game is extended to this level, it is necessary to allow players to employ a mixed strategy. It is unlikely that the farmers would collectively decide to grow either coca or coffee: crop cultivation will be divided among the farmers in percentages. In addition, limiting the coalition of governments to two moves—aerially fumigating all coca or none of it—is a simplification of its capacity to act. By allowing mixed strategies, the game allows the farmers to make independent decisions and grants the government coalition a greater capacity to act. In expanding the game, an additional assumption is made that the farmers will want to maximize their collective payoffs rather than their individual ones. However, because the game is expanded and not entirely revamped, the collective payoff is analogous to the payoffs of the individual farmer in the initial analysis.

The regions used in this study merged twenty-three of Colombia's thirty-three departments into seven regions: these departments were selected if there was any evidence of coca cultivation. Because of the large amount of data available from the United Nations' Office on Drugs and Crime's 2006 Colombia Coca Cultivation Survey, the regions were combined in the same manner as in that report. The regions are demonstrated below on the maps of Colombia in Figure 5.²⁸

²⁸ Please note that, for parts of the paper, the Central region is mentioned, which is a combination of Sur de Bolivar and Catatumbo



(FIGURE 5A)



(FIGURE 5B)



(FIGURE 5C)



(FIGURE 5D)

The values used in the simulation for coca are depicted below in the table in Figure 6.²⁹ The nationally regulated price of Colombian coffee was used, \$199.22 for 125 kilograms of coffee.³⁰ Information on the annual yield of coffee by department or region was not available, so the national average value was used.

Region	Average Annual Yield (Kg/Ha/year)
Meta-Guaviare	9,900
Orinoco	8,552
Sur de Bolivar	6,288
Putumayo-Caqueta	5,559
Catatumbo	5,510
Sierra Nevada	4,840
Pacific	2,705
All Regions	6,343

(FIGURE 6)

(SEE FIGURE 7 IN APPENDIX)

In five of the seven games in Figure 7, the payoff to the farmer of coca cultivation under aerial fumigation was less than the payoff for growing coffee. This means that, in most regions, farmers would generally choose to grow coffee instead of coca if the United States was aerially fumigating all fields. However, this is clearly not the case, as the region with the lowest average payoff for growing coca actually produces the second most coca in Colombia.³¹ To find out exactly why payoffs differed so markedly from actual conditions in Colombia, the probability P of how much the government coalition aerially fumigates has been derived.

29 "Colombia Coca Survey for 2006."

30 L. Pinzon, Colombia Coffee Semi-Annual 2008.

31 "Colombia Coca Survey for 2006."

$$P = \frac{\text{Sum of Hectares of Coca Aerially Fumigated (by Department)}}{\text{Total Hectares of Coca Grown}}$$

$$P = \frac{\text{Sum of Hectares of Coca Aerially Fumigated (by Department)}}{\text{Sum of Hectares of Coca Aerially Fumigated (by Department) + Hectares of Coca Cultivated}}$$

$$\text{Meta-Guaviare: } P = \frac{14714+25915}{14714+25915+20540} = 0.6642$$

$$\text{Orinoco: } P = \frac{5485+1400}{5485+1400+6829} = 0.5020$$

$$\text{Sur de Bolivar: } P = \frac{18022+2662+5588+2146+831+1068+41}{18022+2662+5588+2146+831+1068+41+11643} = 0.7228$$

$$\text{Putumayo-Caqueta: } P = \frac{4575+26491}{4575+26491+17221} = 0.6434$$

$$\text{Catatumbo: } P = \frac{1687}{1687+488} = 0.7756$$

$$\text{Sierra Nevada: } P = \frac{0+0+0}{0+0+0+437} = 0$$

$$\text{Pacific: } P = \frac{59865+1536+0+0}{59865+1536+0+0+18807} = 0.7655$$

By inserting these payoffs into the regional matrices, the average payoffs for growing coca and growing coffee for every farmer can be determined. These values are available in Figure 7 which is located in the appendix.

$$\text{Payoff}_{\text{Coffee}} = P * \text{Payoff}_{\text{Aerial Fumigation}} + (1 - P) * \text{Payoff}_{\text{Do Nothing}}$$

$$\text{Payoff}_{\text{Coca}} = P * \text{Payoff}_{\text{Aerial Fumigation}} + (1 - P) * \text{Payoff}_{\text{Do Nothing}}$$

As the values above show for every region, it is (on average) in the farmer's interest to grow coca, as the payoff over multiple years from growing coca would be higher than that from growing coffee. The margin is smallest in the Pacific region, the department second in total coca cultivation. Therefore, in order to find out how much more the government coalition needs to aerially fumigate to make it more lucrative on average to grow coffee, the probability P of aerial fumigation was derived in each regional matrix. This value of P reveals what percentage of coca

fields the government coalition needs to aerially fumigate in order to make the average payoff for growing coca lower than that for growing coffee. By inputting this derived P, the simulation reveals how the economic situation in Colombia needs to change for coca production to be unprofitable.

$$Payoff_{Coca} < Payoff_{Coffee} = 553.899$$

$$553.899 > P * Payoff_{Aerial\ Fumigation} + (1 - P) * Payoff_{Do\ Nothing}$$

Meta-Guaviare: $P > 1$ (Not Possible)

Orinoco: $P > 1$ (Not Possible)

Sur de Bolivar: $P > 0.9934$

Putumayo-Caqueta: $P > 0.9746$

Catatumbo: $P > 0.9732$

Sierra Nevada: $P > 0.9506$

Pacific: $P > 0.8039$

The values above reveal that, on average, the government coalition needs to fumigate about 97% of fields in order to make coffee cultivation the more lucrative of the two options. There are exceptions however: in Meta-Guaviare and Orinoco, no P value will make coffee cultivation more lucrative, and in the Pacific region, only about 80% of fields need to be aerially fumigated. The figures for Orinoco and Meta-Guaviare are somewhat misleading, as this analysis assumes that fields can be sprayed only once per harvest. If we allow fields to be sprayed twice per season, the equations and payoffs change.

$$Revenue_{Coffee} = (1 - Effectiveness_{AF})^N * (Average\ Yield)(Average\ Colombian\ Price)$$

$$Expenses_{Coca} = 0.3 * Revenue_{Coffee}$$

where N is equal to the number of times a field is aerially fumigated per harvest.

By plugging in $N = 2$, the average yields, and the average Colombian price for Meta-Guaviare and Orinoco, the following results appear:

Meta-Guaviare: $Revenue_{Coca} = (1 - 0.88)^2 * (9900) = 142.56$

$$Expenses_{Coca} = 0.3 * Revenue_{Coffee} = 42.768$$

$$Revenue_{Coca} - Expenses_{Coca} = 99.792 = Profit_{Coca}$$

Orinoco: $Revenue_{Coca} = (1 - 0.88)^2 * (8552) = 123.149$

$$Expenses_{Coca} = 0.3 * Revenue_{Coffee} = 36.945$$

$$Revenue_{Coca} - Expenses_{Coca} = 86.204 = Profit_{Coca}$$

Inputting the profit values as the payoffs in the equations used for solving for P , the following P values are revealed:

$$Payoff_{Coca} < Payoff_{Coffee} = 553.899$$

$$553.899 > P * Payoff_{Aerial Fumigation} + (1 - P) * Payoff_{Do Nothing}$$

Meta-Guaviare: $553.899 > P * 99.792 + (1 - P) * 9900$

$$P > 0.9537$$

Orinoco: $553.899 > P * 86.204 + (1 - P) * 8552$

$$P > 0.9448$$

This data suggest that if the government coalition sprays about 95% of fields in Meta-Guaviare and 95% of fields in Orinoco two times per season, the coffee cultivation will be more profitable than coca cultivation there.

While the data for Orinoco and Meta-Guaviare are intriguing, the data from the

Pacific region reveal insight into more efficient eradication methods. For coca cultivation to be less lucrative than coffee on average in the Pacific region, P needs to be in the $P_{\text{CALCULATED}}$ range.

$$P = \frac{59865+1536+0+0}{59865+1536+0+0+18807} = 0.7655 \qquad P_{\text{CALCULATED}} > 0.8039$$

$$\Delta P > 0.0384$$

Base Coca Production = 18,807 hectares of coca annually in the Pacific region

$$\frac{(59865 + 1536)}{0.7655} * 0.8039 = 76378.9 \text{ Hectares (Theoretical)}$$

$$59865 + 1536 + 18807 = 80208 \text{ Hectares (Current)}$$

$$\text{Needed Reduction} = \text{Current} - \text{Theoretical} = 3829 \text{ Hectares of Coca annually}$$

P is a percentage calculation. Thus, if aerial fumigation is increased by 3.84% or more in the Pacific region, then policymakers should see Colombian farmers in that region gradually defect to other, licit crops. Defections could reduce coca production by up to 18,807 hectares annually with as little as 3,829 Hectares of increased fumigation. In contrast, if the United States maintains its current approach, it would require the full 18,807 hectares to be fumigated.

Discussion of Results

The framework reveals ways that the government coalition can discourage farmers from growing coca. The solution appears to be—as UNODC Executive Director Costa mentioned—greater funding for aerial fumigation efforts. Although the pure strategy payoffs for coca cultivation are lower than coffee cultivation under the right conditions, not enough aerial fumigation is occurring to yield this result. For the UNODC to have increased success combating coca cultivation, the amount of aerial fumigation will have to increase. To allocate this extra funding most efficiently, this study suggests that aerial fumigation increases need to be restricted to one region at a time,

as reducing the payoff of coca cultivation is only worthwhile if the payoff is lowered to a level below that of coffee cultivation. Another way to decrease coca cultivation would be to increase the efficiency of aerial fumigation. While using a more effective herbicide is one solution, another would be to spray all regions twice per harvest: this would change the effectiveness of aerial fumigation from 88% to over 98.5%, reducing the percentage of coca fields that need to be sprayed. However, this statistic is somewhat misleading, as it means that the United States would have to spray around 90% of fields twice instead of about 100% of fields once, thereby leading to a tremendous increase in aerial fumigation. Such a large increase in spraying herbicides poses environmental and ethical concerns. Another purported option—subsidizing farmers to encourage licit crop growth—is shown by this model to be a very expensive solution. Without greater aerial fumigation efforts, the government coalition would have to subsidize farmers multiple times the market selling price of the licit alternatives they grow. Therefore, the model suggests that aerial fumigation is considerably less expensive—provides “more bang for the buck” so to speak—than crop subsidies, which explains why the use of aerial spraying by intervening bodies is currently so prevalent in Colombia.

This analysis not only advises the Colombian government to fund more aerial fumigation, but it also reveals the best regions to increase aerial fumigation in. If the government coalition aerially fumigated about 4% more land in the Pacific region—the region with the second most coca cultivation—then the average coca payoff would be less than the average coffee payoff, which should result in widespread abandonment of the coca crop. The government coalition should target its efforts in that particular region, as large gains are possible there with only a modest increase in activity. The eradication of approximately 3,829 hectares of coca in the Pacific region should result in the eradication of approximately 18,807 total hectares of coca. To put this potential change in perspective, the government coalition would have to triple the current amount of aerial fumigation in the Meta-Guaviare region, the region with the highest amount of coca cultivation, in order to achieve comparable results with the Pacific region.

Before the United Nations, United States, and Colombia decide to pursue greater aerial fumigation efforts, the ramifications of current coca eradication methods need to be mentioned. Although game theory allows researchers to follow the rational decision-making process of two players, it does not reveal other non-quantitative motivations and consequences. In this particular scenario, there are two sets of implications—moral and environmental—that are not considered in this analysis. The first to be considered, moral, involves the livelihood of Colombian farmers. Those farmers who decide to grow coca

do not always do so for selfish reasons; it can be impossible to make enough money growing other, less lucrative crops, and although the coalition of governments does want to eradicate the coca trade, doing so might destroy a way of life and force thousands of farmers to seek a new way to make a living. In addition, greater aerial fumigation could have an untold environmental impact. Information is available that indicates that current levels of aerial fumigation are having a detrimental impact on the environment, and increasing the amount of herbicide dispensed in Colombia will only lead to greater environmental damage.¹ While the government coalition could potentially eradicate coca cultivation in Colombia by increasing the aerial fumigation levels, a decision needs to be made about whether or not it is environmentally worthwhile to move in this direction; if the UN, USA, and Colombia decide they do not want to pursue this action, perhaps they should decide whether or not aerial fumigation and foreign intervention is the proper response to the cocaine trade at all.

Limitations

It is necessary to briefly mention the limitation of this model. With any game-theory model, one of the underlying assumptions is that all parties must act rationally and always choose greater payoffs, which is not always the case in the real world. In addition, while this model takes many of the economic incentives for growing coca into consideration, other non-financial (and often non-quantifiable) motivations do exist. In some cases, farmers grow coca not necessarily because it is more financially lucrative but rather because of the pressure and threats from narco-terrorist or guerrilla organizations, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). However, we posit that this kind of scenario should be considered an exception rather than the norm. Because the major reason is essentially economic in nature, economic frameworks are directly applicable to model this scenario.

Conclusion

This study involves the analysis of coca cultivation in Colombia for the purpose of developing strategies that can improve the efficiency of aerial fumigation efforts in Colombia. The game theory framework reveals that, with enough aerial fumigation, the government coalition can make licit crop growing more profitable than coca cultivation, thereby reducing the amount of coca cultivation in Colombia. However, the government's current levels of aerial fumigation are insufficient to make coca cultivation uneconomical

1 K.R. Solomon, A. Anadon, A.L. Cerdeira, J. Marshall, and L. Sanin, *Environmental and Human Health Assessment of the Aerial Spray Program for Coca and Poppy Control in Colombia* (Washington, DC: Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, 2005).

on a widespread level. Most of the viable solutions to the problem of coca cultivation in Colombia involve aerial fumigating the coca crop to a greater degree, by either spraying fields twice or spraying more coca fields. This report discusses an approach to reducing the coca trade in Colombia by assessing coca cultivation from a behavioral standpoint. By specifically targeting modest increases in eradication, large decreases in coca cultivation can be attained. Ultimately, the government coalition can make more educated decisions about where coca eradication efforts should be increased by considering the economic perspective of individual farmers.

Appendix

Figure 1

		Aerial Fumigation	Do Nothing
All Colombian Farmers	Grow Coffee	$(Revenue_{Coffee} - Expenses_{Coffee}, 0)$	$(Revenue_{Coffee} - Expenses_{Coffee}, 0)$
	Grow Coca	$(1 - Effectiveness_{AF}) (Revenue_{Coca} - Expenses_{Coca})$ $- (1 - Effectiveness_{AF}) (Revenue_{Coca})$	$(Revenue_{Coca} - Expenses_{Coca})$ $- Revenue_{Coca}$

This is the normal form game between the coalition of nations involved with aerial fumigation and collectively all the Colombian farmers

Figure 2

Coalition of United Nations, US Government, and Colombia

		Aerial Fumigation	Do Nothing
All Colombian Farmers	Grow Coffee	$(717.192 - 163.293, 0)$	$(717.192 - 163.293, 0)$
	Grow Coca	$(1 - 0.88) (6300 - 0.30 \cdot 6300)$ $- (1 - 0.88) (6300)$	$(6300 - 0.30 \cdot 6300, 0)$

This is the normal form game included in Figure 1 with calculations included

Figure 3

Coalition of United Nations, US Government, and Colombia

		Aerial Fumigation	Do Nothing
All Colombian Farmers	Grow Coffee	$(553.899, 0)$	$(553.899, 0)$
	Grow Coca	$(529.20, -756)$	$(4410, -6300)$

This is the normal form game included in Figure 1 with values included

Figure 4





Figure 7 (Region-by-Region Analysis)

GENERAL FORM FOR EACH REGION

Coalition of United Nations, US Government, and Colombia

		Aerial Fumigation (p)	Do Nothing (1-p)
Regional Colombian Farmers	Grow Coffee (q)	$(Revenue_{Coffee} - Expenses_{Coffee}, 0)$	$(Revenue_{Coffee} - Expenses_{Coffee}, 0)$
	Grow Coca (1-q)	$(1-Effectiveness_{AF})(Revenue_{Coca} - Expenses_{Coca})$ $-(1-Effectiveness_{AF})(Revenue_{Coca})$	$(Revenue_{Coca} - Expenses_{Coca} - Revenue_{Coca})$

This is the normal form game that will be used to evaluate payoffs for each region in Colombia

META-GUAVIARE

Coalition of United Nations, US Government, and Colombia

		Aerial Fumigation (p)	Do Nothing (1-p)
Meta-Guaviare Farmers	Grow Coffee (q)	(553.899, 0)	(553.899, 0)
	Grow Coca (1-q)	(831.6, -1188)	(6930, -9900)

This is the normal form game that contains values for the Meta-Guaviare region of Colombia

ORINOCO

Coalition of United Nations, US Government, and Colombia

		Aerial Fumigation (p)	Do Nothing (1-p)
Orinoco Farmers	Grow Coffee (q)	(553.899, 0)	(553.899, 0)
	Grow Coca (1-q)	(718.768, -1026.24)	(5986.4, -8552)

This is the normal form game that contains values for the Orinoco region of Colombia

SUR DE BOLIVAR

Coalition of United Nations, US Government, and Colombia

		Aerial Fumigation (p)	Do Nothing (1-p)
Sur de Bolivar Farmers	Grow Coffee (q)	(553.899, 0)	(553.899, 0)
	Grow Coca (1-q)	(528.192, -754.56)	(4401.6, -6288)

This is the normal form game that contains values for the Sur de Bolivar region of Colombia

PUTUMAYO-CAQUETA

Coalition of United Nations, US Government, and Colombia

		Aerial Fumigation (p)	Do Nothing (1-p)
Putumayo-Caqueta Farmers	Grow Coffee (q)	(553.899, 0)	(553.899, 0)
	Grow Coca (1-q)	(466.956, -667.08)	(3891.3, -5559)

This is the normal form game that contains values for the Putumayo-Caqueta region of Colombia

CATATUMBO

Coalition of United Nations, US Government, and Colombia

		Aerial Fumigation (p)	Do Nothing (1-p)
Catatumbo Farmers	Grow Coffee (q)	(553.899, 0)	(553.899, 0)
	Grow Coca (1-q)	(462.84, -661.2)	(3857, -5510)

This is the normal form game that contains values for the Catatumbo region of Colombia

SIERRA NEVADA

Coalition of United Nations, US Government, and Colombia

		Aerial Fumigation (p)	Do Nothing (1-p)
Sierra Nevada Farmers	Grow Coffee (q)	(553.899, 0)	(553.899, 0)
	Grow Coca (1-q)	(406.56, -580.8)	(3388, -4840)

This is the normal form game that contains values for the Sierra Nevada region of Colombia

PACIFIC

Coalition of United Nations, US Government, and Colombia

		Aerial Fumigation (p)	Do Nothing (1-p)
Pacific Farmers	Grow Coffee (q)	(553.899, 0)	(553.899, 0)
	Grow Coca (1-q)	(227.22, -324.6)	(1893.5, -2705)

This is the normal form game that contains values for the Pacific region of Colombia

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About Saumil Jariwala

Saumil Jariwala is a freshman in the Huntsman Program in International Studies and Business at the University of Pennsylvania. He is currently involved with Social Impact Consulting, an organization that aims to help social enterprise and nonprofit organizations in the Greater Philadelphia Area thrive and succeed, and he works as a Research Assistant at the Lauder Institute, a division of the Wharton School of Business. The basis behind this paper developed when Saumil served on a crisis committee involving the FARC at a Model UN conference while he was also taking a class on game theory.



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Iraq from 1972-1975

A Case Study of Power Dynamics in the Cold War

BY ANNA THIERGARTNER
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

Abstract

The relationship between the Soviet Union and Iraq in the 1970s represents the perfect case study of the power politics of the period. Iraq's master politician Saddam Hussein ushered in a new era of economic growth in his country using Cold War politics for Iraqi national interest. By employing development theory and utilizing economic interactions, the Iraqi-Soviet bond reveals why the proxy wars of the Cold War ultimately failed. Conventional thinking of this period often led others to believe that the Soviet Union and the United States always held the power. The bilateral world that they created featured their power politics and their control. However, through the study of Iraq, it becomes evident that the balance of control was often held by the supposedly compliant state. This equally exploitative system shows the intensely calculated movements and developments of all alliances. The Iraqi case study also highlights the flaws in the Soviet Union's plan for developing compliant states. Their inability to effectively retain these alliances may have contributed to their downfall.

"Iraq's present pragmatism is a means toward ultimate hegemony in the Persian Gulf and perhaps throughout the Middle East, inevitably at the expense of both superpowers."¹

"As the world now knows, it was a disaster for Saddam, a triumph for American

1 Michael T. Klare, "Fueling the Fire: How We Armed the Middle East," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 47, no. 1 (1991): 19.

diplomacy and military might, and a centerpiece of George Bush's legacy. Saddam's brutal invasion of Kuwait also provided the unexpected opportunity to write an end to fifty years of Cold War conflict with resounding finality,"² reflected James Baker III, Secretary of State under President George H.W. Bush, on the legacy of the Gulf War. The relationship between the Soviet Union and Iraq commenced in 1958 and was officially solidified in 1972. At the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War, this alliance began to wane and ultimately culminated in Saddam Hussein's policies after the Cold War. Specifically, Iraq gained control of the alliance due to its leverage as a successful trading partner and the Soviet Union's disproportionate need for a geo-strategic outpost in the Middle East to counter the United States' allies in the region, specifically Iran. The combination of stockpiled weapons, vast oil riches, and Hussein's growing egomania led to tumultuous Iraqi-Soviet relations that provide tremendous insight into the nature and importance of power relations during the Cold War. Thousands of studies and books explore the power maneuvering of Cold War relationships between the superpowers and their respective client states. Yet few delve into the day-to-day changes that threatened these alliances. Analyzing the relationship between the Soviet Union and Iraq in the 1970s within the context of development theory, demonstrates the power politics of the period.

