Journal of International Relations

ΣΥΝΕΣΗΣ

GOVERNANCE OF OUR GLOBAL WORLD

Pascal Lamy|*Director-General, World Trade Organization*

Journal of International Relations

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Vanessa Corlazzoli works in Washington, D.C., at Search for Common Ground, where she provides critical support to peace-building and conflict resolution programs in more than 25 countries around the world. Before this appointment, Vanessa, who is originally from Uruguay and Canada, studied Human Security and Humanitarian Studies at The Fletcher School and earned a Masters of Arts in Law and Diplomacy in 2011.

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LETTER FROM THE EDITOR ———————————————————————

Dear Reader:

It is with great pride and profound gratitude that I present to you the fifteenth edition of the Sigma Iota Rho (SIR) *Journal of International Relations*. Building off of the impressive legacy established over the *Journal*'s previous fourteen years of publication, I am thrilled to tell you that this year's edition is better than ever before. Our dramatically expanded pool of submissions coupled with the tireless work of the Executive Board and staff allowed for the production of the highest quality edition to date. This year has also seen an expansion and revitalization of our online platform, sirjouranl.org, regularly publishing op-ed pieces, book reviews, blog posts, and articles on a wide range of issues.

This year, the *Journal* is honored to feature Pascal Lamy, Director-General of the World Trade Organization as our headliner. First appointed in 2005 and unanimously elected to second term in 2009, Mr. Lamy has worked tirelessly to reduce barriers to trade in an effort to reduce poverty, raise global standards of living, and promote development and economic growth worldwide. In his article, Mr. Lamy discusses the ongoing challenges to global governance, detailing how those stumbling-blocks might and must be overcome given the increasing interconnectedness and interdependence of today's world.

This year, the *Journal* also features the voice of Leigh Morris Sloane, Executive Director of the Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs (APSIA). In her article, Ms. Sloane discusses the value of graduate programs in international affairs, imparting invaluable advice regarding graduate programs and how to best take advantage of them and all they have to offer.

The articles selected for publication in this edition present innovative and in-depth scholarly analyses on some of the most critical issues within the field of international relations. Jonathan Diamond provides an original analysis of the burgeoning threat of cyber security. In their co-written piece, Samuel Maynard and Alexandria Todd take an in-depth look at the 2001 Argentine financial crisis, weighing international and domestic factors that contributed to the economic fallout. For our graduate corner, Arielle Newman analyzes how ethnicity and regime type influence the prevalence and type of civil conflict. These, in combination with the other articles in this edition of the *Journal*, together demonstrate the incredible diversity within and complexity of today's international system.

I would be remiss if I failed to direct your attention to the hard work of a number of people, without whom the publication of the *Journal* would not be possible. I would like to thank the Student Activities Council at the University of Pennsylvania and our generous sponsors for their loyal support of the *Journal*. My special thanks goes to Dr. Frank Plantan, National President of SIR, Ms. Donna Shuler, Administrative Director of SIR, and Dr. James McGann, the *Journal*'s Faculty Advisor, for their continuous support, patience, and guidance. And, above all, I am incredibly thankful for my fellow Executive Board members and staff and their incredible dedication and hard work, without which this edition would not have been possible.

Sincerely,

Jillian Rafferty
Editor-in-Chief, *Journal of International Relations*

——————————————————————— **LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT**

Dear Reader,

Mimicking President Obama's recent State of the Union, I would like to declare that "The state of Sigma Iota Rho is good." In the past year, we added new chapters, announced new scholarships, presented the Faculty Advisor Award, and—with this year's excellent *Journal of International Relations*—continued to make the case for the relevance and importance of the organization and its mission.

One of the key contributing factors to our success is the continuing improvement, scope, and reach of the *Journal* and the quality of the research published herein. The quality of the student research in the *Journal* is such that I have been told of its use and citation by professionals and other faculty. It will now be posited in the Library of Congress. University chapters that would like their own library to maintain a complete set should let us know, as we are in the process of calculating what it will take to reproduce back issues for this purpose.

The Online Journal is also thriving. I hope that all readers will consider submitting essays and research to it, and will consider becoming regular bloggers. I can't think of a better way to engage your studies of the world around you and to participate in our collective efforts to make it a better place. It is my intention that next year, a student from a member chapter will assume the duties of the Editor-in-Chief of the Online Journal, so watch for that announcement which will be sent out to all faculty advisors.

Soon it will be graduation season again, and SIR members will proudly display their graduation regalia at commencement. Rewarding and recognizing the academic achievement of our members is one of the purposes of the honor society; it is one of the pleasures of our work. But I think the greatest rewards come from the on-going, life-long pursuit of our core mission: promoting the study and understanding of world affairs. Our individual interests range may from trade, human rights, and the environment to the war on terror, nuclear proliferation, ethnic conflict, and global governance and beyond. But we are united in our desire to be better citizens, better neighbors, better friends and better parents. It is our commitment to understanding the political, economic, historical and sociological roots of these issues that makes for better policies, and subsequently, the world a better place in which to live.

I want to urge all of you—the individual members of SIR and the local chapters—to also make a special effort in the year ahead to pursue programs in your community. This can be as simple as sending SIR members to a local high school's international day, offering to guest lecture in schools and community associations, or recruiting the general public to attend on-campus events. We are now featuring select chapters on the SIR website and will feature a new chapter each quarter to help share and replicate good ideas throughout the organization.

Thank you for your support of Sigma Iota Rho and please enjoy this year's *Journal*!

Best Regards,

Frank Plantan
President

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Governance in a Global World

By Pascal Lamy
Director-General, World Trade Organization

Abstract

In this article, Pascal Lamy analyzes the history of global governance, paying specific attention to both unifying and destructive forces. This article focuses on the effect of the changing geopolitical landscape, as well as the impact of the 2008 economic crisis on international cooperation. While the momentum behind global governance has effectively stalled of late, Mr. Lamy makes note of some recent advances and concludes by giving cause for optimism.

Introduction

The challenges facing global governance are distinct from those that confront the governance of nations, businesses, and other forms of human association.

Scholars must bear this in mind when thinking about the future of the international system. Policy practitioners need new ideas for tackling concrete, often urgent problems—but they inevitably find that even the most elegant plans do not survive first contact with political reality.

What is peculiar about global governance? It is certainly not the case that countries or companies have easier problems to deal with. It is simply that the nature of the international order today does not neatly conform with what we have come to expect from governance: namely, a combination of legitimacy, leadership, coherence, and efficiency. It has become all too apparent that the three-and-a-half century-old Westphalian system of sovereign nation states is, because of its very architecture, barely capable of producing this mix. The crucible of political legitimacy remains national and local, and legitimacy diminishes the further away from citizens power is exercised. The very idea of anointing a "global leader" seems antithetical to the Westphalian theory of sovereign states' enjoying equal rights.

International governance—based as it currently is on organizations with very specific roles and mandates—does not mirror the manner in which a national government presides over different ministries. Moreover, we can no longer pretend that organizations are coherent simply because they are led by coherent sovereign states. To take one example, the membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO) overlaps almost completely with that of the International Labour Organization (ILO). Yet governments have given the WTO observer status at the ILO, but have not agreed to give the ILO similar status at the WTO!

The same holds true for efficiency, which is a byword for "results." Most decisions that matter at the international level are adopted by consensus. Decisions of import are therefore few and far between. What's more, their implementation, with the notable exception of WTO-type decisions, tends to be hampered by insufficient oversight and weak enforcement. International administrations are even more prone to "red-tape syndrome" than are national bureaucracies. The consequences for effectiveness are predictable: all too often, the return on investment—in terms of outcomes achieved compared with resources allocated—is mediocre.

Progress in Global Governance

In spite of these serious impediments, the international system has grown substantially since 1865, when the International Telegraph Union was created to facilitate cross-border transmission, which overcame the need to print out messages at national borders and walk them over to the telegraph office on the other side. Intergovernmental commitments have increased slowly, with the exception of periodic big bangs of institutional creation (most often in the wake of calamitous wars).

The resulting international order is legally underpinned by treaties entered into by state entities that have, on a case-by-case basis, agreed that their national interests are best served by the coordinated renunciation of some sovereignty. These agreements make up a system of rules, obligations, and responsibilities that are binding to greater or lesser degrees. They are part of a wider landscape of formal structures, led by the United Nations system and the Bretton Woods institutions, together with informal groupings such as the G-7/8, and now the Group of 20 major industrialised and emerging nations.

This tenuously interconnected institutional archipelago is a considerable distance from covering all of the necessary fields of international governance. And it is further still from some utopian idea of global government. Keep in mind, however, that the political energy mustered to take even these baby steps away from the "security blanket" of the Westphalian system over the past century was catalyzed by major global disasters. It should be no surprise that the only truly supranational enterprise to date, the European Union, was created on the continent at the epicentre of the two most devastating international conflicts.

CHANGING POWER BALANCES, NEW CHALLENGES

But the gradual building up of international governance has hit a roadblock during the past two decades. Hardly any new institutions have emerged since the GATT's 1995 transformation into the WTO and the establishment of the International Criminal Court in 1998, both of which came in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall. The composition of the UN Security Council looks increasingly antediluvian. Most major international negotiations are currently stalemated; there have even been a few setbacks, if one considers the continuing agonies of the Kyoto Protocol.

This standstill is the result of geopolitical, geo-economic, and even geo-technological developments that have served to exacerbate the preexisting hurdles to global governance.

By far the most important of these has been the emergence of developing countries on the heels of globalization. This process has not been without its ironies: the ideological "recipe" for the international order, in the shape of globalised market capitalism and liberal democracy, was produced in the West. Yet this same matrix has served as the blueprint for the advances made by the Rest—and consequently for the West's relative decline. Emerging powers have leveraged market capitalism, bolstered by information technologies, to achieve economic and social development at an unprecedented speed, reducing poverty (though often not inequality) on a scale never before seen.

This change in the world's centre of economic gravity has reshuffled the cards of global geopolitics. The new players in world politics have learned different lessons from history than the traditional leading actors. They have different cultural attitudes and diplomatic stances, and they are far less inclined to accept the erosion of sovereignty or to assume international responsibilities. They might accept globalization of the economy and markets, but not of international politics. Not having written the rules of the international game, they are less inclined to own them.

The financial and economic crisis that erupted in 2007/2008 only accelerated these trends, simultaneously widening the growth divide and undermining the legitimacy

and prestige of the Western package of rules and procedures that had previously served as a model.

Nowhere has the future shape of international rules been called into question more than in the economic sphere. The former balance of obligations and responsibilities between what was the "North" and what was the "South" no longer applies—and cannot, if rules are to be effective. But the two camps have been unable to agree on a new balance. The result has been a halt in multilateral cooperation on issues such as international trade, climate change, and exchange rate policy, driven principally by thorny relations between the United States and China.

The economic crisis further complicated the prospect for international cooperation by sapping reserves of national political capital, leaving little to dedicate to global governance. And contrary to the conventional wisdom, international policy requires a great deal of domestic political energy, since it is harder to convince public opinion of the need to compromise with foreigners. Any international negotiation is first and foremost a negotiation with and among national constituencies, and involves a strong dose of domestic political leadership: the history of United States foreign policy is one of the clearest examples of this. International governance is less a matter of globalizing local problems than it is of localizing global problems. But in times of economic uncertainty and social anxiety, public opinion hardens, and weak governments save what political energy they have to tend more immediate fires. International considerations are set aside for better times.

Changing power balances and preoccupied governments have produced a crisis of global governance. We are incapable today of producing new principles of cooperation suited to this new world, and we are incapable of inventing new areas of common ground. In a world of growing interdependence, a failure to advance global governance will come with serious risks—political, economic, social and environmental—for future generations.

AVENUES FOR PROGRESS

When searching for solutions to this problem, we need to explore what is feasible. Above all, we need to stop hoping for another big shock to the global order. Such moments are historically the result of the political energy generated by a major global conflict, the prospects of which seem blessedly low today. We therefore need to make the most with what we have.

Some of the most potentially fruitful avenues for plausible progress come from collaboration among the G-20, the United Nations, and the various specialised international organisations, with each leveraging its unique strengths. The informal, self-selected G-20 lacks legitimacy, but can generate political momentum and

encourage a measure of coherence among systemically significant actors. The United Nations, though not known for its efficiency, enjoys the moral legitimacy conferred by universal membership. And finally, the specialized agencies, if supported by the other two sides of this "triangle," can use their technical expertise and know-how to come up with solutions.

Such interaction has already yielded some successes.

The economic crisis and its aftermath have thus far seen countries largely resist protectionist pressures, with the WTO, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) collaborating to monitor G-20 countries' implementation of pledges to refrain from trade and investment protectionism.

Joint efforts by the G-20, the UN, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the OECD, the World Food Programme, and the WTO have helped to curb the rise in international food prices, which would have been amplified by further export restrictions.

The headway made in global regulation of the financial industry has been enabled by the G-20's creation of what is effectively a World Financial Organization via the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Bank for International Settlements, and the new Financial Stability Board.

And the G-20 may be making some progress on the contentious issue of tax havens with research prepared by the OECD.

Given the current absence of political energy for signing new binding treaties, the focus should also be on implementing existing rules more fully, and on improving monitoring. The WTO is doing this. Other international organisations, notably the IMF, could do the same. Greater accountability and results-orientation could be promoted by introducing measuring tools and performance indicators for international institutions and their leaders. The Millennium Development Goals, with their easily measurable indicators, represent a significant step in this direction. A similar approach for national diplomats posted to multilateral institutions could incentivize constructive engagement (though this suggestion may border on the sacrilegious).

Additionally, practical, soft regulation may partially fill some of the many gaps within the global governance archipelago. While by definition incomplete, such codes could be valuable in areas such as energy, taxation, migration and cyber-security. That being said, there are clear limits to this governance "technology," as evidenced by the failure to reach agreement on harmonising accountancy rules internationally, despite the issue's importance to economic globalization.

On a different plane, more regional integration—a sort of mini-globalization—ought to provide steps in the direction of more global governance. Inching away from the Westphalian system is, at least in theory, less complicated for people who speak similar languages and share proximity of both geography and civilization. Africa in particular would reap substantial rewards, in both economic and security terms, from closer trade, investment and transport links throughout the region. Of course, the current turmoil in Europe underscores that continental integration is no panacea, even if there are signs that the crisis is pushing governments there to cross new red lines in supranational governance.

New networking technologies offer potential for generating novel, diffused forms of governance that may be freer of the constraints currently affecting traditional inter-state governance models. The WTO is experiencing this during an on-going initiative with the OECD to measure international trade in terms of value added, an attempt to replace existing bases of measurement that have been rendered obsolete by changes in the structure of production and trade. Thanks to a sort of spontaneous mobilization of statisticians and researchers, with very little top-down direction, the exercise was able to produce some preliminary results in an unexpectedly short amount of time. The analysis has revealed that politically contentious bilateral trade balances are often far smaller than generally thought once imports and exports are measured according to their true national content. When the U.S. trade deficit with China is measured as it should be—that is, in value-added rather than gross commercial terms—it shrinks by more than thirty percent. Thus, even while the WTO's formal rule-making procedures remained blocked, creative collaboration among different international institutions and researchers can to provide a basis for governments to make better trade and macroeconomic policy choices.

THE ROAD AHEAD

Looking ahead, consensus in major multilateral negotiations will remain elusive until leading, advanced, and emerging economies can agree on what they owe to each other, to poorer countries, and to the future. The conundrum arises from the newfound diversity among countries that are systemically significant. Not long ago, major economies, like Tolstoy's happy families, were all alike: rich both in aggregate and per capita terms. Today, countries like China, India, Indonesia and Brazil present a more muddled picture. Their decisions are deeply consequential for the global economy and environment. But are they poor countries with many rich people, deserving of flexibilities in international trade and climate rules? Or are they reasonably rich countries, albeit with many poor people, whose obligations should now get closer to those of the United States, Europe, and Japan?

One possible way forward would see emerging countries accept that they will, as they develop, align their level of international commitments with those of advanced

economies. Meanwhile, the advanced economies would recognize that emerging countries, however fast their current growth rates, deserve long transition periods to converge.

But underlying any grand compromises is a deeper issue: values. It is difficult for countries, as for people, to accept new rules if they share no sense of belonging to a common project. After many years at the various high tables of global governance, I have come to conclude that the fundamental obstacle to moving forward is the absence of common values underpinning a shared ambition for civilization. The issue of values must be tackled if we are to arrive at a new global social contract.

Building a platform of shared values for an integrated, multipolar world will unquestionably be an enormous challenge. Because it will have to depart from traditional ideological models, it will ruffle feathers among those who believe in the superiority of one civilization over another. Because it will have to borrow from cultural models distinct from those dominant in individual regions and continents, some people may find it unconvincing. Because it will have to go beyond the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its covenants on economic and social rights, it will fuel fierce philosophical and even spiritual debates. The staunchest partisans of the nation-state, who deliberately ignore the central role that constructivists have played in making the world a better place, might reject the very premise of such an exercise.

Nevertheless, tackling this "north face" of global governance has become unavoidable.

It may be too much to expect G-20 leaders to use their summits to have a real conversation, to set aside their talking points on IMF quota reform in favor of a frank exchange on development, social justice, sovereignty and environmental sustainability. Indeed, better prospects for progress may come from civil society, where social networks are making possible for the first time a sort of universal awareness— the faintest inklings of a global "demos"—without which global governance risks remaining a disembodied concept.

Nearly a decade has passed since Robert Kagan contrasted a Kantian Europe based on laws, rules, negotiation, and cooperation with a United States still exercising military power in a Hobbesian world, famously concluding that "Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus." I think it is better for the world to look like Venus than Mars.

At the end of his recent history of global governance, Mark Mazower frets that amidst public alienation and passivity by states, "the idea of governing the world is becoming yesterday's dream." That isn't yet true. But unless we can seize opportunities for cooperation today, and work towards shared values tomorrow, it will be.

ABOUT PASCAL LAMY

Pascal Lamy is the Director-General of the World Trade Organization. Before assuming that position in September of 2005, he served as the Commissioner for Trade at the European Commission. He has worked with Credit Lyonnais, the President of the European Commission, and the Group of Seven. While at the WTO, Mr. Lamy has tirelessly promoted the organization's mission of opening trade, reducing trade barriers, and promoting growth and development worldwide, with a particular focus on improving standards of living and reducing global poverty.

The Rise of the French National Front

By Logan Finucan
Loyola University Chicago

Abstract

The following article examines the French political party, the National Front, and its recent electoral successes. By investigating the party's history, discourse, and the empirical analyses of its electoral support, this article assesses competing explanations for the Front's rise in support, namely its positions on European integration, economic policy, and the position of immigrants and Muslims in French society. While hostility toward immigrants is clearly its most effective technique, racism is not the core of the party's ideology. Rather, all three approaches of the party work in tandem and harness the latent fear among the French public of the nation's deterioration. Examined through the lens of Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities, all three present distinct challenges to the idea of the sovereign, culturally bordered community. Immigrants are merely perfect symbols of the impact that globalization and European integration have had on the country. Muslim immigrants are specifically prominent because of their particular interaction with French politics and culture, as well as the ideal of the secular citizen.

Introduction

In March of 2011, a poll was published in *Le Parisien* regarding the upcoming presidential election which left mainstream politicians "hesitating between prudence

and panic."[1] In a major shock to the political establishment, Marine Le Pen, the standard bearer for the far-right National Front (FN), was the leading candidate in projected first round voting, ahead even of sitting President Nicholas Sarkozy. Although her numbers subsequently fell and her opponents' rose, Le Pen still registered support as high as 24% in February of 2012, high enough to secure the second run-off slot against François Hollande, the Socialist candidate.[2] While no one expected Le Pen to register support that high, she secured a surprise 18% in the first round of the presidential election on April 22, 2012.[3]

Since its founding in the 1970s, the National Front has been widely regarded as a radical, xenophobic (and often overtly racist) party with fascist leanings, frequently referred to as being ultranationalist. Long consigned to the fringes of French politics, a revamped and rebranded National Front has surged to prominence in recent years. Challenging the image of a cosmopolitan and tolerant Europe, many similar parties have gained ground and influence in European politics. Though the National Front is one of the most prominent, similar parties have risen to occupy the position of third-largest party in nations as diverse as the Netherlands, Austria, Finland, and Denmark, and have at some point taken part in the governing coalition in Italy, Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, and the Netherlands. Although the use of anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic rhetoric has indeed been very prominent among these parties, competing theories credit the rising economic stress of globalization or grievances regarding the elitism of European governance as the driving force behind their success.

The following will examine the National Front, its history, and its context, and analyze potential explanations for its recent electoral successes. Furthermore, it will assess the extent to which the party can be explained as a function of nationalism as was conceptualized by Benedict Anderson in his *Imagined Communities*. It will argue that all three explanations are valid to some extent and that, by harnessing these grievances simultaneously, the National Front plays to fears of the deterioration of the boundaries and sovereignty of the nation. Rhetoric directed against immigrants is its mostly widely deployed and effective tactic because of immigrants' symbolism of these forces and their interaction with unique features of French political culture. Though a broader comparative analysis vis-à-vis other parties is beyond the scope of this article, this investigation can shed light on the political climate across the continent and suggests significant parallels in other nations when appropriate.

HISTORY AND CONTEXT

The National Front of France, though new in its status as a serious player in French politics, has existed for decades, located within an underground tradition of racism and intolerance in France. From its early days, the FN was a protest party typified by its particularly tough stances on immigrants, domestic crime, and French political elites. It primarily drew support from the working class, former soldiers, Pieds-Noirs and those recently returned from former French colonies.[4] The party was first organized in 1972 by former fascists, fascist sympathizers, and other right-wing fringe groups.[5] From its founding until 2011, the party was lead by Jean-Marie Le Pen, a former soldier in the Foreign Legion who fought in French Indo-China. The party first rose to prominence in the 1980s when it surprisingly won millions of votes nationwide "against a backdrop of rising unemployment, poverty, and political corruption."[6] Le Pen led the party through five successive presidential elections, usually winning between ten and fifteen percent of the first round vote. The party's best and most shocking performance (prior to the most recent election) occurred in 2002 when, against a demoralized and divided left, Le Pen secured the second runoff slot against sitting president and conservative Jacques Chirac. In this "political earthquake," to use the words of then-Prime Minister and presidential candidate Lionel Jospin, Le Pen's second round vote share was approximately seventeen percent.[7]

Generally, the party and, more specifically, the controversial Jean-Marie Le Pen have been associated strongly with anti-Semitism and philo-Nazi tendencies. Le Pen, who was found guilty and fined for Holocaust denial in 2008, has referred to the Nazi death camp gas chambers as a "tiny detail" in history and asserted that the German occupation of France was "not particularly inhumane." [8] Another key component of the party platform and official rhetoric has been hostility to immigration and to the religion of Islam. Often accused of racism, party officials have tried to deflect this accusation through the "pretense that it is cultural not racial difference which makes it impossible to assimilate Maghreb-origin immigrants into French society," and that they are "guarding against mixing and dilution" of French culture.[9] Fysh and Wolfreys identify the party and its ideology as an organization that is anti-egalitarian and not just philo-fascist but fascist itself, where "the individual is seen as no more than a component in a total social whole which satisfies his or her every need."[10]

The National Front entered a new phase of its history in January of 2011, when Marine Le Pen (hereafter Le Pen), youngest daughter of Jean-Marie Le Pen, assumed leadership of the party. The younger Le Pen set out on a mission to "de-demonize"

1   "Marine Le Pen poll rating shock for French politics," *BBC News*, Mar 6, 2011.
2   Eric Pape, "France's Newt Gingrich," *Foreign Policy*, Feb 8, 2012.
3   Henry Samuel, "Marine Le Pen third place finish vindicates decision to tone down far-Right party," *The Telegraph*, April 22, 2012.