The Cold War in the Middle East

The Soviet Union long held an interest in the Arab world. Following World War II, the Soviet Union sought to have a larger presence in the Middle East, while reducing the influence of the Western powers in the region, particularly that of the British.³ The Soviet Union's policies in the Middle East reflect a "total foreign policy which draws no principal distinction between diplomatic, economic, psychological, or military means of operation."⁴ In the period immediately following World War II, the Soviet Union refused to withdraw troops from Iran, citing a misinterpreted 1921 treaty, wherein the Soviet Union had made territorial claims to two Turkish straits to gain access to the Black Sea and had supported the Palestinian people in their conflict with Israel. These decisions can be attributed to the Soviet Union's desire for increased influence in the Middle East, where it hoped to subtly instill Marxist tendencies in governmental offices or nationalist movements.⁵

During the 1950s, the Cold War's ideological battles heightened in the Middle East. The countries in the region increasingly turned to the Soviet Union for

2 James Addison Baker, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace 1989-1992* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995), 52.

3 Galia Golan, *The Soviet Policies in the Middle East: From World War II to Gorbachev*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 29.

4 Richard Pipes, "Some Operational Principles of Soviet Foreign Policy," in *The USSR and the Middle East*, ed. Michael Confino and Shimon Shamir, (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1973), 9.

5 Golan, *The Soviet Policies in the Middle East: From World War II to Gorbachev*, 38.

support due to the security alliance established in the Baghdad Pact of 1955, as well as the split between pan-Arabists and nationalists. Additionally, the lack of a Soviet colonial history in the Middle East appealed to the self-declared neutral nations and leaders in the Cold War, such as Gamal Nasser of Egypt and Jawaharlal Nehru of India.⁶ The Soviet-Egyptian relationship started with arms trade in the 1950s and expanded due to similar commercial interests. Yet, serious issues developed between the two countries after the Egyptians united with the Syrians and formed the United Arab Republic (UAR), which the Soviets perceived as an attack on Communist parties in the region. In the six years between the Six Days War of 1967 and the Yom Kippur War, the Soviets remained active in the Middle East. Specifically, they attempted to develop strong Communist parties in all Middle Eastern countries, and tried to remove British and American influence in the region. Interestingly, the Soviets were the most successful in the Middle East, while the Americans faced the most challenges.⁷ Although the Soviet Union remained involved with other countries in the region, it focused primarily on Iraq.

The Kurdish Question

The first large-scale diplomatic issue concerning the Soviets and Iraqis involved the Kurdish population in Iraq. Northern Iraq holds a Kurdish, non-Arabic speaking minority that has long sought political autonomy from Baghdad. The Kurdish struggle against the central government has resurfaced sporadically throughout Iraqi history. Following the 1958 revolution overthrowing the Iraqi monarchy, the Soviet Union backed Kurdish demands for autonomy within the Iraqi state.⁸ A document written by Peter Ivashutin to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union divulges the extent to which the Soviet Union supported the Kurdish uprisings. He described the Soviet's three-pronged approach, which began with step one: "use the KGB to organize pro-Kurdish and anti-Kassem protests in India, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Guinea, and other countries." Stage two was to "have the KGB meet with Barzani to urge him to 'seize the leadership' of the Kurdish movements in his hands and to lead it along the democratic road," and to advise him to "keep a low profile in the course of this activity so that the West did not have a pretext to blame the USSR in meddling into the internal affairs of Iraq." The Soviets wanted full reign over this small, civil-based proxy war and did not want the Americans to gain strength in the country. The third phase involved illicit espionage; the Soviets tasked "the KGB to recruit and train a 'special armed detachment (500-700 men)' drawn from Kurds living in the USSR in the event that Moscow might need to send Mustafa Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic

6 Ibid., 45.

7 Ivo J. Lederer and Wayne S. Vucinich, *The Soviet Union and the Middle East: The Post-World War II Era*, (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1974), 12.

8 Oles M. Smolansky, *The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), 65.

Party (KDP), ‘various military experts (Artillerymen, radio operators, demolition squads, etc.)’ to support the Kurdish uprising.”⁹ Thus, the Soviets were willing to back the Kurds militarily with Soviet troops, rather than merely sending nominal or technical support. This dedication to support the Kurds developed partially because the Soviets had a deep relationship with Barzani, which began during his exile from Iraq between 1947-1958. Barzani studied political science in Moscow, met Stalin, and therefore, had established close ties with the KGB and Soviet military.¹⁰ While the Iraqis suspected the Soviet Union of supporting the Kurds, the Soviet Union and Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) denied such accusations, insisting that the Kurdish uprisings were due to the policies of the central government rather than foreign involvement.¹¹ Despite the Soviets’ continual support of the Kurds in the 1960s through diplomatic statements expressing their desire for compromise between the Kurds and the Iraqi central government, the Soviets ultimately did not want the two parties to come together peacefully.

In 1970, Iraq and the Kurds reached a temporary peace by adopting the March Agreement, which offered the Kurds some autonomy, as well as inclusion in the cabinet, demarcated borders, and protection from mistreatment. The process of implementation was slower and more cumbersome than expected, and subtle tensions returned in the following year. The Soviets, however, received commitment from the Kurds that hostilities would not resume, and thus resumed their weapons trade. By the end of 1971, various aspects of the March Agreement had yet to be implemented. As part of the 1972 Iraqi-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, the Soviet Union distanced itself from the Kurdish uprisings. Without Soviet support, the Kurds (and more specifically Barzani, a notorious “flip-flopper”) turned to the United States for support, but the superpower refrained, sensing there was nothing to be gained from entering the conflict. The Iraqis subsequently squelched all Kurdish uprisings, and thus returned to their pre-March agreement.

Forming Alliances

Although the relationship between the Soviet Union and Iraq first developed in the late 1950s, both countries solidified their ties with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in April 1972. Iraq’s motivations of nationalizing the oil industry and an increased weapons trade led it to seek out such a treaty with an established superpower. The Soviets, on the other hand, desired another Middle Eastern ally and believed improved relations with Iraq would further their strategic aims. The Ba’th position, characterized by “staunch opponent of ‘imperialism, colonialism, and Zionism,’”¹² was comparable to the Soviets’. Further, Saddam Hussein, who was

9 Peter Ivashutin to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, September 27, 1961.

10 Kamal Said Qadir, “The Kurds and the KGB: The Secret History of the Barzani Family,” August 31, 2006, <http://www.antiwar.com/orig/qadir.php?articleid=9629>.

11 Smolansky, *The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence*, 66.

12 Smolansky, *The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence*, 18.

second in command of Iraq's military at the time, deeply admired Joseph Stalin and his ability to incisively put down enemies and dissidents.¹³ However, the ideological connection between either Hussein and Stalin, or the Soviet Union and Iraq, was otherwise pretty dismal. According to international affairs theorist Francis Fukuyama,

Soviet and Iraqi objectives overlap most fully on the issue of anti-imperialism and opposition to Western influence in the Middle East but differ or are irrelevant on the subjects of pan-Arab nationalism, domestic development, and external economic relations. [...] This somewhat narrow doctrinal basis for Soviet-Iraqi relations has grown even more circumscribed by the coming to power of a Ba'th party faction, led by Saddam Hussein, that has followed a policy of rhetorical toughness coupled with noninvolvement in military confrontations.¹⁴

Due to these differences, Soviet involvement in Iraq did not require the ideological protection and funding that the Soviet Union offered to their other Communist allies.

In the 1972 Treaty, the Soviets requested political autonomy for the Kurds and freedom for the ICP, while the Ba'th sought to establish a close working relationship with the Soviet Communist Party. Further, the Ba'th wanted to learn the Soviet Union's techniques used by the Kremlin and its military to impose party control.¹⁵ The Kremlin supported Iraq's desire to nationalize the oil industry, recognizing the benefits of Iraq's control over its own petroleum and the enormous quantities of oil that the Soviet Union could receive as a result. According to distinguished scholar Oles M. Smolansky, the Soviet Union anticipated receiving large amounts of oil or hard currency in exchange for its technological and personal assistance in establishing the initial stages of the nationalized oil industry.¹⁶ The treaty appeared to be beneficial for both parties and involved a variety of economic and political cooperation. Both Hussein and the Ba'th government enjoyed economic success following the nationalization of the oil industry.

Table 1 Oil Production in Millions of Barrels per Day¹⁷

1950	1965	1975	1980
0.136	1.322	2.262	2.514

13 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (New York: Basic Books, 2005) 141.

14 USA, *The United State Air Force. The Soviet Union and Iraq since 1968*, by Francis Fukuyama, Rand, 1980, Print.

15 Smolansky, *The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence*, 18.

16 Smolansky, *The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence*, 18.

17 Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001) 231.

Efficiency and productivity increased greatly, allowing Iraq to produce many more millions of barrels a day (see table 1). By 1975, Iraq increased its average production of oil by 2.126 million barrels a day, making it one of the highest oil-producing states in the world.¹⁸ Due to the nationalization, the government retained the revenue and soon became known as a wealthy state. With the aid of the Soviet Union, Iraq set up a successful state-owned company that greatly improved its economic activity, which advanced its potential as a strong ally and commercial trader. The nationalization of the oil industry allowed Iraq to become economically more independent and also gave it arguably the biggest ‘bargaining chip’ in modern politics.

Arms Proliferation in the Cold War

Both the United States and the Soviet Union attempted to forge relationships of influence through arms sales. According to an unidentified State Department official in a 1983 US News and World Report article, “arms sales are the hard currency of foreign affairs, they replace the security pacts of the 1950s.”¹⁹ Moreover, these sales empowered and armed almost every third world country at the time. Addressing the importance of the arms trade to the two superpowers, political scientist Michael T. Klare explained that the United States and the Soviet Union each sought to earn the loyalty of the other’s allies through arms deals. Since the two were highly motivated to gain strategic ground, neither imposed arms quotas on its allies. Klare asserts that by the 1980s, several countries in the Middle East possessed “arsenals comparable or superior to those found among the front-line states in NATO and the Warsaw Pact.”²⁰

18 Ibid.

19 Klare, “Fueling the Fire: How We Armed the Middle East,” 23.

20 Ibid.

Table 2 World Arms Deliveries 1963-86, Four Year Averages (Millions of 1981 USD)²¹

Country	1963-6	1967-70	1971-4	1975-8	1979-82	1983-6
United States	3,660	6,504	7,877	8,456	7,968	9,034
Soviet Union	3,238	3,206	6,399	8,275	11,143	14,806
France	364	384	1,116	1,673	3,019	3,596
Great Britain	421	303	824	1,207	1,971	1,045
West Germany	273	249	366	1,047	1,261	1,249
Italy	56	62	231	623	890	763
Other Developed	328	403	744	1,253	1,358	1,143
Other Eastern European	668	655	935	1,701	2,230	2,910
Developing	413	450	868	1,207	2,790	3,680
World	9,421	12,216	19,360	25,442	32,630	38,226

The United States and Soviet Union had a huge market share of the weapons trades, devoting huge sums of economic resources to the purchase of weapons (see table 2). For the Soviet Union in particular, arms sales comprised a huge source of all economic activity. Keith Kraus described the Soviet arms economy of the 1970s, explaining that “matters [were] somewhat different for the Soviet Union because arms sales [were] a source of hard currency. Between 1970 and 1978, such sales represented an average of 8.6% of total hard-currency exports.”²² The arms trade increased greatly in the 1970s, as the Soviet Union became increasingly close with newly rich Middle Eastern states. Additionally, as Middle Eastern oil revenue increased, so too did the region’s ability to purchase arms. Since these countries held hard currency from their oil sales, they became popular clients for arms suppliers, and were thus able to exert some power during the sales. This purchasing power came to provide Middle Eastern states with the upper hand in the usually bilateral Cold War system.

²¹ Keith Krause, “The Political Economy of the International Arms Transfer System: The Diffusion of Military Technique via Arms Transfers,” *International Journal* 45, no. 3 (1990): 702.

²² *Ibid.*

In the context of the Soviet-Iraqi relationship, it was the 1972 Friendship Treaty that allowed for the increased arms trade. Although Iraq had received its first weapons shipment from the Soviets in 1958, after 1972, the state began developing a cache. After signing the treaty, Iraq received SA-3 Surface to Air missiles, TU-22 Medium Range bombers, Scud surface-to-surface missiles armed with conventional warheads, and MIG-23 Fighters.²³ This enormous increase in arms purchasing represents the biggest difference between Soviet-Iraqi relations in the 1950s and Soviet-Iraqi relations in the 1970s. Although there existed some smaller scale arms trade in the 1950s, the massive shift in the 1970s demonstrated a stronger economic partnership. In fact, Iraq became the Soviet Union's best client in terms of arms sales (see table 3). In an effort to ensure Iraqi strategic support, the Soviets continued to supply the country with arms, while Iraq may have had different objectives for participating in the sale.

Table 3 Soviet Arms Supplies to its Chief Arab Clients, 1964-78 (Millions of USD)²⁴

Countries	1964-73	1974-78	Total
Egypt	2,305	430	2,735
Syria	1,153	2,700	3,853
Iraq	742	3,600	4,342
Libya	--	3,400	3,400

While tracking this particular historical narrative, Iraqis held the upper hand in the trade relationship with the Soviet Union. Although Iraq and the Soviet Union had diametrically opposed ideologies, their relationship developed based on a desire for monetary and strategic gains. Iraq was the only non-Communist country in the Soviet Union's circle of "close" allies; this gave it significant leverage when dealing solely with the Soviet Union. Iraq's freedom from the Communist sphere allowed it to negotiate new, better deals with non-Communist countries. Klare described Hussein's effortless acquisition of an extensive cache of arms, which revealed the overall danger of the arms trade.²⁵ After the Iran-Iraq War, Klare stated, "Saddam Hussein has collected the most modern arsenal in the Third World – with help from the United States, the Soviet Union, the French, the British, the Germans, the Chinese..."²⁶ In the twenty years after the 1972 Treaty, Iraq waged war against Iran and tried to annex the small country of Kuwait. Thus, the ability for leaders like Hussein to purchase an inordinate amount of weapons had large, unforeseen consequences.

Demise of the Alliance

²³ Smolansky, *The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence*, 19.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 29.

²⁵ Klare, "Fueling the Fire: How We Armed the Middle East," 19.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

In 1975, only three years after the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed, the Soviet-Iraqi relationship began to disintegrate. During that year, two key events occurred: the signing of the Algiers Accord and the crushing of a Kurdish revolt. These two events drastically changed the Soviet-Iraqi alliance, and displayed Hussein's single-minded pursuit of national interest.

The Kurds remained upset about the lack of implementation of the March Agreement by the central government. By 1974, Kurdish leader Barzani had armed a paramilitary Kurdish security force, received significant funding from the United States and Iran, and declared the Kirkuk oil fields to be the property of Iraqi Kurdistan.²⁷ Hussein's regime and the Kurds held negotiations that proved fruitless; this development, coupled with violence on the Iran-Iraq border, caused the situation to deteriorate rapidly. War broke out in the spring of 1974, and Barzani's Peshmergas and various Kurdish volunteers throughout Iraq presented a force equal in size to Iraqi soldiers. However, Iraq held superior arms, which it had obtained through trade with the Soviet Union, and used them to carry out successful raids.²⁸ A US State Department memo reflecting on a conversation with Soviet Counsellor Avenir Khanov reveals how the use of Soviet arms displeased the Soviet Union, explaining, "Soviets do not like fact that their arms are being used against 'nationalist' movement. Even if reactionary one, but once arms in hands of a country, donor loses control."²⁹ Even as Iraq's use of Soviet arms upset the Communist superpower, its Kurdish enemies continued to receive support from Iran and the United States. Thus, the Soviet Union continued to support Iraq, because it feared that the United States and Iran would gain strategic power with a Kurdish victory. Many fellow Middle Eastern leaders attempted to bring Hussein and the Shah of Iran together to negotiate their differences with little success until King Hussein of Jordan brought together representatives of both countries in October 1974, which culminated in the Algiers Accord.³⁰

The Algiers Accord ended the Kurdish Rebellion, increased Iraqi tension with Moscow, and later, and allowed for the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. The accord defined the border of the Shatt al-Arab waterway, which had long been contested, and would eventually become a major source of conflict that spurred the Iran-Iraq war. Additionally, the accord closed the Iranian border, which effectively made it impossible for Iran to continue to support the Kurds. While this treaty temporarily solved several controversial issues, Iraq never consulted with the Soviet Union during its negotiation. A US State Department memo discussed Evgeny Pyrlin,

27 Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship*, 165.

28 *Ibid.*, 169.

29 USA, Department of State, *Soviet Disagreement with Goy over Kurdish Policy*, Moscow, 1975, Print.

30 Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship*, 170.

Soviet Deputy Chief of Near East Countries Department:

Some of Moscow's reticence about the Iraqi-Iranian rapprochement can probably be put to the Soviets' apparent total exclusion from a role as mid-wife. However, we suspect that there may be deeper Soviet concerns about the negative effect an improvement in Iraqi-Iranian bilateral relations can have on Soviet Relations with Iraq. A reduction in Iraqi-Iranian tensions and Baghdad's apparent success in dealing with the Kurdish Rebellion (in a manner which most report indicate Moscow has opposed) will almost certainly reduce two of Moscow's major sources of leverage with Baghdad.³¹

Moscow's exclusion from the negotiation process illustrated Iraq's independence from the Soviet Union. Had Iraq been a true Soviet satellite state, the Soviet Union would likely have greatly modified if not entirely prevented the treaty.

Shortly after signing the Algiers Accord, Saddam Hussein made a highly anticipated visit to Moscow, which addressed several interests between the two countries. Hussein bragged about the Algiers Accord, calling it a "major Iraqi achievement," and assured the Soviet Union that both Iran and Iraq were "implementing it by joint efforts and cooperation."³² The Soviets still worried about the conclusion to the Kurdish uprising. They feared that if changes were not made, the Kurds would again attempt to overpower Iraqi forces. Interestingly, according to the US State Department, the Soviets "waxed pedantically eloquent about [their] 'rich experience' in resolving nationality problems. He assured Iraq that a policy directed at a 'democratic solution' of the national question would always meet 'understanding' from the Soviet people."³³ Although the Soviets hoped Iraq would take a more humanitarian stance to the Kurds, Iraq did not oblige. For Iraq, the signing of the Algiers Accord opened up possibilities for a new regional security network, with limited Soviet influence. This potential regionalism alerted the Soviets who had hoped for regional hegemony in the Middle East.

Although these regional issues weakened the Soviet Union's influence, Iraq's treatment of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) deeply disturbed the Soviet Union as well. During the Kurdish hostilities, the ICP worked to consolidate its power and increase its membership and publications throughout Iraq. In the spring of 1976, the ICP held its Third Party Congress, where it condemned the government's oppression. In turn, Baghdad used a "vitriolic propaganda campaign against the Communists."³⁴ By this time, the Ba'th Security Apparatus, including the

31 USA, Department of State, *Soviet Views on Iraq-Iran Relations*, Moscow, 1975, Print.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship*, 183.

Mukhabarrat (secret police) and Amn al-Amn (general security police), had consolidated its power. The government was purged of non-Ba'ithi and became omnipresent in all spheres of life. Arguably, Hussein and the Ba'ith used what they had learned from the Soviets and what they had admired in Stalin to implement an authoritarian regime. Interestingly, the government's desire for control in the spirit of the Soviet Union led to the crackdown on the ICP. In 1978, the Revolutionary Command Council, the leadership of the Ba'ith, made non-Ba'ithi political activity illegal for any former military men.³⁵ Since Iraq required military service, this ruling applied to every man over the age of eighteen. Certainly, these purges and consolidations affected more than just the Communist party. However, for a country with formal ties to the Soviet Union, this treatment of the ICP was particularly unexpected. The Soviet Union supported Communist parties worldwide, both monetarily and strategically. The Ba'ith effectively deteriorated the Soviet-Iraqi Alliance by attacking the ICP in such a manner.

Economic Theory

Much of Soviet-Iraqi relations have been driven by their mutual desire for alliance and economic partnership. The best illumination of their relationship can be found in dependency theory, an economic theory that may provide insight into the power struggle that defined much of their interaction. The theory developed toward the end of imperialism in the 1940s, as colonized countries started launching independence movements, and thus began to face a new set of economic challenges. The development theory attributed these countries' underdevelopment to their continued reliance on old economic structures. Overall, dependency theory asserts that the same controller and controlled relationship exists after official independence. Fernando Cardoso and Enzo Falleto, an expert in the field, explained that "[t]he contradiction between the attempt to cope with the market situation in a politically autonomous way and the de facto situation of dependency characterizes what is the specific ambiguity of nations where political sovereignty is expressed by the new state and where economic subordination is reinforced by the inter-national division of labor and by the economic control exerted by former or new imperialist centers."³⁶ Scholars continue to cite this form of nominal independence as the cause of the Third World's twenty-first century underdevelopment. The chronic underdevelopment of states proved highly exploitable by both the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

However, it would be imprudent to consider this dependency scenario unchanged by the Cold War. The bilateral nature of the world during this period kept the United States and Soviet Union pitted directly against each other. Certain countries used their desired alliance as a 'bargaining chip' to negotiate the best deal. During the Cold War, relationships described by dependency theorists slowly inverted

³⁵ Ibid., 186.

³⁶ Ibid.

themselves, a concept explained in reverse dependency theory. Highly motivated powers seeking footholds in strategic regions often bowed to the demands of a “subordinate” party, such as Iraq. As a result, these relationships shifted daily and on the whim of the “subordinate” state. The United States and Soviet Union became relatively dependent on the huge influx of money from the arms trade, which relied primarily on the clientage of underdeveloped states. Klare, author of “Fueling the Fire: How We Armed the Middle East,” details this paradigm using arms sales. He wrote, referencing the Client-Supplier relationship,

[b]y agreeing to provide arms to a client, the supplier seeks a local ally for its ongoing struggle against the other superpower. Once the relationship has been forged, however, the recipient comes to expect continuing and even expanded arms deliveries in exchange for its continued loyalty to the supplier – and any reluctance on the part of the supplier will be condemned as evidence of inconstancy and unreliability, the result is ‘reverse dependency.’ The patron finds itself beholden to the good will of the client, and must satisfy the client’s appetite for modern arms.³⁷

As the client states held most of the power, they were able to negotiate deals with enormous gains. Given each side’s loss is the other’s gain, the client will always have a supplier. The political structure of the Cold War allowed concepts described in reverse dependency to thrive, as the client states benefited from the superpowers’ tactical interests.

Although this relationship accurately depicted reverse dependency theory, the Soviets had their own economic and political tactics for developing strategic relationships. The Soviet Union started giving a third world country military or economic aid that would then develop into a level of import and export dependence, ultimately leading the country to politically align itself with Soviet ideologies.³⁸ This plan relied on the ability of the third world country’s trade dependence to influence its foreign policy. However, Iraq became an example of the reverse dependency theory, because its economic activities afforded the country certain economic freedoms. The NATO report on the Mediterranean Situation in 1975 noted, “[a]ccording to certain reports the USSR has suspended arms deliveries to Iraq as a sign of its displeasure over certain steps taken by Baghdad.”³⁹ However, this effort to assert its dominance backfired, spurring Iraq to turn to the West, particularly to France, for trade and the sale of oil. Of non-Communist countries

37 Klare, “Fueling the Fire: How We Armed the Middle East,” 21.

38 Philip G. Roeder, “The Ties that Bind: Aide, Trade, and Political Compliance in Soviet-Third World Relations,” *International Studies Quarterly* 29, no. 2 (1985): 192.

39 USA, NATO, Draft Report to NATO Ministers on Mediterranean Situation, 21 October 1975, Print.

in 1976-1979, France led Iraqi exports with \$8,099,000,000 (1980 USD).⁴⁰ Other Soviet satellites did not possess the same autonomy and bargaining power, as they were often relatively smaller, ideologically Communist, or under more constrictive economic auspices with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet-Iraqi relationship provides an interesting and rich case study of strategic armament and proxy wars during the Cold War. Conventional studies of this period would suggest that the Soviet Union and the United States dominated all their foreign relationships; the bilateral world that they created featured their power politics and their control. However, through the study of Iraq, it becomes evident that supposedly compliant states sometimes enjoyed dominance in their relations with the superpowers. This mutually exploitative system reveals the intensely calculated nature of the movements and developments of Cold War alliances. The Iraqi case also highlights the flaws in the Soviet Union's plan for developing compliant states. Specifically, the superpower's inability to effectively retain these alliances may have contributed to its ultimate downfall. Still, the Iraqi case is unique in that the state had several abnormalities including Saddam Hussein's shrewd skills and immense crude oil reserves. However, if Iraq's circumstances were less favorable, or if Hussein had not been in power, perhaps the Soviet Union would have maintained the upper hand and Iraq would have succumbed to Communism. However Iraq was the dominant power in this relationship, which caused Soviet attempts to develop a compliant state to be completely futile. In reality, the Soviet efforts gave Iraq every tool it needed to flourish on its own and play both sides of the bilateral world.

40 Smolansky, *The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence*, 32.

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
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German Attitudes towards Islam and the Threat to Liberal Democracy

BY DAVID STERN
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Abstract

This paper analyzes the extent to which antipathy towards Islam in Germany poses a threat to liberal democratic institutions (e.g. free practice of religion, separation of church and state, access to the right of citizenship). I explore two cases in which institutional protections against ethnic and religious discrimination proved insufficient in isolating the effects of popular illiberal sentiment on public policy. The first finds several causal links between the ascendancy of multiculturalism in public and political discourse and outcomes in integration policy. The second reveals a systematic failure of constitutional mechanisms in dismantling institutional discrimination. Despite constitutional safeguards to resist waves of illiberalism, or anti-democratic behavior, very little stands in the way of anti-Muslim sentiment from becoming a political reality in Germany. Politicians play a significant role in this process, and may find that their posturing is indeed a dangerous game.

Introduction

German Chancellor Angela Merkel's proclamation that multiculturalism is dead resonated far beyond the walls of the Christian Democratic Union's (CDU) youth conference. In newspapers around the world, this rightward lurch was easily contextualized within the controversy following the release of Thilo Sarrazin's "Deutschland schafft sich ab" (Germany Does Away with Itself). Sarrazin, a SPD

(Social Democratic Party) politician and former board member of Germany's central bank, claimed Muslim immigrants are intellectually inferior to ethnic Germans. Public debates about multiculturalism in Germany are hardly new – as a political issue, they can be traced back to the 1980's. However, recent developments altered the way public discourse is conducted. The straitjacket of permissibility and political correctness has been removed, and German politicians show no reticence in exploiting public sentiment for political gain. This paper explores whether this development poses a threat to liberal democracy in Germany and whether the political system, as established in the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), can resist this kind of antidemocratic movement.

Background of Immigration and Citizenship

Multiculturalism has long been a controversial concept in Europe. Outside of its debatable denotation, multiculturalism's association with themes of immigration, citizenship, integration, and national identity make it a loaded term. Determining the impact of multiculturalism's importance as a political issue cannot be done without understanding these issues in their German context. Germany's approach to multiculturalism – that of accommodation, rather than non-hierarchical pluralism – can be traced back to the Basic Law. Articles 3 and 4 of the Basic Law protect citizens from being discriminated against (*benachteiligt*), or given preferential treatment (*bevorzugt*) on the basis of gender, ancestry, race, language, background, and religious or political beliefs. Despite these formal protections, most non-ethnic Germans and immigrants are treated as "others" in practice and discourse.

Since the first immigration contracts were signed in the 1950's, Germany has viewed immigration as a tightly managed, temporary solution to national shortages in skilled labor. Between 1961 and 1973, the number of guest workers (*Gastarbeiter*) of Turkish origin rose from 6,700 to 650,000 – about 15.2% of the non-ethnic population of Germany.¹ The idea behind this program, as the name implies, is that the immigrant laborers were "guests" and would eventually return to their country of origin. This was reinforced through a succession of immigration policies. In the 1970's, the policy of rotation sent workers home after a year, effectively preventing permanent settlement; 2.5 million Turkish guest workers who took part in this program did not, in fact, settle in Germany.²

Until a reform law was passed in 1999, German citizenship was defined by *jus sanguinis* (right of blood) rather than the *jus soli* (right of soil), the latter being the legal standard used by almost all Western democracies. This definition of citizenship is alluded to in the Basic Law, but established primarily by the 1913 Imperial and

1 Ayhan Kaya, *Islam, Migration and Integration: The Age of Securitization* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 42.

2 *Ibid.*, 42.

National Citizenship Law (Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz).³ Brought about by Kaiser Wilhelm in order to establish a common German identity that would unify the Reich, the law predicated citizenship on ethnic identity (Volksdeutschen). In his comparison of American and German citizenship criteria, Mathias Bös points out that this law, which is reinforced by Article 116 of the Basic Law, laid the foundation for membership based on ethnicity. Not to be overlooked is the key difference between Staatsangehörigkeit (nationality, or membership in a state) and Staatsbürgerschaft (citizenship, or membership in a nationally constituted society).⁴ This distinction still plays a key role in the politics of naturalization, where assimilation to ethnic German culture is considered a necessary condition of belonging to German society.

While Article 116 gives ethnic Germans and their descendants the right to naturalize, the laws governing naturalization for foreigners are rather rigorous. Not until the reinstatement of the Ausländergesetz in 1991, was there a law that established a path to citizenship for immigrants. Requiring fifteen years of residency, this law was only a small step towards liberalizing immigration policy. Additionally, it left intact the requirement that applicants demonstrate knowledge of German culture (Bekanntnis zum deutschen Kulturkreis), which was not amended until the 1999 reforms. Under this requirement, an applicant, who had actively participated in an ethnic association, could not become a citizen – an obstacle many Turkish immigrants faced, having otherwise been excluded from the German civic sphere. Although this requirement was abolished, it was replaced with stringent language requirements, knowledge of the German political system, and a loyalty oath swearing allegiance to the German constitution.⁵

These requirements and the differentiation of nationality from citizenship are important in understanding Germany's policies towards Muslims today. The politics of naturalization in Germany require the applicant to conform to Leitkultur (literally: leading or dominant culture), which, as Jürgen Habermas recently wrote, "...depends on the misconception that the liberal state should demand more of its immigrants than learning the language of the country and accepting the principles of the Constitution."⁶ The threat to Germany from radical Islamists has brought discourse in Germany to a fever pitch. Much like their European and American counterparts, German politicians have channeled anxieties about Islam and foreigners into rhetoric that would require the state to take a greater role in

3 Ibid., 45.

4 M Bös, 'The Legal Construction of Membership: Nationality Law in Germany and the United States,' Germany and Europe Working Papers Series 00.5, (The Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies at Harvard University), 5. <http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu/publications/docs/pdfs/Boes.pdf>.

5 Ruud Koopmans, *Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe*. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2005), 53.

6 Jürgen Habermas, "Leadership and Leitkultur," *The New York Times*, October 11, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/29/opinion/29Habermas.html?pagewanted=1&ref=immigration>.

integrating immigrants, specifically by requiring a higher-degree of assimilation from immigrants and citizens of immigrant background.

“Islam as a threat to democracy”

“We do not support religious exclusion -- and certainly not racial exclusion,” Geert Wilders, the notoriously outspoken Dutch politician told the German periodical, *Der Spiegel*, “We have no problems with other skin colors, or with Muslims – our problem is with Islam.”⁷ Though Wilders inhabits an extreme in public discourse, his popularity and that of his German counterparts reveal the popular perception of a Huntingtonian clash of civilizations (*Kulturkampf*) between Christianity and Islam. Recent polls indicate that opposition to Islam comes not from a fear of possible violent terrorist attacks, but the perceived threat Islam poses to Christian society and liberal democratic ideals such as freedom of speech, tolerance, and peaceful public discourse. The fatwa against Salman Rushdie, the violent murder of Theo van Gogh, and the enormous fallout following Danish cartoonist Kurt Westergaard’s portrayals of Mohammed give evidence to those who claim Islam is incompatible with liberal democratic values. The violent response and continued threats of violence that underlie self-censorship of the media undoubtedly pose a threat to freedom of speech. The common response to these events – conflating Islam with an outspoken and radical minority – poses an even greater one.

A recent study on rightwing extremism conducted by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation – a think-tank associated with Germany’s Social Democratic Party – revealed alarmingly high and rapidly increasing Islamophobic sentiment in Germany. According to the study, 53.7% of respondents “who otherwise tend to reject rightwing extremist statements” agreed with the statement, “I can easily understand that Arabs make some people uncomfortable” and 55.5% with the statement, “The practice of religion should be limited considerably for Muslims in Germany.” Additionally, 55.4% of all respondents agreed to the first statement, an increase from 44.2% in 2003.⁸ One can only speculate as to the reason this sentiment is increasingly common among Germans. However, the survey offers several other perspectives that may shine a light on these Islamophobic attitudes. Of the respondents, 23.6% agreed at least in part with the statement, “What Germany needs now is a single strong party that embodies the *Volksgemeinschaft*.” Literally meaning “people’s society”, the desire for a *Volksgemeinschaft*, a concept with a historically racial connotation, reveals a concern for the waning dominance of traditional German society and culture.

The responses to three questions regarding xenophobic behavior are somewhat

7 “Spiegel Interview with Geert Wilders,” *Der Spiegel*, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,727978,00.html>.

8 “Right-Wing Extremism 2010,” *Spiegel Online – Nachrichten*, <http://www.spiegel.de/flash/flash-24552.html>.

more revealing. The following three statements all received support from 31% to 36%: "Germany is becoming too foreign to a dangerous degree because of the number of foreigners here," "When the number of jobs available shrinks, foreigners should be sent back to their home countries," and "Foreigners just come here in order to take advantage of our welfare state." These results partially explain the xenophobic sentiment as it relates to a weakening economy. Though the connection between economic insecurity and Islamophobic sentiment may seem tendentious, Habermas convincingly argues that antipathy towards immigrants, the attraction to charismatic politicians who appeal to Islamophobic sentiment, and opposition to the Stuttgart 21 train station renovation are all linked, writing:

"But they meet in the cumulative effect of a growing uneasiness when faced with a self-enclosed and ever more helpless political system. The more the scope for action by national governments shrinks and the more meekly politics submits to what appear to be inevitable economic imperatives, the more people's trust in a resigned political class diminishes."⁹

The German electorate's increasing frustration with its (perceived) diminishing influence in public policy formation and the view that their leadership is unable to effectively confront important issues may be the keystone holding all these crucial issues together. Indeed, 94% of people in the above study agreed with the statement "People like me don't have any influence on what the government does anyway."¹⁰ The increasing visibility of Muslims may contribute to a feeling of helplessness Germans have in their ability to assert control over their social and cultural environments. Globalization and European integration may have reduced the control Germans have in their own lives, but Islam, and therefore Turkish immigrants, became the easy target of a disenfranchised electorate. Though legitimate immigration issues exist in Germany, labor statistics show that a declining German birthrate and a shortage of labor in specific industries actually require more skilled labor. As German politicians increasingly manipulate public fears of Islam to maintain public approval, there is a danger that Muslims will be scapegoated at great detriment to liberal democracy.

Scapegoating and the Dangers of Political Posturing

Since last year's reelection as Chancellor, the approval ratings of Angela Merkel and her ruling coalition with the Free Democrats (FDP) have been in freefall. Facing public frustration with her initial indecisiveness and subsequent decision to bail out Greece economically, her staunch support for the unpopular Stuttgart 21 project – an expansive renovation of Stuttgart's main train station and downtown area – and the decision to extend the life of nuclear power plants, it is no surprise that she appears to be digging herself in an ideological corner with her stance on immigration and

9 Habermas, "Leadership and Leitkultur."

10 "Right-Wing Extremism 2010," Spiegel Online – Nachrichten.

multiculturalism. More remarkable than Merkel's proclamation that multiculturalism is dead, is the attention received by President Christian Wulff's comments in the wake of the Thilo Sarrazin debate. "The future belongs to nations that are open to cultural diversity...Christianity doubtless belongs in Germany. Judaism belongs doubtless in Germany. That is our Judeo-Christian history. But now, Islam also belongs in Germany," Wulff said.¹¹ Wulff's comments may seem innocuous, but they set off a firestorm as conservative politicians swung to the right and lambasted the CDU politician. The reactions to Wulff's comments sketch the landscape of opinion on the state's role vis-à-vis Muslims. The chorus sounds off:

Aiman Mazyek (Leader of Germany's Central Council of Muslims – Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland - ZMD): "The inner unity of Germany is not achieved only by bringing together East and West, but rather by allowing the different cultures and religions to grow together."¹² Gregor Gysi, a politician of The Left (Die Linke), took issue with the assumption that the responsibility to integrate lies solely on the shoulders of immigrants: "It's not only immigrants who are responsible for integrating but also Germany."¹³

Members of the Christian Social Union (CSU), the Bavarian sister party to the CDU, were some of the most vocal opponents to Wulff's comments. Several CSU politicians explicitly called for a Christian Leitkultur, by suggesting Islam should be subjugated to the "major" religions in Germany. Christine Haderthauer, the Bavarian Social Affairs Minister, said, "Religious freedom must not become religious equality." Her colleague Norbert Geis, a CSU representative in the Bundestag (the lower house of the national Parliament) was even more explicit, "If the president wants to put Islam in Germany on an equal footing with Christianity and Judaism, then I think that is wrong."¹⁴ CSU Leader and Minister-President of the state of Bavaria, Horst Seehofer, even went so far to say Germany should stop accepting Turkish and Arab immigrants.¹⁵

Merkel has since hedged her earlier comments and articulated a position just to the right of Wulff's, whose candidacy as President she promoted just months before. The Chancellor endorsed the President's words, but added that Muslim immigrants must accept German values and that the Basic Law must supersede Shariah law.^{16 17} The reactions to Wulff's comment demonstrate several major themes shaping Germany's

11 "Religious Tolerance Meets with Praise and Criticism," Deutsche Welle, <http://www.dw-world.com/dw/article/0,,6070436,00.html>.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Siobhán Dowling, "The World from Berlin: 'Should Muslims Be Treated on an Equal Footing?'" Spiegel Online – Nachrichten, October 8, 2010, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,722065,00.html>.

15 Judy Dempsey, "German Politician Makes Anti-Immigrant Remarks," The New York Times, October 12, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/12/world/europe/12iht-germany.html>.

16 "Religious Tolerance Meets with Praise and Criticism," Deutsche Welle.

17 Dowling, "The World from Berlin: 'Should Muslims Be Treated on an Equal Footing?'"

policy towards Muslim immigrants. First is the focus on agency. Supporters of integration called on the immigrants and their communities to act, rather than focusing on the policy of the state. Wulff found support during a diplomatic trip to Turkey he took shortly after making the comments.

Turkish President Abdullah Gul called for the assimilation of Turkish immigrant in Germany, "It is a duty for all of us to ensure every citizen speaks the language of the country they reside in fluently...the use of integration issues for political capital should be avoided, everybody must contribute to a solution instead."¹⁸ Despite the fallout among German politicians, Wulff's comments won him some political capital, as Gul's comments legitimized the state's management of integration issues, primarily before the integration summit the ruling coalition held later in November. In the run-up to the summit, Merkel also solidified her alliance with President Wulff, by declaring that all parties were responsible for solving the problem of integration. Though little was achieved at the meeting, CDU politicians pushed Merkel's integration agenda, which includes increasing language and integration courses and recognizing foreign degrees and training certificates.¹⁹

Merkel and Wulff's active engagement varies greatly from Merkel's right-baiting statements on multiculturalism and Shariah law. Though she may have toned down her rhetoric, she may have spawned a fissure between the CDU and CSU, who have historically had a non-competitive relationship. As seen by CSU politicians' assertion that Christianity must be actively valued above Islam – the second major theme of the comments – the party has picked up the torch of reactionary rhetoric. Although the CSU may be intensifying their program in the wake of last year's historic loss of their absolute majority in Bavaria, the specter of their policies taking hold is very real. If Merkel's coalition collapses – a possibility with elections in five federal states (why italicize?) next year – Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg, the increasingly popular Defense Minister and CSU politician, could win her seat. With the wave of popular Islamophobia unleashed by Sarazzin, this could be the perfect storm of radical politics and a weak coalition. Even if the ruling coalition simply moves to the right to capture this popular sentiment, illiberal policies towards immigration and the free practice of religion could be implemented.

Policy Mechanisms of Consultation and Restraint

What makes this kind of institutional discrimination possible, if not easy, is the Basic Law's establishment of a corporatist, consociational political system. While

18 "Germany's Turks Urged to Learn German to Integrate," BBC News: Europe, October 19, 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11578657>.

19 Anna Reimann, "Endless Pledges: German Integration Summit Delivers Little," Spiegel Online – Nachrichten, November 4, 2010, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,727238,00.html>.

the Basic Law establishes freedom of religion, it also requires consultation with peak organization (Spitzenverbände), which includes civil society and religious organizations. In practice, there is no strict separation of church and state. Outside of political consultation, the Catholic and Protestant (Evangelische) churches play a major role in the state's implementation of education (religious instruction is required in school) and social welfare programs. The Basic Law permits the free practice of religion (Article 3), but reserves the right to grant religious organizations public corporation status to individual states (Article 140).²⁰ Receiving this status is essential for a religious organization to effectively operate within the state. Formal recognition confers the ability to receive funding from the state and to have the state collect Kirchensteuer (church taxes), which are funds allocated to religious organizations from the federal taxes paid by their parishioners.

The failure to recognize a Muslim organization in any Land or to recognize Islam as a state religion demonstrates that the CSU's calls for a Christian Leitkultur are already institutionalized. In October, Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière rejected calls from opposition parties to recognize Islam as a state religion, "If you now ask: Will Islam be put on the same level as the Judeo-Christian understanding of religion and culture that we have, then my answer is: not for the foreseeable future."²¹ As an integrationist, Maizière's stance against recognizing Islam is puzzling, considering this policy perpetuates the exclusion of Muslim organization from the political system. Lack of this recognition can effectively hinder the efforts of Muslim communities in building mosques, providing religious instruction in schools, and the right to be consulted as a religious community in the formation of public policy relevant to their interests.

The pitfalls of Germany's consociational political process are evident in the breakdown of the second German Islamic Conference in May. Established by Maizière's predecessor, Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, the goal of the conference was to facilitate discussion and coordinate policy regarding the Muslim community. In order to meet the state's desire to consult a singular representative body, four Muslim umbrella organizations [Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion (DITIB), the Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren (VIKZ), the Islamrat (IR) and the ZMD] formed an overarching association (Koordinierungsrat der Muslime – KRM).²² This top-down attempt to reduce an ideologically, religiously, and ethnically diverse Muslim community faced many difficulties. During the conference this May, the ZMD took issue with the government's management of the conference and pulled out of the discussions. Among the reasons ZMD Chairman Ayyub Axel Köhler cited for pulling out of the conference were: Maizière's refusal to recognize Islam as an

20 Joel S. Fetzer, and J. Christopher Soper, *Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 108-9.

21 Dowling, "The World from Berlin: 'Should Muslims Be Treated on an Equal Footing?'"

22 Kaya, *Islam, Migration and Integration: The Age of Securitization*, 172.

official religion, that it was “a conference decreed by the federal government,” and that it excluded half of Germany’s “Mosque-centered” communities.²³ This last point was indeed relevant: the Interior Ministry excluded the entire umbrella organization IR from the conference, citing a criminal investigation into a leader of one of its member organizations, Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüş (IGMG).²⁴ The Interior Ministry’s exclusion of groups it perceived as radical from the discussion seems to have doomed the meeting from the outset.