4   Pape.
5   Peter Fysh and Jim Wolfreys, *The Politics of Racism in France*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998): 97-98.
6   Ibid., 1.
7   Elena Kulinska, "The European Extreme Right in 2010: A New Phenomenon or the Same Pattern?" *Western Balkan's Security Observer* 5, no. 17 (2010): 58.
8   Henry Samuel, "Le Pen found guilty of Holocaust denial," *The Telegraph*, Feb 8, 2008; Pape.
9   Fysh and Wolfreys, 209.
10   Ibid., 5.

the party and "has rooted out, quarantined, or condemned out-of-line figures in the party for what was once considered fairly standard behavior."[11] She has particularly tried to reverse the image of the party as anti-Semitic, and has loudly condemned the Holocaust and made overtures to France's Jewish voters.[12] Sympathetic discourse towards the Nazis has been excised. Although she has shrewdly softened the image of the party, it is generally agreed that the fundamental ideology of the FN remains largely unchanged.[13] In place of these changes, however, Le Pen has redoubled the focus on the status of Islam in France. Rather than pursue the more explicit racism of her father, Le Pen has transformed attacks on Muslims themselves to attacks on their public religious behavior, characterizing it as an unacceptable public manifestation of religion in the secular state.[14] As early as March of 2011, barely three months after she had assumed leadership, the party began to reap benefits, achieving approximately fifteen percent in local elections, compared to just seventeen percent for the ruling UMP party.[15]

THE NATIONAL FRONT TODAY

What are the factors driving the rise of the National Front, and to what extent is this related to its orientation towards immigrants and Muslims? Although its xenophobic and Islamophobic positions are usually credited, there are other competing theories that deserve examination. The first is that a vote for the National Front is purely a protest against a political system which is perceived to be corrupt and too willing to cede sovereignty to an elitist and undemocratic European Union. This is certainly a compelling rationale, and one that Le Pen and the party frequently place front and center in campaign discourse. There is undoubtedly fertile ground for this line of argument in France currently. A recent study from the Paris Institute of Political Studies Center for Political Research reported that two-thirds of the French population agree that French democracy is "malfunctioning," an even greater number say that politicians seek only their own personal gain, and nine out of ten say that the country lacks any "authority" and needs new leadership.[16]

As several French politicians and commentators have observed, Le Pen's goal is to portray both the left and the right of France's political class to be effectively the same thing—"an ineffective, impotent, out-of-touch political cluster that is incapable of

dealing with the issues that voters care about."[17] Le Pen's explicit rhetoric and refusal to endorse either Sarkozy or Hollande in the second round vote of the last election are expressions of this sentiment; "They [the other candidates] are locked in their European box…. Those who claim to want change when their hands are tied by treaties… are liars or incompetent or both."[18] Furthermore, Le Pen has pledged to claw back French sovereignty ceded to the European Union and decries the undemocratic nature of its administration; in an April 2012 speech in Lyon, she said that "Goldman Sachs places its men at the top of Eurozone countries. Goldman Sachs puts its man at the head of the European Central Bank…. In Greece, Italy, the ECB, oligarchs have taken power." She went on to call the Euro a "devastating ideology" which seeks to bring about a federal Europe and pledged to withdraw France from the currency union.[19] Similar rhetoric has come from parties in Finland, the Netherlands, Austria, and Greece, oftentimes colored by calls to abandon the Euro and strident opposition to what it sees as domestic elites bowing to foreign-imposed austerity policies.

The second potential explanation often given, related to the first, is that support for the FN arises from the economic stresses that the mainstream parties are felt to be unresponsive to. It is true that the party's base of support has traditionally been located demographically in the working class and geographically in the economically stressed, former industrial areas such as the Mediterranean coast, the Rhône region, Alsace-Lorraine, and Pas-de-Calais.[20] To these voters suffering economic hardship without adequate response from the mainstream, Le Pen offers a populist protest vote and a message of "patriotism, protectionism and state paternalism."[21] One of the new foci of the FN under the younger Le Pen has been a renewed emphasis on economic matters; she often laments the "downward social escalator" of the French economy and espouses economic policies reminiscent of the far left.[22]

Some, such as philosopher and public intellectual Slavoj Zizek, have extended this argument further and blame the withdrawal of serious leftist politics for this political innovation. Zizek argues that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the left has retreated politically toward centrist, liberal capitalism, retreated rhetorically away from the working class, and ceased to speak to their concerns. The result, he argues, is that "radical anti-immigration parties have become the only serious political force in Europe today which still is ready to appeal to the ordinary working people… [and]

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11   Pape.
12   Liam Hoare, "The French Far Right's Unlikely Quest for Jewish Voters," *The Atlantic*, Feb 23, 2012.
13   Kim Willsher, "Marine Le Pen and France's Front National sense their time has come," *The Guardian*, Jan 21, 2012.
14   Pape.
15   Henry Samuel, "French National Front make 'historic' gains in local elections," *The Telegraph*, Mar 21, 2011.
16   Quoted in Robert Zaretsky, "France on the Verge of a Nervous Breakdown," *Foreign Policy*, February 1, 2013.

17   Pape.
18   Quoted in Nicholas Vinocur, "France's Le Pen taps anti-EU 'rage' at fiery rally," *Reuters*, April 17, 2012.
19   Quoted in Lionel Laurent, "French far-right leader blasts Goldman Sachs, euro," *Reuters*, April 7, 2012.
20   Pierre Bréchon and Subrata Kumar Mitra, "The National Front in France: the Emergence of an Extreme Right Protest Movement,"*Comparative Politics*, 25, no. 1 (1992): 69.
21   Willsher.
22   Pape.

are establishing themselves as the only authentic… voice of protest."[23] There is some anecdotal evidence to support this proposition: one of the primary bases of support for the FN is in Pas-de-Calais, a former industrial region with an unemployment rate nearly twice the national average, where the Socialists used to dominate elections.[24] Outside the city of Lille, Hénin-Beaumont is the home constituency of Le Pen where, in the 2010 local election, she led the party to take forty-three percent, compared to just twenty-one percent for the Socialists.[25] One Le Pen voter expressed the sentiment that the FN "always defends the little people."[26] In nearby Abbeville, the Socialist mayor himself even confessed, "since 1995 [the end of Socialist President Mitterand's tenure] we have not known how to talk to these people."[27] Fysh and Wolfreys, arguing similarly, have observed that "The National Front made its electoral breakthrough in a period [the 1980s] dominated by the hopes raised and then dashed by a new Socialist-Communist coalition which briefly held out the hope of a changed world before relapsing into austerity and managerialism."[28]

Similar conditions have accompanied the electoral success of other parties, particularly the Freedom Party of Austria which has made significant inroads in Vienna municipal elections, previously the exclusive domain of the leftist Social Democrats.[29] Likewise, amid the political and economic chaos of Greece, the Golden Dawn party, long dismissed as a fringe neo-Nazi group, registered a worrying increase in support in 2012. In addition to aggressive anti-austerity rhetoric, many credit the loyalty that the party has built up to years of nearly Hezbollah-style distribution of social services to the needy.[30] Almost as universally as they oppose immigration, these parties tend to strongly support the welfare state.

The National Front and Muslims

As earlier stated, the most prominent and frequently cited reason for the success of the National Front is its harnessing of anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic prejudices. The rise the National Front in French politics has been paralleled by an increase in the numbers (or at least public recognition) of immigrant communities in France, many of them Muslim. Islam has been present in France to some extent for centuries. Immigrants, many of them Muslims from current and former French colonies in West

and North Africa, began arriving in large numbers post-WWII. Muslims currently number approximately six million, or ten percent of the population.[31] They are especially concentrated in the Ile-de-France region, the south of France, and the industrial north. Furthermore, populations are usually concentrated in poor, high-density suburbs, integrated poorly with the larger French population.[32]

Despite this obvious geographic problem, the Muslim population of France is still one of the better integrated in Europe. Most second-generation immigrants in France have adopted European attitudes toward clothing, culture, and gender roles, and have little knowledge of Islam.[33] Nevertheless, perceptions of them among the native French, though better than among most other Europeans, remain mixed at best; according to a 2011 survey, forty-five percent of the French believe that the Muslim population wishes to integrate into French society, while fifty-four percent think that they wish to remain separate.[34] Twenty-six percent of non-Muslim French citizens responded to a 2006 survey that they believe there is a conflict between being a Muslim and living in a modern society."[35] While this number is low compared to other European countries, it still represents a significant portion of the population. More troublingly, surveys have indicated that forty-two percent of the French believe that the Muslim presence is a threat to national identity and seventy-six percent believe that Islam is advancing too quickly.[36]

Le Pen and the party often make headlines for controversial statements regarding Muslims. Such comments usually fall into two categories: in the first, Le Pen or an FN politician frames the problem of the Muslim population in terms of law and order, as well as fears of extremist terrorism; in the second, they argue that the Muslim population threatens French values and the French way of life. Le Pen has particularly focused on the former issue since the March 2012 shooting spree in Toulouse by French-born Muslim Mohamed Merah, making such statements as: "I've been saying this for ten years. Entire districts are in the hands of Islamic fundamentalists and I say it again today the danger is underestimated," and "How many Mohamed Merahs are on the boats and planes that arrive in France every day filled with immigrants? …How many Merahs are among the immigrants' children who don't integrate?"[37] Le Pen has directed special ire towards public behavioral manifestations of Islam, which

23   Slavoj Zizek, *Democracy Now!* Interview by Amy Goodman, October 18, 2010.
24   John Irish, "Weaker far-right still force in French election," *Reuters*, March 29, 2012.
25   Maïa De la Baume and Steven Erlanger, "Social Ills Feed Rise of Far-Right Party in France," *New York Times,* March 27 2011.
26   Quoted in de la Baume and Erlanger.
27   Steven Erlanger, "Focus on French Economy Fuels gains by Far Right," *New York Times*. February 5, 2012.
28   Fysh and Wolfreys, 6.
29   Joshua Keating, "Is Europe's far-right surge overblown?" *Foreign Policy*, October 11, 2010.
30   Liz Alderman, "Right-Wing Extremists' Popularity Rising Rapidly in Greece," *New York Times,* September 30, 2012.

31   BBC, "Muslims in Europe: a Country Guide," last modified December 23, 2005.
32   Beate Winkler, "Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia," *European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia,* 2006.
33   Fysh and Wolfreys, 144.
34   Andrew Kohut, "Common Concerns About Islamic Extremism Muslim-Western Tensions Persist," *Pew Research Center, (*July 21, 2011): 17.
35   Andrew Kohut, "The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other," *Pew Global Attitudes Project*, (June 22, 2006): 3.
36   Jonathan Laurence, "France's Beef with Islam," *Foreign Policy*, March 7, 2012.
37   Quoted in Brian Love, "Radical Islamists taking over French suburbs, Le Pen says," *Reuters*, March 22, 2012; Quoted in Irish.

are perceived to impinge on French society, such as the adoption of halal standards in fast-food restaurants. In a curious inversion of the vaguely pro-Nazi discourse of her father, she has at times compared the public praying of Muslims in the streets to the Nazi occupation.[38]

More tangibly, both Ivarsflaten and Oesch have reached the conclusion by empirical modeling that, even after accounting for the successful mobilization of economic and political grievances, anti-immigration and "cultural protectionist" positions are the key to the electoral success of the FN and other similar parties in Western Europe. [39] This argument is further bolstered by the geographic concentration of FN support in precisely the areas with the highest concentration of immigrants, such as Pas-de-Calais and the Mediterranean coast.[40]

THE NATIONAL FRONT AND FRENCH IDENTITY

Given the National Front's reliance on explicitly nationalistic rhetoric, it is worth examining in more detail how these explanations fit within a paradigm of the general national identity and France's conception of its own identity specifically. One of the seminal texts of the past thirty years on the topic of national identity is *Imagined Communities*, written by Benedict Anderson in 1983. As conceptualized by Anderson, a "nation" is "an imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign." It is imagined in that most of its members will never meet one another, yet remain tied in a notional bond to one another. It is necessarily limited because it draws a boundary, however elastic, between its members and others. It is sovereign in that it conceives of itself as a cohesive unit whose freedom demands expression" though the sovereign state.[41] Rather than an ideology, Anderson maintains that nationalism is an expression of association and community, which makes more sense when treated "as if it belonged with 'kinship' and 'religion', rather than with 'liberalism' or 'fascism.'"[42] A constructed concept, the idea of the nation rests upon a narrative of shared language and history, by which the individual participates in the immortality and continuity of "an immemorial past" and a "limitless future."[43] The nation is an idea which links "fraternity, power and time meaningfully together."[44]

Within the definition of the nation provided by Anderson, both grievances against the undemocratic character of domestic elites and the governance of the European Union as well as economic stress seem to represent challenges to the concept of national sovereignty. Le Pen herself is quoted as saying that "'the real line of fracture' between the National Front and the system is not left-right but with forces who support globalization and Europeanization."[45] She has also declared passionate "opposition to the totalitarian character of the EU and its desire to remove people's sovereignty."[46] The way in which the party harnesses economically stressed voters is shown by its proposed reforms, which are typified by protectionism, anti-Europeanism, and muscular state support for the economy. Though the party may be drawing voters from working class constituencies historically associated with the left, it is still decidedly national in character and focused on a revival of the French state. Le Pen has stated, "I don't defend the workers of the world. I defend French workers," and that she wants the state to "spearhead the rearmament" of the French economy.[47] In this sense, argues French political analyst Jean-Yves Camus, the National Front is trying to establish itself as "the true inheritor of Gaullism," itself typified by radical economic and political national independence.[48]

Although every nation thinks of itself and its national character as *sui generis*, the political culture of France does display some unique and significant features that affect this inquiry, most importantly the civic values of the French Revolution and the centrality of the state. More so than in many other states, the national identity of France is intertwined with the ideal of the French citizen. As Bozec and Duchesne argue, "The revolution gave rise to the idealized figure of the citizen: an abstract individual who must detach him or herself from their particular interest and sub-national identities (religion, social class, and so on) to enter the public sphere."[49] This has resulted in a "lay republican tradition which claims that France has successfully integrated generations of immigrants by denying community attachments, treating citizens only as interchangeable individuals."[50] The state is expected to play the central role in facilitating this transformation and has traditionally played a strong role in enforcing uniformity, particularly in providing a universal and standardized education. In contrast to the liberal pluralism of the United States, France has historically denied or omitted any kind of "right to be different" on the grounds that it would call into question official uniformity and somehow threaten France's democratic institutions."[51] Therefore, the "'French exception'… is essentially the emphasis on cultural unification,"

38   Pape.
39   Elisabeth Ivarsflaten, "What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe?: Reexamining Grievance Mobilization Models in Seven Successful Cases," *Comparative Political Studies*, 41, no. 1 (2007): 14; Daniel Oesch, "Explaining Workers' Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway and Switzerland," *International Political Science Review*. 29.3 (2008): 366-368.
40   Bréchon and Mitra, 69-70.
41   Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (Ann Arbor, MI: Verso, 2002), 6.
42   Anderson, 5.
43   Ibid., 11-12.
44   Ibid., 36.

45   Elaine Ganley, "AP Interview: Le Pen defends anti-Islam fight," *Associated Press,* April 19, 2012.
46   Henry Samuel, "Marien Le Pen third place finish vindicates decision to tone down far-Right party."
47   Ganley, "AP Interview: Le Pen defends anti-Islam fight"; Hoare.
48   Quoted in Erlanger.
49   Géraldine Bozec and Sophie Duchesne, "Europe as a Missed Opportunity: Looking Backwards to Modernity in France," in *Europe, Nations and Modernity* ed. Atsuko Ichijo. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001: 38.
50   Fysh and Wolfreys, 206.
51   Ibid., 3-4.

which, through the almost ideal image of the citizen, is tolerant of private diversity, so long as all externally conform to community standards of orthodox civic behavior and values.[52]

This myth of uniformity, so key to French national identity, is clearly challenged by the waves of new immigrants and particularly the visible separateness of Muslims by geographic concentration and public dress. This represents a crisis of the boundaries of the nation that Anderson describes. The presence within France of those who do not identify themselves (or are not identified by others) as French immediately creates an awareness of the cultural edge of the bounded nation. Concerns regarding this boundary seem to be created by its demographic retraction, undermining the notion of the nation's immortal continuity and further enhanced by public fears of violent extremism, as well as the common perception that Muslims are either incapable of integrating properly or do not wish to. The retreat and blurring of this boundary have problematized the definition of the community and resulted, de Wenden has argued, in the "partly fabricated otherness of immigrants… the Other has contributed to create a negative consensus…. Today, the extreme right is trying to constitute a *tricolore* community of blue, white and red, in opposition to the Maghrebian, but also the European."[53] In short, discourse directed against immigrants is used in order to generate unity among the remaining "native" French.

GENERALIZING THE RISE OF THE RIGHT

The utility of this narrative of otherness has no doubt been noticed by other right-wing populist parties across Europe, as is clear from the near omnipresent refrain that each respective nation is historically "not a nation of immigrants." Across the continent, immigrants, oftentimes Muslims specifically, are being rhetorically distinguished and constructed as an existential threat to the community. Geert Wilders of the Dutch Party for Freedom, in an elegant piece of exclusionary rhetoric simultaneously reinforcing the Netherlands' image of itself as tolerant of Muslim immigrants, has been fond of saying that he is "only intolerant of the intolerant."[54] Similarly in Italy, the Lega Nord, though more difficult to group with other anti-immigrant parties due to its somewhat divergent positions on the European Union, social policy, and sub-national identity, has nonetheless seized on the perceived threat of immigrants to reinforce "native" identity, going so far as to compare the fate of Italians to that of Native Americans if immigration is not curbed.[55]

Despite empirical evidence privileging the immigration hypothesis, the National Front should not be classified as an anti-immigration party alone, as the independent usefulness of this model is limited. According to the empirical models of Ivarsflaten and Oesch, mobilization of anti-immigration sentiment was the key factor in the FN's success, but both acknowledge that economic and political grievances contributed as well. Even the argument of geographical correlation is complicated by the reasons for the high immigrant population—these areas were once important industrial centers that imported labor, though they are now in decline and suffer from economic stress. As earlier quoted from de Wenden, discourse is directed not just against "the Maghrebian", but against "the European" as well, the ideal of which emerges from FN rhetoric as just as potent a threat to France. All of these potential explanations need to be considered as working synergistically and as deriving, in whole or in part, from challenges to the French state and national identity. As such, the ideology of the National Front, if it can even be called an ideology, does not just use nationalistic themes and techniques, but in fact stems directly from the idea of the nation itself.

All three of the possible factors—economic stress, political alienation, and anti-immigrant sentiment—interact, feed off one another, and stem from the forces of globalization, which is the ultimate challenge to the nation-state in the modern era. Latent anxieties regarding diminishing sovereignty and the retreat of increasingly porous cultural boundaries of the nation have been compounded by economic stress being blamed on these very factors. The success of the National Front is a response to these anxieties, and it organizes support by pledging to turn back the clock and restore France to its former glory. Though anti-immigrant rhetoric is the most visible and empirically tangible source of mobilization for the party, racism is not likely the ultimate motivator of FN voters. The constant presence of "the immigrant" in France functions as a constant reminder and symbol of the stresses of globalization and the way in which it undermines the unity and sovereignty of the community. As this symbol, they are the easiest scapegoat and lowest-hanging rhetorical target that the FN and similar parties use to form a negative consensus in defense of the nation. Muslims specifically seem to have borne the brunt of these pressures and have been constructed as the specific "other" *du jour*, likely because of conflict between the practice of Islam and French civic values that are often associated with the ideal of the public citizen.

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Nation Front is its effect on mainstream politicians in France. Many have worried about the effect of the FN on both discourse and policy in France. Uneasy about the challenge presented by a force to his right, President Sarkozy took an evidently more combative stance towards immigrants in the run-up to the 2012 election.[56] As Slavoj Zizek has argued, the party has had the effect of shifting the window of acceptable discourse rightward: "Things which were

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52   Bozec and Duchesne, 40.
53   Catherine de Wenden, "Changing Representations of the Other in France: The Mirror of Migration," in *Blurred Boundaries: Migration, Ethnicity, Citizenship*, ed. Rainer Bauböck and John Rundell (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1998), 89-90.
54   "Profile: Geert Wilders," *BBC News,* June 23, 2011.
55   Jeff Israely, "An Italian Town's White (no Foreigners) Christmas," *Time*, December 1, 2009.

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56   Irish.

unacceptable [to say publically] 10-15 years ago are now acceptable…. The far right… is setting the agenda."[57] The Council of Europe's Commission Against Racism and Intolerance issued a similar warning in the spring of 2012, stating that "xenophobic rhetoric is now part of mainstream debate."[58] Given the most recent success of Le Pen and the National Front, it seems likely that the party will continue to be a force in French politics for the near future, especially if economic stagnation continues. The long-term prospects for the party are difficult to predict, however, and are dependent on many external factors. As Mohamed Zouaoui, a Muslim resident of Hénin-Beaumont speculated about his fellow neighbors, "If we give these people something to eat tomorrow… they will forget about racism."[59]

This same dynamic holds true continent-wide, where right-wing populist parties are surging and support for mainstream parties is often flagging, suggesting a broad, if not deep, well of support for nationalist parties. The forces challenging the integrity of the nation-state, compounded by the uncertainty of the European economy, are unlikely to abate, indicating that such parties may remain a fixture of European politics to varying degrees in different nations moving forward. Although unlikely to attain substantial political power in nearly all circumstances, right-wing populist parties nonetheless have the potential to complicate and slow the process of European governance by either placing right-ward pressure on mainstream parties or by directly leveraging their increased influence to obstruct domestic governance or EU negotiations, as Italy's Lega Nord has threatened towards a government of the Italian center-left.[60] Le Pen herself has succinctly described her party's current goal: "You only need to be a spoiler to have an enormous weight."[61] Though it represents an extreme case in terms of ideology and prevailing conditions, the dramatic and often violent rise of the Greek Golden Dawn serves as a further warning to the rest of Europe on the potential for radical nationalist forces to gain influence should the economic climate of Europe fail to improve.

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57   Zizek.
58   Quoted in Elaine Ganley, "Europe far-right in steady climb toward power," *The Guardian*, May 4, 2012.
59   De la Baume and Erlanger.
60   Barry Moody and Sara Ross, "Italy's Northern League vows to paralyze next government," *Reuters,* February 13, 2013.
61   Quoted in Ganley, "Europe far-right in steady climb toward power."