While the politics of association prevent the federal government from coordinating policy towards German Muslims and Muslim immigrants, most of this policy is actually executed by the states (Länder) and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz -BfV).²⁵ This has created a patchwork of regulations, where permission to give religious instruction, build mosques, and form associations is decided on a local level, and usually outside of public scrutiny.

The ability for states to establish discriminatory laws, despite the Basic Law’s provision for free practice of religion, was permitted in a 2003 decision by the Constitutional Court. In the case, the Stuttgart school system would not hire Ferestha Ludin, a German-Afghani refugee, as a teacher because she wore a headscarf. The court, which has the responsibility to enforce federal law over state law, ruled in favor of the plaintiff, but not on the grounds that her right to free religious practice had been violated. Rather, it was determined that the plaintiff had been wrongfully treated because there was no law in Baden-Württemberg that prohibited instructors from wearing headscarves in classrooms. Though cultural, and not religious, matters are relegated to the states, the court’s deference to the state in this case empowered states to legislate in matter of religion. In response to the Ludin decision, Baden-Württemberg passed legislation that prohibited teachers from wearing headscarves in classrooms under the pretense that they had to be neutral with regard to “values.” Bavaria responded similarly to a Constitutional Court case that prohibited the state from mandating the presence of crucifixes in classrooms.²⁶ The state circumvented the court’s decision by re-legislating the mandate as a matter of cultural heritage.²⁷ These events created a dangerous precedent. By painting religious matters as cultural matters, states could promote Christianity and exclude Islam from the

23 “Blow to Islamic Conference as Leading Muslims Pull out,” *The Local - Germany’s News in English*, <http://www.thelocal.de/national/20100513-27177.html>.

24 “Government’s Islamic Conference Gets off to a Rocky Start,” *The Local - Germany’s News in English*, <http://www.thelocal.de/national/20100517-27251.html>.

25 Bernard Godard, “Official Recognition of Islam,” *European Islam: Challenges for Public Policy and Society*, ed. Samir Amghar and Amel Boubekeur (Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies, 2007), 188.

26 Jytte Klausen, *The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 177.

27 *Ibid.*, 177-78.

public sphere. In failing to enforce the supremacy of federal law and by not ruling on the “neutrality” issue, the court tacitly condoned the states’ actions.

The power of the states to grant public corporation status to religious association has been an obstacle to the integration of Muslim communities. In cases of mosque-building and providing religious instruction, non-recognition, Muslim communities must face public resistance, political maneuvering, and bureaucratic red tape. With domain over education policy, states have been forced to react to increasing demand for Islamic-oriented religious instruction in schools. Article 7 of the Basic Law establishes religious instruction as part of the core curriculum. The particular doctrine of the instruction is to be determined by the relevant religious community. Some states, like Hamburg and North-Rhein Westphalia, have responded to the demand by offering courses closer in content to comparative religion than to religious instruction. Because Muslim communities remain unincorporated, the states have no obligation to consult Muslim communities regarding the content, or even to acknowledge the demand at all.²⁸ In a single case, Berlin was forced to recognize the Islamische Föderation Berlin (IFB) as a religious society in order to provide Islamic religious instruction. The Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) ruled that Berlin had to recognize the association; otherwise the group would not be officially permitted to administer the course.

Cultural concerns also have an undue influence in states’ decisions regarding group recognition. Many restrictions are placed on recognition status, including the requirement that such organization be democratic. Unlike the Basic Law’s provision that bans undemocratic parties – which has been applied twice, with the oversight of the Constitutional Court – there is little regulation of a state’s or the BfV’s (the Federal Office for Protection of the Constitution) determination of “undemocratic behavior”.²⁹ In an essay on Muslim citizenship in Germany, Werner Schiffauer examines the BfV’s categorization of Islamist ideologies. The spectrum consists of three types: subcategory A (pan-Islamist jihadists, who use terror attack to threaten the state), subcategory B (Islamist organization who use violent means to change the host society), and subcategory C (organization that ‘fight for Islamist positions in the context of the social life of the Federal Republic or at least try to establish spaces for organized Islamist engagement’).³⁰ At the end of the spectrum, subcategory C’s definition of Islamism is the most vague, and therefore open to subjective interpretation. The consequences of being considered Islamist and receiving one of these labels could be severe; it could cause an organization to be outlawed or put a halt to naturalization proceedings.

28 Fetzter and Soper, *Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany*, 112.

29 *Ibid.*, 115.

30 Schiffauer Werner, “Enemies within the Gates: The Debate about the Citizenship of Muslims in Germany,” *Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: A European Approach*, eds. Tariq Modood, Anna Triandafyllidou, and Ricard Zapata-Barrero (London: Routledge, 2006), 98.

Schiffauer's examination of the BfV's investigation of Millî Görüş shows just how fickle perception of Islamism can be. To the BfV, the beliefs of first generation members of Millî Görüş towards the creation of an Islamic political order in Turkey were evidence that the group's beliefs were incompatible with democracy. Schiffauer points out that the desire of an Islamic political order may be contextual – an ideal for those remaining in Turkey, whose minority status would not have allowed free practice of religion. For members raised in Germany, this ideology may not hold true.³¹ Because the BfV cannot know the true ideology of the organization, it must maintain its suspicion and assume that Millî Görüş and many Muslim organizations are Islamist, whether or not it is actually true. An example of observations of Millî Görüş' activity in Baden-Württemberg shows just how capricious the BfV's evidence of "undemocratic behavior" can be. A swimming event organized by the youth branch of Millî Görüş in Düsseldorf called for male teenagers to wear bathing suits in accordance with Islamic dress rules – bathing suits that go from knee to navel. This elicited the response: "The IGMG evidently considers it to be appropriate to distance itself from the majority society by ostentatious emphasis on religious rules."³² The condescension towards the group's behavior highlights Germany's conflation of an immigrant's failure to assimilate with the immigrant's views on democracy.

The Future of Islam in Germany

As Germany's Muslim population continues to grow, German politicians will find it increasingly difficult to play the politics of religion. The nature of the consultative system has allowed German politicians to deny access to Muslims to political institutions and to effectively exclude them from political and civic life. Any politician that is serious about integration must recognize Islam as an official religion, and prevent the systemic discrimination of non-recognition that pervades the Länder. The failure of the Constitutional Court to prevent the implementation of discriminatory policies against Germany's minorities lays bare the danger of the game German politicians are playing. Appealing to increasingly popular reactionary sentiment by asserting the dominance of Christian *Leitkultur* threatens to exacerbate a system of institutionalized discrimination. As German politicians increase their illiberal rhetoric, they may find they have damaged liberal democratic values more than they thought Muslims ever could.

31 Ibid., 99.

32 Ibid., 101.

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Analyzing the Causes of the Suez War Through the Lens of Realism

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Abstract

This paper will analyze the causes of the Suez Crisis and the war that soon followed between Egypt on one side and Great Britain, France, and Israel on the other. The war's causes cannot be attributed simply to the events that immediately preceded the crisis. These causes were latent in a series of events that occurred over the course of two years before the Suez Crisis actually began. While there are a number of theoretical frameworks through which one can view these events that led to the Suez Crisis, realism best explains the causes of the crisis and the war that soon followed. Nationalism and misperceptions are two alternative theoretical frameworks through which the causes of the Suez Crisis and the subsequent war could be explained. Yet ultimately Egypt's nationalist rhetoric and Britain's misperceptions were primarily fueled by realist concerns.

Introduction

The causes of the Suez Crisis and the war that soon followed between Egypt on one side and Great Britain, France, and Israel on the other cannot be attributed simply to the events that immediately preceded the crisis such as the nationalization of the Suez Canal or the withdrawing of funding for the Aswan Dam. By deploying an extensive array of primary and secondary sources, this paper will subsequently

argue that the causes of the Suez Crisis were latent in a series of events that occurred over the course of two years before the crisis itself actually began. While there are a number of theoretical frameworks through which one can view the events that led to the Suez Crisis, realism best explains the causes of the crisis and the war that soon followed. A careful analysis of the events leading up to the Suez Crisis will demonstrate that the primary concern of all states involved in the crisis was the desire to maintain their own security as well as the overall balance of power in the Middle East. As a result, it was tensions among the actors involved in the Suez Crisis, centered on realist concerns, that eventually led to the Suez Crisis and the war that would follow. Specifically, in the case of the Suez Crisis, access to oil was more of a realist concern than an economic one, since access to oil was viewed as a strategic necessity vital to the survival of the state, rather than purely an economic function. Although other theoretical frameworks such as nationalism and misperceptions can also help explain the causes of the Suez Crisis, tensions between the actors, however, centered primarily on realist concerns. Furthermore, in the absence of realist objectives, nationalism and misperceptions alone could not have caused the Suez Crisis and the war that would follow.

Before delving into the events leading up to the Suez Crisis, it is important to highlight some key tenets of realism that are relevant to the events and tensions of the time. According to realism, the international system is in a state of anarchy: unlike a state, there exists no overriding force that can constrain the aggressive actions of other states in the global arena. Because no effective international police force exists, states must therefore engage in self-help or take unilateral measures in order to protect themselves.¹ This situation gives rise to a phenomenon known as the security dilemma - a form of the prisoners dilemma - in which state A will arm itself, often times with the mere intention of securing its sovereignty. In truth, however, this action will make state A less secure, since other states will become suspicious of state A's intentions, leading to a perpetual arms race.² Thus, in a world dictated by the tenets of realism, the only way to preserve peace and mitigate the effects of anarchy is through a balance of power system, which ensures that no one state can get so powerful that it will be able to threaten the sovereignty of another state. Furthermore, in a realist world, interest is solely defined in terms of power, meaning that all states are essentially undifferentiated units that compete for power, and the particular motives or ideology of a state are irrelevant; only power matters.³ Analyzing the events leading up to the Suez Crisis through these key tenets of realism reveal the reasons as to why the Suez Crisis and the subsequent war occurred.

1 Kenneth Waltz, *Man the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), 201.

2 *Ibid.*, 183.

3 Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Knopf, 1964), 8-10.

An appreciation of the significant long-term causes of the Suez Crisis requires an understanding of the more immediate causes. In the months preceding the crisis, the United States and Great Britain decided to fund Egypt's Aswan Dam project. Both these states feared that Egypt was moving into the Soviet sphere of influence, and therefore sought to appease Nasser by funding the Aswan dam. In June 1956, Nasser recognized Communist China in order to guarantee Egypt a steady source of arms in case the Soviet Union did not continue to supply Egypt.⁴ The United States, in response to Nasser's recognition, withdrew funding for the dam.⁵ In turn, Nasser reasoned that he would be able to gain an alternative source of funding for the Aswan Dam through the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. On July 26, 1956, Nasser announced that he was nationalizing the canal, thereby initiating the crisis. Subsequently, on October 29 of the same year, Israel attacked the Egyptian army in the Sinai, which was followed by the British and French attack two days later. Between the nationalization and war itself, there were numerous attempts on the part of the United States and the UN to alleviate the crisis. Yet, from the start, only four days after nationalization, France placed its forces under British command and both countries began to draw up a joint military plan for possible operations against Egypt.⁶ Furthermore, even in the months preceding Nasser's nationalization, a memoranda circulated in the British foreign office stating that "the only possible ways of disrupting the present course of the Egyptian regime were: (i) the death of Nasser; (ii) a free hand to the Israelis."⁷ Nasser's nationalization of the canal thus served as a mere pretext for Britain and France to invade Egypt. Once the crisis began, war essentially became inevitable, as illustrated by the fact that both Britain and France began planning a military strike almost immediately after nationalization took place, and it was only a question of when the war would commence. Tensions previously existed between Britain, France and Israel on one side, and Egypt on the other, in the years preceding the crisis, which were fueled primarily by realist concerns. An analysis of these tensions can help explain why these countries colluded to attack Egypt,⁸ and why there were already plans to use force against Egypt before the crisis actually began.

In the years leading up to the Suez Crisis, the primary goal of two of its main actors, Egypt and Britain, was to ensure that they would possess a position of power in the Middle East. In the early years of Nasser's rule, his main complaint against Britain was directed against the presence of the large military bases in the Suez, yet this complaint was motivated purely by his desire for Egypt to remain sovereign rather

4 Michael Oren, *The Origins of the Second Arab-Israeli War* (London: Frank Cass, 1992), 92.

5 Laura M. James, *Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 22.

6 James, *Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy*, 33; Keith Kyle, "Britain and the Crisis," in *Suez 1956*, ed. WM. Roger Louis and Roger Owen (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 112.

7 James, *Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy*, 16.

8 Kyle, "Britain in the Crisis," 126-128.

than an ideological aversion towards the colonial powers.⁹ Indeed, following the signing of the June 1954, Anglo-Egyptian treaty in which Britain agreed to pull all its troops from the Suez in 20 months, Nasser remarked how the treaty was “a turning point [in] a new era of friendly relations...between Egypt, Britain, and Western countries.”¹⁰ At the same time, Egypt sought not only sovereignty but also regional hegemony. Egypt therefore was opposed to British military alliances not because it had an ideological aversion towards Britain, but rather because such an alliance would allow Britain to maintain forces in strategically important parts of the Middle East, which would pose a threat to Egypt’s drive for regional leadership.¹¹ Furthermore, Egypt opposed such collective security alliances due to Britain’s relation with Iraq, which was Egypt’s main competitor for regional hegemony.¹² Egypt’s foreign policy was dictated not by ideology, but rather by realist considerations that called for maintaining its sovereignty and solidifying its place as a regional hegemon.

Likewise, Britain sought to maintain a presence in the Middle East in order to protect its strategic interests, which were vital to its national security. Britain’s military bases as well as access to its oil interests in the Middle East were essential to the preservation of its empire.¹³ The Suez Canal was considered the “jugular vein” of the British Empire, which ensured a free flow of Britain’s primary oil concessions. Furthermore, Britain, more than any other country, was dependent on the canal because, since its opening, 70% of its traffic was British vessels.¹⁴ During an era in which Britain was slowly relinquishing its empire, it sought to create the Middle East Regional Defense Organization (MEDO), which would allow it to guard these vital strategic interests.¹⁵ For Britain, access to Middle East oil was not merely an economic concern, rather it was a strategic necessity vital to its survival. The Under-Secretary at the British foreign office, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, emphasized that if Britain did not have access to Middle East oil, its gold reserves would disappear in a year, and the country would not be able to pay “for the bare minimum necessary for... defense.”¹⁶ Britain thus sought to maintain a foothold of power in the Middle East in order to guard its vital strategic interests, namely its military bases and access to Middle East oil.

While Britain was establishing a collective Middle Eastern security pact for some

9 Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, “Nasser and the struggle for independence,” in *Suez 1956*, ed. WM. Roger Louis and Roger Owen (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 34.

10 *Ibid.*, 34.

11 Oren, *The Origins of the Second Arab-Israeli War*, 60-61.

12 *Ibid.*, 67.

13 J. C. Hurewitz, “The Historical Context,” in *Suez 1956*, ed. WM. Roger Louis and Roger Owen (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 22.

14 Hurewitz, “The Historical Context,” 22.

15 Oren, *The Origins of the Second Arab-Israeli War*, 61.

16 Kyle, “Britain and the Crisis,” 123.

time, it was the creation of the Baghdad Pact in February 1955, a security alliance between Turkey and Iraq that Britain joined two months later, which created tensions between Egypt and Britain. Nasser primarily viewed this pact as a colonial guise to “suck in other Arab states and isolate Egypt.”¹⁷ Furthermore, because of the intense regional rivalry that already existed between Egypt and Iraq, Nasser saw this pact as a way for Iraq and Turkey to isolate Egypt in order to fulfill Iraq’s goal of forming an Arab league without Egypt.¹⁸ The tensions between Egypt and Britain developed precisely at the juncture when Egypt felt that its power was being threatened through the formation of the Baghdad Pact and the subsequent empowerment of its rival Iraq. The Baghdad Pact heralded the beginning of an intense competition for power in the Middle East, and the tensions emerging from this struggle for power paved the way for a conflict between Egypt and Britain.

Tensions in the Middle East did not just center on the shifts in the balance of power that came out of the Baghdad Pact; they also developed between Egypt and Israel as well as other Western states over the flow of arms to the Middle East. Previously in May 1950, Britain, France, and America announced the Tripartite Declaration in order to establish a Western monopoly on arms sales to Middle Eastern countries.¹⁹ Imposing this monopoly allowed the Western states to maintain the status quo by ensuring that no single Middle Eastern country acquired an overwhelming amount of arms that could be used to threaten other countries and trigger a regional arms race. The logic behind the Tripartite Declaration was grounded in realist thought, since it sought to ensure that the military capabilities of different states were balanced, thereby alleviating the possibility of a preemptive attack.

After the Tripartite Declaration was announced, the Western powers sold arms to both Egypt and Israel, yet these sales were minimal in order to maintain the tenor of the balance of power in the Middle East.²⁰ Following Israel’s largest retaliation against an Egyptian army base in Gaza, Egypt sought out an arms deal that resulted in drastically tipping the arms balance in the Middle East, thereby igniting an arms race in the region that would last for years. In order to put a halt to the infiltrators from Gaza who killed many Israelis, Israel launched Operation Black Arrow otherwise known as the Gaza Raid. This operation was the largest Israeli retaliation to date, yet Israel’s leadership did not expect more than 10 Egyptian casualties, and thus was shocked when 37 Egyptians were killed and 28 were wounded.²¹ This raid illustrated that Egypt lacked “a viable deterrence” to prevent an attack from Israel, and this sentiment caused massive Palestinian riots

17 James, *Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy*, 10.

18 *Ibid.*, 12.

19 Amin Hewedy, “Nasser and the Crisis of 1956,” in *Suez 1956*, ed. WM. Roger Louis and Roger Owen (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 162.

20 Oren, *The Origins of the Second Arab-Israeli War*, 82-84.

21 *Ibid.*, 25.

in Gaza that specifically targeted Egyptian and Arab League offices.²² Therefore, Nasser's primary objective, following the Gaza raid, was to "ensure Egyptian rearmament from whatever sources it could be obtained."²³

While Nasser would have preferred to obtain weapons from the West, Egypt accepted an arms deal worth \$200 million US dollars from the Soviet Union, which was sold through Czechoslovakia.²⁴ This deal was enormous by Middle Eastern standards, worth over ten times more than previous Western arm sales, and included MIG fighter jets and Ilyushin bombers that immediately alerted many countries in the region.²⁵ Egypt, following the Gaza raid, realized that in an anarchic world there was no overriding force that could protect it. Thus, Egypt engaged in self-help by circumventing the Western arms monopoly and purchasing an enormous amount of weapons from the Soviet Union. The purchase, which was announced at the end of September 1956, upset the balance of power in the region, exasperated tensions with the West, and unleashed an arms race with Israel that made conflict inevitable. Nasser did not want to spite the West through this arms deal, yet ultimately realist concerns trumped and Nasser declared that "we would have preferred to deal with the [W]est, but for us it was a matter of life and death."²⁶

The Czech Arms deal subsequently triggered an arms race in the region and heavily influenced Israel to seek arms from France so it would not be out-armed by Egypt. Following the arms deal, Ben Gurion saw Egypt's growing arsenal as an imminent and existential threat to Israel far surpassing the threats that the country faced from the other Arab states in the region.²⁷ To counter Egypt's growing arsenal, Ben Gurion, after appealing to the French Prime Minister Guy Mollet for months, was able to obtain 24 Mystere fighter jets, to counter the MIGs that Egypt had acquired from the Soviets. This deal prompted Egypt to seek additional arms, and it soon signed a second deal with the Soviet Union that included 100 MIGs and Illyushins.²⁸ Both Egypt and Israel undertook these arms deals primarily for defensive reasons, in order to counter the threat posed by the other, rather than to launch a full scale offensive attack. Yet as the security dilemma illustrates, both of these arms deals, instead of making either Israel or Egypt more secure, as they had hoped, in fact made each state less secure and triggered an arms race between them that led to the Suez Crisis and the war that would follow.

Following Egypt's massive arms purchase from the Soviets in September 1955,

22 Keith Kyle, *Suez* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991), 65; Oren, *The Origins of the Second Arab-Israeli War*, 86.

23 Keith Kyle, *Suez*, 65.

24 Oren, *The Origins of the Second Arab-Israeli War*, 86-87.

25 Kyle, *Suez*, 105; Oren, *The Origins of the Second Arab-Israeli War*, 86-87.

26 Dessouki, "Nasser and the Struggle for Independence," 35.

27 Oren, *The Origins of the Second Arab-Israeli War*, 90-91.

28 *Ibid.*, 92.

Israel was seriously contemplating a preventive war against Egypt before it could absorb Soviet arms and use them in an Egyptian first strike.²⁹ Yet Israel refrained from undertaking such an action due to realist considerations. David Ben-Gurion, Israel's prime minister at the time, realized that initiating a war against Egypt would make Israel worse off since it would diplomatically isolate Israel, and bring a total halt to Western arms sales.³⁰ This embargo would override any short-term gains in terms of balance of power that Israel would receive if it preemptively attacked Egypt, since the embargo would more adversely affect Israel's ability to balance against Egypt in the long run. These realist concerns dissipated, however, when, in the midst the crisis, France and Britain invited Israel to take part in their plan to invade Egypt. Ben Gurion realized the importance of taking action against Egypt at this precise juncture as he articulated in his diary: "I think we have to undertake this operation. This is a unique opportunity that two 'not so small powers' will try to topple Nasser."³¹ In addition to receiving military support from two Western powers, Israel, by the very fact that it was backed by Britain and France, did not have to worry about its arms sales being interrupted, since these states were the country's largest arms suppliers. The realist threat that the Czech's arms deal posed to Israel would have very likely driven Israel to launch a preemptive strike war against Egypt were it not for the threat of a Western arms embargo. Thus, at the very moment when Israel realized that such an embargo was not a threat, the realist concerns that held Israel back from launching a preemptive strike against Egypt dissipated.

The Czech arms deal did not just increase tensions between Egypt and Israel for realist considerations, rather Western states also saw this deal as a threat to the balance of power in the Middle East. The Tripartite Declaration put forth by Britain, France, and the United States sought to prevent an arms race in the Middle East by establishing a Western monopoly on arms sales. The goal of the Tripartite Declaration was not just to prevent an arms race in the region but also sought to guarantee Western hegemony in the Middle East by preventing outside competitors, namely the Soviet Union, from gaining influence in the region through arms sales to Arab countries, and upsetting the regional balance of power.³² Thus, when the Soviet Union completed the largest arms deal with a Middle Eastern state up until that date, the Western powers saw a shift in the balance power on both the international and regional level, wherein Egypt was moving into the Soviet sphere of influence.³³

Britain, in particular, was not only worried about the threat to Western hegemony in

29 Mordechai Bar-on, "David Ben-Gurion and the Sevres Collusion," in Suez 1956, ed. WM. Roger Louis and Roger Owen (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 147.

30 *Ibid.*, 147.

31 *Ibid.*, 153.

32 Hewedy, "Nasser and the Crisis of 1956," 162; Oren, *The Origins of the Second Arab-Israeli War*, 77.

33 Hewedy, "Nasser and the Crisis of 1956," 162-164.

the region that the arms deal posed, but also saw this deal as a way through which the Soviets could encroach on its main strategic resource in the region, particularly its access to oil.³⁴ To counter the Soviet influence over Egypt and protect its strategic energy interests, a senior British diplomat, Evelyn Shuckburgh, wanted to appease Egypt by considering a policy of cutting all British support to Israel.³⁵ Yet Shuckburgh's official superior, Sir Harold Caccia, who was the Deputy Under-Secretary of State at the time, did not think that Britain should go so far and cut its support to Israel. Rather, he stated that Britain "may have to get rid of Nasser, especially if he becomes publicly committed to the contract."³⁶ This feeling was echoed by Britain's foreign secretary, Macmillan, when he told Dulles, just days before the deal was publicly announced, "The world will not allow the USSR to become the guardian of the Suez Canal. We could make life impossible for Nasser and ultimately bring about his fall."³⁷ The Czech arms deal caused alarm among top British officials since an Egypt led by Nasser was an invitation for the Soviet Union to exert more influence in the Middle East and further threaten Britain's strategic interests. This sentiment, centered on realist considerations, exacerbated tensions between Britain and Egypt and laid the foundation for the crisis and the war that would soon take place.

During the crisis itself, political figures in Britain called for the overthrow of the Egyptian government and justified using force for the very same realist concerns, which had contentiously increased tensions between the two countries from the outset. There was a firm held belief within Britain, as articulated by the Press Secretary William Clark, that if Nasser was not toppled within a year "the Eden government is doomed and British (and probably western influence) in the Middle East is destroyed."³⁸ Furthermore, the Under-Secretary at the British foreign office, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, saw an Egypt led by Nasser as a threat to Egypt's oil interests in the Middle East. Kirkpatrick, expressing the sentiment that drove British leaders to try risky policies that did not have America's support, emphasized that if Britain did not have access to Middle East oil, its gold reserves would disappear in a year. In turn, Britain would not be able to pay "for the bare minimum necessary for... defense."³⁹ Britain's realist concerns that drove it to war against Egypt, namely its fear over losing influence in the region and strategic access to oil, echoed the similar realist concerns that, in years preceding the crisis, created tensions between Britain and Egypt.

Realist concerns, unique to France, likewise influenced it to invade Egypt together with Britain and Israel. In early 1956, the Algerian war that had been taking

34 Kyle, *Suez*, 74.

35 *Ibid.*, 74-75.

36 *Ibid.*

37 *Ibid.*, 76.

38 James, *Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy*, 33.

39 Keith Kyle, "Britain and the Crisis," 123.

place between the French and the National Liberation Front (FLN), an Algerian nationalist group, became “the principal focus of French politics.”⁴⁰ Egypt, based on accumulating evidence, provided crucial military support to the FLN,⁴¹ and thus posed direct a threat to French power in North Africa. French leaders, in the early days of the Suez Crisis, sought to link the importance of responding forcefully to Egypt’s nationalization of the canal and bringing a halt to Egyptian support for Algerian rebels. Indeed, the French foreign minister, Christian Pineau, stated “if Egypt’s action remained without a response, it would be useless to pursue the struggle in Algeria,” so therefore, “France considers it more important to defeat Colonel Nasser’s enterprise than to win ten battles in Algeria.”⁴² In mid-October, only days before the Suez War, France intercepted the Athos, a ship that was loaded with arms and munitions in the Egyptian port of Alexandria, which was bound for Algerian rebels.⁴³ For France, this event solidified Egypt’s role in funding Algerian rebels. Thus, France, like Britain and Israel, launched a war against Egypt because of its unique realist concern, which was the threat that Egyptian support to Algerian rebels posed to French power in North Africa.

Instead of explaining the causes of the Suez Crisis and the war that followed through realism, it could also be argued that the causes of the Suez Crisis can be explained through the theoretical framework of nationalism. In relation to the events preceding the Suez Crisis, this theory can be defined as a protest movement against imperial control. Such a protest movement has the potential to lead to conflict between the indigenous population of a state seeking self determination and the outside state exerting control. This conflict stems from the hypocrisy that “European imperialism failed to extend to others what it was willing to claim for itself-the right of national self determination, and [which] meant that the nationalist ideology was turned against European control and used as a weapon of national liberation.”⁴⁴ As a result, nationalism, starting with the elites and spreading to the masses, stimulated the indigenous population to demand the “wresting [of] authority away from external control.”⁴⁵ This nationalist sentiment, causing the indigenous population to defy any sort of outside control, coupled with a refusal by the outside state to yield full sovereignty over the indigenous population, had a great propensity to spur conflict between these actors.

In the years preceding the Suez Crisis, there was much tension between Egypt and Britain, which was driven by Nasser’s policy of the ‘restoration of dignity.’

40 Maurice Vaisse, “France and the Suez Crisis,” in Suez 1956, ed. WM. Roger Louis and Roger Owen (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 137.

41 Bar-on, “David Ben-Gurion and the Sevres Collusion,” 151.

42 Ibid., 137.

43 Ibid., 138.

44 Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newham, *The Penguin dictionary of International Relations* (London: Penguin Books, 1998).

45 Ibid.

This policy was related to the very idea of nationalism as a protest movement against external control, and therefore emphasized independence as its primary objective. For Egypt, freedom from external control meant that it not only had to assert its national sovereignty, but also retain full control over its resources and wealth as well as defy western military pacts, which Nasser viewed as a threat to the sovereignty of small countries.⁴⁶ Following the signing of the Baghdad Pact, Egypt's propaganda against the pact emphasized the importance of Arab nationalism and Arab solidarity against imperialism. The Egyptian leadership, through the 'Voice of the Arabs,' Egypt's powerful radio broadcast show, urged the Arab masses to oppose "the stooges of imperialism," and warned pro-Western regimes to stay away from "imperialist devices" (meaning the Baghdad Pact).⁴⁷ Nasser thus resisted the Baghdad Pact because he was motivated by a nationalist movement that sought to protest any form of outside control. This form of nationalism generated tensions between Egypt and the Western powers in the years leading up to the Suez Crisis.

Egypt's leaders, in truth, however, utilized this nationalist and anti-imperial propaganda not because they wanted to assert their opposition to external control, but rather for realist goals, namely to decrease the influence of Iraq, Egypt's rival for regional hegemony. Before the signing of the Baghdad Pact, there was a strong rapport between Britain and Egypt. The Egyptian Minister of Guidance, Salah Salem, in July 1954, confided to Sir Evelyn Shickburgh, a British politician, that "he had not slept, he had instructed his broadcasting stations to stop anti-British propaganda."⁴⁸ Furthermore, in September 1954, Nasser told the United Press agency that he considered himself a friend of the West.⁴⁹

It was only after the signing of the Baghdad Pact and the shift in the regional balance of power in favor of Iraq that came long with it, that the Egyptian leadership launched a propaganda campaign. While this campaign was filled with anti-imperial sentiments, this rhetoric did not specifically attack Western powers, but was rather aimed at Iraq. As part of this campaign, Nasser sought to associate Iraq with imperialism as well as Zionism and stated that "Britain and the USA – the perpetrators of the Palestine tragedy – are today the cherished allies of Nuri al-Said," who was the Iraqi prime minister at the time.⁵⁰ Before the signing of the Baghdad Pact, Egypt was very much willing to cooperate with the West. Egypt only launched its anti-imperialist propaganda campaign when it felt that its leadership position in the Middle East was under attack following the signing of the pact, and this anti-imperial propaganda was a mere guise for underlying

46 Dessouki, "Nasser and the Struggle for Independence," 32-33.

47 *Ibid.*, 36.

48 James, Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy, 5.

49 Dessouki, "Nasser and the Struggle for Independence," 35.

50 *Ibid.*, 12.

realist tensions. While Egypt was influenced by the idea of nationalism as a protest movement against imperialism, it was realist considerations that dictated when it would unleash anti-imperial policies.

Another argument that one can make against realism being the primary cause of the Suez Crisis and the subsequent war is related to the misperceptions that existed amongst the actors involved in the crisis. Analyzing the causes of the Suez Crisis through the theoretical framework of misperceptions means that the crisis could have been averted had it not been for certain misperceptions. The most significant misperceptions that led to the Suez Crisis were essentially those that resulted from the assimilation of information to pre-existing beliefs. In *Perceptions and Misperception in International Politics*, Robert Jervis argues that actors will often interpret ambiguous evidence in way that is compatible with their beliefs. Additionally, Jervis notes how one's beliefs are formed based on expectations or perceptual sets "that represent standing estimates of what the world is like and therefore what a person is likely to be confronted with." Individuals, according to Jervis, will then become predisposed to interpret incoming information in a way that conforms to their past experiences.⁵¹

One significant misperception prevalent among the British leadership was the strongly held belief that Egypt was involved in facilitating the coup in Jordan, which overthrew Glubb Pasha; as King Hussein's chief of staff, he was a major source of British influence in the Middle East. Nasser, at a meeting with the British foreign secretary Selwyn Lloyd that took place in the days following the coup, started laughing when Lloyd confronted him about Egypt's alleged role in the coup.⁵² This incident left a strong impression on Lloyd and the British leadership that Egypt was responsible for Glubb's dismissal. Yet in reality, Egypt was not responsible for the coup, which is why Nasser laughed in response to Lloyd's accusation. The coup was a complete surprise to Nasser since he had expected the coup to take place a couple months later.⁵³ Glubb was ousted primarily because of the domestic tensions that existed between Glubb and Hussein on policies related to Israel. Glubb's recommendation to retreat from large areas of the West Bank for strategic reasons faced vehement opposition from Hussein. Furthermore, Hussein was willing to attack Israel if it launched an attack on Egypt, a policy to which Glubb did not fully endorse.⁵⁴ It was these tensions, rather than Nasser's influence, that persuaded Hussein to tell his officer, Major Ali Abu Nuwar, to initiate the coup against Glubb.

51 Robert Jervis, *Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 144-147.

52 James, *Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy*, 17.

53 Kyle, *Suez*, 94.

54 *Ibid.*, 92-93.

Even though Nasser was responsible for the coup, Britain's leaders were predisposed to interpret Glubb's dismissal in light of recent events that generated much tension between the two states. Two months earlier, in December 1955, Egypt unleashed a massive propaganda campaign in Jordan in order to thwart British efforts to convince Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact. When the British representative, Sir Gerald Templar, came to Jordan in order to convince them to join the pact, Egypt incited mass anti-British demonstrations in Jordan. Furthermore, Egypt's inside man in Jordan, Anwar Sadat, secretly met with Palestinian cabinet ministers and convinced them to resign rather than let Jordan join the pact, and their resignation effectively blocked Jordan's ascension to the pact.⁵⁵ When Glubb was ousted from Jordan only two months later, Britain's leaders interpreted this information in a way that conformed to this recent experience. Britain's leaders thought that just as Egypt sought to diminish British influence in the region by persuading Jordan not to join the Baghdad Pact, Egypt would likewise do everything in its power to drive Glubb Pasha out of Jordan in order to further diminish British influence in the Middle East. This misperception based on Britain's pre-existing image of Egypt, in light of recent events, played a significant role in solidifying tensions between Egypt and Britain, on the eve of the crisis. It prompted Eden to tell his foreign office minister, Anthony Nutting, in reference to Nasser "I don't want him neutralized. I want him murdered."⁵⁶

While it was misperception rather than realist concerns that actually created this tension between Britain and Egypt, this misperception was fueled by realist concerns. Had realist concerns not existed, Britain would have been much less likely to suspect that Egypt was responsible for Glubb's dismissal. Before Glubb's ouster, he had stressed to British leaders that "the one ambition of Egyptians...is to dominate the Middle East and to this purpose it is essential for them to get rid of British and American influence."⁵⁷ Glubb's warning prompted British leaders to realize that they must invite Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact in order to counter the spread of Egyptian influence in the region and safeguard British power there. Egypt's subsequent campaign, aimed at preventing Jordan from joining the pact, posed a direct challenge to Britain's desire to reassert itself in the region. Glubb's dismissal from Jordan thus must be viewed in light of Britain's realist concerns. For Britain, Glubb's dismissal from Jordan, like its failure to recruit Jordan into the Baghdad Pact, signified a decrease in its regional power. Britain, therefore, reasoned that just as Egypt sought to decrease Britain's regional power by convincing Jordan not to join the Pact, so too, it sought to decrease Britain's regional power by causing Glubb's removal from Jordan. In the absence of these realist concerns, it is unlikely that Britain would have generated a misperception and automatically assumed that Egypt was responsible for Glubb's dismissal.

55 Oren, *The Origins of the Second Arab-Israeli War*, 73-75.

56 James, *Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy*, 17.

57 Kyle, *Suez*, 90.

The causes of the Suez Crisis and the subsequent war can best be explained through the theoretical framework of realism. Two of its main actors, Britain and Egypt, sought to ensure that they would maintain a position of power in the Middle East. Egypt desired regional hegemony, yet initially sought out a friendly relationship with the British. Only when its hegemony was threatened, through the creation of the Baghdad Pact and the subsequent empowerment of its rival Iraq, did tensions develop between Britain and Egypt. This, in turn, initiated a regional struggle for power that paved the way towards the Suez Crisis. The regional arms race between Israel and Egypt that was triggered by the Gaza raid and Czech arms deal also illustrates the realist concerns that triggered the Suez Crisis. Israel, fearing the shift in the balance of power following the arms deal, eventually launched an attack on Egypt once the threat of a Western arms embargo dissipated. The arms deal also broke the Western monopoly on arms sales and represented a significant Soviet threat to western hegemony in the region. Britain, in particular, saw this increasing Soviet influence over Egypt as a direct threat to a vital strategic interest, namely Britain's access to Middle East oil, and thus sought to undermine the Egyptian regime in the months preceding the crisis as well as during the crisis itself. France saw Egypt as a direct threat to its strategic interest in North Africa, and therefore also wanted to use force against Egypt. Nationalism and misperceptions are two alternative theoretical frameworks through which the causes of the Suez Crisis and the subsequent war could be explained. Yet ultimately Egypt's nationalist rhetoric and Britain's misperceptions were primarily fueled by realist concerns. The Suez Crisis was significant since, while it involved many actors each with its own unique goals. All these actors shared a strong common bond in that their actions both during and in the years preceding the crisis were driven by realist concerns.

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Morris Breitbart is a junior at Princeton University majoring in Politics with a concentration in International Relations. Currently, he is researching the influence of Israel-China ties on the American-Israel relationship. Outside of class, Morris is a fellow with the Program In Religion, Diplomacy, and International Relations based out of the Liechtenstein Institute for Self Determination at Princeton, where he is analyzing the role of religion in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Prior to university, he spent a gap year studying in a Jewish seminary in Jerusalem where he delved into a variety of Jewish texts related to Jewish law, philosophy, and ethics.

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Senegal and Guinea: A Comparative Study of Democratic Success and Failures

BY JESSICA LEBLANC
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Abstract

This paper will examine and compare the governmental transitions of Senegal and Guinea, and will determine what caused these two otherwise strikingly similar countries to adopt greatly differing governmental systems. This study will use a most-similar systems analysis to determine the causation of the variance in governance results. The hypothesis of this study is that Senegal has been considered a model for democratic progress in Africa, while Guinea has not, due to the difference in the manner in which they gained independence from French colonization. While Senegal and Guinea both gained independence in the period of the late 1950s to the early 1960s, Senegal's transition used many progressive steps, including guidance from France and other countries, and a controlled plan of action in order to successfully shift from French territory to an electoral democracy. Guinea's transition to independence was a result of an unforeseen course of action that resulted in no guidance, aid, or organized planning to foster a successful transition to democracy.

Introduction

Within a two-year time span, the two African colonies of Guinea and Senegal gained independence from France and began their shift to independent governance. Guinea seceded from French rule in October 2, 1958, and immediately

claimed complete independence.¹ Two years later, in April of 1960, Senegal began its transition into an independent government from France, and complete independence was achieved on August 20th of the same year. Both countries are extremely comparable in many other ways – specifically, sharing similar location, demographics, colonization, neighbors, and culture. In these aspects, they are nearly identical.² Despite these many similarities, including secession from France around the same time, Senegal has become a model of democracy within Africa, while Guinea’s attempt to democratize has been unsuccessful.³ It is important to determine the causation of the disparity between these two remarkably analogous countries in order to understand what can create a successful democratic transition.

The two countries’ divergence in governmental practices results from differing strategies of secession from French control in the late 1950s. While Senegal and Guinea both claimed independence from France within two years of one another, their manner in which they did so differed greatly. Senegal became an independent state in distinct and separate steps: transitioning from colonization, forming a federation, and having independence within a year’s time.⁴ The transition of secession from France had clear steps to independence, with clear intentions and preparation. Guinea’s transition had lacked preparation, clarity of intentions, and a step-by-step process.⁵ Today, Senegal stands as one of Africa’s most successful democracies, while Guinea is known as one of the least successful governments in the democratization process of Africa.

Democracy, simply defined, is a political system wherein the government is elected by the people. For the scope of this paper, a true democracy must hold elections that meet specific criteria. Elections must be held frequently with universal suffrage, and there must be a choice of parties to elect into office. Additionally, elections must reflect a true choice given to the people of the state, and must bring upon change of some sort. Democratic governments must also allow for successful and peaceful transitions of power, while having low instances of human rights violations, along with low levels of violence and rebellion.

By these definitions, Senegal has reached all criteria of a democracy. Since its establishment in 1997, the National Observatory of Elections has ensured the credibility of the presidential and legislative election process.⁶ In the last election

1 Lapidó Adamolekun, *Sekou Toure’s Guinea* (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd, 1976).

2 “CIA World Fact Book, 2011,” <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>.

3 Christopher Fomunyoh, “Francophone Africa in Flux: Democratization in Fits and Starts,” *Journal of Democracy* 12.3 (2007): 37-50, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v012/12.3fomunyoh.html.

4 “CIA World Fact Book 2011”

5 Adamolekun, *Sekou Toure’s Guinea*.

6 “Country Report: Guinea,” Freedom House Inc., <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2010&country=7833>.

of Senegal, the election resulted in one party receiving 55.9 percent of votes, another with 14 percent of votes, another with 5.9 percent of votes, and with others obtaining 9.7 percent of votes. Additionally, Senegal has universal suffrage for all citizens over the age of 18 years old and elections are held every 5 years.⁷ Senegal grants various rights and civil liberties to their population unheard of in most African nations. According to a Freedom House scale, the country scored a 2 on the political rights scale and a 3 on the civil liberties scale (with 1 being most free and 7 being least free), and has been deemed as a free status country from 2005 to 2008. Unfortunately, in 2009, it has regressed to a “partly free” country due to problems concerning increasing authoritarian practices of President Abdoulaye Wade. Despite this recent change in rankings, Senegal guarantees its population the freedom of expression, religion, and assembly. Overall, Senegal is considered a country in the “forefront of democratic consolidation.”⁸

Although Guinea technically holds elections, it cannot be considered a democracy in any shape. With the last election results resulting in one party’s claim of 95.3 percent of votes, the elections are not democratic by any means. Since the last Guinean “election” and the death of the Guinean president on December 22, 2008, a violent militant takeover of the government, led by a Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, had occurred.⁹ On September 2009, less than a year after the takeover, more than 150 protestors in opposition of Camara’s policies were massacred. Reports surfaced regarding the use of severe beatings and rape as a way to control political opposition. Three months later, in December 2009, Moussa Dadis Camara was shot and killed, leaving the country in even further uncertainty and misdirection. On the same Freedom House scale in which Senegal received a 2 for political rights and 3 for civil liberties, Guinea received a score of 7 and a 6, respectively.¹⁰ Guinea is typified by “failed political processes, excessive violence and return to militant rule,” and therefore lacks many requirements of a successful democracy that Senegal has met.¹¹

By utilizing the result of a democratic government as the dependent variable, this study will explore the manner in which these two similar African countries transitioned from French colonization to their current government structure. Senegal and Guinea differed greatly in their progression to independence from France in the late 1950s, and this manner of transition from a colony to an independent state is the factor that made Senegal shift successfully into the democratic world, while Guinea’s governance followed a path of autocracy and instability. This study will also discuss alternative explanations and justify why

7 “CIA World Fact Book 2011.”