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Tribalism and Nationalism in Iraqi Kurdistan

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ABSTRACT

This paper analyzes the importance of tribalism in shaping the historical conflicts surrounding Kurds in Iraq—both amongst themselves and subsequently with the state of Iraq. Beginning with a general analysis of tribalism, the paper suggests that the structure of Kurdish tribes was the single greatest contributing factor to the regional conflicts of the twentieth century and the lack of realization of an independent Kurdish state. Because of the tribal-based Kurdish submission to leadership, figures like Sheikh Mahmoud Barzinji, Mostafa Barzani, and Jalal Talabani were able to gain power and fuel conflict that consequently prevented an independent Kurdish state from emerging. And ironically, the effects of tribalism were often the downfall of these tribal leaders as well. Ultimately, only tremendous external factors were able to break the stronghold of Kurdish tribalism and spur the creation of a Kurdish province in Iraq.

INTRODUCTION

In analyzing the struggle for independence in Iraqi Kurdistan over the last century, many scholars have pointed to the salience of oil, geography, external influence, controversial leaders, heartfelt nationalistic sentiment, and tribalism in fueling the desires of the Kurdish movement for autonomy in Northern Iraq. However, few scholars have dealt with the issue of why this consistent effort to achieve Kurdish independence from Iraq habitually failed throughout the twentieth century. This paper

contends that tribalism was a double-edged sword, serving as both the catalyst for the Iraqi Kurdish nationalist movement and the main obstacle to the movement's success for nearly the entire twentieth century. As Van Bruinessen argues, many Kurdish tribal authorities have vehemently opposed the push for Kurdish nationalism, fearing that "the success of the [nationalist] movement would bestow additional power and prestige upon its leaders... to the inevitable detriment of their traditional rivals."[1] Just as the Kurdish nationalist movement was heavily influenced by the political structure of tribalism, so too was the power-hungry nature of Kurdish tribal leaders the main obstacle to the success of the secessionist movement.

The Kurds are a people with long ties to the Middle East—but it was only after the Arab conquests in the seventh centurty that the Kurds truly begin to "emerge from obscurity."[2] Through the nineteenth century the Kurds were at times ruled by the Muslims, Mongols, Safavids, Ottomans, and finally the British. The region of Kurdistan describes the territory of land inhabited by ethnic Kurds. In its inception in 1919, its borders stretch from near the Mediterranean on top of Alexandretta in Turkey, North to Armenia, down to Mosul, Iraq, and continue down the left bank of the Tigris until Mandali, including the eastern flank of Lake Urumiya and through some of the Zagros Mountains.[3] The Kurdistan region is a shining example of an ethno-nationalist group which fails to fit neatly into modern geographic boundaries, spanning the modern states of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. The current area known as Iraqi Kurdistan is the portion of Kurdistan which lies in Northern Iraq and encompasses much of the regions of Dohuk, Sulaimaniyeh, and Arbil, with additional contested areas, including the city of Kirkuk.

KURDISH TRIBES: A POLITICAL NATURE

Upon analyzing the construction and nature of the Kurdish tribal system in Northern Iraq, one can see the motivations that would fuel any Kurdish nationalist movement of the future and the problems that would belie future efforts towards autonomy. The simplest yet most overarching theme of Kurdish tribes is that they are inherently political organizations. While the Kurds certainly are a segmentary people—a group of tribes that are spliced within themselves into closer knit groups—the basis of their tribal organizations is often of a political or practical nature rather than of a familial or patrilineal basis.[4] Ibn Khaldun, a prominent fourteenth century Muslim thinker, believed that many Middle Eastern tribes are defined "only in contradistinction to the city"; that tribes are defined by the "*asabiya*" or loyalty obtained from

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1   Martin Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan* (New York: Zed Books Ltd, 1992): 71.
2   David McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, 3rd revised and updated ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004): 3.
3   Ibid.
4   Hakan Ozoglu, "State-Tribe Relations: Kurdish Tribalism in the 16th- and 17th-Century Ottoman Empire," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (May, 1996): 6.

simultaneously attacking a city—a political bond of war.[5] The multiculturalism of some tribes in Kurdistan demonstrates the overall fluidity of kinship within these organizational structures. As O'Leary has noted, in the Nineveh provinces, there are in fact multicultural tribes which blur religious lines in order to advance a politically viable tribal relationship.[6] Accordingly, Van Bruinessen's notion that "actual political allegiance to a lineage becomes more important than real kinship" resonates throughout Kurdish society.

In a similar vein, the tribes of Kurdistan, despite their mobility and lack of familial structure, are hugely authoritative, with tribe-members displaying the utmost obedience to the higher-ups of tribes, such as chieftains and sheikhs. A fine example of this adherence to tribal authority is visible in "blood feuds" which permeate Kurdish tribal interactions. Blood feuds between tribes can emerge when a person in one tribe kills a person in another and may lead to all out wars between tribes.[7] The magnitude of tribal confrontation is often based on the tribal political importance of the actors involved. Regardless, the killing of a member of a tribe often takes on a communal character and can single-handedly lead to many years of hostilities between two groups. Hearkening back to Ibn Khaldun's idea that *asabiya* was the strongest unitary factor of Middle Eastern tribes, the prevalence of the blood feud conveys the strength that military and political matters retain over kinship in Kurdish tribes. While not all conflicts devolve into blood feuds, these rivalries are indicative of the bitter political divisiveness that can occur between Kurdish tribes. It is no surprise, therefore, that in the midst of such potential rivalry and repeated hostility, no coherent movement for a unified Kurdistan came about until the urbanization of the twentieth century began to dull the influence of tribes.

Sheikh Mahmoud and the Rise of Kurdish Ethno-nationalism

The vestiges of a call for an independent Kurdish state based on ideas of Kurdish ethnic nationalism can first be seen in the nineteenth century, during the xenophobia-inspired raids organized by Badr Khan against all non-Kurdish outsiders, as well as the cultural efforts of Haji Qadir to establish a Kurdish identity.[8] The first organized Kurdish nationalist movement rose in the cities of Turkey around 1908, organized by the Kurdish Society for Mutual Aid and Progress.[9] It was not until the conclusion of World War I, though, after the British established the modern state of Iraq, that a uniquely Iraqi Kurdish nationalist movement emerged. At this time, the British attempted to establish a system of limited rule in Iraq and as such gave the most

recognized leader in the region, Sheikh Mahmoud Barzanji, primary rule over Iraqi Kurdistan in December 1918.[10] The British hoped Sheikh Mahmoud would be an effective puppet for them, allowing them to indirectly rule over the Kurds.[11] Nevertheless Sheikh Mahmoud suspected the British of dishonorable politics and unreasonably tight control and also recognized the power he held as leader of the Mosul *vilayet*. Accordingly, in May 1919 he organized a revolt against British mandate and declared an independent Kurdistan, with the support of some of the tribes with whom he had close relationships.[12] Romano recognizes that Mahmoud was "probably both a Kurdish nationalist as well as a feudal tribal-religious leader."[13] Indeed, Sheikh Mahmoud's tribal status and personal connections with other tribal leaders, specifically in the Sulaimaniyeh region, helped drive the first ever Iraqi Kurdish push for nationalism.

Despite repeated British promises that they would recognize an autonomous Kurdish state, including the famous Anglo-Iraqi "state of intent" in December 1922, the British neglected to sign the Treaty of Sevres in 1920, which would have assured a Kurdish state within the year. This lack of agreement for a Kurdish state popularized Barzanji's movement among many Iraqi Kurdish tribal leaders, who viewed Kurdish autonomy, as Barzanji did, as a way to protect their power from British manipulation.[14] Likewise, it was neither the British nor Sheikh Mahmoud's leadership which compelled tribal leaders to support the movement, but rather, that there was "a similar desire, even compulsion, on the part of the Kurdish tribal chieftains to exploit any perceived weakness of central power to assert their own autonomy."[15] Even after the capture of Sheikh Mahmoud and his temporary exile in 1922, revolts continued through 1924, with a renewed 1927 uprising in Sulaimaniyeh, the epicenter of the Sheikh's movement, because of widespread tribal discontent with British rule. Accordingly, this movement persisted primarily in the rural countryside and not in the Kurdish city.[16] The non-urban location of these uprisings is further evidence for the claim that significant tribal support was behind the prolonged movement initiated by Sheikh Mahmoud Barzinji. In 1931, after learning that the soon-to-be-declared independent Iraq would not include an independent Kurdish region, Sheikh Mahmoud made a final pusch to overthrow the new Iraqi government. Ultimately, the government defeated Barzanji and his followers in 1932, emphatically ending the nearly decade-long effort for nationalism.

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5   Faleh A, Jabar and Hosham Dawod, *The Kurds: Nationalism and Politics* (London: Al Saqui Books, 2006): 72.
6   Brendan O'Leary, "Civil Wars in Iraq and Sudan," *Political Science* 598, University of Pennsylvania: Philadelphia, February 8, 2012.
7   Van Bruinessen, 65.
8   Nader Entessar, *Kurdish Ethnonationalism* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publisheers, Inc., 1992): 49.
9   Van Bruinessen, 275.

10   Entessar, 50; David Romano, *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization and Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 183.
11   Ibid.; Charles Tripp, *A History of Iraq,* revised ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 33-34.
12   Ibid., 34.
13   Romano, 185.
14   McDowall,169; Entessar, 50.
15   Tripp, 34.
16   Ibid.

While tribes sustained the first nationalist movement behind Sheikh Mahmoud, it is also important to note that some tribal authorities feared Sheikh Mahmoud's growing power during the 1920s. Much confrontation arose among the tribal leaders of Iraqi Kurdistan because many accurately perceived that he had larger plans to achieve political power over the Kurds in the region.[17] While Sheikh Mahmoud was able to solidify his leadership by gaining the support of rival tribal leaders in Sulaimaniyeh, the leaders of Erbil, Kirkuk, Halabja, and other regions surrounding Sulaimaniyeh violently opposed his rule, as they jockeyed for power with the Sheikh in the increasingly volatile world of Kurdish tribal politics.[18] Romano echoes that Sheikh Mahmoud was "opposed by several other Kurdish elite rivals in the region" and believes that this lack of Kurdish unity against the British led to the failure of the nationalist movement—that because "no sufficiently organized Kurdish nationalist group existed to mobilize Kurds on the basis of such nationalism and in a manner that could supersede sectarian divisions," the movement could never succeed.[19] While protection of power led some Kurdish tribal authorities to support the Sheikh's movement against British indirect rule, it was this same tribal safe-guarding of power and wariness of any pan-Kurdish movement that was in fact the single biggest obstacle to the nascent Kurdish nationalist movement of the 1920s.

MOSTAFA BARZANI, THE CONTROVERSIAL UNIFIER

After Sheikh Mahmoud's movement was finally shut down, another tribal leader, Sheikh Ahmad Barzani, began to rise as the new standard-bearer of Kurdish nationalism, with the full support of his Barzani tribe of Northeast Iraq.[20] However the pitfall, once again, was Sheikh Ahmad's inability to procure the support of other Kurdish tribes who, in addition to disagreeing with his odd Islamo-Christian religious practices, also thoroughly feared him as a military competitor.[21] Ahmad and his family were ultimately exiled by the government to Southern Iraq after the government crushed his fledgling movement in the early 1930s.

But Ahmad's son, Mostafa Barzani, snuck from Southern Iraq back into his homeland in 1943 to assume leadership of the Barzani tribe.[22] Just like Sheikh Mahmoud, the younger Barzani may have truly believed in the cause of Kurdish nationalism, but he had political motivations as well. Van Bruinessen notes that, "it soon became clear that [Barzani] considered himself as the only real leader of and spokesman for the Kurds," and was determined to see this idea grow into reality.[23] With the full support of his tribe, Barzani was able to quickly lay the groundwork for the future of Kurdish

nationalism and began to organize mobilized attacks against Nuri al-Said's Iraqi government of the 1940s.[24] Romano specifically notes that this Kurdish movement was not a "peasant-proletarian movement" but rather a rural and tribal-centric movement, led by "traditional elites" such as Barzani.[25] Barzani's first rebellion was an uprising in 1943-44 which spanned areas that included both Kurdish Iran and Kurdish Iraq. Soon afterwards, Barzani formed the Rizagri Kurd Party (RKP), which rapidly became the strongest nationalist party at the time. The RKP easily held more influence than either the Heva or Azadi nationalist parties simply because of the tribal influence Barzani lent to its name.[26]

Nevertheless, Barzani's tribal alliances often hurt him, and Romano notes in fact that Barzani's deals and the tribal coalition he had formed "acted as a constraint on Kurdish nationalist development because Barzani's status as an *agha*, a conservative tribal leader and large landowner, often hampered the allegiance of opposing tribes and non-tribal Kurdish peasants."[27] Indeed, the strong political tribalism, which was so inherent to the formation of the nationalist movement under Sheikh Mahmoud and to the resurgence of nationalism under Barzani, fundamentally created rifts with other Kurdish tribes, a reality not at all surprising given the earlier account of the partisan nature of Kurdish tribalism. Throughout the beginning of Mostafa Barzani's movement, the Kurdish nationalism effort, possibly intentionally and possibly by implication, led to a dichotomous choice for tribes: either align with Barzani or oppose the movement. As Barzani and his movement gained power and the affirmation of long-time rivals such as the Zibari tribe—which had been feuding with the Barzanis for nearly one hundred years—his satisfaction among other tribal leaders who opposed the Zibaris dwindled.[28]

In May of 1946, Barzani was exiled to the Soviet Union by the Iranians due to rabble-rousing in Iranian Kurdistan. Later that year, the RKP split, and one of the splinter groups, led by Barzani, formed the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP). While in the USSR, Barzani was elected the first president of the KDP and continued to organize Iraqi Kurdish self-determination movements from abroad, even managing to expand his movement to include a peasant-proletariat mass.[29] But this urban expansion only took place after the firm roots of nationalism were planted in the Barzani tribe's and neighboring tribes' collective psyche.

Barzani's organizing capabilities while in exile were limited, and though he controlled a powerful force of one thousand *peshmerga* (Kurdish tribal fighters) and maintained

17   Ibid.
18   Entessar, 50.
19   Romano, 185.
20   Entessar, 54.
21   Ibid.
22   Ibid., 55.
23   Van Bruinessen, 27.

24   Entessar, 54-55.
25   Romano, 189.
26   Ibid., 188; Entessar, 56.
27   Romano, 188.
28   Entessar, 62-63.
29   Romano, 188.

the Kurdish nationalist framework through management of the KDP, there was little opportunity to wage an all-out rebellion from the late 1940s through late 1950s.[30] Logically, while the nationalist movement was growing among urban Kurds, without the presence of a tribal leader such as Barzani to unite factions and lend the political power of a tribe, any serious attempt at an autonomous effort was limited.

BARZANI RETURNS

While Kurdish nationalism was relatively subdued throughout most of the 1950s, the Kurdish political situation changed drastically in 1958, when Abd al-Karim Qasim overthrew King Faisal of Iraq in a coup.[31] Qasim initially rose to power with joint Kurdish-Arab support, quickly granting Kurds inclusion in his government and openly suggesting that a Kurdish state was a possibility.[32] Upon assuming power, as a goodwill gesture, Qasim allowed Barzani back into Iraq, a boon to both the Kurdish nationalist movement as well as Barzani's political power. Qasim and Barzani were closely allied for the first few years of the Qasim regime, and Qasim seemed dedicated to making a Kurdish state a reality. Although relations between the two leaders had begun to fracture in 1960, their relationship truly reached a breaking point—due to tribal infighting—in the summer of 1961.[33] Because of his tribal aggression towards his traditional tribal rivals—the Suchi and Herki tribes—Barzani seized territory that Qasim had understood to be outside of historic Barzani land.[34] Qasim proceeded to bomb the village of Barzan, and Barzani retaliated with his full *peshmerga* force against Qasim's government, commencing a two-year struggle against Qasim. Were it not for the politics and power-driven realities of Barzani in tribal Kurdistan, the entire conflict may have been avoided, and Qasim may have been willing to work with Barzani to establish a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq.[35] While there is no certainty that such a negotiated state would be autonomous, the rampant tribalism of Iraqi Kurdistan eliminated any possibility of conflict resolution with Qasim's regime between 1961 and 1963.

In demonstrating the strength of Barzani's tribal authority, it is also important to note that tribe members seem to have gone against their own interests in supporting Barzani instead of Qasim. The common Kurd would have benefitted from amicable relations with Qasim not only because of his willingness to negotiate on a Kurdish state, but also because of his Land Reform Act of 1958, which demonstrably benefitted the Kurdish peasant and proletariat classes. But tribal leaders adamantly opposed the Act, for fear of losing land to the common Kurd. McDowall notes that "in striking

testimony to the strength of tribal loyalties, their followers were insufficiently aware… to recognize that they were supporting the very class that exploited them or that they stood to benefit from the land reform."[36] Such provisions included those which were created to "protect tribal solidarity" in order to make sure external forces would not be able to seize Kurdish tribal land, ultimately offering more stability to the tribal region.[37] In fact, at first the country was nearly unanimously in support of Qasim's uprising in 1958, precisely because of the social and economic reforms he promised for the enormous underclass of urban and tribal poor which dominated Iraq— including Kurds.[38] Entessar notes that the tribal leadership's pressure against the reforms led many of their tribal followers to oppose the reforms.[39] Only the pervasive tribal loyalty of many Kurds could have pitted tribe members against such obviously favorable reforms and in favor of Barzani.

Barzani's violent movement persisted throughout the 1960s, highlighted by four major campaigns in an eight-year span during that decade, later dubbed the First Iraqi-Kurdish War. Throughout this period the Kurds were unable to fully assert themselves as independent across three different regimes in Baghdad.[40] Once again, Kurdish tribal structure fueled the nationalist movement but at the same time prevented its true success. As Romano notes, without the support of key larger tribes, such as the Baradustis, Harkis, and Surchis, the Kurdish nationalist movement was doomed to fail.[41] McDowall echoes that tribal chiefs of the Zibari, Surchi, Harki, Baradusti, and Kushnaw tribes "opted to support Qasim out of an almost ideological loathing of Mulla Mustafa [Barzani], stymieing the revolutionary movements of the 1970s."[42]

BARZANI AND TALABANI: THE NEW TRIBAL RIVALRY

Almost immediately after the KDP signed a ceasefire with Qasim in early 1963, the Ba'ath party took power in Iraq. The Ba'ath seemed prepared to grant the Kurds a state within a federated Iraq in exchange for peace.[43] At first, the Ba'ath tried to negotiate with Barzani, but soon gave up after the grandiosity of Barzani's demands, which included full rights over Kirkuk and its associated oil fields.[44] The Ba'ath subsequently approached the KDP and their chief negotiator, Jalal Talabani, offering a deal for a

30   Brendan O'Leary, "Civil Wars in Iraq and Sudan," *Political Science* 598, University of Pennsylvania: Philadelphia, February 15, 2012.
31   Entessar, 60.
32   Ibid.
33   Ibid., 62.
34   Ibid., 60.
35   Ibid., 62; Van Bruinessen, 27.
36   McDowall, 309.
37   Roger Owen, "Class and Class Politics in Iraq before 1958: The Colonial and Post-Colonial State," in *The Iraqi Revolution of 1958: The Old Social Classes Revisited*, ed. Robert Fernea and William Louis, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991): 161.
38   Peter Sluglett and Marion Farouk-Sluglett, "The Social Classes and the Origins of the Revolution," in *The Iraqi Revolution of 1958: The Old Social Classes Revisited*, ed. Robert Fernea and William Louis, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991): 134.
39   Entasser, 61.
40   Romano, 191.
41   Ibid., 192.
42   McDowall, 312.
43   Entessar, 63-65.
44   McDowall, 314.

federated state within Iraq, but the KDP rejected the deal, demanding nearly full autonomy for the Kurds.[45] While both segments of the Kurdish nationalist movement may have rejected the government's 1963 proposal, the divide between Barzani's bloc of tribes and Talabani—who commanded the KDP establishment—grew quickly during the mid-1960s. By the time President Abd al Salam Arif's government took power in 1964, a schism divided the Kurdish nationalist movement. "On one side, [KDP Secretary-General] Ahmad, Talabani and the KDP intelligentsia asserted an ideological position evolved over the previous 20 years," rooted in Marxism and secularism. Conversely, "Mulla Mustafa [Barzani] was able to rally the conservatives, the tribal and religious leaders of Kurdistan."[46] A new era was beginning in which tribalism would be the obstacle to peace not because of its opposition to it, but rather because of its pervasive influence on Barzani, who subsequently refused to sincerely accept any deal proffered by the Iraqi government. Whereas Talabani and the KDP were more likely to side with the government in efforts to secure peace, Barzani was inclined towards rebellion because of a desire to assert political dominance over Kurdistan.

Barzani's tribal power mentality and political strength soon overpowered the Talabani-Ahmad wing of the KDP. By 1964, Barzani was back at the helm of the movement. When Arif died in 1965 after a two-year stint as president, Abd al Rahman Bazzaz succeeded Arif's post in August of 1965. The next year Bazzaz issued the famous Bazzaz Declaration of 1966, which affirmed "the reality of Kurdish nationalism" and promised to pass a law "which will enable [Kurds] to carry on local activities."[47] However, because of a change in leadership, the Declaration was never implemented, and it has been suggested that the government may have just been buying time with the Bazzaz Declaration in order to regroup after a major military ambush by the Kurds, that occurred just months before the declaration.[48] Others think that the government believed its alliance with KDP dissenters—led by Ahmad and Talabani and their government-funded mercenary army—was a substantial counterweight to Barzani's tribal coalition.[49] Indeed, it may very well have been that the clash between Barzani's tribal coalition and Talabani's mercenary army resulted in the government's reneging on the Bazzaz Declaration in 1966-67.

The split within the Kurdish camp persisted even as the new Ba'ath government of 1968 issued its March Manifesto, conceding to the Kurds nearly all the issues that Qasim's 1963 agreement had not.[50] Even Barzani was content with the Manifesto's provisions, and it seemed that by 1974, the deadline for the Manifesto's implementation, the

Kurds would achieve true self-rule. But conflict arose between the Kurds and the government. Many claim that the efforts of Saddam Hussein, the effective second-in-command of the Ba'ath Party at the time, to "Arabize" the Kurds spurred hostility and hampered the achievement of any true accord. While Hussein's efforts to assimilate the Kurds may have jeopardized the agreement, it is more likely that Barzani and his tribal, power-driven insistence on remaining the most influential man in Iraqi Kurdistan ruined the chances for Kurdish autonomy. Van Bruinessen echoes the idea that tribalism was the Achilles' heel of the March Manifesto by providing a firsthand account of how village youth in Kurdistan in the 1970s often discussed that "tribal morality was obsolete" and the pressing need to end the senseless "blood feud" by Barzani against Talabani.[51] Even common citizens at the time seem to have been aware of the tribal influences on Barzani's relationship with Talabani.

Further complicating the fulfilment of nationalist goals was an intense jockeying for power among the tribes supporting Barzani in the 1970s. As Van Bruinessen states, "The guerilla struggle [in the mid-70s] in Iraq… was not only a reaction to the Baghdad government's undeniably harsh policies towards the Kurds, it was also waged against a background of rivalry between the would-be successors of Barzani as the sole leader of the Kurds"—a reality which had significant impact on the unity of Barzani's movement.[52] Despite the surface story of the Ba'athists' ruthlessly reneging on their agreement for Kurdish autonomy, tribalism and the influences of tribal power politics seemed to have played a significant role as well in the failure to secure an independent Kurdish state through the March Manifesto.