8 Fomunyoh, “Francophone Africa in Flux: Democratization in Fits and Starts.”

9 “CIA World Fact Book 2011.”

10 “Country Report: Guinea”


11 Fomunyoh, “Francophone Africa in Flux: Democratization in Fits and Starts.”

these alternatives cannot properly explain the difference in the results. This study will follow a mostly qualitative format, comparing these two cases in a descriptive manner and demonstrating the differences using sources such as polity scores, database articles, Freedom House reports, CIA World Fact Book information, and other historical overviews of the states. This comparative case study will use the format of a most similar systems analysis, as these countries are extremely alike in many ways, except for the noticeable differences in their current governmental systems.


Similarities of Senegal and Guinea

Senegal and Guinea share certain features, which consequently, could not account for the differences in their governmental structures. Both countries experienced a period of colonization and are currently also similar in terms of their population and location. Thus, these variables could not have caused the divergence in political systems.

While the particular age demographic of a particular country could be argued as a causal factor for democratic transition failure, it is not a valid explanation for this particular study. In terms of population demographics, Senegal and Guinea share extremely similar figures. Senegal currently has a median age of 17.9 years old, with a 2.6% population increase per year. Guinea has a median age of 18.5 years, with a 2.6% population increase per year. Current Senegal figures also show 41.2% of the population under the age of 14, 54.8% between the age of 15 and 64, and only 3% over the age of 65. In Guinea, 42.8% of the population is under the age of 14, 53.7% is between the ages of 15 and 64, and 3.5% over the age of 65. These statistics are strikingly similar, and demonstrate the parallel of a young population concentration in both countries.¹²



¹² "CIA World Fact Book 2011."



These 2005 population distribution pyramids, with information taken from the United States Census Bureau International Data Base, provide a visual representation of the population distribution within the country by age. Both images display a very bottom heavy pyramid, thereby demonstrating that Senegal and Guinea have extremely similar age distributions within their populations; the majority of their people are extremely young.¹³

Another comparative aspect that could be argued as a cause for the dependent variable of democratic success is differences in cultural aspects of the two countries. However, this argument is not valid, as the both countries contain extremely similar cultural aspects such as religiosity, language, and customs. In Guinea and Senegal, religion plays a central role in cultural identity, as both countries have a high percentage of Muslims and a small percentage of Christians and indigenous religions. The people within both countries speak similar languages, with French as the official language and the majority of citizens speaking similar ethnic tongues. As neighbors within the same continent, with similar histories and shared bordering countries, their cultural facets are undoubtedly similar. The few cultural aspects that differ are due to the recent differences in their governmental successes.¹⁴ Due to the similarities in these aspects, though, it is clear that the cultures of these countries did not create this divergence in outcomes of democratic success.

While cultural factors and age demographics are important variables to examine, the economic structure of a country is also a factor that cannot be ignored. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a primary indicator of economic wealth within a country, is important to consider when comparing countries' democratic transitions. Richer countries are able to democratize easier and maintain democratic standards, while poorer countries are less likely to successfully democratize and remain as a democracy.¹⁵ While this fact could hypothetically explain why one

13 "International Data Base," US Census Bureau, <http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/pyramids.html>

14 "CIA World Fact Book 2011."

15 Carles Boix and Susan C Stokes, "Endogenous Democratization," *World Politics* 55.4 (2003): 517-549, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v055/55.4boix.html.

country successfully democratizes while another does not, it cannot be used as an explanation for this particular study. In 2008, Senegal's GDP was \$11.12 billion US dollars and Guinea's was \$10.96 billion US dollars. With only a .16 difference, the GDPs of the two countries were strikingly comparable at this time. It is important to note that while the current GDP rates of these countries are very different (Senegal at \$22.62 billion US dollars and Guinea at \$10.14 billion US dollars), this shift has only occurred rather recently. However, the temporal order of economic changes must be considered, as it is very likely that the success of the Senegalese governing power has generated an improved GDP, and not the other way around. Past similarities in GDP between the two countries clearly demonstrate that GDP could not have had an influence on the difference in governmental transitional success.¹⁶

Another important control variable to consider is the historical context of colonization that both Guinea and Senegal share. These two countries came under French control in the mid-19th century, serving as slave trade ports for Europe.¹⁷ In 1985, Senegal and Guinea, along with six other African nations, became a part of "French West Africa," a federation of colonies ruled by France. All of the countries within this federation faced the same French regulations, including a 1946 law allowing African colonies to appoint a French parliament as well as a 1951 law allowing assembly of a regional council for the colonies. Under the regulations of the colonization of "French West Africa", the two countries' relationships of colonization with France are nearly identical.¹⁸ Similarly, in the late 1950s, both countries succeeded from France; however, they differed in the manner in which they did so.

When comparing countries, it is important to consider the geopolitical contexts. As a whole, neighboring countries can have a significant impact on the ability for an individual country to democratize properly.¹⁹ Countries neighbored by pre-existing democracies prove more successful in democratizing than those surrounded by autocratic countries. However, Senegal and Guinea share the same set of neighboring countries, a feature which could thus be disproved as a possible factor for creating differentiating results. Since Senegal neighbors Guinea to the north, the two countries border Mauritania, Mali, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Gambia, and Guinea-Bissau, among others. Additionally, these neighboring countries have various forms of government, with few as successful democracies and many as autocracies.²⁰ Interestingly, in a continent comprised of mostly autocratic, unstable

16 "CIA World Fact Book 2011."

17 "CIA World Fact Book 2011."

18 "ASNOM-French West Africa," last modified 2010, http://www.asnom.org/en/151_aof.html.

19 Daniel Brinks and Michael Coppedge, "Diffusion is no Illusion: Neighbor Emulation in the Third Wave of Democracy." *Comparative Political Studies* 36.10 (2006): 463-487, <http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic741392.files/Diffusion.pdf>.

20 "CIA World Fact Book 2011."

states, Senegal was able to democratize successfully, while Guinea's attempt was a complete failure and resulted in the autocratic governance found in many African nations. Evidently, the environment of neighboring countries did not function as the independent variable that caused this disparity of success between Senegal and Guinea.

It has been demonstrated that that neither age demographics, cultural factors, GDP, history of colonization, nor neighboring countries have caused the difference in governmental systems in these two African states. The factor that created this difference was in the manner in which these countries seceded from French rule. Their differing approaches unleashed a series of actions that resulted in Senegal transforming into a successful democracy and Guinea becoming the instable autocracy of today. Senegal's secession from France was organized with careful consideration and it aimed to progress slowly into independence while retaining support from its past colonizer. Conversely, Guinea's progression had no such systematic process; rather, the country abruptly declared independence, rejecting any form of help from its previous colonizer. These differing factors created a chain of events for each of these countries, which resulted in the success of Senegalese democracy and the utter failure of Guinea's.

Senegal, a colony of France for hundreds of years before independence, became a self-governing colony of France in November 1958. This development provided Senegal with more independence, while it received aid and guidance from its mother country. Its transition into self-governance was followed by the formation of the Mali Federation in April of 1958, which was a joint effort with the former Soudan (now called "Mali"), a country also in the process of seceding from France to become a democratic state. On June 20, 1960, The Mali Federation split, and both Soudan and Senegal broke away from French control and became completely independent. Today, almost 50 years later, both Mali (formerly Soudan) and Senegal are considered among the stronger democratic countries in Africa, boasting impressive records of promoting political rights and civil liberties.²¹

Guinea's transition to independence happened as result of an incisive refusal to accept a "Franco-African Community," a treaty proposed by France that offered a 'renewal' of the colonization of Guinea. Since France regarded Guinea's refusal of the proposal as a declaration of secession, it terminated all support with Guinea. Specifically, France withdrew all of military troops and ended all monetary aid immediately, thereby leaving Guinea's political system extremely vulnerable.²² From 1958-1984, Sekou Toure assumed leadership and established an autocratic rule. Without the support from a democratic country, Toure's regime was able to

21 "Country Report: Senegal."

22 Adamolekun, Sekou Toure's Guinea.

ban oppositional parties and repress many facets of the media.²³ After Toure's death in 1984, Lasana Conte seized control and continued to rule under the precedent of the autocratic framework of Toure's government. Despite pro-democratic forces within Guinea that forced Conte to hold elections, the "elections" clearly had no democratic backing. Conte was elected by the majority of the population every "election" and then used his power to alter laws to remove term limits, all while maintaining a façade of creating a more democratic Guinea. After years of harsh autocratic rule, Conte's death on December 22, 2008, marked the end of his reign. However, remnants of his rule still exist, as his death was followed by yet another militant seizure of government leadership in Guinea, Moussa Camara.²⁴

Senegal, unlike Guinea, has faced no period of harsh authoritarian rule or violent militant take-over within the government. Although the country experienced a period of a one-party Socialist leadership post-independence, it was not nearly as repressive or violent as the original government of Guinea. This period of governance began the slow transition into democracy, as Frenchman Leopold Senghor led the one-party system for two decades, and thus was able to maintain ties with France. Although this original leadership was not considered democratic, Guinea was able to smoothly transition into a democratic state with a stable socialist government that granted many rights to its people. When this period ended in 2000, Senegal began to truly progress into the democracy of today.²⁵

Evidently, a government's stability after independence had a severe impact on the direction that these countries took in their transitional phases. Although Senegal did not originally have a democratic leader, its government remained stability, which was certainly not found in Guinea during this time. These differing variables of stability between Guinea and Senegal resulted from the manner in which they transitioned; for if Guinea had established a step-by-step transition to independence as Senegal did, far less turmoil would have ensued, and therefore the country could have transformed itself into a successful democratic state. The aid provided by France, in both monetary and political forms, allowed the Senegalese government to assimilate under the guidance of an already established world power. Without the great monetary support provided by France, Senegal would have had the same economic capacity as Guinea; and without the political guidance, it is likely that Senegal would have fallen into the autocratic state characterized by many of its neighboring countries, such as Guinea.

The political elections in Guinea and Senegal serve as important indicators that reveal the level of democracy of each country. This study focuses on the earliest

23 "Polity IV Country Report 2007: Guinea," Center for Systemic Peace, <http://www.systemic-peace.org/polity/Guinea2007.pdf>.

24 "Polity IV Country Report 2007: Guinea."

25 "Country Report: Guinea."

elections in the 21st century: Senegal's 2000 election and Guinea's 2003 election. These elections are important in assessing the democratic progress these two countries have made since they declared independence. In 2003, Guinea's autocrat, Lasana Conte, allowed elections after facing increasing public pressure for years to do so. Despite the clear public outcry for free elections, Conte won with 90% of the vote, but only after the Guinea Supreme Court Panel disqualified six of the seven opposition party members, leaving only one relatively unfamiliar opposition. Additionally, the majority of opposition parties in Guinea boycotted the election, even though Conte's government reports that over 80% of Guinean citizens voted. Various human rights groups have indicated that the real percentage is fewer than 15%, a troubling statistic.²⁶ However, Senegal's 2000 election yielded much better results, and is considered by the international community to have been a free and fair election. Abdoulaye Wade, the most recent president, won the 2000 election by acquiring 59.5% of the vote. At his sixth attempt at running for office, he beat the Socialist party that had been in control for 40 years, and thus began enacting more democratic policies.²⁷ This election was Senegal's final step to becoming a democracy within Africa. These differences in the Guinean and Senegalese elections of the 21st century demonstrate the great dissimilarities of the two governments.

While there are a few other differences in these countries in addition to the independent variable, these other factors alone cannot explain this difference in governmental structure, and can be disproved as possible explanations. Many of these differences described below may have had an influence on the political outcome of each county, yet these differences are caused by the independent variable - without the independent variable, these differences would not have existed.

While social scientists, such as Michael Bratton, have argued that the reason why some African countries have had success in transitioning into democracy lies within the government's response to protests, this explanation does not hold true for the cases of Senegal and Guinea. Specifically, Bratton's work suggests that political protests can incite liberalization reforms within the country, which makes the likelihood of democratic transition more plausible. While this argument is logical in theory, history has demonstrated that this is not always the case; there is much disparity in results of countries with political protest.²⁸ In fact, both Senegal and Guinea have had similar political protests that yielded different results. Many countries with political protests did not receive democratic elections - more than half of them did not. While protest may aid in liberalizing a country, it is not sole factor that can change a country from an autocracy to a democracy.

26 "Country Report: Guinea."

27 "Country Report: Senegal."

28 Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

Another common argument for the success and failure of democratic transitions focuses on the type of leader. While leaders have a significant impact on the state, this variable is not a sufficient causal explanation for Guinea and Senegal. In each case, the type of leader that came into power resulted from the independent variable. Specifically, the leaders during the transitional phases were only able to assume power through the manner in which these states gained their independence. Because Guinea succeeded so abruptly from France, its political climate allowed Toure, an authoritarian dictator, to come into power.²⁹ Alternatively, due to the cooperation between France and Senegal during the Senegalese transition to independence, no such authoritarian leadership came about. Rather, Senegal's diplomatic relation with France allowed the country to adopt many of France's successful policies. Both Senegal and Guinea constructed separate paths towards governance of a new, independent nation, which directly affected the type of leadership in each country.

Conclusions

Although certain factors are related to the differences in Senegal's and Guinea's current government systems, these factors can be set in a chain reaction formation, stemming from one variable. Hence, this comparative case study reveals certain ideas in the theory of gradualism, which argues that gradual steps to independence prove to be successful in creating a long-lasting democracies without violence. Gradualism allows a country transitioning from colonization or dependence to systematically form a strong, successful independent democracy in a structured manner. This study has provided further evidence that the beginning stages of a country's development after succession are crucial in its ability to democratize effectively, which is seen in Guinea and Senegal. Thus, analyzing democratic transitions is important to better understand how to establish democracies that provide human liberties and electoral rights for all.

²⁹ "History of Guinea."


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
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Jessica LeBlanc is a senior at the University of New Hampshire majoring in International Affairs and Sociology with a minor in Spanish. She wrote this piece in 2009 for an International Affairs course pertaining to democratic transitions across the globe. In her spare time, Jessica enjoys writing and conducting social research. She hopes to obtain a job related to these interests post-graduation.


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
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
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
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HIV Crisis: Stigma and Social Inequalities

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Abstract

This paper argues that HIV is a social crisis entrenched in levels of inequality, which policymakers have only just started to recognize as a reality. Throughout the latter half of the 20th century, HIV/AIDS spread along “international fault lines” that follow steep gradients of inequality. The epidemiology of the virus demonstrates the interplay between social factors and HIV: as societal constraints make individuals more vulnerable to contracting the virus, the social impacts of HIV further exacerbate existing situations of inequality and bigotry. With the discovery of HIV in 1983, developed countries initially failed to address the critical issues involved with the epidemic, while developing countries struggled to formulate effective policies. But as states and organizations began recognizing the societal context of the virus, they adopted a multilateral approach, incorporating other levels of governance, religious leaders, NGOs, and public figures. These efforts mobilized communities to promote sustained human development, which proved effective in preventing the spread of the virus and eliminating the negative stigmas associated with it.

Over the past few decades the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) has spread at increasingly large rates in various parts of the world. HIV, an illness that gradually destroys the immune system, is transmitted when a sufficient amount of contaminated bodily fluids from an infected individual is passed into the bloodstream of another. Usually, it occurs during unprotected sexual intercourse, contact with blood, breastfeeding, childbirth, and drug injections. Yet despite universal marketing campaigns that say that ‘AIDS/HIV is for Everyone,’

the distribution of the epidemic is highly localized. As HIV entrenches itself into the ranks of the poor and marginalized, it becomes a social crisis. This crisis is strengthened by negative stigmas of the virus, which reveal levels of inequality between socioeconomic classes and genders. The epidemiology of the virus demonstrates the interplay between social factors and HIV: as societal constraints make individuals more vulnerable to contracting the virus, the social impacts of HIV further exacerbate existing situations of inequality and bigotry. This paper argues that HIV is a social crisis entrenched in levels of inequality, which policymakers and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have only just started to recognize as a reality.

Some groups are at high risk of HIV infection, whereas others, mostly in the developed world, are relatively shielded. Throughout the latter half of the 20th century, HIV/AIDS spread along what Farmer calls “international fault lines,” which follow steep gradients of inequality.¹ Due to societal constraints of rudimentary education, low wages, and poor quality healthcare, rural communities plagued by poverty are more vulnerable to the virus, and consequently face high rates of transmittance. According to Michael Merson, Director of Duke University’s Global Health Institute, 64% of all those who are living with HIV in the world reside in Sub-Saharan Africa.² Even though HIV/AIDS has affected a few leaders and cultural icons in southern Africa, the region’s history of institutionalized and legalized inequality make for a “fertile ground” for HIV proliferation.³ Additionally, women tend to carry the brunt of the infection, comprising 57% of those who are HIV positive in Africa.⁴ Aside from biological factors, women’s vulnerability to the virus is reinforced by their lack of education and socially imposed inferior status, which renders them unable to protect themselves or insist on safe sex. Once HIV is contracted, these females can easily spread it to their children while breastfeeding or during childbirth, which intensifies the epidemic as mortality rates increase.

The stigmas associated with HIV reveal how concepts of social inequality are ingrained into the virus. Conceptions about HIV intertwines concepts such as sex, death, fear, and disease, all of which can be manipulated along prejudicial lines to exacerbate the condition of those affected by the virus. Hence, HIV stigmas can be linked to forms of discrimination—racism, bigotry, or misogyny—and can be aimed at further marginalizing social groups. Because AIDS was first discovered

1 Paul Farmer, “Social Inequalities and Emerging Infectious Diseases” *Perspectives* 2, no. 4 (October-December 1996): 264.

2 Michael H. Merson, “The HIV/AIDS Pandemic at 25 – The Global Response,” *New England Journal of Medicine* 354, no. 23 (June 2006): 1, <http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp068074>.

3 Tony Barnett and Alan Whiteside, *Aids in the Twenty-First Century: Disease and Globalization* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 136.

4 Amy S. Patterson, *The Politics of Aid in Africa* (Bolder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2006), 8.

among self-identified homosexuals, it is thought of as the “gay plague” as well as a “harbinger of the apocalypse.”⁵ In 1987, American Reverend Jerry Fallwell ascribed HIV and AIDS as a godly retribution and said “God destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah primarily because of the sin of homosexuality. Today, He is again bringing judgment against this wicked practice through AIDS.”⁶ Other groups, including prostitutes, impoverished harijans, and primitive tribal groups—all of which reflect certain fears and inequality found in most human societies—have been associated with AIDS as well.⁷ In fact UN Secretary General Bon Ki-Moon touched on a very important relationship between stigma and disease, saying that its negative stigma “helps make AIDS the silent killer, because people fear the social disgrace of speaking about it, or taking easily available precautions. Stigma is a chief reason the AIDS epidemic continues to devastate societies around the world.”

In recognizing the societal factors inherent in the epidemic, HIV policy is no longer perceived as contained within the domain of the Ministry of Health; other sectors have launched HIV-related initiatives. With the discovery of HIV in 1983, developed countries initially failed to address the critical issues involved with the epidemic, while developing countries struggled to formulate effective policies. Merson suggests that because HIV/AIDS “often engendered stigma, discrimination, and denial, because of its association with marginalized groups, sexual transmission, and lethality,” the 1980s and 1990s were decades of slow, inadequate responses to the growing problem.⁸ Sub-Saharan African governments had to cut their health, education, and welfare budgets by 26% between 1980 and 1985 as the structural adjustment programs forced these countries to prioritize federal finances on what they deemed important.⁹ However, during the 1990s, as the negative stigmas associated with HIV began to lessen and citizens became more active in the fight against the virus, states adopted a multilateral approach, incorporating other levels of governance, religious leaders, NGOs, and public figures to further HIV prevention and care. Specifically, this multilateral approach views HIV as an epidemic shaped by numerous societal and contextual factors, all of which need to be addressed when formulating strategies to eradicate the virus. In 1996, six UN agencies cosponsored the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), which was committed to forming a more effective multilateral global response.¹⁰ Additionally, that same year, the UN Commission on Human Rights concluded that the term “or other status,” which is used throughout several human rights conventions, should be “interpreted to include health status,”

5 Alex de Waal, *Aids and Power: Why There is no Political Crisis – Yet* (London: Zed Books Ltd., 2006), 14 -16.

6 Ibid.

7 Barnett and Whiteside, *Aids in the Twenty-First Century: Disease and Globalization*, 337.

8 Merson, “The HIV/AIDS Pandemic at 25 – The Global Response,” 1.

9 Patterson, *The Politics of Aid in Africa*, 14.

10 Merson, “The HIV/AIDS Pandemic at 25 – The Global Response,” 1.

particularly involving those who have contracted HIV/AIDS.¹¹ By prohibiting the discrimination and stigmatization on the basis of a person's real or perceived HIV/AIDS status, the UN, as well as other organizations, began to address many of the crucial issues intertwined with the epidemic: discrimination, inequality, and vulnerability.