Still, the Ba'ath and the Kurds attempted to negotiate through the Kurds, dubbed the Autonomy Law of 1974. While the Law had many provisions which assured Kurdish self-rule, Barzani and the KDP, which was increasingly under Barzani's full control, rejected the offer, deriding the provisions in the deal about Kirkuk and complete self-rule.[53] A furious Barzani then initiated the largest rebellion in Kurdish history, commanding nearly 100,000 fighters to rise up against the Iraqi government.[54] While Barzani claimed to be acting in the name of Kurdish nationalism, Barzani's own son, Ubayd Allah, stated that his father, in truth, "did not want self-rule to be implemented even if he was given Kirkuk and all of its oil. His acceptance of the [autonomy] law will take everything from him, and he wants to remain the absolute ruler."[55] Indeed, because of his status as a tribal leader, Barzani was able to turn his personal political ambitions into a region-wide movement, which included galvanizing over 50,000 tribal *peshmerga* in his anti-government struggle.

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45   Ibid.
46   Ibid., 316.
47   Ibid., 318.
48   Romano, 191.
49   McDowall, 319.
50   Entessar, 73.

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51   Van Bruinessen, 71.
52   Ibid., 31.
53   McDowall, 335-336.
54   Ibid., 337.
55   Ibid.

In 1975, two major actions of the Iraqi government helped quash this historic outburst of Kurdish nationalism. First, recognizing that the Iranians were gaining influence and subtly supporting the Kurdish revolutionaries, Iraq signed the Algiers Agreement in 1975, which ended hostilities between the two countries, thereby removing a longtime ally of the Kurdish nationalist movement.[56] Second, as a follow up to this blow, the Iraqi government forcibly relocated hundreds of thousands of Kurds and destroyed many tribal villages in an effort to uproot the core of oppositional support (the tribes), shutting down the tribal network behind Barzani's coalition.[57] Hussein and the Ba'ath realized that the only way to truly dismantle the national movement was to break down Barzani's tribal structures, and they did just that, destroying over 1400 tribal villages and fundamentally altering the tribal demographics of Northern Iraq.

The Algiers agreement, Hussein's deportations, and Mostafa Barzani's death led to the splintering of the KDP. In the aftermath of this fragmentation, the Iraqi leadership succeeded in splitting the Kurdish opposition. Out of its ashes, Talabani created the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan party (PUK) in June of 1976.[58] Talabani and the PUK initially cooperated with Hussein, who became President of the Iraqi government in 1979. But during the late 1970s and early 1980s, PUK and KDP descended into factionalism, mimicking the early struggles Sheikh Mahmoud faced in dealing with rival tribes while trying to organize a nationalist movement. The warring continued for nearly half a decade. Hussein boasted "that the Kurdish organizations would never be able to achieve anything since they were hopelessly divided against each other and subservient to foreign powers."[59] While not tribal at its core, this factional division present in the Kurdish nationalist movement was reminiscent of tribal struggles throughout the ages and surely was influenced by the Kurds' history of political tribalism.

Settlement

During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), Hussein clamped down on the Kurds, bringing the PUK and KDP closer through shared opposition. Between 1983 and 1986, after years of controversy, there was increased collaboration between the two factions, leading to the formation of the joint Iraqi Kurdistan Front (IKF) in 1988. The IKF was a glimmer of hope that the tribal conflict which had been the basis for the failure of the nationalist movement was coming to a close, and that a more ideological basis of self-determination and freedom was taking over—one that unified the Kurdish population, overlooked tribalism, and as such had the potential to be successful.[60]

Following the devastation inflicted upon the Kurds during the Anfal campaigns and the Gulf War, Kurdish unity began to solidify.[61] The U.S.-led coalition's delineation of a "safe haven" for the Kurds above the thirty-sixth parallel at last gave the Kurds their independent rule. This external force finally established what eighty years of nationalist movements could not: a Kurdish state. Under the legislation passed on October 4, 1992, the Iraqi Parliament officially recognized Kurdistan within a federated Iraq.[62] While national conflict and efforts at full autonomy are still prevalent in Kurdistan, a federated state of Kurdistan within Iraq has been the virtual status quo for the past twenty years.

Conclusion

Tribal leaders' playing power politics and tribe members' adherence to overarching authority are cornerstones of Kurdish tribalism. In efforts to expand their respective influences, Sheikh Mahmoud and Mostafa Barzani took advantage of these two characteristics of Kurdish tribes and successfully created strong nationalist movements. But the opposition of rival tribes—a reality just as intrinsic to Kurdish tribalism as sheikhdom—subverted both movements from ever achieving their full potential.

As the Kurdish nationalist movement evolved, the main obstacle to success changed from rival tribes to a rival nationalist movement, ultimately organized under Talabani and the PUK. Treating Talabani like a rival tribe, Barzani continued to play political games, impeding various generous offers broached by successive Iraqi governments from the 1960s through the 1970s. The ideology behind the tribalism of Kurdistan was both the primary cause of the nationalist movement and its main impediment until the 1980s. Ultimately, only the shocks of external forces—Saddam Hussein's massacres of the 1980s and the Gulf War—were able to break the in-fighting in Kurdistan and force tribal authorities to unify under a federated state of Kurdistan.

56   Entessar, 77.
57   Ibid.
58   Ibid., 78.
59   McDowall, 347.
60   Entessar, 79

61   Ibid., 80
62   Faleh A. Jabar, *The Shi'ite Movement in Iraq* (London: Al Saqui Books, 2003).

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Embracing Borderlessness in Cyberspace

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Abstract

Although cyberspace is often considered a borderless domain, the reality is in fact far more complex. At its most superficial layer, the content of cyberspace is already divided according to various national interests. However, at a deeper level, the level of hardware and software throughout cyberspace is far more diffuse, a vibrant mosaic of information technology (IT). The rapid internationalization of a once U.S./Japan-dominated IT market and growing concerns over national cyber security have prompted some states to adopt supply chain security policies that exclude certain IT providers from consideration in government acquisitions. Furthermore, these policies stand to be expanded to the private sector as it plays a greater role in national cyber security. If carried to their logical conclusion, supply chain security policies could very well fragment cyberspace down to the level of hardware and software. Such a "balkanization" of cyberspace would reduce the risk of "blowback" from cyber attacks, thus making these burgeoning instruments of foreign policy that much more attractive. Ultimately, states would be better advised to invest in the verification of foreign IT rather than bar these technologies from national systems. By embracing the borderlessness of cyberspace, states may, in fact, make themselves more secure.

Introduction: Who Controls the Internet?

In December 2012, diplomats from 151 states convened in Dubai for the World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT), many of them anticipating a battle over global internet governance. While the United States and many of its

allies sought to uphold the status quo (the relatively decentralized "multi-stakeholder model"), others aimed to introduce language to the treaty that might set the stage for greater national control over the internet. Ambassador Terry Kramer, head of the U.S. delegation, warned that such language could lead to a "balkanization of the internet, where everybody develops their own approach, their own standards, their own sets of rules."[1] Accordingly, when the revised treaty was finalized, containing a vague but seemingly innocuous injunction "to prevent the propagation of unsolicited bulk electronic communications," Kramer and delegates from seventy-nine other states (including Japan, India, Germany, and the United Kingdom) refused to sign.[2] "We cannot support a treaty that is not supportive of the multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance," he declared, before walking out of the conference in protest.[3] How the treaty *opposes* the multi-stakeholder model is not clear, especially given that it makes no reference to the internet at all. Some analysts suggest that while "unsolicited bulk electronic communications" would conventionally be interpreted as spam, states could use the language to justify political censorship and otherwise curtail freedom of speech.[4] Such policies certainly run counter to the interests and principles of the United States and many of its partners, but they do not threaten to "fundamentally alter the governance and operation of the Internet."[5] Indeed, they merely reflect the already splintering face of the World Wide Web.

Despite the developments of the past twenty or so years, many internet freedom advocates and amateur cyber security strategists maintain the view that cyberspace— "the sum of the globe's communications links and computational nodes"—is a "borderless" realm.[6] After all, nearly inestimable quantities of data course around the globe each second with little to no regard for national boundaries, and it is only at great pains that some states manage to assert control over these slippery 1s and 0s. Yet control they do, and both states and their citizens have exerted pressures on the

web that make it less than world wide.[7] Users demand different services according to their geographic location, while national governments seek to impose their own laws on digital communications, ranging from uncontroversial forms of censorship (e.g. blocking child pornography) to China's notorious "Great Firewall." It is this latter sort of governmental control in particular that most frequently attracts the label "balkanization" and the general disapproval of liberal democracies like the United States, which opposes such measures as part of its International Strategy for Cyberspace.[8]

Content control à la China's Great Firewall is, however, only one of many ways in which the global internet threatens to splinter along national lines—and, arguably, it is not the most important. In fact, recent moves by national governments, including the United States, to shore up their cyber security by means of preferential acquisition and other supply chain security policies hold the potential to split up the internet on a far more fundamental level. Driven in part by fears of built-in security threats, many states implement supply chain security policies when they limit their purchases of information technology (IT) to certain trusted suppliers, in several cases excluding foreign-made products from national IT supply chains. By imposing such restrictions on the hardware and software that form the foundations of cyberspace, these policies threaten to "balkanize"[9] not just the internet, but also information technology (IT) more broadly. In so doing, these states may actually put at greater risk the same security they seek to bolster—with potentially profound consequences for cyber security everywhere.

IT and the Rise of the Rest

To a large extent, it is only natural that the United States and its allies should seek to preserve the status quo with respect to the global internet as they did at WCIT. After all, the very invention of the internet is traditionally credited to the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)—2000 U.S. presidential candidate Al Gore's claim notwithstanding.[10] The highest levels of authority over the structure of the internet, namely the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names ad Numbers (ICANN) and the Internet Society (ISOC), are likewise situated in the United States and ultimately subject to U.S. government control.[11] Not only has the United States laid claim to the logical organization of the internet, but its physical infrastructure too has historically been composed predominantly of American- (and Japanese-) designed and manufactured

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1   U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesperson, Ambassador Kramer on International Telecommunications Conference, on the record hearing, November 29, 2012; see also Michael V. Hayden, "The Future of Things Cyber," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 5, no. 1 (2011): 3-7, 8.

2   International Telecommunications Union, Final Acts, World Conference on International Telecommunication, December 14, 2012, Article 5B.

3   Eric Pfanner, "U.S. Rejects Telecommunications Treaty," *New York Times*, December 13, 2012.

4   Danielle Kehl and Tim Maurer, "Did the U.N. Internet Governance Summit Actually Accomplish Anything?" *Slate*, December 14, 2012.

5   Sense of Congress on Governance of the Internet, S. Con. Res. 50, 112th Congress, 2012; the Senate resolution here refers to leaked proposals suggesting a more radical reformulation of internet governance spearheaded by the Russian Federation (sub note 38), though by the time the treaty was finalized, Russia had retracted its revisionist program.

6   Martin Libicki, "The Emerging Primacy of Information," *Orbis* 40, no. 2 (1996): 261-274; as Bush administration 'Cyber Czar' Richard A. Clarke points out, cyberspace "includes the Internet *plus* lots of other networks of computers that are not supposed to be accessible from the Internet" (see Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake, *Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It* (New York: HarperCollins, 2010), 70). This article uses both terms in similar capacities but maintains a distinction between the two.

7   See Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu, *Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

8   See esp. The White House, *U.S. International Strategy for Cyberspace* (Washington, D.C., 2011): 8.

9   "To break up (as a region or group) into smaller and often hostile units"; "Balkanize," Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary.

10   Philip Agre, "Who Invented "Invented"?: Tracing the Real Story of the 'Al Gore Invented the Internet' Hoax," UCSD, 2000.

11   Goldsmith and Wu, 168-172.

hardware and software components. Yet in much the same way that states like China and Russia have challenged U.S. hegemony in international political spheres, so have non-Western developers begun to chip away at a market once firmly dominated by firms such as Microsoft and Toshiba.

Despite a lack of comprehensive data, anecdotal evidence supports an application of Fareed Zakaria's "rise of the rest" hypothesis when it comes to information technology. As Zakaria describes in his *Post-American World*, the modern age is characterized not by the decline of the United States per se, but the rise of "the rest" of the world both in terms of economic and cultural power. A similar trend holds in the IT sector, as relative power in the global market shifts away from the United States and its allies toward emerging economies. In 1995, the global IT industry—defined as "computer hardware, data communications equipment, computer software, and computer services"—was heavily dominated by the United States and Japan, with U.S. and Japanese corporations capturing forty-one and seventeen percent market share respectively, according to a study from the United Nations University.[12] A 2002 report by the U.S. International Trade Commission shows that between 1991 and 2000, "emerging producers such as Mexico, Korea, the Philippines, and China captured growing portions of the U.S. [IT] import market, with their collective share rising from 9 percent to 31 percent," while Japan's fell from nearly a third to eighteen percent.[13] In the same period, the collective share of U.S. export markets held by the EU, Canada, and Japan fell from sixty percent to forty-two percent, while states such as Mexico, Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, China, and Brazil increased their share.[14] In addition to their role as growing markets for U.S. IT exports, most of these states became "emerging IT producers" themselves.[15] This rise in both demand and supply of IT in emerging economies is consistent with the strong correlations between gross domestic product (purchasing power parity) and adoption of technologies such as personal computers, mobile phones, internet, and broadband, as demonstrated by a 2007 study from the Personal Computing Industry Center.[16] Thus, as "the rest" have risen, so too has their footprint in the global IT market grown.

While many states have improved in terms of IT production, a select few have truly excelled. The year 2000 marked the expansion of Chinese telecom multinational Huawei into the global market. With financial support from the Chinese state, Huawei strategically undercut Western competitors like Ericsson and Nokia in emerging markets, offering products and services from mobile phones to complete mobile and broadband network integration—all for a relatively low price.[17] Over time, the company has sought contracts in developed countries as well, beginning in 2001 in the Netherlands and more recently facing resistance in Australia and the United States.[18] Russian security software firm Kaspersky Lab provides another case study in the rise of non-Western IT firms, capturing 7.75% global market share in the fifteen years since its founding in 1997, according to research by U.S. software management and security provider OPSWAT.[19] Kaspersky has thus far been most successful in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, where it is well known for uncovering Stuxnet and cyber espionage campaigns like Flame, but it hopes to see "very fast expansion" into markets in Asia-Pacific and North America in the near future.[20] Although the two companies differ markedly in myriad ways, from the goods and services they provide to their business strategies, both illustrate the slowly shifting balance of the global IT market away from the West and toward "the rest."

Our Wei or the Highway

The ascendance of "the rest" in the global IT market has presented U.S. policymakers with a number of problems, real or imagined, relating to economic advantage and cyber security. Huawei, in particular, has stirred up substantial concern in official circles, with some viewing the company's motives as more sinister than profit maximization alone. In early October 2012, the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence issued a report on Huawei and fellow Chinese telecom giant ZTE, warning of the potential threat the companies pose to national security.[21] The report recommends that the Committee on Foreign Investment (CFIUS) prevent Huawei and ZTE from merging with or acquiring U.S. companies and that both public and private sector entities exclude Huawei and ZTE equipment from their systems.[22] Though by no means the U.S. government's first confrontation with Chinese IT firms (CFIUS has twice blocked Huawei from acquiring U.S.-based companies), the committee's report represents one of the sharpest articulations on IT supply chain security to date.

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12   Pohjola Matti, "Information Technology and Economic Development: An Introduction to the Research Issues," United Nations University Working Papers, 1998.

13   Theresa H. Canavan, Robert Carr, and Christopher Johnson, "Factors Affecting U.S. Trade and Shipments of Information Technology Products: Computer Equipment, Telecommunications Equipment, And Semiconductors," U.S. International Trade Commission, Office of Industries Working Paper, February 2002, 7.

14   Ibid, 8.

15   Ibid.

16   Jason Dedrick, Kenneth L. Kraemer, and Paul Seever, "Global Market Potential for Information Technology Products and Services," Personal Computing Industry Center, March 2007.

17   "Huawei: The company that spooked the world," *The Economist*, August 4, 2012.

18   John Pomfret, "History of telecom company illustrates lack of strategic trust between U.S., China," *The Washington Post*, October 8, 2010; Maggie Lu Yueyang, "Australia Bars Huawei From Broadband Project," *New York Times*, March 26, 2012.

19   "Security Industry Share Market Analysis," OPSWAT, March 2012.

20   "Kaspersky Lab Named One of the Fastest-Growing Vendors in Endpoint Security Space Among the Top 10 Vendors by Revenue," Kaspersky Lab, June 29, 2011.

21   Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed by Chinese Telecommunications Companies Huawei and ZTE, H. R. Rep., 112th Congress (2012), vi.

22   Ibid., vi-vii.

Just how a telecommunications corporation threatens U.S. national security may not be immediately obvious. The key lies in the structure of cyberspace, which, broadly speaking, may be divided into three layers: "the physical layer, a syntactic layer sitting above the physical, and a semantic layer sitting on top."[23] Huawei produces components of the physical layer (hardware) with associated elements of the syntactic layer (software) that facilitate telecommunications (the semantic layer), e.g. telephone switches, routers, and even mobile phones. In theory, it could exert influence over these communications at a very fundamental level. And given the immense range of services that depend on electronic communications—everything from power generation to transportation to financial services—any influence over the integrity of those communications is a great power indeed. Fears thus revolve around the idea of "backdoors" purposely engineered into Huawei systems, which could (again, in theory) allow the Chinese government to bend these systems to political purposes: eavesdropping or even shutting them down remotely, e.g. in the event of a conflict with the United States.

Nor are such fears entirely unfounded. Inserting "backdoors" into communications systems is, for instance, standard practice even in the United States, where the 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) requires all telecommunications, internet, and voice over IP (VoIP) providers to ensure their systems have built-in surveillance capabilities for wiretaps. Some of these backdoor-enabled systems have even been exported abroad.[24] In the same way, it is not at all unthinkable that China might coerce Huawei or ZTE to open up systems to surveillance and other forms of control.

Yet, the unclassified version of the House Intelligence Committee's report contains no hard evidence that validates such fears, other than a general failure to allay the Committee's suspicions. Indeed, almost one week later, the White House released its own evaluation of Huawei and found "no clear evidence that Huawei Technologies Ltd had spied for China."[25] It is true that Huawei technology has been found to contain certain software vulnerabilities (programming flaws that allow hackers to exploit digital systems), but none of these appear to be deliberate sabotage—just careless coding.[26] Just what incentive Huawei, or the Chinese government for that matter, has to jeopardize the company's remarkable success for a little intelligence or for an edge in some future "cyber war" remains unclear. Huawei is the second highest grossing telecom multinational in the world and arguably more of an asset to China economically than politically or militarily.[27] What is more, Huawei has taken steps

to demonstrate the security and reliability of its systems, having North American shipments independently verified by U.S. government contractor Electronic Warfare Associates, for example.[28] Despite a certain lack of candor with respect to its structure and relationships with the Chinese government, it appears that Huawei is making a good faith effort to ensure the trustworthiness of its offerings.[29] Further, if the product in question is sound, does it really matter if future products might *theoretically* be compromised?

The House Committee's rather nebulous suspicions have led some, including Huawei spokespeople, to level the charge of protectionism. As previously suggested, economic motives may have played some role in the Committee's calculus, even if only in the form of lobbying efforts from Huawei's competitors, who after all "have a vested interest in hyping concerns."[30] Such motives notwithstanding, the Committee's concern over U.S. supply chain security is nevertheless well placed. "America has no effective system of supply-chain checks," writes *The Economist*, even as "the FBI… has assessed with high confidence that threats to the supply chain from both nation-states and criminal elements constitute a high cyber threat."[31] Though patriotic hackers, international cyber criminals, and foreign intelligence agencies have generally topped states' suspect lists when it comes to cyber attacks, the role of major multinational IT companies cannot be ignored. In order to secure themselves against digital "back doors" and other forms of sabotage, states are likely to limit their acquisitions of information technology to certain trusted sources.

NATIONAL SECURITY MARCHES ON

In the grand scheme of things, the Intelligence Committee's concern is nothing new. Most, if not all, states have certain preferential acquisition policies, and the World Trade Organization even permits such restrictions on free trade, as long as they serve the interest of national security. The United States, for its part, has Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), which restrict government contracts to primarily domestic suppliers. That similar policies should extend to information technology should be no surprise. In an age of "cyber warfare," states are no better advised to buy network equipment from a geopolitical rival any more than to allow said rival to operate one of their fighter jets. Some level of wariness in these matters is acceptable—indeed, expected.

What is notable, however, is the House Intelligence Committee's attention to the

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23   Martin C. Libicki, *Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010): 12.
24   "Huawei: The company that spooked the world."
25   Joseph Menn, "White House review finds no evidence of spying by Huawei – sources," *Reuters*, October 17, 2012.
26   Lucian Constantin, "Hackers reveal critical vulnerabilities in Huawei routers at Defcon," *Computerworld*, July 30, 2012.
27   "Huawei: The company that spooked the world."

28   Ibid.
29   Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed by Chinese Telecommunications Companies Huawei and ZTE, v.
30   "Who's afraid of Huawei?" *The Economist*, August 4, 2012.
31   Ibid.; Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed by Chinese Telecommunications Companies Huawei and ZTE, 1.

private sector, namely operators of critical infrastructure—"the physical and cyber systems and assets so vital… that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on [a state's] physical or economic security or public health or safety."[32] Critical infrastructure encompasses sectors as disparate as power, water, transportation, public health, and financial services and is united by a growing reliance on information technology. Accordingly, all sectors are potentially vulnerable to cyber attacks, and indeed some strategists specialize in dreaming up doomsday scenarios in which computer viruses disable air traffic control or blow up nuclear power plants.[33] As unlikely as such scenarios may be, the fears they engender are quite real and have driven important bureaucratic and budgetary developments in the United States over the past decade. Recent years have witnessed efforts to more directly regulate the cyber security practices of critical infrastructure operators, such as the failed Cybersecurity Act of 2012. Designed to ensure that "companies running [U.S.] critical infrastructure meet basic, commonsense cybersecurity standards, just as they already meet other security requirements,"[34] the bill faced fatal opposition from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which characterized its "voluntary cybersecurity practices" as more "costly regulation."[35] While the need for some sort of minimum standards cannot be overstated, the opposition's concern is reasonable as well. In fact, their concerns may only scratch the surface.

Whereas U.S. government procurement has always been preferential (at least since the Buy American Act of 1933), the private sector has generally enjoyed the freedom to source its acquisitions as it sees fit. With respect to information technology, however, this freedom may become more restricted over time if certain alternatives are deemed threatening to operators' cyber security (e.g. Huawei and ZTE, per the House Intelligence Committee report.) The Cybersecurity Act would have guarded against such restrictions with assurances that federal standards would be "technology neutral," not requiring the "use of specific commercial information technology product[s]; or that a particular commercial information technology product be designed, developed, or manufactured in a particular manner."[36] Yet with this Cybersecurity Act defeated, the shape of future legislation remains uncertain; it is even possible that President Obama will choose to bypass Congress and issue an executive order on security standards.[37] All speculation aside, one thing seems certain. As private sector entities become more prominent stakeholders in national cyber security, there is bound to be pressure to limit what technologies these stakeholders may or may not utilize.