By emphasizing human rights, governments and NGOs made tremendous strides to provide healthcare to impoverished individuals afflicted with HIV. While striving to reduce, or even eliminate, costs of treatment for those in rural poverty, these policies recognize that societal inequality sculpted routes for HIV transmittance. In 2003, UNAID and the World Health Organization (WHO) launched 'The 3 by 5 Initiative' in order to provide 3 million HIV positive individuals in low and middle income countries with antiretroviral treatment by 2005.¹² Although the rate of HIV expansion outstrips that of HIV treatment, the campaign has been successful in alleviating the inequality of treatment to the rural poor, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.¹³

Other countries such as Brazil, Thailand, and Uganda have implemented more effective policies in order to establish universal access to treatment. Brazil's new constitution, written in 1989, was heavily influenced by human rights conventions. The document attested to the rights of individuals inflicted with HIV, granting them legal protection against discrimination, and provided universal healthcare.¹⁴ In 1996, despite pharmaceutical copyright issues, Brazil began supplying free access to antiretroviral therapy (ARV) to people with HIV/AIDS. In November 2010, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva furthered this initiative by donating \$21 million USD to build a new drug factory in Mozambique "to increase the availability and affordability of ARVs" in Africa.¹⁵ Though NGOs and states have enacted policies designed to alleviate costs of treatment for the rural poor, these policies do not fully address other social inequalities involved with the human poverty index and development.

Although states began examining societal inequalities of HIV in the 1990s, the gender-related issues were harder to address in HIV policies because they exposed taboos ingrained in social contexts. The crux of the issue with women in developing countries is rooted in their socially imposed inferior status and vulnerability to

11 Aniekwu Nkolika Ijeoma, "Gender and Human Rights Dimensions of HIV/AIDS in Nigeria," *African Journal of Reproductive Health/La Revue Africaine de la Sante Reproductive* 6, no. 3 (December 2002): 34.

12 "The Millennium Development Goals Report," United Nations, 2010: 5.

13 Ibid.

14 Barnett and Whiteside, *Aids in the Twenty-First Century: Disease and Globalization*, 44.

15 Charlotte Plantive, "Brazil's Lula visits anti-retroviral plant in Mozambique," *Agence France-Presse*, November 10, 2010, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j-Z4hBdl-vBXPIN975H11US9XrtSA?docId=CNG.f9d2d5785b5f42d16df8850351db368c.131>.

men. Gender inequality, unlike rural poverty, cannot be remedied with monetary means. Thus, HIV policy concerning women has to stem from within a society, empowering these women to strive for equality and rights. However, it remains difficult for many African countries to challenge this socio-cultural power structure, as inequality is institutionalized within their legal framework. In 2001 King Mswati III of Swaziland reinstated an ancient chastity rite in an attempt to stymie HIV proliferation amongst females. Specifically, Mswati placed a five-year prohibition on all girls under the age of 18 from engaging in sexual intercourse, while instructing virginal girls to wear a “tasseled scarf as a symbolic badge of virginity.”¹⁶ Additionally, any man who has taken a girl’s virginity would be required to give a cow to the girl’s family.¹⁷ However, this rite only reinforced a woman’s status as inferior. Furthermore, this legislation strengthened the perception that women are to blame for HIV transmission.

Still, other countries are attempting to improve the quality of life for women afflicted with HIV. In 1992, Ugandan women founded the National Community of Women Living with HIV/AIDS (NACWOLA), which is committed to fighting associated stigmas and abuse, while economically empowering its members so that they can reduce women’s vulnerability and dependency.¹⁸ This foundation also provides members with coping mechanisms, such as ‘memory books’ between parents and children as well as access to legal counsel for domestically abused women, divorce contracts, and property inheritance.¹⁹ The formation of additional organizations, like NACWOLA, unites women in developing countries and equips them with resources that strengthen their status in society as well as eradicate their stigma associated with HIV.

Due to societal stigmas, homosexual men also struggle to form organizations to effectively combat HIV/AIDS in their communities and to embolden their status as equals in society. Homosexual male intercourse poses problems for the HIV/AIDS epidemic, as it often involves anal sex – an act with a higher risk of HIV transmission than unprotected vaginal sex. While some countries in Africa simply evade discussions regarding male homosexual sex, others completely deny and forbid its existence. Thus, these men are often neglected in HIV prevention campaigns.²⁰ Nevertheless, many countries in Latin America have implemented policies to promote greater tolerance of homosexuals with HIV/AIDS. Recently, several Latin American countries have founded organizations and projects that aim to eradicate the associated stigma. In 2000, the Brazilian Ministry of

16 Thulani Mthethwa. “Swaziland Abandons Ancient Chastity Right,” Associated Press, August 22, 2005, <http://www.aegis.com/news/ap/2005/AP050816.html>.

17 Ibid.

18 Nana K. Poku, *Aids in Africa: How the Poor are Dying* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 180.

19 Ibid.

20 De Waal, *Aids and Power: Why There is no Political Crisis – Yet*, 14 -16.

Health implemented the SOMOS project, designed to “empower gay men by educating them about HIV/AIDS” and train them alongside other governmental departments, NGOs, and university students.²¹ Similarly, in Asia, Thailand’s Rainbow Sky Association forms community networks for men who have sex with other men and trains mentors to promote prevention methods. Unlike efforts for females in developing countries, HIV policy for homosexuals does more to combat their stigma.

Stigmas shed light on the role of societal factors in shaping the course and magnitude of an epidemic. HIV is undeniably a social crisis. As HIV continues to spread along channels of social inequality, policymakers and organizations have just started to address afflicted individuals as equals. Although the associated stigmas reveal the gross inequalities entrenched in the virus, policymakers and organizations must work to diminish these stigmas while empowering the marginalized group. For groups associated with taboos, such as females in developing countries and homosexual males, HIV policy stems most from internal action by committed citizens. Thus, as empowered communities in developing countries mobilize to promote sustained human development, they effectively remove stigmas and escape poverty traps.

21 Chuck Stewart, ed., *The Greenwood Encyclopedia of LGBT Issues Worldwide* (Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press, 2010), 42.

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Lorein Abenheim is a Magazine Writing major and Political Science minor at the S.I. Newhouse School of Public Communications at Syracuse University. She is a member of the Pi Sigma Alpha Honors Society and is currently working on an extensive research project on satellite development in the United States in relation to climate change at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University. On campus, Lorein has contributed political feature stories to the Daily Orange, the student-run campus newspaper.



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Why Neoliberalism? The Economic Reasoning behind Post-Apartheid South Africa

BY RACHEL BONDS
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Abstract

Neoliberalism is touted by the developed world as today's only viable method of organizing political economy. This belief is often forced on developing countries, but in the case of South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) willingly adopted neoliberalism. The objective of this study was to answer two questions. First, why did the ANC government initially adopt neoliberal policies following independence? Second, what have been the consequences and benefits of these policies from their initial implementation until the present day? By examining the current literature on neoliberalism and the post-apartheid South African government, many conclusions can be drawn. The ANC adopted neoliberal policies due to international pressures, a desire for international capital, and the forces of globalization. These policies have been largely successful at stabilizing the economy, partially successful at increasing GDP growth, and unsuccessful at poverty alleviation. The research findings reveal important policy implications for the future of the South African economy.

Introduction

When South Africa held its first racially free elections in 1994, many black South Africans believed that the government would implement both economic and political change. The African National Congress (ANC), founded in 1912, had always maintained that their basic economic goal was to, "build a strong South African

economy based on its own resources and labor, meeting the demands of its own and foreign markets, under majority rule.”¹ The ANC and other reform movements were loosely based on Socialist ideologies and the belief that a strong state would be necessary to create economic equality. Yet, the heavy state intervention found in Keynesian models generated ambiguous results. Thus, at the time of South Africa’s independence from apartheid, the world accepted, and later touted, neoliberalism² by default. This new shift in international economic ideology caused the new ANC government, “to be rudely awakened by the impact and implications of globalization on the eve and early dawn of majority rule in 1994.”³ In other words, by the time the ANC gained control of South Africa, its well-established Socialist economic platforms were already under attack.

This paper seeks to address two interrelated questions. First, why did the ANC government initially adopt neoliberal policies following independence? Second, what have been the consequences and benefits of these policies from their initial implementation until the present day? These questions have far-reaching and important implications for future South African policy makers and the direction of the economy as a whole.

Initial Policy Adaptation

The ANC was formed to defend black South Africans against racial injustice and to fight for majority rule. From the 1920s to the 1940s, the ANC movement grew stronger and more militant in reaction to increased legislation against the black majority. In 1955, the ANC developed a comprehensive economic plan that embodied the core beliefs of their independence movement. This plan, referred to as the Freedom Charter, was heavily influenced by Socialist and Communist ideologies and focused on the principles of nonracial capitalism, majority rule, and collectivist transformation. In addition, the charter espoused equality through education, land reform, and a living wage, while representing a culmination of South African’s economic grievances with the apartheid regime. In contrast, the National Party (NP), which had governed the country since 1948, identified the Freedom Charter as a Communist document, which resulted in the arrest of many ANC leaders under the 1950 law that banned Communism. This conflict set the stage for negotiations between the NP and the ANC, which became the main opposition party during the stages before independence.

International financial institutions and banks that were holding much of South

1 Michael H. Allen, *Globalization, Negotiation, and the Failure of Transformation in South Africa* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 2.

2 For the purposes of this paper, neoliberalism will be defined as the economic principles of privatize, stabilize and liberalize that are advocated by the United States and other liberal market economies. Neoliberal policy recommends a market driven economy dominated by the private sector, and advocates policies of fiscal stability, low government intervention, and trade liberalization.

3 *Ibid.*, 3.

Africa's debt influenced the NP's policy preferences heavily during the negotiations. The state was worried about the possibility of further capital flight after the 1985 Standstill⁴ devastated South Africa's economy. NP leaders were motivated to prevent further economic problems to protect their own domestic investments and wealth. The economic impact of sanctions enacted by the United States and Great Britain in 1985-86 cannot be undervalued; these sanctions were an important factor in forcing F.W. De Klerk, the president of South Africa prior to independence, to negotiate a democratic transition. F.W. De Klerk's brother, Willem, remarked that, "once the taps of international capital investment and loans had been turned off, apartheid began to stare the spectre of bankruptcy in the face."⁵ Predictions suggest that, without sanctions, South Africa's economy would be roughly 20-35% greater.⁶ Clearly, the economic situation in South Africa had deteriorated well past the breaking point, and the NP attempted to salvage what little capital was left after 1989. Accordingly, the need to protect the South African economy for current investors led to economic talks with the ANC prior to independence.

The ANC approached these negotiations hoping to implement their Freedom Charter, but they were quickly confronted with the realities of a globalized South African economy. Regarding these realities, Michael Allen wrote, "the ANC and its allies came to the eve of accession to power wanting to change a country that was already being profoundly changed by new patterns of investment, trade, and financial flows. Reversing market trends to create a self-sustaining socialist economy was out of the question."⁷ To continue negotiating on friendly terms with the NP, the ANC agreed to forgo its plan to nationalize strategic domestic industries, and guaranteed pension and property rights to white civil servants.⁸ This decision represented a decisive break with the ANC's socialistic past and illustrated the power of globalization as a constraint in the domestic bargaining arena.

While NP and ANC leaders were negotiating, international actors played an important role in South Africa's economic policy decisions. Specifically, De Klerk was uncertain whether economic negotiations with the ANC would produce favorable results, but international actors pressured him to begin the negotiation process. About the influence of Western powers, Chris Landsberg wrote, "The Western powers

4 The 1985 Standstill refers to the freezing of all lending assets in the South African economy held by foreign banks. The disappearance of foreign credit caused the South African rand to rapidly depreciate in value and the South African Government froze all \$10 billion of its debt payments to foreign creditors due to lack of reserves. This debt was finally paid off in 2001.

5 Chris Landsberg, "South Africa Entrapped: Global Interests and Actors in South Africa's Democratic Transition, 1984-1994," Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research, 25, <http://wiserweb.wits.ac.za/PDF%20Files/wirs%20-%20landsberg.PDF>.

6 Ibid.

7 Allen, *Globalization, Negotiation, and the Failure of Transformation in South Africa*, 91-92

8 Landsberg, "South Africa Entrapped: Global Interests and Actors in South Africa's Democratic Transition, 1984-1994," 8.

promised to play a role in persuading the ANC to negotiate with the NP government, and settle for a deal that would safeguard the interests of all.⁹ In this vein, foreign actors (most notably the United States and Great Britain) were able to mediate negotiations between the ANC and the NP, while advocating neoliberal policies that would benefit their own interests. George E. Moose, the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, remarked on the eve of transition that, “A vibrant, free-market economy is vital to generating the resources to address socioeconomic inequalities that are the cruel legacies of apartheid. [...] The establishment of genuine democracy in South Africa will not by itself be enough to attract badly needed capital or trade.”¹⁰ He followed by delineating the United States commitment towards rebuilding the South African economy through private business investment, increased trade, and US assistance in securing new IMF loans.¹¹ The ANC realized they needed to pursue neoliberal policies in line with American desires in order to receive these benefits, proving the final demise of the Freedom Charter.

When the new ANC government took power, it was faced with numerous economic challenges many of which resulted from the remnants of previous NP policies. The South African government had been actively using import substitution policy¹² to govern the country, which dated back to the Pact government in 1924. The South African Institute of International Affairs found that by the “1970s this model had run its course, and the National Party government was essentially unable to change direction owing to its geo-political circumstances and entrenched interests.”¹³ This meant that although South Africa’s pre-apartheid policies were outdated and inefficient, they were largely continued until independence, leaving the ANC with a troubled domestic economy.

The ANC responded to these challenges with two major policy plans, the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) in 1994 and the Growth, Equality, and Redistribution plan (GEAR) in 1996. These two documents clarified the new government’s commitment to macroeconomic stability and were partially intended to send a message of confidence to international investors. Both RDP and GEAR included the following macro-economic principles: fiscal conservatism, tax reform, minimizing the federal budget deficit, improved debt management, and efficient tax

9 Ibid., 30.

10 George E. Moose, “Economic and democratic support for South Africa,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch 5, no.10 (March 7, 1994): 131.

11 Ibid.

12 Import Substitution policy is based on the premise that developing countries must reduce their foreign dependency on manufactured goods from the developed world. This policy calls for extremely hard trade barriers to foster growth of domestic industries, but often created inefficient domestic industries with strong political constituencies that insured operations of unprofitable firms and created large government debt.

13 Peter Draper, “To Liberalize or Not to Liberalize? A Review of the South African Government’s Trade Policy,” The South African Institute for International Affairs Trade Report, no. 1 (2003): 20, <http://www.saiia.org.za/images/upload/tr1.pdf>.

policy. These fiscal objectives were incorporated in South Africa's 1996 constitution. The ANC moved forward with a strict policy to promote stability over growth, in an effort to combat their deteriorated economic position following the apartheid.¹⁴

In 1994, South Africa became a signatory to the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which later became the World Trade Organization (WTO). The offer to join the GATT was the first trade policy decision made by ANC leaders, and illustrated that, "the new South African government, despite its strong union base and national developmental objectives, quickly accepted trade liberalization as one of the pillars of its industrial strategy. [...] It has formed the basis for an increasingly internationalist perspective on the part of South Africa's economic policy-makers."¹⁵ GATT membership was not endorsed by the NP, but instead, the ANC and domestic labor unions were the main supporters of this move. Both groups argued that joining GATT would demonstrate the new government's commitment to international economic institutions; the unions further advocated that GATT membership would hurt domestic businesses more than the domestic manufacturing industry, and were largely unconcerned with possible unemployment at this time. Overall, GATT membership rapidly liberalized South Africa's trade policy, lowering manufacturing tariffs from 19.9% in 1994 to 9.6% in 2000.¹⁶ In addition, South Africa reduced tariffs in a multitude of sectors at a faster rate than was required for WTO membership, reflecting a strong commitment to trade liberalization by the ANC government.¹⁷

At the conclusion of constitutional reform in 1996, South Africa had transformed into a largely neoliberal state. NP leadership, heavily influenced by international actors, desired the protection of assets held by white South Africans and foreign investors after independence. Although the ANC initially advocated more socialist policies, the reality of a globalized South Africa prevented the Freedom Charter from being implemented. Instead, the ANC negotiated an economic transformation from import substitution to neoliberalism, focusing on stabilization policies and GATT membership. These two factors combined to create increased international investment, trade liberalization, and privatization—all of which stand as hallmarks of neoliberalism.

Neoliberalism Today: A Cost-Benefit Analysis:

It is difficult to ascertain the net effects of neoliberal policy on the South African

14 Janine Aron, et. al., ed., *South African Economic Policy under Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 6-7.

15 David Lewis, et al., "South Africa: Economic Policy-Making and Implementation in Africa: A Study of Strategic Trade and Selective Industrial Policies," *The Politics of Trade and Industrial Policy in Africa: Forced Consensus?* ed. Charles C. Soludo, et al. (Trenton: Africa World Press, 151-178), 151.

16 Aron et al., *South African Economic Policy under Democracy*, 160

17 *Ibid.*, 162

economy due to the amount of variables interacting with one another at the time. The most significant economic problems did not stem from neoliberalism, but instead were inherited by the ANC. The ANC government's attempts to modernize and expand the economy were severely hampered by, "the structural deficits of apartheid, the effects of sanctions and disinvestment and the products of 'struggle politics.'"¹⁸ Thus, it is difficult to determine whether current economic problems stem from neoliberal policy or the legacy of apartheid - or a combination of both.

There is substantive evidence, however, that neoliberalism has improved, or at least stabilized, the South African economy since the 1994 transition. GDP growth rates have steadily risen since independence: GDP growth was 2.6% from 1994-1999, 3.6% from 1999-2004 and over 5% from 2005-2007. Although these rates are lower than expected, they are a modest achievement due to pre-independence conditions. More impressive was the growth in the tertiary sector of the economy, accounting for 78% of GDP growth since 1995. The growth of investment was also promising, increasing by 6.9%, with 81% of this investment originating from the private sector and public corporations. The largest investment recipient industries were construction (10.9%), transport and communication (11.6%), retail (8.5%), and the financial sector (7.3%).¹⁹ These are promising statistics, especially because the growth is concentrated in modern service industries and is being facilitated by private and public companies, rather than the government. When comparing these statistics to figures from 1985-1994 (.8% GDP growth and -2.3% change in investment), the data illustrates a significant positive change in the economy since neoliberal reform, with moderate levels of growth in several important economic sectors.

The results of South Africa's free trade policy, which was simultaneously introduced along with domestic neoliberal reform as a break from import-substitution policies, are also hard to empirically link to one factor, but broad conclusions can be drawn. There is limited evidence that liberalization has reduced inflation and the rand (South Africa's currency), "has fought its way out of the trenches of decline and has given credence to the soundness of the government's economic policies."²⁰ Pusch Commey, a South African journalist, noted that, "pundits have conceded the rand's overall good standing to a healthy fiscal position, few current account problems, an excellent trade balance, and sound economic management."²¹ Liberalization and the facilitation of foreign technology has increased productivity in the manufacturing sector by 70%, while contributing to an impressive trade balance.²² Overall, trade liberalization has "increased growth in the volume of imports and exports in the early 1990s corresponded with tariff reductions, the elimination of surcharges, and

18 Stuart Jones, *The Decline of the South African Economy*, (Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2002), 19.

19 Aron et al., *South African Economic Policy under Democracy*, 32.

20 Pusch Commey, "The Rand's Amazing Run," *New African* no. 416: 29.

21 *Ibid.*

22 Aron et al., *South African Economic Policy under Democracy*, 174.

the removal of trade sanctions."²³

As promising as the above statistics are, unemployment has remained a persistent problem. It is unclear how neoliberalism has impacted employment, and it is more likely other factors, such as pre-independence inefficiencies and rapid population growth, are to blame for persistently high levels of unemployment. The ANC government inherited one of the highest levels of unemployment in the world: from 1995-2003, unemployment continued to rise from 29% to 42%, but then began declining, when it reached 36% four years later.²⁴ Geeta Kingdon and John Knight, Oxford economists, have argued that there were two primary reasons for persistent unemployment: slow economic growth and the increase in labor force participation and population. From 1995-2003, they found that labor force participation grew by 4.8%, while wage employment grew by 1.8%. The rapid growth of the labor force can be attributed to a combination of the following factors: immigration, a natural increase in the number of working-age people, and an increase of the labor force (spurred in part by a 15% increase in female participation from 1995-2003).²⁵ Consequently, this growth can partially explain persistent unemployment not affected by neoliberal policies. Likewise, the fall in unemployment from 2003-2007 can be attributed in part to the slower growth of the labor force, which was partly due to the HIV/AIDS crisis.²⁶

An employment change often blamed on neoliberal policy and trade liberalization has been the decrease in manufacturing employment from 1990-2002. International trade liberalization has not been proven to increase net unemployment in the South African economy, but instead, increased trade flows have altered the composition of employment. Lawrence Edwards, Rashad Cassim and Dirk van Seventer have argued that as jobs have been created in export oriented sectors such as natural resource based and chemical sectors, they have declined in import competing sectors such as textiles, leather and footwear. Consequently, "the net direct of trade flows on employment was therefore close to zero."²⁷ When accounting for employment solely in the manufacturing sector, it appears the key variable affecting unemployment is technological change. They concluded that, "improvements in productivity reduced employment by close to 3 percent per annum between 1990 and 2002. A problem is that technological change could itself be related to liberalization as firms adopt new technologies or restructure production in response to increased international competition."²⁸ As a result, decreases in manufacturing employment are occurring, but the productivity of the workforce is increasing. When coupled with growth in export jobs, neoliberal reform and free trade policies have been beneficial for the

23 Ibid., 167.

24 Ibid., 16.

25 Ibid., 303.

26 Ibid., 323.

27 Ibid., 172.

28 Ibid.

economy as a whole, even though it has negatively affected certain groups that were dependent on inefficient manufacturing employment.