WHITELIST, BLACKLIST, RED LIST, NEW LIST

How states choose to impose such limits will vary, to be sure. The Russian government, for example, appears to have whitelisted Kaspersky Lab in 2011 as one of its two trusted cyber security providers, alongside little-known Dr. Web.[38] Much has been made of Kaspersky Lab founder Eugene Kaspersky's relationship with the Kremlin.[39] Some have tried linking the "great virus hunter" to Russian intelligence, pointing to Mr. Kaspersky's KGB-sponsored education at the Institute of Cryptography, Telecommunications, and Computer Science and his service as a Soviet army intelligence officer, to say nothing of his recent cooperation with the Federal Security Service (FSB). In partial defense, Mr. Kaspersky notes that many anti-virus and cyber security firms cooperate with intelligence and law enforcement. Indeed, both Microsoft and Google have been linked to the National Security Agency, and even Microsoft routinely cooperates with Russian law enforcement—though not without some controversy.[40] Apart from more formal ties, Mr. Kaspersky's views on information security align with those of Russian President Vladimir Putin to a much greater extent than most of his peers. Both see great dangers in the openness of the internet: Mr. Kaspersky has reportedly called for "government regulation of [social networking sites]" while Putin's Russia submitted a proposal to WCIT to the effect that "states shall have the sovereign right… to regulate the national Internet segment, as well as the activities within their territory."[41] Whether or not Mr. Kaspersky and Putin are orchestrating some dark conspiracy to transform the internet as we know it, Moscow's cyber short list may say as much about who the Kremlin trusts as about who it *mistrusts* (e.g. Kaspersky's American competitors Symantec and McAfee, to name a few).

The United States, on the other hand, takes the opposite approach, singling out those it deems *untrustworthy* and leaving the other half of the equation open. On the flip side of Russia's implicit mistrust of American security firms, many U.S. organizations, both public and private, have refused to work with Kaspersky Lab, suspicious of its roots and wary of anyone subject to the coercion of the Kremlin.[42] As detailed

32　"Critical Infrastructure Protection," U.S. Department of Homeland Security, accessed August 14, 2012.
33　Clarke and Knake, 67-68.
34　Barack Obama, "Taking the Cyberattack Threat Seriously," *The Wall Street Journal*, July 19, 2012.
35　"Cybersecurity: More Government Regulation?" U.S. Chamber of Commerce, accessed January 15, 2013.
36　*Cybersecurity Act of 2012*, S. 2105, 112th Congress, 2nd Session (2012), 103(f).
37　Shaun Waterman, "Obama will take the lead protecting cybernetworks," *The Washington Times*, January 7, 2013.

38　"Russian Laws and Regulations: Implications for Kaspersky Labs," Taia Global.
39　Noah Shachtman, "Russia Top Cyber Sleuth Foils US Spies, Helps Kremlin Pals," *Wired*, July 23, 2012; Kaspersky's response: Eugene Kaspersky, "What Wired is Not Telling You – A Response to Noah Shachtman's Article in Wired Magazine," Nota Bene, July 25, 2012; and Noah Shachtman's counter: Noah Shachtman, "Kaspersky Denies Kremlin Ties, Compares Himself to Indiana Jones," *Wired*, July 25, 2012.
40　Stewart Mitchell, "Could US cyberspies have moles inside Microsoft?" *PC Pro*, June 15, 2012; David Kravets, "Court Upholds Google-NSA Relationship Secrecy," *Wired*, May 11, 2012; on Microsoft in Russia, see Clifford J. Levy, "Russia Uses Microsoft to Suppress Dissent," *New York Times*, September 11, 2010.
41　Noah Shachtman, "Kaspersky Denies Kremlin Ties, Compares Himself to Indiana Jones"; Russian Federation, Proposals for the Work of the Conference, Document 27-E, November 17, 2012, submitted to the World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT-12), Dubai, United Arab Emirates, December 3-14, 2012.
42　Andrew E. Kramer and Nicole Perlroth, "Expert Issues a Cyberwar Warning," *New York Times*, June 3, 2012.

above, the U.S. government has all but blacklisted Huawei, blocking the company's U.S. expansion efforts dating back to its attempted acquisition of 3Com in 2010 and 3Leaf in 2011.[43] Nor is the United States the only one to turn up its nose at China's telecom superstar. In March 2012, Australia denied Huawei a lucrative contract to develop its National Broadband Network,[44] while just three months later, Algerian courts convicted Huawei and ZTE employees of bribery and banned both from future contracts for two years.[45] India blacklisted Huawei along with several other suppliers in 2010, but ultimately softened its stance a mere four months after.[46]

Between blacklisting and whitelisting, the Middle Kingdom treads a middle path. In many cases, the transfer of proprietary technologies to Chinese partners is the cost of entry into the market. For items with encryption components, access is predicated upon transfer of the relevant encryption keys—coincidentally illegal for many U.S. firms under Export Administration Regulations.[47] One legal expert suspects this latter policy to be an "excuse to buy only Chinese-origin technologies," but to ascribe purely protectionist motives to China's technology policies would miss the greater objective.[48] China's technology transfer policies allow it not only to shelter domestic businesses from international competitors but also, in many cases, to close the gap between them in one fell swoop. It is this same drive to "close the gap," as it were, that has made China one of the "most aggressive" perpetrators of industrial espionage: indeed, "of the seven cases litigated in 2010 under the [U.S.] Economic Espionage Act of 1996, six involved China."[49] By stealing trade secrets from key competitors, Chinese companies may quickly achieve peer status with respect to a specific technology, leapfrogging long periods of costly research and development. Ultimately, China aims to achieve the same global advantage that countries such as the United States enjoy in IT and other high-tech sectors. Such initiatives drive primarily at economic growth; after all, who wouldn't want to be a leader in the fastest growing sector on earth? From the standpoint of security, however, the transfer of certain technologies (e.g. encryption keys) may enable China to rival the status quo powers in more than economics alone.

Regardless of how they go about it, states are drawing up short lists of IT providers, so to speak (many are in fact quite long). The product of the "rise of the rest" in the global IT market and gnawing fears of "cyber attack," this trend toward more

preferential acquisition policies (what some have called "techno-nationalism")—and the potential expansion of these policies to parts of the private sector—threatens to "balkanize" cyberspace, fragmenting a once global network along national lines. If national cyber security concerns are carried to their logical conclusion (and the trend of IT diversification continues), national networks may become more differentiated. Huawei routers, for example, might become illegal for use in U.S. critical infrastructure networks, while critical systems in Russia could be obliged to choose between Kaspersky Lab and Dr. Web for their security. Imposing such restrictions not only means foregoing efficiency gains from global competition, as *The Economist* warns,[50] but also fundamentally altering the way states approach "cyber warfare."[51]

Staking out the Attack Surface

As it stands, the relative homogeneity of global information systems poses a challenge to "cyber warriors," hackers who ply their craft in the service of nation-states. As of December of 2012, roughly forty-five percent of desktop computers worldwide run Windows 7, with another thirty-nine precent running Windows XP, and six percent running Windows Vista. These numbers do not differ remarkably from region to region: fifty-one percent of North American desktops run Windows 7, with Windows XP and Vista in second and third at nineteen and ten percent respectively. Asia reveals a similar picture, at fifty-three, thirty-eight, and four percent respectively.[52] Especially when it comes to basic software like operating systems, cyberspace really does appear to be borderless. A virus designed for Windows 7 stands to infect roughly half of desktops anywhere in the world, with little geographic variation. Clearly "cyber warriors" have little incentive to create "cyber weapons" (really just glorified computer viruses) that indiscriminately target Windows; they would be targeting their own systems, not to mention those of their allies and more than a few innocent bystanders. Such is the problem of "collateral damage," frequently brought to the fore in discussions of cyber warfare. To achieve the desired level of precision, these hackers must either target a less widespread technology and/or build in special checks to ensure their "weapons" do not run amok.

One particularly illustrative case of a "precision-guided cyber weapon" is Stuxnet, a worm widely credited to the United States and Israel, which reportedly disabled nearly one thousand centrifuges in Iran's nuclear enrichment facility at Natanz.[53] Like any virus, Stuxnet initially infected its target by means of software vulnerability—or in the case of Stuxnet, *four* vulnerabilities—all of them obscure programming flaws in Microsoft Windows. Yet because Windows is so widespread, and because the

43   "Huawei backs away from 3Leaf acquisition," *Reuters*, February 19, 2011.
44   Maggie Lu Yueyang, "Australia Bars Huawei from Broadband Project."
45   Juha Saarinen, "Huawei, ZTE banned from Algeria," *itnews*, June 14, 2012.
46   Bruce Einhorn, "A Setback for China's Tech Ambitions in India," *Bloomberg Businessweek*, May 6, 2012; Bruce Einhorn, "China's Huawei Overcomes Opposition in India," Eye on Asia, *Bloomberg Businessweek*, September 7, 2010.
47   "Ear Controls for Items That Use Encryption," U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security.
48   Jaikumar Vijayan, "New China encryption rule could pose headaches for U.S. vendors," *Computerworld*, April 29, 2010.
49   James A. Lewis, "China's Economic Espionage: Why It Worked in the Past But It Won't in the Future," *Foreign Affairs*, November 13, 2012.

50   "Who's afraid of Huawei?"
51   Ibid.
52   "Desktop Operating System Market Share," Net Market Share, last updated December 2012.
53   See David E. Sanger, *Confront and Conceal: Obama's Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power* (New York: Crown, 2012), 188-225.

programmers were presumably interested only in Iranian nuclear systems, they had to give their creation a few additional instructions. One was that the virus act only in the presence of a special software used in industrial facilities: Siemens Step 7. But even Step 7 isn't unique to Iranian nuclear plants; in fact, quite a few U.S. facilities use it as well. A final criterion, then, was to execute only if Step 7 controlled fifteen centrifuge clusters, each containing 164 centrifuges running at a frequency between 807 Hz and 1210 Hz (an architecture unique to Natanz).[54] Such a high level of precision would have been impossible without high-level intelligence on the layout and technical specifications of the nuclear plant itself. Nor could the attackers be sure their weapon would work until they tested it, which, as *New York Times* correspondent David Sanger reports, they did, across a number of U.S. national laboratories.[55] Ultimately, it seems the cyber attack was at least partially successful, though not without substantial costs to its planners.

Now imagine that the systems of hardware and software that make up cyberspace were to become differentiated along national, perhaps regional, lines, as states continue to shorten their lists of trusted IT suppliers. Suddenly, collateral damage poses much less of a problem for cyber warriors. If Huawei were banned outright from the United States, for example, then U.S. hackers could exploit vulnerabilities in Huawei technology to attack Chinese systems, without worrying about any collateral damage domestically (other major Huawei markets like Africa might not be so lucky).[56] Hackers targeting Russia could similarly exploit Kaspersky Lab software and rest assured their malware would have no effect on American systems running, say, McAfee. In such a universe, a state's *attack surface*—"the subset of the system's resources that an attacker can use to attack the system"—becomes a function of its whitelist, blacklist, etc.[57] The sort of intelligence and testing that went into the Stuxnet attack likewise becomes much less important. If the very foundations of cyberspace differ from state-to-state, cyber warriors need not spend time and resources building in special checks to avoid blowback (i.e. domestic collateral damage); they can simply point and shoot at a national set of technology.

Even if blowback poses less of a risk, collateral damage in general will continue to complicate cyber warriors' calculus. Take the above scenario of U.S. hackers attacking China via Huawei technology: although such an attack would not risk upsetting U.S. systems (as few to none use Huawei), it would nevertheless affect large swathes of China, and for that matter Asia, Africa, and Europe.[58] Such widespread collateral damage would violate two of the core principles of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC),

namely *distinction* and *proportionality*. On the one hand, an indiscriminate attack on Huawei systems would make no *distinction* between the target (China, presumably its government and/or military) and other users. On the other, the collateral damage from such an attack would, in all likelihood, be out of *proportion* with the advantage U.S. hackers would gain as a result. The United States for its part goes to great lengths to adhere to LOAC, which, it holds, also applies to cyber warfare.[59] During the 1998-1999 Kosovo War, for example, the Pentagon issued an internal memo titled "Assessment of International Legal Issues in Information Operations," which warned against using cyber attacks to shut down Serbian financial systems for fear the collateral damage might be considered a war crime.[60] Stuxnet, likewise "was… designed to minimize collateral damage."[61] Beyond questions of legality and morality, however, collateral damage is equally undesirable from a practical standpoint, as it risks drawing unrelated third parties into the fray.

To raise a stock specter, it is conceivable that terrorists, largely unconstrained by these considerations, might take advantage of a more differentiated attack surface. Indeed, expert James A. Lewis predicts that Al-Qaeda could deploy its own cyber weapon within a decade.[62] If not to avoid a potentially higher incidence of interstate cyber warfare, states might reconsider policies of balkanization in light of the risk of cyber terrorism.

Ultimately, due to the difficulties of ensuring compliance with supply chain security policies, the differentiation of networks across borders is likely to take place only in the public sector and perhaps a small handful of private sector partners such as the defense industrial base. Effectively countering market forces on a national scale and across a wide range of information technology may be beyond the capabilities of even the most competent governments. Even with regard to the public sector, states will in all likelihood continue to share many similarities in both hardware and software. China, for example, has its own operating system known as Red Flag, which is the default on government systems, but many government employees choose to run Windows as well, simply because it works better.[63] Nevertheless, the mere fact that Chinese government systems have a unique characteristic allows hackers to better discriminate and leaves China with a marked vulnerability. Restricting the

54   Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, and Eric Chien, "W32.Stuxnet Dossier," Symantec, February 2011.
55   David E. Sanger, "Obama Ordered Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran," *New York Times*, June 1, 2012.
56   "Huawei: The company that spooked the world."
57   Pratyusa K. Manadhata, "Game Theoretic Approaches to Attack Surface Shifting" in *Moving Target Defense II*, ed. Sushil Jajodia, et al. (New York: Springer, 2013): 4.
58   Ibid.

59   The U.S. International Strategy for Cyberspace states with regard to cyber warfare that it "reserve[s] the right to use all necessary means—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—as appropriate and consistent with applicable international law"; high level U.S. military officials have likewise confirmed that "the law of armed conflict will apply" to cyber warfare (see David E. Sanger and Elisabeth Bumiller, "Pentagon to Consider Cyberattacks Acts of War," *New York Times*, May 31, 2011).
60   U.S. Department of Defense Office of General Counsel, An Assessment of International Legal Issues in Information Operations, May 1999.
61   Robert Fanelli and Gregory Conti, "A Methodology for Cyber Operations Targeting and Control of Collateral Damage in the Context of Lawful Armed Conflict" in *2012 4th International Conference on Cyber Conflict, Proceedings*, ed. Christian Czosseck, et al. (Tallinn, Estonia: CCD COE, 2012): 319-331, 330.
62   "Assessing The Threat of Cyberterrorism," National Public Radio, February 10, 2010.
63   James A. Lewis, conversation with author, August 2012.

IT available to a state's users, while potentially mitigating some security risks, also stands to sharpen other risks.

(Dis)trust But Verify

Cyberspace is not the global commons that some imagine it to be; the "content layer" in particular has ben shaped by users and governments according to various national interests. On a deeper level, the level of hardware and software, these distinctions are not nearly as apparent—at least for now. If national supply chain security policies continue on their present trajectories, however, this layer too may come to resemble a political map, with each state's networks composed predominantly of technology supplied by non-threatening vendors. Such a balkanization of IT would in turn divide up the vulnerabilities exploited by hackers, thus diminishing the risks of blowback and (some) collateral damage. And to the extent that these risks act as some sort of deterrent to the cyber warriors of the world, reducing them could adversely affect international cyber security.

If, on the other hand, IT is allowed to diffuse in accordance with market forces, vulnerabilities will be to a great extent shared among different states, and in the end this condition of shared vulnerability may be the most secure. "Trust but verify," to quote Ronald Reagan, or even *distrust* but verify.[64] Rather than pour energy and resources into balkanizing the IT industry, states would be better advised to invest in more robust verification mechanisms. Lest they create their own Red Flag-esque vulnerabilities, it is ultimately in everyone's interest to embrace the borderlessness of cyberspace.

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64   "Who's afraid of Huawei?"

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The Chinese, American, and Sudanese Oil Triangle

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Abstract

China's growing demand for energy greatly affects the international system's balance of power, threatening Western nations like the United States with its expanding influence. By manipulating small oil-rich states like Sudan, China can ensure long-term political stability and economic growth while improving its overall power-projection capabilities. China's entrance into the oil market contributes to the resource scarcity dilemma and challenges the United States, especially with its high consumer demand. Structural realism effectively demonstrates the self-interested ambition of China's bilateral relationship with Sudan, as well as the U.S. role in criticizing China's motives and activity in the region. This theoretical approach is key to understanding how small states like Sudan can act as both significant investments for sustained economic growth and pawns for curtailing the rise of a new world power.

Introduction

Global competition for natural resources is one of the clearest manifestations of the struggle for power and influence that states exhibit in the international system. Undeniably, resource scarcity poses an enormous risk when it comes to guaranteeing state security, stability, sovereignty, and survival. Oil, especially, is a major factor in power politics among actors with large, fuel-hungry industries and populations. Procuring this oil by manipulating major oil producers is an essential exercise in

exerting influence and amassing fortune. But how can states effectively achieve this without disturbing the balance of power in the international community? To address this issue, this article will examine China's pursuit of power, its investment in the Sudanese oil market, and how these factors subsequently affect the United States and the overall international community through a structural realist framework.

Realism serves as a valuable theoretical approach to understanding how these industrialized powers are motivated to act when confronted with potential energy shortages. Oil, a limited natural resource only available in select geographic locations, is an object of global demand. According to the CIA World Factbook, of the world's most industrialized powerhouses, the United States is ranked number one in oil consumption, using 19,150,000 barrels per day (bbl/day) in 2010. China, with its enormous population and growing automotive industry, ranks third with 9,400,000 bbl/day and rising. The two giants have an obvious vested interest in the oil market and challenge the international community with their influences on oil suppliers. Sudan and South Sudan, even despite their recent civil conflict and separation, are still important oil producers, particularly for the Chinese. Of all the overseas oil investments that China makes, Sudan has proven to be their "single most outstanding success."[1] After the humanitarian crisis broke out in Darfur, however, China faced harsh criticism over its defense of Omar al-Bashir's government, which exposed the materialism of China's economic agenda.[2] Although the United States has not yet made an impression on the Sudanese oil market, Washington is aware of the superior relative gains that China is making in the region, and actively seeks to discredit them before the international community.

A Realist Theoretical Approach

The writing of John Mearsheimer, a scholar in offensive realism, provides the foundation for applying a structural realist theoretical approach to the issue of oil security and resource manipulation. In his article "The False Promise of International Institutions," he explains the nature of the international system by denoting the five core assumptions of realism, which can then be employed in a general sense to the study of oil politics and the resource scarcity dilemma.

The first assumption affirms that the international system is in a state of anarchy, existing as "a brutal arena where states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other, and therefore have little reason to trust each other."[3] In the international community, states do not have to answer to a central governing body or authority

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1   Linda Jakobson and Daojiong Zha, "China and the Worldwide Search for Oil Security," *Asia-Pacific Review* 13, no. 2 (2006): 67.
2   Ibid., 68.
3   John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1994): 9.

and are free to exercise the full extent of their sovereignty in order to gain power and ultimately profit.[4] A notable consequence of anarchy is that "when there is competition for scarce goods and no one to serve as arbiter, a struggle for power will ensue among the competitors."[5] In terms of oil security, there is no one to govern where giants like China and the United States can establish their oil industries. This leads to a fierce global competition over energy—and, subsequently, power.

This inherently hostile environment follows into the second core assumption, namely that states wield an "offensive military capability."[6] Competition is intensified by fear, causing states to "regard each other with suspicion," distrust one another, and "anticipate danger."[7] Suspicions are grounded in the third assumption, which maintains that "States can never be certain of the intentions of other states."[8] The lack of transparency in motives inhibits a state from effectively determining whether its fear for its own security is founded. In this case study for example, Washington has encountered trouble ascertaining what Beijing's influence in Sudanese oil means for U.S. oil security and its relative power position.

The fourth core assumption underscores survival as an innate "basic motive driving states."[9] In this sense, the quest for oil becomes a part of guaranteeing state security by satiating domestic energy needs and ensuring political stability. In order to achieve these essential goals, states conform to the fifth assumption, which posits that they "think strategically about how to survive in the international system."[10] Competition for oil security unmistakably manifests this final assumption because of resource scarcity, which motivates actors to manipulate oil suppliers abroad. This kind of activity does not go unnoticed by other actors, especially the industrialized giants. Countries like the United States and China are keenly aware of each others' oil sources, especially since their demands far outweigh those of their smaller and less intimidating competitors.

One key pattern of behavior that states exhibit in a competitive anarchic international system is their "aim to maximize their relative power position over [others]."[11] States are not merely satisfied with *absolute* gains; they are also concerned about *relative* gains. Ideally, states strive for global hegemonic status so that "survival would then be almost guaranteed."[12] U.S. dominance in international society allows it to easily

negotiate for scarce resources and stake a claim in oil-rich territories overseas. China's rising status poses a threat to the ease of access Washington enjoys in the oil market. The two states need to "compete with and adjust to one another if they are to survive and flourish."[13]

One of the major critiques of structural realism involves the concept of complex interdependence theory. This theory alters the major premises of structural realism in order to account for states that become interdependent on one another and engage in bilateral agreements. The assumptions that "states are the only significant actors, military force is the dominant instrument, and security is the dominant goal" are reversed to affirm that "(1) States are not the only significant actors—transnational actors working across state boundaries are also major players; (2) force is not the only significant instrument—economic manipulation and the use of international institutions are the dominant instruments; (3) security is not the dominant goal - welfare is the dominant goal."[14] The opportunity for economic manipulation is an essential instrument for states in interdependent relationships—especially for the larger, more dominant actor in the agreement. This approach converges with realism when considering that these agreements are usually created out of necessity and consequently will operate in favor of influential and manipulative states in their pursuits for power. When countries with high levels of oil consumption, like China, establish a pipeline with small oil producers, an interdependent relationship is formed, but a certain level of dominance of one state over the other exists. Thus, the international system can be considered "somewhere between" realism and complex interdependence.[15]

There is no such strong interdependence between them the United States and China. The United States could hypothetically "compensate for the potential loss of Chinese goods by purchasing them elsewhere."[16] However, Washington profits immensely from the "potential size of the Chinese market for American goods," and it is true that there exists a high level of "domestic demand for Chinese goods in the U.S."[17] This inhibits the United States from "[acting] against China" because "U.S. multinational corporations [have pressured] the U.S. government not to implement sanctions against China for unfair trade practices or human rights violations."[18] Despite the U.S. dominance in the international community, China wields considerable leverage in this relationship. Consequently, China can exercise a significant amount of freedom in its activity with other states, without the immediate threat of being punished by the United States' powerful hegemonic presence.

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4   Ibid., 10.
5   Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18, no. 4 (1988): 616.
6   Mearsheimer, 10.
7   Ibid., 11.
8   Ibid., 10.
9   Ibid.
10   Ibid.
11   Ibid.
12   Ibid., 12.

13   Waltz, 618.
14   Joseph S. Nye, "Chapter 7: Globalization," In *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, (New York, NY: Pearson Longman, 2008): 17.
15   Ibid.
16   Nye, 18.
17   Ibid.
18   Ibid.

CHINA'S GROWING POWER AND DEMAND

China's economic development and expanding global influence have improved its position among the great powers of the world. China's growth is estimated to continue unabated until 2030,[19] and at the rate of its development over the past two decades, the size of China's GDP is projected to "eventually rival and even surpass[that of] the United States."[20] China's emergence as the "low-cost manufacturing platform of the world" makes it a formidable challenger in the international economy, with its "competitive prices for low-cost good and its voracious appetite for raw materials."[21] Most realists would argue that the expansion of China's influence and "power projection capabilities" will likely end in economic and political conflicts between China and the United States.[22] This likely will create tension among Western powers over the acquisition of diminishing natural resources.

China's tremendous economic growth over the past thirty years has led to an increase in energy consumption, moving China away from a doctrine of self-sufficiency, particularly in oil production.[23] China's rising demand exhausted its domestic oil fields, and now China seeks to satisfy its energy needs by searching for oil suppliers abroad.[24] The widening gap of supply and demand launched China into the global market for energy. China began to import fuel in 1993, and by 2006 China was the "world's third-largest net importer of oil behind the US and Japan,"[25] importing "over 40 percent of its oil supplies."[26] China's hunger for energy contributed to the rise of oil prices all over the world, and between 2003 and 2008 the Chinese oil market accounted for a third of the increase in global demand.[27] Many energy experts believe that China's demand will rise relentlessly until 2020, when China is estimated to consume "over 11 million barrels a day."[28]

In recent years, maintaining relationships with foreign crude oil producers has been a central concern for China's oil security and overall stability. In accordance with the fourth core assumption of structural realism, China's leaders are concerned about the survival of the state and fearful that "an interruption of fuel supplies or unforeseeable

price rises could put the brakes on growth."[29] If significant obstacles to China's growth were to arise, political or social unrest could potentially delegitimize the control of the Communist Party and diminish its global position of power.[30] In the face of this threat, the Communist Party has developed a "neomercantilist oil strategy" that aims to take "direct control of oil production in major oil-exporting countries" and "ensure that the output of oilfields under Beijing's control is exported directly to China and not sold on the world oil market."[31] The exclusive manipulative power over oil production that China seeks reveals its goal to make superior gains relative to states that control the multinational oil corporations that dominate the market.

In order to maximize its gains relative to other states and successfully employ a neomercantilist oil strategy, Beijing will undoubtedly need to become more expansive in the future and cultivate strong bilateral relationships with oil-rich states.[32] To satiate its energy demands and maintain the status quo, China must expand its diplomatic relations and develop a "strategic calculus."[33] This notion directly relates to the fifth core assumption, which asserts that states need to think strategically in order to guarantee survival. By vigorously cooperating with foreign nations in the "exploration and development of oil and gas resources abroad," China can design complex interdependent relationships that will serve its interests.[34]

CHINA AS A THREAT

While China believes that the United States and other Western oil companies have too much influence over the oil industry, Washington is increasingly suspicious of Beijing's rise as a major world power. The Western world, wary of "China Threat Theory", is "[paying] close attention to Beijing's impact on the world oil market."[35] Seeing China's gradual increase in oil imports and its efforts to strengthen relationships abroad, the United States questions whether China is shaping the global environment to operate in its favor and seeking greater influence in international affairs.[36] Structural realists like Mearsheimer believe that, a "wealthy China could not be a status quo power but an aggressive state determined to achieve regional hegemony," and that "although it is certainly in China's interest to be the hegemon in Northeast Asia, it is clearly not in America's interest to have that happen."[37]

Regardless of whether or not China's motives are clear, it is reasonable to expect

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19   Yu-Hui Tseng, "Chinese Foreign Policy and Oil Security," *International Quarterly for Asian Studies* 39, no. 3 (2008): 348.

20   Robert J. Art, "The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul," *Political Science Quarterly* 125, no. 3 (2010): 359.

21   Ibid.

22   Ibid., 360.

23   Tseng, 343.

24   Ibid., 348.

25   Gawdat Bahgat, "Africa's Oil: Potential and Implications," *OPEC Review: Energy Economics & Related Issues* 31, no. 2 (2007): 98.

26   Heinrich Kreft, "China's Quest for Energy," *Policy Review* no. 139 (2006): 62.

27   Tseng, 347.

28   Ibid.

29   Kreft, 64.

30   Ibid.

31   Ibid., 66.

32   Art, 361.

33   Tseng, 343.

34   Ibid., 356.

35   Ibid.

36   Art, 362.

37   Ibid.

that China's influence will only increase.[38] From a realist perspective, "Great powers always find reasons to wield their great power" and states should be suspicious of strong competitors, since "more power creates more opportunities for influence."[39] Therefore, it is necessary for the United States, in maintaining its primacy, to slow the rise of China. However, trying to halt China's rise altogether would be irrational, both since doing so would require "drastically curtailing China's economic growth, upon which all else depends," and because "waging economic denial against [China]"[40] would destroy the trade benefits that Washington and Beijing mutually enjoy.

The only viable option would be to design institutions that mitigate the third core assumption, which affirms that a state can never be sure of its competitor's intentions in the international community. In 2004, in order to increase transparency and monitor each other's activities, the two powers established the U.S.-China Energy Policy Dialogue. This Dialogue opened a line of communication for the purpose of negotiating agreements on energy cooperation and initiating an "energy information exchange."[41] The two also created the U.S.-China Oil and Gas Industry Forum, "composed of governmental and industrial leaders from both sides," as a way of gauging motives and supervising each other's activity in the industry.[42]

SUDAN AND THE RESOURCE CURSE

Sudan's entrance into the oil market as a "medium-sized oil producer" has had both positive and negative impacts upon its economy.[43] In the late 1990s, Sudan began a process of "exploration and development operations" with intentions of building an oil industry.[44] Throughout the past decade, oil development became "the centerpiece of Sudan's economy," leading to an average increase in real GDP of approximately 7.9% between 2004 and 2008. Throughout this time, oil development succeeded in effectively expanding Sudan's industrial and service sectors.[45]

However, Sudan's weak government infrastructure makes it vulnerable to reliance on its oil production, a phenomenon also known as the resource curse. Sudan's "underdevelopment and weak state institutions" led to intense political instability and civil conflict that allowed the "the economic and political afflictions of the resource

curse to take hold."[46] By 2008, the Sudanese government had amassed a total debt of $33.7 billion,[47] and in 2010, the state's GDP was among the lowest in the world. However, in 2001, before the secession of the south, Sudan was "the third largest oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa, behind Nigeria and Angola."[48] Sudan's lack of effective governance and ongoing instability, coupled with its reliance on oil revenues, make it a prime target for resource manipulation.

THE CHINESE-SUDANESE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP

In pursuit of raw materials and oil, China saw an opportunity to begin cooperating with Sudan following the African state's independence. In the 1970s, China opened a line of communication with the Sudanese government, during the latter's period of "brief parliamentary and more extended military government."[49] At first their partnership consisted of trade negotiations featuring cotton as the dominant Sudanese export, but by 1986 the two states created a joint economic committee. The establishment of this committee made clear China's interest in Sudan's potential for oil production.[50]

During September of 1995 the Sudanese president visited Beijing and made an official request that China engage in its budding oil industry.[51] Shortly after, China's state-owned oil companies started the process of oil exploration.[52] In 1996, China bought into forty percent of Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), and a year later signed a contract allowing GNPOC to develop three blocks in Southern Sudan.[53] China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) also entered the market and eventually became a major partner in the Greater Nile Producing Consortium.[54] CNPC and the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) merged to claim almost half of Petrodar Operating Company (PDOC), which at the time was the "second largest oil consortium in Sudan."[55]

China's tremendous investment into Sudanese oil production demonstrates Beijing's aim to "turn Sudan into an oil exporter."[56] China's first major success towards achieving this goal took place when China shipped a cargo of "600,000 barrels of Nile

38   Ibid., 361.
39   Ibid.
40   Ibid., 352.
41   Tseng, 356.
42   Ibid.
43   K. L.E.E. Pak, Gerald Chan, and Lai-Ha Chan, "China in Darfur: Humanitarian Rule-Maker or Rule Taker?" *Review of International Studies* 38, no. 2 (2012): 341.
44   Bahgat, 97.
45   Patey A. Luke, "Crude Days Ahead? Oil and the Resource Curse in Sudan," *African Affairs* 109, no. 437 (2010): 619.

46   Ibid.
47   Ibid.
48   Ibid., 622.
49   Daniel Large, "China and the Changing Context of Development in Sudan." Development 50, no. 3 (2007): 57.
50   Linda Jakobson and Daojiong Zha, "China and the Worldwide Search for Oil Security," Asia-Pacific Review 13, no. 2 (2006):66.
51   Ibid.
52   Large, 58.
53   Pak, Chan, and Chan, 431.
54   Bahgat, 99.
55   Pak, Chan, and Chan, 431.
56   Large, 59.

Blend crude" from Port Bashair terminal on the Red Sea in August of 1999.[57] This accomplishment was attributed to the construction of "field production facilities, airfields, all-weather roads and feeder-pipers – as well as further exploration and extraction."[58] Operational in 2000, The GNPOC also buried a "1,600-km, 28-inch pipeline" in the southern Heglig oil fields to link their supply to the international oil market.[59]

Although a power imbalance exists between the two states, Sino-Sudanese bilateral cooperation is deemed among scholars as "a genuine case of 'mutually beneficial' pragmatism—rather than natural solidarity."[60] Sudan benefits from China not only because of their political compatibility, but also because China allows Sudan to "circumvent U.S. pressure" in the global oil industry.[61] Sudan exported eighty percent of its official average total in Sudanese crude to China between 2001 to 2004. China also became (northern) Sudan's leading overall trade partner, claiming seventy-five percent of Sudan's total exports in 2006.[62]

China was also able to exercise its neomercantalist economic strategy with its newfound partner, primarily because it presented an opportunity for China to "access resource markets not controlled by established powers in Africa" and "pursue oil interests in countries where Western companies are not present."[63] China gained exclusive control over Sudan's oil supplies by taking advantage of ongoing instability and civil strife in Sudan. Additionally, Sudan's convenient geographic isolation allowed China to maintain dominance.[64] For China, Sudan is viewed as a lucrative business venture that can help address its growing energy demands "through a long-term overseas supply base."[65]

The Chinese presence in sub-Saharan Africa has not gone unnoticed by the United States. In December 2005, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick made a "comprehensive statement"[66] to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. He criticized China's role in "locking up energy supplies in the world" and accused the rising power of basing its cooperation on "[achieving] energy security, regardless of the poor governance in the host country."[67] Other Western powers also realized the implications of China's oil import strategy, which caused mounting tension in the

international community.

BACKLASH AGAINST CHINA'S ROLE IN DARFUR

U.S. involvement with Sudan is characterized mostly by the Washington's intolerance for the humanitarian crisis in Darfur and the ensuing civil strife. The outbreak of violence perpetrated against black African Muslims by Arab militia groups in the Darfur region began in the early 2000s. Since then, Western powers have condemned the Sudanese government for its alleged involvement in the atrocities. Yet in October of 1997, even before the violence broke out, the Clinton Administration imposed economic sanctions against Sudan. In 2002, Congress passed the "Sudan Peace Act,"[68] The sanctions were meant to "deny the Government of Sudan access to oil revenues" and consequently cripple their heavily energy-reliant export economy.[69] To supplement these measures, Western activist groups have also made strides to inhibit Sudan's growth in GDP, but the "Asian oil bloc… [has] kept Sudan's economy afloat."[70]

As the leading actor in the Asian oil bloc, China's engagement with the Sudanese economy has considerably softened the blows dealt by Western powers. China's "politico-economic partnership with Sudan" is widely acknowledged as a "formidable barrier to successful humanitarian intervention in Darfur."[71] The West threatened China's global reputation by attacking its considerable stake in Sudan's oil industry, viewing this stake as a motive for China's "unwillingness to impose sanctions against the Sudanese authorities."[72] Beijing retaliated by citing its non-interventionist political philosophy and expressing its concern that "outside humanitarian interventions would lead to foreign infringement and national disintegration."[73]

Further criticism targeted China's presence as a key component of the Sudanese arms manufacturing industry. Revenues accrued by oil were linked to the hard currency used by the Sudanese government for arms purchases.[74] In this way, the Chinese were seen as major players in the "[development of] northern Sudan's arms manufacturing industry" and contributors to the Darfur atrocities.[75]

Beijing tried to legitimate business in Sudan by "[publically highlighting] the beneficial developmental impact of its economic links." Emphasizing its position that Sudan's underdevelopment was a cause of conflict in the Darfur region, China insisted that its economic cooperation and investment in Sudan would help resolve the humanitarian

57   Ibid.
58   Ibid.
59   Ibid.
60   Ibid., 58.
61   Ibid.
62   Ibid.
63   Ibid.; Pak, Chan, and Chan, 430.
64   Large, 58.
65   Ibid., 58-60.
66   Pak, Chan, and Chan, 429.
67   Ibid., 430.

68   Ibid.
69   Ibid.
70   Ibid.
71   Ibid., 435.
72   Ibid., 430.
73   Ibid., 435.
74   Large, 59.
75   Ibid.

crisis in the long-term.[76] According to Michael Desch's realist theoretical approach towards humanitarianism, the anarchical international environment leaves little room for issues concerning "human rights and values" when states are primarily concerned about their survival.[77] Humanitarian action is "rarely taken when it [jeopardizes] other stated goals of [state interest]."[78] China's apprehension towards tackling the Darfur genocide and risking its investments in Sudanese oil demonstrates this self-interested ambition towards greater economic power and stability over humanitarian action.

In reaction to international pressure to confront the genocide, China was divided over its policy in Sudan. Some argued that China should take a defensive stance by refusing to "bow to the pressure from the West," while others contended that humanitarian intervention would be a way to safeguard China's "international standing."[79] Beijing's relationship with Khartoum has also put Chinaese businesses and citizenry at risk, making it difficult for China to remain neutral.[80]

China eventually succumbed to pressure and pushed Khartoum to allow for UN intervention in the region.[81] After the Darfur crisis began garnering widespread media attention, the Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Lu Guozeng visited Khartoum in August of 2004. Shortly thereafter, Beijing made a $610,000 humanitarian aid donation to assist with the crisis.[82] In 2006, China also made a $3.5 million donation to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS).[83] Later, in 2007, more than 400 Chinese peacekeepers arrived in Darfur. However, this group received harsh criticism from even the Sudanese Justice and Equality Movement, who called for their withdrawal.[84] The Movement, like the rest of the international community, criticized the Chinese for supporting Sudan "[because of] oil, not for human rights."[85]

Western powers view Chinese intervention as a ploy to "simply [mask] the ulterior motive to control [Sudan's] energy resources."[86] Realists argue that there are three benchmarks to China's humanitarian aid, which are to first "uphold the norms of national sovereignty and non-intervention in international politics;" second, "to play the role and cultivate an image, of a 'responsible great power;'" and third, "to develop

warm ties with Third World countries and the regional organizations that they form."[87]

However, while the United States criticizes China's role in Darfur, Washington is not necessarily innocent itself. In *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, Edward Carr posits that "…politics are not (as the utopians pretend) a function of ethics, but ethics of politics," suggesting that "morality is the product of power."[88] Washington's call for humanitarian intervention in Darfur is grounded in its hegemonic authority in the international system. As a result of the United States' immense power projection capability, Washington can effectively impose its idea of ethics on the rest of the world.[89] By "discrediting the policy of a potential enemy" like China, the United States is effectively increasing its relative power by imposing its own "superior" ethical norms upon the rest of the international community.[90]

CONCLUSION

Resource scarcity and survival are essential driving forces for interstate interactions in the international system. Structural realism's five core assumptions and basic patterns of behavior expose the materialist economic agenda that states exhibit in their global quests for oil. The case of China's growing demand for energy proves to be a fitting example of a state acting self-interestedly to gain power and influence over other actors in the anarchical international system. China's early influence on the Sudanese oil market has played a major role in making China a prominent sub-Saharan oil producer, despite the political turmoil and humanitarian crisis in Sudan. Criticism of China's initial non-interventionist strategy in Darfur, especially from the United States, eventually pressured China into acting in order to mend its global reputation and demonstrate responsibility as a new world power. China's gradual rise will continue to threaten U.S. primacy, and, in the future, controversies over less prominent states like Sudan are likely to play a major role in curtailing China's global influence.

76   Ibid., 60-61.
77   Michael C. Desch, "It Is Kind to Be Cruel: The Humanity of American Realism," *Review of International Studies* 29, no. 3 (2003): 417.
78   Ibid., 419.
79   Pak, Chan, and Chan, 431.
80   Ibid., 441.
81   Ibid., 440.
82   Large, 60.
83   Ibid.
84   Pak, Chan, and Chan, 440.
85   Ibid.
86   Ibid., 436.

87   Ibid.
88   Edward Hallett Carr, "The Realist Critique," In *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, (London: Macmillin, 1940), 64.
89   Ibid., 75.
90   Ibid., 73.

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Rightwing Nationalists in Japan and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands

By Maxine Zhang
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Abstract

The People's Republic of China and Japan are contending over the Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands, a set of islands located in the East China Sea. Justifying their inherent sovereignty over the territory based on maritime law and historical documents, Japan and China, respectively, both have considerable stake in the islands. If one country surrenders its rights to the islands, not only will it weaken its bargaining power in other territorial disputes, it will also lose a source of potentially rich natural resources that are hidden in the seabed below the islands. Two key counteractive forces in the bilateral tension are analyzed: (1) Japan's desires to claim sovereignty over the Islands; and, (2) its want to maintain a cordial and stable relationship with China. In Japan, radical rightwing organizations and politicians, whose nationalistic actions repeatedly deteriorate Japan's relationship with China, have advanced territorial claims over the islands. This paper will examine the actions of a particular rightwing activist group, the Japan Youth Association (JYA), in the 1990s. Additionally, this paper will evaluate the actions of a radical political leader, the Governor of Tokyo, Ishihara Shintaro, in the contested purchase of the islands in 2012. Through these analyses, I will gauge the influences of the JYA and Governor's Shintaro on Japan's foreign policy in regard to the disputed territory. After analyzing JYA and Governor Ishihara's roles in the dispute, it is evident that the Japanese government values its relationship with China above satisfying the demands of rightwing nationalists. The Japanese government seeks to neutralize escalating conflicts advanced by activists and politicians by interfering in their activities regarding the dispute over the islands. However, this desire to uphold a cordial relationship with China is severely offset by Japan's claim of sovereignty over the islands.

Introduction

The year of 2012 marked the fortieth anniversary of diplomatic normalization between the People's Republic of China and Japan. However, territorial disputes over a set of islets, known as Diaoyutai in China and the Senkaku Islands in Japan, have repeatedly harmed bilateral diplomatic and security relations in recent years. The publication of the 1969 report by the United Nations Commission for Asia and Far East (ECAFE), which hinted at the existence of large oil reserves and other rare minerals under the islands, was particularly damaging.[1] The discoveries of this report elevated the prominence of the issue in both countries, which resulted in continuous bilateral conflicts over the territory. On September 11, 2012, the Japanese government announced its purchase of three of the islands. This evoked massive, violent anti-Japan demonstrations throughout cities across China. Protestors rallied outside of Japanese embassies, pillaged Japanese restaurants, and overturned Japanese-made cars.[2] This fervent behavior escalated as a result of the words and actions of Japanese rightwing activists and politicians who continued to instigate the conflict, disregarding the national government's pleas to neutralize the situation. The democratic nature of Japan has allowed nationalists to pursue their political agendas successfully. Politicians have strong incentives to please their constituents in order to ascend to or maintain their positions of power. Thus, nationalistic interests can gain noticeable presence in the domestic sphere despite the desires of the national government not to agitate bilateral relations. Therefore in Japan, "numerically small but well-organized and funded rightists make 'surrender' or even concession on sovereignty claims, politically difficult if not impossible."[3]

This paper aims to examine the behaviors of a Japanese rightwing group, the Japan Youth Association (JYA), and the actions of Tokyo's governor, Ishihara Shintaro, during the purchasing conflict of 2012. Through this analysis, this paper will assess the influence that rightwing players have over Japan's foreign policies in regard to the disputed islands. This analysis reveals that, while Japanese radical nationalists and even the Japanese government have insisted that the islands are part of Japan's inherent territory, the Japanese government places a significant value on its relationship with China. To that end, the government repeatedly intervened with JYA and Ishihara's bold movements in order to prevent them from worsening bilateral relations. Therefore, regardless of their influences domestically and internationally, rightwing nationalists—activists and politicians alike—can severely impact bilateral

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1   "Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands" *Global Security*, December 29, 2012.
2   "Anti- Japan protests hit China cities amid island row" *BBC news*, September 15, 2012.
3   Ralf Emmers, *Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 56.

relations but cannot dictate Japan's foreign policy over the islands.

Background Information on the Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands

(Appendix A: Map of the Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands)[4]

With a land area of 6.3 square kilometers, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are composed of five uninhabited islets and three barren rocks.[5] The islands are located in the East China Sea and are "approximately 120 nautical miles northeast of the [Republic of China] (Taiwan), 200 nautical miles east of the Chinese mainland, and 200 nautical miles southeast of Okinawa."[6] This set of unoccupied islands appeared at first to be of little importance. Officially, Japan has had the islands under its jurisdiction since 1972, following the Okinawa Reversion Treaty in 1971 (the United States administered Okinawa and nearby land after the Second World War and returned the territories along with the Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands to Japan with this treaty). However, China and Taiwan both use historical evidence to claim sovereignty over the territory.[7]

Despite the multiple claims over the territory, until September 2012, the legal ownership over four of the islands belonged to the Kurihara family from the Saitama prefecture in Japan. Kurihara Kunioki privately owned three of the islands and

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4　Appendix A.
5　Emmers, 47.
6　Reinhard Drifte, *Japan's Security Relations with China since 1989: From Balancing to Bandwagoning?* (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003): 49.
7　Emmers, 48.

leased them to the government for US$300,000 a year. Kurihara's sister owned the fourth island and leased it to the defense ministry for an undisclosed sum.[8] Even though these islands were privately owned, the Japanese government exercised jurisdiction over them and claimed them as properties of the nation. Additionally, since the establishment of the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security pact between Japan and the United States, the latter has been responsible for defending and protecting Japan if the country or its territories are under attack.[9] As such, the territorial dispute is not only a bilateral conflict; it incorporates other players in the region, including the United States. An expert on the matter, Unryu Suganuma, stated, "if there is a flash point to ignite a third Sino-Japanese War, it will be the ownership of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea."[10] Although the conflict will not necessarily result in a war in the region, the importance of state sovereignty and its implications, as well as the abundance of natural resources on the islands, are some reasons behind persisting tensions and the elusive resolution of the conflict.