Conclusion

South Africa's democratic transition was accompanied by a radical economic transformation that modernized the country from import substitution to neoliberalism. This transition was the product of negotiations between the NP, the ANC, and international actors, eventually resulting in South Africa's GATT membership and the ANC's GEAR and RDP stability programs.

It is difficult to determine the costs and benefits of neoliberalism today, but some broad conclusions can be drawn. Although GDP growth has been slower than expected, it had increased to 5% in 2007, with most of that growth being in the service sector. Investment rates have had a higher increase, up to 6.9% in some sectors. Many criticize neoliberalism for not providing employment, but the primary reasons for persistently high levels of unemployment appear to be increases in the population of the labor market and increases in productivity (which is related to neoliberalism, but can be considered an improvement in the manufacturing sector even though it has decreased employment). Further, jobs have been created in key, export oriented industries to offset losses in import-competing sectors.

Critics of neoliberalism in South Africa have pointed to growing inequality under the ANC despite overall growth. Although it is hard to gather accurate statistics on overall poverty levels, it appears that the growth in inequality has been largely interracial. Servaas Van der Berg, a South African economist, illustrates this point, writing, "Rising black per capita incomes over the past three decades have narrowed the inter-racial income gap, although increasing inequality within the black population seems to have prevented a significant decline in aggregate inequality and poverty."²⁹ However, he also found that rising black inequality was not enough to assume a higher percentage of the population in poverty, noting that, the percentage of people in poverty, as measured by R3 000 per capita per year, has remained stable."³⁰ Hence, it is uncertain that neoliberalism or any other ANC policy has actually increased the percentage of the population living in poverty, but instead the real number of people living in poverty has increased as the country's population has increased. The Southern African Regional Poverty Network aligns with Van der Berg's findings, stating that in 2001, roughly 57% of South Africa's population was living below the poverty line, a figure that has remained stagnant

29 Servaas Van der Berg and Megan Louw, "Changing Patterns of South African Income Distribution," (Paper presented, Conference of the Economic Society of South Africa, Stellenbosch, South Africa, 2003), 19.

30 Ibid.

since 1996.³¹ However, the same study has found that, “the poverty gap has grown from R56-billion in 1996 to R81-billion in 2001 indicating that poor households have sunk deeper into poverty over this period.”³²

In brief, the neoliberal policies enacted by the ANC government have been highly successful at stabilizing and promoting the economy internationally, moderately successful at promoting growth, and largely unsuccessful at poverty alleviation. Although neoliberalism has not proven to increase the percentage of the population in poverty, those living below the poverty line have fallen deeper below the threshold. This does not mean that initial neoliberal reform was a failure, but it does suggest that neoliberal policies are not reaching a large proportion of the population.

The South African government shows few signs of changing its neoliberal policies in the future. However, the government will eventually have to confront the fact that 57% of its population is in dire need of assistance—which does not necessarily have to come at the expense of neoliberal reform. High poverty levels will not only burden the state with providing for its citizenry, but also impede future growth regardless of economic policy decisions. For example, concerns about public health and a poorly educated workforce could deter possible investors regardless of open investment policies enacted by the government. As a result, increasing funding for educational opportunities and public health (most notably to address the HIV / AIDS epidemic) will improve both the current standard of living and future opportunities for the nation’s low-income population. Enacting social policies in conjunction with further neoliberal reform should result in increased growth and productivity in the future.

Neoliberalism has developed over hundreds of years of economic and political debate to become the leading economic philosophy of the 21st century. South Africa began its democratic transition with an economic transformation to join the international community by embracing neoliberal ideology. It is unrealistic to expect the benefits of development to come rapidly when the developed world was allowed centuries to develop their own economies. Although South Africa faces many challenges, it has endured the growing pains of a new democracy and built a strong foundation for future success, thereby ensuring its regional hegemony and international prominence in the future.

31 Craig Schwabe, “Fact Sheet: Poverty in South Africa,” Southern African Regional Poverty Network, <http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000990>.

32 Ibid.

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Rachel Vernee Bonds is a junior at the University of Georgia, double majoring in International Affairs and African Studies. She is particularly concerned with International Political Economy and the geographical region of Sub-Saharan Africa. Last summer, she spent four weeks studying abroad in Tanzania, and completed a Legal internship with Sodexo North America. This summer, she will be studying abroad and volunteering with women's issues in Ghana and Togo. She also works as a Research Assistant for the British Standards Institute, where she compiles trade and economic reports.



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NGO and MNC Relationships in the Global Community

BY JENNY TAI
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Abstract

In the past few decades, new actors have appeared in the international community, conducting operations that are no longer confined within state boundaries. As power shifted from nation-states to financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF, multinational corporations (MNCs) have emerged as dominant forces. Thus, in a globalized world with new power dynamics, it remains questionable as to what types of institutions should hold MNCs accountable for human right abuses. While there exists no international legal standard that monitors the operations and behavior of MNCs, NGOs have addressed these concerns, drawing on different strategies with these corporations. This paper explores the inner workings of the NGO-MNC relationship, arguing how this partnership could be more effective in the global community.

Introduction

After the horrors of the Holocaust, the United Nations formed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948, a document of paramount importance in the global arena. This legislation attested to an individual's rights to many freedoms including civil, political, and economic ones, but it only applied to states. Moreover, the UDHR is not a binding contract; there is no mechanism for the enforcement or punishment of those states that violate its terms. Although the

vast majority of states voted in favor of this document, and more did so as time went on, disagreements continuously emerge among the participant states about what constitutes a human rights violation. Overall, many developing countries value economic development, often neglecting human rights in the process. As developing governments receive economic support from developed countries, whose primary goal is to create favorable conditions for investment, the likelihood of human rights violations increases.¹

While there exists no international legal standard that monitors the operations and behavior of MNCs, some countries have instituted domestic laws that pertain to the labor, environmental, and human rights obligations of these corporations. The United States has always been one of the strongest proponents of preventing human rights abuses under international law. Under the Alien Claims Tort Act (ACTA), human rights violations committed abroad by a foreign citizen or American citizen can be tried in US courts.² This act has recently been extended to allow litigation against companies that choose to invest in countries where governments commit human rights abuses. In turn, business representatives vehemently complained, arguing that the act would undermine the economic activity and international trade. Additionally, corporations that operate in developing countries believed that they would face an onslaught of lawsuits, which would affect economic conditions.³ However, as of 2004, only 38 cases against corporations have been filed.⁴

Any given government can extend human rights legislation outside of its own state to the extent that it does not compromise another state's autonomy. Each state wishes to protect its interests domestically and internationally; however, globalization has created further confusion regarding international policies, making it harder for one state to pursue its objectives without conflicting with the interests of another's. The increased number of participants in international policies—governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and multinational corporations (MNCs)—has created additional ambiguities. With such uncertainty in the international system, it makes it easier for issues to go unchecked and for human rights violations to occur.

The role and limits of NGOs

Many NGOs have addressed some of the issues regarding human rights legislation that governments have been unable to touch. NGOs are defined as "self-governing, private, not-for-profit organizations that are geared toward improving the quality

1 Emilie Hafner-Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, "Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises," *American Journal of Sociology* 10, no. 5 (March 2005): 1373–1411.

2 Beth Stephens, "Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush Administration's Efforts to Limit Human Rights Litigation," *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 17 (2004): 169–205.

3 *Ibid.*

4 *Ibid.*

of life of disadvantaged people. They are neither part of government nor controlled by a public body.”⁵ NGOs were in existence long before the UDHR was formed, but since the declaration’s inception, NGOs have worked to strengthen their role within the international system. Additionally, NGOs are not restricted by the same boundaries as individual states do, and often focus on a transnational issue, such as human rights. In general, NGOs promote human rights by gathering substantial information about a particular subject, maintaining a large network of contacts abroad, and drawing from a large repertoire of strategies to pressure governments. NGOs might also provide financial aid to local organizations or suggest advocacy methods.⁶

The biggest limitation to the role NGOs play in promoting human rights violations, though, is its lack of “actual” power to implement policies. Some compare the role of NGOs to that of consultants, in that these organizations persuade and advise governments.⁷ They function as intermediaries, but ultimately the power still lies within the state. Yet similar to a state, both entities struggle when dealing with MNCs based in developing countries.⁸ Although MNCs increase economic activity in a developing country, namely by employing cheap labor and purchasing natural resources, the growth usually comes at the cost of suppressing the local people. Thus, many legislators have suggested the need for some global governance to regulate international corporations.

Role of Multinational Corporations and Human Rights

Due to globalization, the rise of MNCs and NGOs has fragmented power relations within the international arena, thereby blurring the lines between the public and private spheres.⁹ Currently, the rising power of MNCs poses a challenge to conventional methods of human rights enforcement. The global community does not agree as to whether MNCs should be subjected to a state’s international law or to a global judicial system. However, many states hold that MNCs do not have rights as individuals, and thus, putting a firm on trial for making profit is unreasonable.

Throughout the last few decades, MNCs have been accused of violating human of life, liberty, workers’ rights, security, and property.¹⁰ These violations can be

5 Peter Van Tuijl, “NGOs and Human Rights: Sources of Justice and Democracy,” *Journal of International Affairs* 52 (1999): 493-512.

6 *Ibid.*

7 *Ibid.*

8 Donald H. Schepers, “The Impact of NGO Network Conflict on the Corporate Social Responsibility Strategies of Multinational Corporations,” *Business and Society* 45 (2006): 282-99.

9 Peter T. Muchlinski, “Human Rights and Multinationals: Is there a Problem?” *International Affairs* 77 (November 2001): 32-48.

10 Surya Deva, “Human Rights Violations By Multinational Corporations and International Law:

categorized into three different groups of corporate complicity: direct violation, indirect violation, and silent complicity.¹¹ Direct violation of human rights occurs when a firm intentionally violates human rights, while indirect violation occurs when a firm knowingly assists the government of a state violating human rights.¹² A mining company that forces the relocation of an entire village in order to conduct digging on that site, directly violates the populations' rights of the UDHR.¹³ However, a company that benefits from the abuses committed by a government or another corporation, indirectly violates the victims' rights of the UDHR. Specifically, Unocal's cooperation with a Myanmar oil company to build pipelines is categorized as an indirect violation, given the oil company's torture and forced labor practices. Silent complicity, the third category, occurs when an MNC is aware of the violations occurring in the state in which they operate, but either chooses to do nothing to prevent the violations or is precluded from intervening by some legal obligation.¹⁴ Though the latter two categories are relatively similar, it is important to distinguish them. In the case of indirect violation, MNCs work with the violator and benefit from the violations, even though these corporations do not commit the abuses. In silent complicity, however, MNCs choose to work in corrupt environments, while failing to speak out against the violations. The majority of these violations occur in developing states where governments do not have the means to enforce human rights legislation within their own countries. In the past decade, many firms developed corporate social responsibility policies, but the majority of companies continue to neglect these issues.

The international community has recognized its role in influencing social policies, yet it remains unsure as to how to hold MNCs accountable for violating human rights; indeed, there is disagreement as to whether these corporations should be held accountable at all.¹⁵ NGOs, though, have recognized how MNCs interact with states that commit grave human rights abuse, and thus use multilateral approaches when addressing the issues. Although many MNCs have developed their own programs for corporate social responsibility, NGOs have supported these initiatives and launched other programs that expand these companies' efforts.

Methods of NGOs

NGOs focus on MNCs who have gained an increasing amount of power within the international community, due to the political shift of power from nation-states to

Where from Here?" Connecticut Journal of International Law 9 (2003): 1-57.

11 Ibid.

12 Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, "Categories of Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Abuses," *Hastings International and Comparative Law Review* 24: 339-349, HeinOnline.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Kerrie M. Taylor, "Thicker than Blood: Holding Exxon Mobil Liable for Human Rights Violations Committed Abroad," *Syracuse Journal of International Law & Commerce* 31, no. 2 (2004): 273-297.

financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF. Therefore, NGOs want to hold these MNCs more accountable for their actions, as state governments are no longer able to do so. MNCs are able to exert a considerable amount of influence on country, as they interact with various societal levels: the labor force, supply sectors, and government officials. Thus, NGOs have to deploy various methods when dealing with MNCs that conduct a wide array of operations. Some NGOs have advocated for a stronger overarching legal obligation, while others have confronted these corporations directly. Overall, NGOs utilize strategies that are tailored to the behavior of a particular MNC as well as different political and socio-economic contexts. In his article "NGO Strategies for Promoting Corporate Social Responsibility," Morton Winston illustrates some of the approaches that NGOs might use when targeting MNCs.¹⁶

1. *Engagement and Support*

This tactic focuses on heavy research and persuasion; NGOs work with MNCs, and encourage them to voluntarily implement their own codes of conduct, while monitoring their compliance. This strategy relies on ethical arguments that persuade MNCs to accept accountability for their actions and embrace corporate responsibility. NGOs, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, frequently employ this strategy when dealing with MNCs.

2. *Stakeholder Activism*

This strategy focuses on engaging and influencing stakeholders—including suppliers and creditors—to voice their concerns regarding corporate policy. NGOs seek to exert enough pressure on the pension funds of the stakeholders to weaken their relations with the corporations and to promote awareness of the issue at hand. This strategy promotes corporations to develop and monitor their own form of corporate social responsibility, which should meet the demands of their stakeholders.

3. *Moral Stigmatization and Shaming*

Moral stigmatization and shaming, probably the most widely-used NGO tactic, involves publicly criticizing and damaging the reputation of an MNC. This method proves to be highly effective because an MNC is sensitive to any negative press, and will thus work quickly to bolster its public image.

4. *Economic Pressure*

NGOs can target MNCs on a confrontational level by exerting economic pressure on these corporations, a tactic which involves imposing sanctions and promoting boycotts. NGOs might also implement the selective purchasing law, which penalizes companies for doing business with repressive regimes by preventing them from participating in public

16 Morton Winston, "NGO Strategies for Promoting Corporate Social Responsibility," *Ethics & International Affairs* 16, no. 2 (2002): 71-87.

contract bids. However, economic tactics tend to adversely affect the workers of the companies as well.

5. *Government-Imposed Standards*

This method holds state governments accountable for an MNC's actions, as it includes legislation that imposes a legal obligation on the firms. The case of *Doe v. Unocal*, in which the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement granted US Courts jurisdiction over violations committed at the international level, best exemplifies this method.

The choice of strategy depends on NGOs' interaction with MNCs and the willingness of MNCs to accept corporate responsibility. Often, NGOs use multiple methods in conjunction with one another to persuade MNCs to change their policies.

Cases of MNCs violating Human Rights

The following cases illustrate how a corporation committed human rights abuses and the steps it took after the violations were revealed to the global community. In both cases, NGOs deployed numerous approaches to change the policies of the MNC. After facing public humiliation and declines in revenues, the MNCs eventually met the demands of the NGOs and created social responsibility programs. These scenarios depict the importance of public opinion and economic activity for MNCs, which make these corporations such easy targets for NGOs.

Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc.

Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc., a large mining company, formerly conducted a gold and copper operation in Indonesia, a country which was considerably politically unstable at the time.¹⁷ After investigating reports of human rights abuses carried out by Indonesian security forces who were linked to Freeport, NGOs began to criticize the corporation. Although the company boasted a clean record, the government's security forces that it hired to protect the mining areas were committing systematic human rights violations, specifically against environmental groups and marginalized individuals. Thus, through various lawsuits and political campaigns, NGOs tarnished Freeport's public image, thereby affecting the company's economic activity and margin of profits. Freeport then joined the "Global Mining Initiative," which focuses on the impact of mining on local communities. Additionally, it began collaborating with various NGOs, such as Amnesty International and the Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights.¹⁸ By working with NGOs and promoting more ethical standards,

17 Juliette Bennett, "Business in Zones of Conflict - The Role of the Multinationals In Promoting Regional Stability," United Nations Global Compact, <http://www.unglobalcompact.org/issues/conflict_prevention/meetings_and_workshops/Reg_stability.html>.

18 Ibid.

Freeport reexamined its responsibilities as a MNC in the globalized system.

Talisman in Sudan

In 1991, Talisman, a Canadian oil company, began to launch a project in Sudan. From the beginning, Talisman's operation was confronted by Sudan's second civil war, which had begun in the mid-1980s. Additionally, the increase in oil production in the country altered the balance of military power between the north and south.¹⁹ Talisman was accused of aiding the Northern Arab Sudanese government and fueling the civil war. Specifically, the company was supplying funds that the government then funneled into purchasing equipment used for human rights abuses and supporting its repressive activities.²⁰ Thus, the oil company indirectly exacerbated the conditions in the country, and furthermore, did not provide any relief to Sudanese civilians. NGOs, such as Amnesty International, the American Anti-Slavery Group, and the Canadian Inter-Church Coalition, among others, utilized the internet and other media outlets to publicize this information. Moreover, they pressured the Canadian government and its investors to sanction the company's actions, which resulted in a significant drop in stock prices.²¹ Hence, Talisman partnered with the NGOs and other companies to draft a corporate responsibility program.

Partnership between NGOs and MNCs

Unlike NGOs, which often operate on a non-profit basis, MNCs must consider their stakeholders and other affiliates. With such different objectives, why, then, do NGOs and MNCs enter into partnerships? As power dynamics in the international system have considerably shifted, the role of each player has become convoluted, and thus strategies that once worked must now be revised.²² Specifically, the push for MNCs to become more responsible in their business practices has caused some corporations to seek out NGOs as partners to help implement effective solutions.²³ At the very least, MNCs collaborate with NGOs to appear as socially responsible. Firms are pressured from two sides: economically, they must remain profitable, while socially, they must maintain certain standards of human rights. Thus, many corporations have turned to NGOs, which have professional expertise in human rights issues, and use them as resources when implementing a project.

19 Stephen Kobrin, "Oil and Politics: Talisman Energy in Sudan," *NYU Journal of International Law and Politics* (2004): 239-272.

20 Benenet, "Business in Zones of Conflict - The Role of the Multinationals In Promoting Regional Stability."

21 Kobrin, "Oil and Politics: Talisman Energy in Sudan," 239-272.

22 Deborah Spar, "The Power of Activism Assessing the Impact of NGOs on Global Business," Harvard Business School, <http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~hiscox/Spar.pdf>.

23 Tadashi Yamamoto and Kim Gould Ashizawa, *Corporate-NGO Partnership in Asia Pacific* (Tokyo: JCIE, 1999).

While NGOs fulfill their moral and ethical goal by partnering with an MNC, they also benefit on a financial and developmental level. Corporate support can relieve an NGOs of monetary issues in procuring funding, thereby allowing it to rely less on public donations and federal support. Additionally, MNCs provide NGOs with greater outreach programs and marketing exposure.²⁴ Their interaction can be seen as a mutual symbiosis, as both entities derive a benefit from one another: MNCs are developing a better corporate culture and NGOs are operating on a more business-like model. These partnerships are also beneficial in terms of leveraging political support from lobbying and interest groups. Independently, NGOs and MNCs have influenced policy, and therefore a partnership will only strengthen their individual power.

Traditionally, though, NGOs aligned themselves with governments in the public sphere and corporations in the private sphere. Yet as the lines between the two spheres dissolve, ethical problems have emerged. An NGO must remain genuine in its ideals when trying to secure sponsorship from an MNC, which may try to compromise some of an NGO's integrity in the process.²⁵ Additionally, the amount of influence an NGO can exert on an MNC is in question, and NGOs disagree about whether such a partnership should be approached at all. If there is a large power imbalance between the two parties, the partnerships could result in greater conflict.²⁶

In order for an effective partnership to occur there needs to be a mutual understanding of how issues should be carried out. Some NGOs criticize MNC-NGO partnerships and claim that these partnerships exist so that MNCs can promote a public image of corporate social responsibility. Thus, an MNC must truly demonstrate its genuineness when aligning itself with an NGO. Although NGO-MNC partnerships may compromise the objectives of each party (an MNC's economic values and an NGO's altruistic vision), there is still the potential for effective collaboration. Thus, organizations and corporations should be honest and specific about what each hopes to achieve through collaboration during the discussions that precede partnership.²⁷ They must be fully committed in the partnership, outlining their goals beforehand in order for each side to benefit from one another.

24 Ibid.

25 Clara C. J. M. Millar, Chong Ju Choi, and Stephen Chen, "Global Strategic Partnerships between MNEs and NGOs: Drivers of Change and Ethical Issues," *Business and Society Review*, 109 (December 2004): 395-414.

26 Ibid.

27 Millar, Choi, and Chen, "Global Strategic Partnerships between MNEs and NGOs: Drivers of Change and Ethical Issues," 395-414.

Conclusion

As power shifts from nation-states to financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF, MNCs have emerged as dominant forces in the global community. With new power dynamics, it remains questionable as to what types of institutions should hold MNCs accountable when these corporations commit human right abuses. Yet, it is hard to hold moral and ethical standards to corporations that were founded on the basis of competition and earning profit. While there exists no international legal standard that monitors the operations and behavior of MNCs, NGOs have addressed these concerns and developed effective relations with these institutions. These successful cases signify a trend towards an even more unified world. Since an NGO's power is limited, many of these organizations have turned to the state government for help to implement more successful policies. When NGOs, MNCs, and state governments engage in a collective cooperation, they can solve some of the issues of global governance, such as universal human rights.

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About Jenny Tai

Jenny Tai is a junior at the University of Pennsylvania majoring in International Relations. She is interested in international business, management, and public policy. This article was inspired by a class discussion in her management class about the changing role of Multinational Corporations in today's world. On campus, Jenny is involved in Wharton Asia Exchange, the International Relations Undergraduate Student Association, China Care, and the Kite and Key Society.



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