Issues of Sovereignty

The concept of state sovereignty originated in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia, a series of peace treaties that gave rise to modern principles of autonomy and territory.[11] Since then, sovereign states came into existence and the concept spread globally, as Western ideas and standards became more prevalent. Sovereignty is interpreted as "the power of a state to exercise jurisdiction over persons and things within its own territory, usually to the exclusion of all other authorities."[12] Thus in a Westphalian model, overlapping territories cannot exist, and sovereign states are to assert their jurisdiction by administering and protecting their territories.[13] However, the factors that validate "sovereignty" differ among countries.[14] Both China and Japan have justifiable reasons for claiming sovereignty over the Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands. In addition to the different criteria for sovereignty, there exists an equally important factor that prevents the maintenance of long-lasting resolutions: if either nation concedes territorial claims, then that nation may lose bargaining power in other territorial conflicts.

8　"Japan-China Dispute: Little islands but very big problem," *The Independent*, August 23, 2012.
9　Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan (January 19, 1960), Asia for Education, Columbia University.
10　Unryu Suganuma, *Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino- Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands* (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press and Association for Asian Studies, 2000): 151.
11　Stephen D. Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia," *International Security* 20:3 (1995- 1996): 115.
12　Suganuma, 27.
13　Shibuichi Daiki, "Contemporary Japanese Rightists Movements," (PhD diss., National University of Singapore, 2006): 167.
14　Suganuma, 152.

China's Claims of Sovereignty

By tracing documents from the Ming and Qing Dynasties, it is evident that China asserts its sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands using concepts of historical discovery in the context of a Sinocentric world order. Sinocentrism is the notion that China stood at the center of the world system that prevailed in East Asia until the nineteenth century.[15] As such, before the Western interpretation of sovereignty and international law spread to the region during the late sixteenth century, the Chinese maintained a Sinocentric world order in which other countries and societies had to pay tribute to the Chinese emperor under a tribute-investiture system.[16] With China at the cultural center of this order, the first emperor of the Ming Dynasty, Zhu Yuanzhang sent envoy Yang Zai to the Ryukyu/Liuqiu Kingdom (currently Okinawa prefecture) to announce the establishment of the new dynasty and bring the kingdom into the Chinese system as a tributary country.[17] Logbooks from the Ming Dynasty reveal that the envoys who travelled from ports in the Fujian Province to the Ryukyu Kingdom used the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands as navigational aids.[18] The islands are mentioned in reports of investiture missions in 1534, 1555, 1579, and 1606.[19] In one of the oldest navigation guides published in the fifteenth century, the *Shunfeng Xiangsong* [May Fair Winds Accompany You!], it is written that the "Diaoyu Islands are good for refueling wood and drinking water."[20]

Early Ming Dynasty documents revealed that the Chinese used the islands as navigational tools and refuge spots for voyagers. Furthermore, during the Qing Dynasty, records from the "investiture missions in 1683, 1755, 1801, 1809, and 1838" also mention the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.[21] Historical academic books written at that time such as the *Taihaishi Chalu* [Record on the Mission to Taiwan] and *Huangchao Zhongwai Yitong yu Tu* [Geographical Atlas of China and Foreign Countes in the Qing Dynasty] mention the islands as part of the Chinese military defense system. Additionally, the Dowager Empress Cixi issued an edict in 1893 in which she granted the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands to Sheng Xuanhuai, a famous entrepreneur and the chief minister of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices, to collect medicinal herbs.[22] From China's perspective, "from 1372 to 1895, the country maintained a 'continuous and peaceful display of territorial sovereignty' over the Diaoyu Islands in the only conceivable forms, given the conditions of such desolate islands and the pre-industrial age."[23]

China asserts that it was only after Japan's 1895 victory in the Sino-Japanese War that Japan seized the islands in additions to Taiwan, as part of the unequal conditions put forward in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. However, following the defeat of the Axis Powers in the Second World War, the United States, the United Kingdom, and China issued the 1945 Potsdam Declaration, which limited Japan's sovereignty to "the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine."[24] The San Francisco Peace Treaty, signed in 1951, called for Japan to relinquish its claims over Taiwan.[25] These treaties did not mention the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, and the United States continued to control the islands from the end of WWII until 1972. The ambiguities of the treaties posed the key question of whether the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were included in the Treaty of Shimonoseki at all. If so, then the San Francisco Peace Treaty returned the islands to China as part of Taiwan's "appertaining islands."[26]

Japan's Claims of Sovereignty

The Japanese, on the other hand, use modern legal terms, particularly the concepts of *terra nullius* and discovery, to support their claims of sovereignty over the islands. *Terra nullius* is a Latin term for an "unadministered no man's land." Under international laws, countries can assert sovereignty over *terra nullius* through discovery and occupation.[27] As the influences of Western colonial powers and imperialism became prevalent in the mid-nineteenth century, Meiji Japan undermined the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1868. The Meiji Restoration ushered in an era in which the Japanese emulated Western colonial powers by annexing nearby societies and imposing Japanese customs and languages upon them. The Japanese annexed and abolished the Ryukyu Kingdom, which ended the kingdom's tributary missions to the Qing Dynasty and established the Okinawa Prefecture in 1879. During this time period, the Chinese also ceased their navigation around the Ryukyu Islands and stopped using the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands as navigational tools and refuge shelters.

When the Japanese surveyed the islands during the late nineteenth century, they saw no signs of official administration, deemed them as *terra nullius*, and under a cabinet decision, incorporated the islands into the Okinawa Prefecture in 1895.[28] During the following year, Japan leased the islands to businessman Koga Tatsuhiro, who ran factories processing bonito fish and albatross feather on the islands for thirty years. According to the Japanese, their sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands can be supported by "formal incorporation of the islands into Japanese local administrative units, actual surveys of land by government agencies, the institution of leasing land, and the approval by local government of academic investigations, rescue operations

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15   Emmers, 48; Daiki, 169.
16   Suganuma, 45.
17   Ibid.
18   Ibid., 58.
19   Daiki, 173.
20   Suganuma, 59.
21   Daiki, 173.
22   Suganuma, 86.
23   Emmers, 49.

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24   Ibid.
25   Ibid.
26   Ibid.
27   Suganuma, 58
28   Emmers, 49

and weather stations."[29]

Furthermore, the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the Potsdam Declaration, and the San Francisco Peace Treaty did not explicitly mention the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The only treaty to mention the islands is the Okinawa Reversion Treaty. While the San Francisco Treaty was enforced, the United States retained control over Okinawa and Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands for security purposes. This provided Washington with access to military bases in Japan and pacified anti-U.S. sentiment in the country. During their near thirty-year occupation of Okinawa, Washington viewed the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands as part of Okinawa. This association was "evident in US government publications and the policy stances of the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations."[30] However, Nixon's endeavor to normalize the U.S. relations with China, as well as the establishment of U.S.-Taiwan defense partnership, meant that the United States could not continue to associate the islands with Okinawa. Thus in 1972, Washington transferred the "administrative rights" over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands to Japan through the Okinawa Reversion Treaty.[31]

Further Importance of Sovereignty: A Cascading Effect

China and Japan are engaged in other territorial disputes with multiple countries and nations. Thus, if either nation concedes their rights to the islands, that nation's bargaining powers would diminish substantially. For example, China is in contentions with Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Taiwan, and the Philippines over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, and with South Korea over the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) delimitation in the Yellow Sea.[32] (An EEZ is a seazone that stretches 200 nautical miles from the shore, an area wherein the coastal state has the jurisdiction to explore and exploit marine resources.[33]) Beijing fears that if it relinquishes its sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, then its control over autonomous states such as Taiwan and Tibet might weaken. Meanwhile, Japan is in disputes with South Korea over the Dokdo/Takeshima Island, with Russia over the four southernmost Kurile Islands/North Territories, and with China and Taiwan over the EEZ delimitation in the East China Sea. Therefore, the two nations cannot easily achieve reconciliation. After all, the implications of relinquishing the islands are severe and far-reaching.

Natural Resources

Besides the ambiguous issues of sovereignty and its implications, it is possible

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that there exists an array of rich, natural resources hidden under the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands' seabed. This possibility further incentivizes China and Japan to strengthen their claims of sovereignty. Before uncovering information about the potential presence of natural resources, neither country had the islands on its policy agenda. This could explain why both China and Japan committed minimal effort to claim the islands through post-war treaties. In its 1968 seismic survey report, the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) noted the potential existence of large oil and gas reserves under and around the seabed of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. This information sparked a series of territorial disputes between China and Japan.[34] Following that highly publicized survey, additional studies about the potential hydrocarbon reservoirs explored the possibility of the presence of rich natural resources in the East China Sea. In 1970, the director of the Japan Petroleum Development Corporation, Yutaka Ikebe, compared the untapped reservoirs of the East China Sea to Saudi Arabia's oil reserves. Moreover, "geologist Michihei Hoshino predicted that the shelf would soon be 'one of the five biggest oil producing regions in the world.'"[35]

Control over these deposits is especially salient for resource-scarce Japan and import-dependent China. Both countries rely heavily upon imports for hydrocarbons, namely oil. In fact, China imports fifty-two percent of its hydrocarbons (and this percentage if rising rapidly) and Japan imports nearly one hundred percent of its hydrocarbons. Additionally, ninety percent of oil in Japan and fifty percent of oil in Chinese is obtained from the Middle East.[36] Amidst China's robust economic growth and modernization actions, the nation has been reliant on oil imports since 1993 and is seeking additional energy sources. By 2020, it is estimated that sixty to eighty percent of the oil that China consumes will be imported.[37] Since the needs for energy resources are so pressing in both China and Japan, claiming jurisdiction and developing gas fields in the contested sea zones would be particularly advantageous for both nations.

Case Study: Examination of Japan Youth Association's Actions in the 1990s

In Japan, radical rightwing activist groups lead the movement to advance national sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. It is important to note that the stance of the Japanese rightwing activists and the official stance of the Japanese government are fundamentally the same. Both the rightwing activists and the government argue that the islands belong to Japan and that there are no legitimate territorial disputes. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan's website, the islands were not included in the territories Japan relinquished under the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Additionally, the official government view states that "it was not until the latter

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29   Ibid.
30   Ibid., 50
31   Ibid.
32   Christian Wirth, "Ocean governance, maritime security and the consequences of modernity in Northeast Asia," *The Pacific Review* 25:2 (2012): 225.
33   *Exclusive Economic Zone,* Glossary of Statistical Terms: (September 1, 2012).

34   Drifte, 49.
35   Emmers, 57.
36   Wirth, 230.
37   Richard Bush, *The Perils of Proximity* (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution, 2010), 67.

half of 1970, when the question of the development of petroleum resources on the continental shelf of the East China Sea came to surface, that the Governments of China and Taiwan authorities began to raise questions regarding the Senkaku Islands."[38]

Despite the agreement about Japan's inherent sovereignty over the islands, a study of the Japan Youth Association (JYA/*Nihon Seinesha*), a rightwing nationalist group, and their radical, nationalist movements in the 1990s reveals its rocky relationship with the Japanese government. There are two main reasons that JYA and this specific time frame are appropriate for analysis. First, the JYA has been the most active and outspoken radical rightwing group in regard to the Diaoyu/Senkaku matter. Second, the 1990s was a time of frequent JYA-advanced activities on the islands. Every time that JYA escalated the matter, the Japanese government sought to neutralize the situation in order to prevent the deterioration the Sino-Japanese relationship.

JYA is a radical, rightwing organization with fifty branches and 700 members nationwide. Kobayashi Kusuo, a top-ranking leader of the Sumiyoshi Association, a *yakuza*, or mafia gang organization, founded JYA in 1969.[39] *Yazuka* gangs, as defined by scholar Daiki Shibuichi, "are formal members and supporters of quasi-family organization pinpointed by the Japanese police as criminal groups."[40]

It is unclear why the Sumiyoshi Association chose to use the territorial dispute as the core of their movement. However, according to Ono Keizo, a senior radical rightwing activist, "*yakuza* connections are rather simple-minded and do not understand ideology or history."[41] This point highlights the key difference between the JYA and other rightwing groups. The latter possess an intellectual set of theories and historical knowledge to defend their patriotic memories of World War II and to combat accusations of Japanese aggression. These theories and histories help other rightwing groups justify Japan's history textbooks, which are criticized by Japanese leftists and Chinese and Korean citizens for glossing over Japan's imperialism in Asia. With this territorial dispute as the crux of their movement, JYA need not trumpet any sophisticated theories or knowledge of history. Instead, the group needs to understand territorial conflicts, remain patriotic to their land, and maintain their pride as a rightwing group.[42] It is also possible that that JYA is using its engagement in the conflict over to islands to advance its prestige as a legitimate, rightwing group.

JYA constructed lighthouses on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. However, the group faced opposition from the Japanese government when they tried to authorize the

lighthouses. The organization built its first lighthouse in 1978 and visited the islands during the following years to survey the area and inspect the facilities. In 1989, JYA members submitted an application to the Japanese Coast Guard for authorization of the lighthouse.[43] The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs deferred the authorization indefinitely. In 1990, the Maritime Safety Agency considered recognizing the lighthouse officially, but this triggered indignant protests from China, Taiwan, and the Xinhua News Agency, which stated that the chief cabinet secretary of the Japanese government, Sakamoto Misuji, arrogantly claimed the islands.[44]

Witnessing the acrimonious reactions from China, Sakamoto tried to maintain cordial bilateral relations by postponing the matter, agreeing with a statement Deng Xiaoping made in 1978: "Our generation is not wise enough to find a common language on this [Diaoyu/Senkaku] question. The next generation will be wiser. They will surely find a solution acceptable to all."[45] Then-Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki blamed the rightwing activists for instigating Sino-Japanese conflict by applying to have the lighthouse authorized.[46] Clearly, the Japanese government wanted to neutralize the situation and prevent it from turning into a larger dispute.

Nonetheless, JYA continued their activities on the islands, exacerbating the group's already rocky relationship with the Japanese government. JYA performed maintenance on the lighthouse in 1994 and 1995. In 1996, they constructed a five-meter, 210-kilogram lighthouse made of erosion-proof aluminum on one of the islands. Again, the group applied for authorization of the lighthouse in 1996, and again, the government deferred the authorization. In 2000, JYA built a small Shinto shrine to signify Japan's control over the islands.[47] Despite the group's mission to assert Japan's control over the islands, the Japanese Coast Guard officials, leaders of the Japanese government, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not support the group's activities. Additionally, Coast Guard officials viewed the JYA's *yakuza* connections as untrustworthy and suspicious, and therefore kept a close watch over the group. In 1996, the Japanese government had the police arrest a JYA member for illegally possessing a gun as a "signal to warn the Japanese activists, and to assure the Chinese and Taiwanese governments that the JYA movement would be checked."[48]

Case Study: Examination of Ishihara Shintaro's Actions in the Purchasing Dispute in 2012

Aside from nationalistic rightwing organizations, radical rightwing politicians also

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38   "The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan last modified September 2012.
39   Daiki, 180.
40   Ibid., 181.
41   Ibid.,182.
42   Ibid.

43   Ibid., 185
44   Suganuma, 139.
45   Ibid., 140.
46   Ibid.
47   Daiki, 186-187.
48   Ibid., 188-189.

advanced the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island movements. The actions of these politicians invited trouble for the national government as it struggled to maintain cordial relations with China. This case examines the island conflicts that emerged when the governor of Tokyo, Ishihara Shintaro, declared that he would purchase the islands in April of 2012, until Japan purchased the islands in September 2012. This case study reveals the measures that the national government took to appease the Chinese government and downplay the consequences of the governor's actions.

In his speech at The Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C., on April 16, 2012, Ishihara Shintaro proposed his plan for the Tokyo Metropolitan Government to purchase three of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (namely the Uotsuri-jima/Diaoyu Dao, the Kitakojima/Bei Xiaodao, and the Minamikojima/Nan Xiaodao) from the businessman who privately owned them.[49] Following the Okinawa Reversion Treaty in 1971, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were returned to Koga Tatsuhiro's son, Koga Zenji. At that time, newly released reports illuminated the potential for the existence of large energy reserves under the islands' seabed. Since Koga realized the value of the islands but did not have an heir, he decided to sell the territory to his long-time friends, the Kuriharas, under the condition that the islands could not be sold to a private entity.[50] For the last fifty years, Ishihara has attempted to persuade the Kuriharas to sell the islands to the Japanese government in order to defend Japan's contested sovereignty over the islands.[51]

Ishihara's extreme rightwing stance and political incentives, as well as the 2010 Diaoyu/Senkaku islands' collisions, motivated his proclamation of his interest to purchase the islands. An advocate of the JYA's activities, Ishihara bragged that he propelled the movement to construct the first lighthouse on Gyocho jima/Diaoyu Dao.[52] Ishihara also raised funds for an expedition party for radical rightwing activists and university students to land on the islands and install an iron pole with a battery-operated electric bulb.[53] Shortly after, he allowed the group to join his second expedition to build a better lighthouse with a solar cell.[54] Besides his nationalistic position on the islands, Ishihara is known for his jingoistic statements and xenophobia, blaming the rising crime rate in Tokyo on the increase of foreigners in the metropolitan area.[55]

Associate Professor of international relations at Yamaguchi Prefectural University Asaba Yuki deduced that "China's ever-growing clout is generally felt with greater apprehension year by year and it is easier for political entrepreneur to exploit [that

anxiety] for his or her own purposes."[56] Ishihara may have a political stake in instigating matters with China in order to unite citizens under a single cause—that is, defending Japan against China's expanding strength. After all, Ishihara's son, Ishihara Nobuteru, Secretary-General of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), is in a politically unstable position. Perhaps Ishihara seeks to rouse the matter of the disputed islands in order to consolidate enough opposition against the ruling Democratic Party of Japan's (DPJ) "lenient" treatment of China. In this way, Ishihara could force the current DPJ Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko to call an election earlier than scheduled, causing power to tip toward the LDP.[57]

In September of 2010, a Chinese fishing boat collided into two Japan Coast Guard ships off the coast of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, which prompted the arrest of the fishing boat captain. China protested vehemently over the arrest, canceled large-scale tourist trips between the two countries, and suspended exports of rare earth metals to Japan.[58] Unwilling to worsen bilateral relations, then Prime Minister Naoto Kan called for the release of the Chinese captain. The actions taken by the Japanese government in the 2010 boating collision troubled Ishihara and bolstered his decision to have Tokyo purchase the islands.

In turn, Ishihara asserted that the islands are inherently Japan's territory and that the country should protect its sovereign lands. Ishihara then called for a bid to purchase the islands in order to consolidate Japan's control over them. Nao's actions provoked Ishihara to compare China to organized crime groups looking to "expand their turf."[59] According to an article in the July 7, 2012 issue of *Mainichi Shimbun*, one of Japan's most widely circulated national newspapers, Ishihara stated that he was obliged to purchase the islands because the national government would not make a move to combat China's claims over them (even though it might be unreasonable for the metropolis to purchase the islands).[60]

Ishihara's plan quickly gained momentum, evidenced by the heavy inflow of money to the cause. On April 27, 2012, the Tokyo municipal government opened an account at Mizuho Bank to facilitate donations toward the purchase of the islands.[61] In just over one month, from late April to early June, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government received over 70,000 donations—totaling about one billion yen—from supporters in favor of Ishihara's plan to purchase the Islands.[62] By September 13 of that year,

49   James J. Przystup, "Japan- China Relations: Happy 40th Anniversary…?" *Comparative Connections* (2012).
50   "Japan-China dispute: Little islands but very big problem," *The Independent*, August 23, 2012.
51   Mark Mackinnon, "Tokyo's Hawkish Governor Stirs the Pot," *Foreign Policy*, August 14, 2012.
52   Daiki, 190.
53   Ibid.
54   Ibid.
55   Mackinnon.

56   Ibid.
57   Ibid.
58   Hitoshi Tanaka, "Politicizing the Senkaku Islands: A Danger to Regional Stability," *East Asia Insights* (Japan Center for International Exchange: August 2012).
59   Mackinnon.
60   "尖閣国有化の方針." 毎日新聞, July 7, 2012: 1.
61   Przystup.
62   Kyodo, "Donations to metro government to buy Senkaku Islands top 1 billion," *The Japan Times Online*, June 2, 2012.

the Metropolitan Government received around 1.47 billion yen from over 100,000 donations.[63] Public opinion polls are also indicative of the support for Ishihara's bid, as they show that about seventy percent of the population was in favor of the plan.[64] This high percentage could be attributed to a generally simplistic understanding of the islands, since some supporters fear that China could purchase the islands from the private owners.[65] Some political leaders were also in favor of Ishihara's idea, including the mayor of Ishigaki City, and Tokyo's Vice Governor, Inose Naoki, who proposed a national fundraising campaign towards the purchase of the islands.[66]

Support for Ishihara's proposal spread rapidly, in part due to large-scale demonstrations and the effects of flyers that elicited nationalistic and xenophobic sentiments. Volunteers in favor of Japan's nationalization of the disputed territories disseminated these flyers. During the peak of Golden Week, on May 5, 2012 in the middle of a busy intersection in Nanba, Osaka, an ardent group of protestors with headquarters in the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Building rallied for Japan's ownership of the islands. The group hoisted banners and passed out fliers that asserted Japan's sovereignty over the islands. Additionally, the protestors provided boxes to collect donations for the islands' purchase.

The flyers featured nationalistic messages that aimed to rally support for Ishihara's proposal to purchase the islands. As shown in Appendix B, the title is "Prefectural Governor Ishihara, Resolute Support!" with a subtitle that reads, "the Senkaku Islands are Japan's territory, historically and by law."[67] The flyer then proceeds to declare, "Don't forgive Communist China's despotism!" and provides facts to support Japan's claim. Using historical evidence to support Japan's claims over the islands, the flyer "Japan's Territory, Senkaku Islands" (shown in Appendix C) also roused citizens to stand in favor of purchasing the islands. This flyer presents the slogan, "to protect the territory is to protect the country, let's hold an interest in Japan's territory."[68] Also, slips of paper on which individuals could write their opinions about the islands emphasized the potential danger that Japan would face were it to avoid nationalizing the islands. These slips of paper stated that Japan needed to claim the islands to protect the country for the sake of the children.[69] Besides criticizing Beijing for asserting sovereignty over the islands for economic reasons, the flyers also propagated strong xenophobic sentiments that warned against the influx of Chinese immigrants to Japan. Citing cases of Chinese immigrants in Italy and Canada, the flyer

associated these immigrants with increasing domestic crime rates.[70]

Naturally, a growing proportion of the Japanese populace in support of Ishihara's proposal for purchasing the islands, combined with increasing anti-China attitudes rallied by negative propaganda, resulted in vehement anti-Japan protests in China. This worsened Sino-Japanese bilateral relations. Propelled to action by the increasing influence and momentum of Ishihara's supporters, the Japanese government purchased three out of the five Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands (namely the Uotsuri-jima/ Diaoyu Dao, the Kitakojima/Bei Xiaodao, and the Minamikojima/Nan Xiaodao) for 2.05 billion yen from businessman Kunioki Kurihara on September 11, 2012. Japan immediately nationalized the territory.[71] Some may see the Japanese government's nationalization of the islands as a provocative move that angered Chinese and Taiwanese citizens. However, in reality, the Japanese government intended to prevent the situation from worsening. Japan opted to maintain control over the territory in a peaceful, quiet manner. Japan concluded that keeping the islands under its own control was the best solution, especially with the pressure from Ishihara's frequent, provocative condemnation of China's sovereignty over the islands and the growing momentum of his popular fundraising campaign. Japan's complete control over the islands prohibits Ishihara and other private citizens from instigating the issue by building infrastructure and conducting surveys around the territories. According to Richard Bush, a Sino-Japanese expert, tensions with China surely would have escalated if Ishihara had purchased the islands. First, Ishihara would have been able to "facilitate activities on the islands by nationalistic Japanese groups (planting flags, erecting lighthouses) as his way of saying 'no' to China."[72] Even worse, the Japanese government would not be able to restrain Ishihara's actions, which would also damage relations with China. Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujiwara stated that, "if there is some difficult situation that could stir up national sentiments in (China and Japan), it's quite important to prevent misunderstanding or unexpected accidents."[73] Osamu also repeated that the central government purchased the islands to "secure their peaceful and stable management."[74]

Conclusion

Through the examination of the actions of JYA during the 1990s and the conduct of Governor Ishihara during the contested purchasing dispute in 2012, it is clear that the Japanese government repeatedly repressed the activities of rightwing activists and politicians in order to pacify territorial disputes with China. However, Japanese

63   Shiela A. Smith, "The History Behind China and Japan's Anger over a few Empty Islands," *The Atlantic*, September 22, 2012.
64   Tanaka.
65   Ibid.
66   Przystup.
67   Appendix B.
68   Appendix C.
69   Appendix D.

70   Appendix E.
71   "Japan nationalizes disputed Senkaku islands after signing 2.05 bln yen deal with owner", *News Track India*, September 12, 2012.
72   Richard C. Bush III, "Japan- China Territorial Tensions Should Ease with Island Deal", Brookings Institution, September 5, 2012.
73   "Japan nationalizes disputed Senkaku islands."
74   Ibid.

nationalist groups' steadfast and unrelenting claim of sovereignty over the contended area offset the efforts to maintain cordial bilateral relations. Moreover, Noda's move to purchase the islands further antagonized its neighbor and aggravated the mass public throughout China and Taiwan. Chinese premier Wen Jiabao asserted that the islands "are an inalienable part of China's territory, and the Chinese government and its people will absolutely make no concessions on issues concerning its sovereignty and territorial integrity."[75]

The vehement opposition to Japan's actions and the fervent anti-Japan protests throughout China should have been warning signs to the Noda administration that their efforts to restrain the actions of nationalistic rightwing activists and politicians by purchasing the islands is the factor that infuriated both the Chinese government and people alike. From Japan's perspective, the nationalization of the islands is not an anti-China movement, but rather an action that was necessary to quell Ishihara's fervent actions regarding the islands. Ishihara's actions, after all, had increasingly dangerous consequences. The government worried that if Ishihara gained unrestrained access to the islands, then his actions would further deteriorate bilateral relations. Japan believed purchasing the islands and guarding them from further nationalistic activities to be a wiser solution.

There is no doubt that a cordial and stable relationship between China and Japan is vital to maintaining peace in the region and to bolstering economic growth. Therefore, China and Japan need to dedicate more effort to developing crisis management mechanisms for the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Otherwise, the continuation of the territorial dispute, saturated with strong nationalistic sentiments, will only worsen the already contentious Sino-Japanese relationship.

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75   "China sends patrol ships to disputed East China Sea islands," *BBC news*, September 11, 2012.

"Japan nationalizes disputed Senkaku islands after signing 2.05 bln yen deal with owner." *News Track India*, September 12, 2012. http://www.newstrackindia.com/newsdetails/2012/09/12/231-Japannationalizes disputed-Senkaku-islands-after-signing-2-05-bln-yen-deal-withowner.html (accessed September 15, 2012).

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Map of the Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands
<http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2012/0830/What-s-behind-the-China-Japan-island-dispute>


Appendix B: "The Senkaku Islands are Japanese Territory"

Appendix C: "Japan's Territory, Senkaku Islands"

Appendix D: "I support Tokyo's Acquisition of the Senkaku Islands"

Appendix E: "A Threatening Group That Spreading throughout the World: the Proliferation of Chinese Immigrants"

世界中に広がる脅威の集団

急増 中国人移民！！

暴動・治安崩壊・外国人参政権で危険倍増

イタリアでは…

カナダでは…

そして、日本でも…

……あなたの町は大丈夫ですか？

Punishing Pariahs: The Efficacy of Sanctions on Rogue States

BY JOSH KUTZ
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ABSTRACT

The objective of this research paper is to determine the efficacy of negative sanctions used against pariah states from the mercantilist/realist perspective. Despite extensive research on this subject, scholars have been unable to come to a consensus on sanctions' effectiveness; this uncertainty is then reflected in their sporadic usage by states. However, there are certain factors that can increase the probability of success when implementing sanctions, such as the use of multilateral sanctions and "smart" sanctions. These targeted efforts are particularly effective when dealing with rogue states. Although this paper does not discuss the failures of positive sanctions, it is evident that negative sanctions are the better solution when dealing with uncooperative and/or irrational state actors.

INTRODUCTION

With the advent of the global market economy and the continuing influence of globalization, states increasingly use economic statecraft as a policy tool. As interconnectedness has expanded and intensified, states' ability to affect the behavior of other actors has similarly improved. Perhaps unsurprisingly because of its central role in the present global system, the United States is the world's leading initiator of economic sanctions. More specifically, as the *de facto* police force of the world, the United States is also the state that most frequently sanctions rogue states. As Anthony Lake, former National Security Advisor to President Bill Clinton, asserts, "As the sole

superpower, the United States has a special responsibility for developing a strategy to neutralize, contain and... eventually transform these backlash states into constructive members of the international community."[1] This paper will address the effectiveness of economic sanctions from the mercantilist perspective by considering two recent examples: North Korea (also known as the DPRK) and Iran (also known as the Islamic Republic).

DEFINITIONS

Scholars often conflict in their definitions of "sanctions" and "rogue states." In order to eliminate any confusion concerning terminology, it is necessary to specify the intended meaning of language used. For the purposes of this paper, these terms can be understood as indicated below.

Sanctions

Generally speaking, sanctions can be either positive or negative—the proverbial "carrots and sticks," respectively. In other words, they can affect a change in behavior either by offering incentives or by threatening (and eventually executing) malevolent economic action. For the purposes of this paper, however, sanctions will be considered only from the negative and punitive perspective. Therefore, sanctions can be defined as the actual or threatened withdrawal of economic resources to affect a policy change by a target.[2] These can be further divided up into two categories: trade sanctions and financial sanctions. The former include blockades, embargos, boycotts, and removal of most-favored nation (MFN) status. The latter involve attacks on currency, freezes of financial assets abroad, banning private bank lending or foreign direct investment (FDI), and banning other forms of financial aid.

"Rogue" State

Punitive sanctions are most commonly placed on states labeled "rogues." In any random gathering—of individuals, businesses, organizations, or states—there is inevitably at least one actor that does not follow the rules and norms. In the international system, these actors are referred to as rogue states. Essentially, the designation is assigned to any country that is a direct threat to the peace and stability of the international system. Also known as pariah states, these can be more specifically defined as "recalcitrant and outlaw states that not only choose to remain outside the family of democratic nations but also assault its basic values."[3] In order to be classified as a rogue, a state has to display several common characteristics: pursue weapons of mass destruction

(WMDs); support terrorism; and abuse its own citizens.[4] Lake identifies five such states: Cuba, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and Libya.[5] Although there are significant differences among these five, they are united by "local and regional agendas aimed at altering the status quo by violence if necessary."[6] Although the term "rogue state" has no basis in international law, it is utilized by American decision makers in the formulation of policy and is therefore the term used here for the sake of consistency.[7]

MERCANTILISM AND SANCTIONS

In many ways, sanctions—both in general and as they apply to rogue states—are the logical manifestation of mercantilism. Closely related to realism, classical mercantilism is a theoretical viewpoint based on the compulsion of nation-states "to create and sustain wealth and power in order to preserve and protect the nation's security and independence from any number of real and imagined threats."[8] In other words, foreign policy decisions are implemented primarily in the interest of national security. World peace and stability are of secondary concern. We can expect states to behave accordingly, sometimes sacrificing the universal good in favor of more personal and immediate interests. Today's version of mercantilism—neomercantilism—"accounts for a more complex world marked by intensive interdependence and globalization where states use a wider variety of instruments—especially economic ones—to protect their societies."[9] States will always think in terms of their own interests and attempt to advance their own wealth. They will protect their own industries, even in liberal, open market systems.

Sanctions are mercantilist in nature. Particularly when utilized against rogue states, their intention is often to prevent a target from attaining certain capabilities. An opponent's gain is considered a loss at home; this is a fundamental principle of both mercantilism and realism. As Lauren Van den Berg notes, "By their very nature, sanctions focus on material deprivation as a means to gain political concession."[10] In other words, states see foreign policy as a win-lose situation, where compromise is not an option. Therefore, economic incentives (i.e. positive sanctions) are not useful for a mercantilist state. This view of foreign policy as a zero-sum game leads them to act to deprive opponents of any advantage, even if that advantage could potentially

1   Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States," *Foreign Affairs* 73 (March-April): 46.
2   Steve Chan and A. Cooper Drury, *Sanctions as Economic Statecraft: Theory and Practice* (New York: St. Martin's Press, LLC), 1-2.
3   Lake, 45.

4   Ibid., 46.
5   Ibid., 45.
6   Kori Schake, "Rogue States and Proliferation: How Serious is the Threat?" in *Strategic Assessment 1999: Priorities for a Turbulent World*, ed. Hans Binnendijk, et al. (Washington: National Defense University), 220.
7   Rebecca M. Jackson, "Negotiating Multilaterally with Rogue States," (MA diss., Georgetown University, 2011).
8   David N. Balaam and Bradford Dillman, *Introduction to International Political Economy*, 5th ed. (Boston: Pearson Education, Inc.), 57.
9   Ibid., 57.
10   Lauren Van den Berg, "Economic Sanctions: An Effective Tool of Foreign Policy Statecraft?" *Queen's Policy Review* 1: 9.

benefit the entire global community.

It is evident that, for the mercantilist, sanctions are the natural choice. But are they effective?

EFFECTIVENESS

By definition, economic sanctions are designed to inspire a change of policy. Success or failure is determined by "whether economic sanctions can change the behavior of a foreign government at an acceptable cost."[11] By this classification, less than one third are successful. Van den Berg suggests, "despite the popularity and relief they seem to offer from more extreme alternatives, economic sanctions rarely achieve their official objectives.[12] One possible critique of this stance is that sanctions are often implemented for reasons including but not limited to the stated objective. In other words, states frequently have secondary goals that are not shared with the public. Therefore, "using only the achievement of the publicly revealed goal to determine the 'success' or 'failure' of sanctions is inadequate."[13] Yet even assuming that some cases can be justified by this explanation, one can easily claim that punitive sanctions fail a majority of the time.

Although a shift in policy is always the ultimate goal, there are two avenues commonly used to affect this change: signaling and economic measures. These are often confused as having separate objectives, but in reality they are different paths to the same goal. Let us first consider symbolism. According to James M. Lindsay, states can have five main objectives when imposing sanctions: compliance, subversion, deterrence, international symbolism, or domestic symbolism.[14] Sanctions, says Lindsay, are most effective when used as symbolism, both internationally and domestically. These signals represent "tangible indicators of the sender country's seriousness over a particular issue or dispute."[15] The majority of scholars agree that sanctions are most valuable when used as a means of signaling. Significantly, statistics fail to account for this aspect when considering effectiveness because it is impossible to measure or calculate the successful transmission of the initiator's displeasure.

Second, states may also seek to inflict economic hardship in order to lead to change policy. Akbar E. Torbat notes, "Sanctions are considered to be economically successful if they can significantly damage the economy of the target country while little damage is done to the economy of the imposing country."[16] Put simply, these measures are economically effective if they hinder the target's ability to function. Both of these avenues—signaling and economic measures—are politically effective if they successfully accomplish a goal such as the reduction or elimination of human rights violations.

Globalization has introduced new difficulties into the sanctioning process. Isolation from the global community is no longer easily attainable. Increasing integration has created an entrenched web, whereupon cutting off part of the global supply chain would create enormous distress and confusion in the international economy. Additionally, globalization, while providing the ties between nations that make sanctions possible and necessary, also allows a targeted state to maneuver around the imposed restrictions.[17] States have become adept at using third parties to continue to export goods and services to the same consumers and clients. Finally, in order to disrupt their firmly established supply chains, states must feel threatened themselves, Washington's word is no longer sufficient to enforce isolation. Self-interest—often manifested in economic goals—makes even U.S. allies question the isolation of rogues. For example, "France's oil consortium openly challenged U.S. sanctions by investing in Iranian oil fields," and "Canadian companies invest in Cuba with regularity."[18] Indeed, as globalization has continued and created a flatter, less economically hegemonic world, "America has found it increasingly difficult to isolate a country economically. European and Asian companies have eagerly filled the economic vacuum left by the departure of U.S. companies and the cessation of U.S. trade, making the impact of unilateral U.S. sanctions on the foreign-exchange reserves of a nation marginal at best."[19] In this brave new world, states must find ways to foster cooperation in order to effectively sanction those who step out of line.

Whether other states decide to support or oppose the sanction effort can make or break it. In a globalized world, alliances become significantly more important for security.[20] For example, historically, when the United States and the European Union have shared concerns, more progress has been made. International support and coordination are substantially more effective than unilateral actions.[21] Acting unilaterally leaves targets with too many opportunities to avoid or alleviate the effects of sanctions. When a collective effort is made by the international community, a target's options become much more limited. As Rebecca M. Jackson asserts, "If the state can secure its interests elsewhere or with other negotiating partners, they may

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11   Nikolay Marinov, "Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?" *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (July): 564.
12   Van den Berg, "Economic Sanctions," 11.
13   James McDermott, Ivan Eland, and Bruce Kutnick, *Economic Sanctions: Effectiveness as Tools of Foreign Policy* (Washington: United States General Accounting Office), 12.
14   James M. Lindsay, "Trade Sanctions as Policy Instruments: A Re-Examination," *International Studies Quarterly* 30 (June): 153.
15   Van den Berg, 10.

16   Akbar E. Torbat, "Impacts of the US Trade and Financial Sanctions on Iran," *The World Economy* 28: 427-428.
17   Van den Berg, 11.
18   Schake, 223.
19   Meghan O'Sullivan, "Sanctioning Rogue States," *Harvard International Review* 22: 2.
20   Van den Berg, 11.
21   Torbat, 431.

more easily withdraw from negotiations."[22]

Yet all too often, economic sanctions—whether they are unilateral or multilateral—end up hurting the wrong people. Recent developments in the theory of economic statecraft emphasize "smart sanctions." Initiators attempt "to protect certain groups (such as the elderly, women and children) from becoming collateral damage" and tailor the measures to impact a target's leadership.[23] Smart sanctions attempt to place the punitive strain only on the elites by actions such as blocking their bank accounts, monetary outflows, and arms embargoes. Citing David Cortright and George A. Lopez, Torbat concludes, "Sanctions can be an effective foreign policy tool when targeted smartly on the ruling decision makers."[24] When comprehensive sanctions are employed, a rally-around-the-flag effect unites the population of the target, inciting anger against the initiator instead of its deserving recipient—the flawed government. By restricting the impact of sanctioning to policymakers, initiators do not run the risk of provoking nationalism in the target state.

It is evident that there are many different ways to interpret efficacy. If considered solely in terms of changed policy, sanctions generally fail. But they can indeed be effective in terms of signaling and affecting economic hardship. Multilateral sanctions and smart sanctions also tend to be more successful. Do these trends hold true for rogue states?

Case Studies

North Korea and Iran are two countries that are most commonly associated with the rogue tag; consequently, they have frequently been the targets of punitive sanctions. Each case has been characterized by comprehensive sanctions. For the purposes of this paper, we will focus on multilateral measures targeted against North Korea and unilateral ones against Iran in order to demonstrate the increased effectiveness of multilateral and smart sanctions. What follows is a brief background of both states focusing on the events leading up to the sanctions and the sanctions themselves, before an analysis about the shortcomings or benefits of specific methods.

Iran: Background

The Islamic Republic of Iran has been a frequent target of unilateral U.S. sanctions over the past thirty-five years. This paper considers three instances: the hostage crisis of 1979, the military and nuclear development leading to sanctions in 1992, and the ongoing Iranian sponsorship of terrorism.

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22   Jackson.
23   Van den Berg, 12.
24   Torbat, 408.

Since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, U.S.-Iranian relations have deteriorated. In response to the Tehran hostage crisis in 1979, the United States enacted sanctions to compel Iran to release the captive U.S. diplomats. President Carter led the embargo of oil imports from Iran and exports to Iran. Iranian assets in U.S. banks were also frozen. These "initial American sanctions against Iran were retaliatory and coercive, but were not designed to affect fundamental domestic change within the target nation."[25] 444 days after Iranian students stormed the embassy and captured U.S. diplomats, the hostages were released.

Following Grand Ayatollah Khomeini's death in 1989 and the stabilization of Iran's economy, new leaders Rafsanjani and Khamenei sought a partner to help rebuild Iran's burgeoning nuclear infrastructure. Russia and China were both willing.[26] Not surprisingly, Iranian efforts to reestablish the state's nuclear programs were met with U.S. sanctions. Washington feared what a country like Iran "with little transparency, vast oil wealth, and past willingness to use chemical weapons might do if [it] developed nuclear weapons."[27] The passage of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 sought to deny Iranian and Iraqi access to WMDs and other advanced conventional weapons.[28] Significantly, the 1992 measures included stipulations that any country or foreign company affiliated with Iran's nuclear development would be subject to sanctioning.

More recently, the United States has targeted Iran as part of the War on Terror. Following September 11, 2001, President Bush implemented Executive Order 13224, which froze the assets of any entity determined to be supporting international terrorism. This list includes a wide array of individuals, organizations, and financial institutions in Iran. Some of Washington's targets have included "individuals and Iranian institutions, including banks, defense contractors, and the Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)."[29] For example, the Iranian commercial airline Mahan Air, which provided various methods of support to the IRGC and Quds Force, has been added to the lengthening list.[30] The United States has more specifically targeted Iran's oil industry. In July 2010, President Barack Obama "signed into law a measure aimed at penalizing domestic and foreign companies for selling refined gasoline to Iran, or for supplying equipment in Iran's bid to increase its refining capacity."[31] In November 2011, Obama signed an executive order mandating that the international community

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25   Paul Velazquez, "Sanctioned State: The Effects of International Sanctions on Iran's Internal Politics" (MA thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 16.
26   Ibid., 36.
27   Ibid., 37.
28   Ibid.
29   Toni Johnson and Greg Bruno, "The Lengthening List of Iran Sanctions," *Council on Foreign Relations*, July 31, 2012.
30   Ibid.
31   Ibid.

stop conducting oil transactions with the central bank of Iran.[32] Both of these recent moves have provoked significant protest by many states, especially China and Russia, who claim that these measures undermine diplomatic pursuits to end Iran's support of terrorism.

Iran: Effectiveness of Sanctions

The unilateral sanctions used to punish and coerce the Islamic Republic were, in general, unsuccessful. With the exception of the 1979 hostage crisis, which had a single, definite objective, sanctions have not successfully affected change in Iran's behavior. After the 1992 Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act, Russia signed a contract in 1995 "to complete two 950-megawatt light-water reactors" and also received development aid from China.[33] Following the sanctions under both Bush and Obama, Iran has continued to sponsor terrorist organizations. The State Department labeled it the "most active state sponsor of terrorism" in the world in 2009, and Tehran has only "become more aggressive in recent years."[34]

North Korea: Background

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea, has aggressively pursued nuclear capability and generated instability in the East Asia region. North Korea also has a history of human rights violations. Over the past several decades, the global community collectively and the United States individually have attempted to intervene due to the DPRK's continued disregard for international laws and norms. For our purposes, we will discuss the United Nations (UN) sanctions of 2006 and 2009.

As North Korea industrialized under Kim Il-sung, it also began to develop nuclear capability, since it lacked traditional energy resources such as oil and coal. After establishing cooperative agreements with the Soviet Union in the early 1950s, the DPRK began to research and pursue nuclear capability.[35] In the 1960s, North Korea's Soviet benefactors supplied a nuclear research reactor.[36] Through indigenous research and further Soviet assistance, North Korea gradually developed the capability to produce weapons-grade plutonium. In 1985, Pyongyang signed on to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).[37] Though it initially refused, the DPRK eventually signed the NPT-mandated safeguards agreement with the International

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32   Ibid.
33   Greg Bruno, "Iran's Nuclear Program," *Council on Foreign Relations*, March 10, 2010; "Nuclear Iran: Nuclear History," *Institute for Science and International Security*.
34   "Iran 'Leading Terrorism Sponsor,'" last modified May 1, 2009; Daniel L. Byman, "Iran's Support for Terrorism in the Middle East," *Brookings Institute*, July 25, 2012.
35   "North Korea: Nuclear", last modified February, 2013.
36   Ibid.
37   Ibid.

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1992.[38] This pact required that North Korea declare all of its nuclear facilities and materials and open itself to inspection and routine monitoring by the IAEA. Although the examinations proceeded, North Korean officials refused to disclose the amount of plutonium the state had already produced from tests in 1989, 1990, and 1991 and denied IAEA inspectors access to the waste sites, claiming them to be military bases and therefore off limits.[39]

Under mounting pressure, the regime threatened to withdraw from the NPT in March of 1993.[40] Washington responded by entering into negotiations with Pyongyang, stalling the country's removal from the NPT. But relations once again turned frosty following North Korea's unsupervised removal of spent fuel rods in May of 1994.[41] After significant brinkmanship, former President Jimmy Carter travelled to North Korea and met with Kim Il-sung. This meeting produced the Agreed Framework signed by the United States and North Korea on October 21, 1994.[42] Under this agreement, the DPRK agreed to freeze its nuclear program and rejoin the NPT in return for five billion dollars worth of free fuel, two LWRs (light water reactors incapable of producing plutonium), and a substantial amount of food aid.[43]

Around the turn of the century, the international community became concerned about reports of a secret highly enriched uranium (HEU) program in place in North Korea. In 2002, U.S. intelligence discovered evidence of transfers of HEU technology and materials from Pakistan to the DPRK in exchange for advanced ballistic missile technology.[44] Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, Pakistani nuclear scientist, later confirmed the accusation and apologized to his country.[45] In December of 2002, Washington responded by suspending oil shipments to North Korea.[46] Pyongyang retaliated by reopening nuclear facilities and expelling the IAEA inspectors, and announced its withdrawal from the NPT a month later.[47]

In response to the DPRK's violation of the stipulations of the Agreed Framework and successive agreements (both bilateral and multilateral), the United Nations implemented sanctions in an effort to halt North Korea's nuclear proliferation. "By its resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), the Security Council imposed certain measures relating to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea."[48] These measures

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38   Ibid.
39   Ibid.
40   Ibid.
41   Ibid.
42   Ibid.
43   Ibid.
44   Ibid.
45   "I Seek Your Pardon," last modified on February 5, 2004.
46   "North Korea Profile: Timeline," last modified in February 2013.
47   Ibid.
48   "Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)," last modified in December 2011.

included: an arms embargo; a nuclear, ballistic missiles, and other weapons of mass destruction programs-related embargo; and individual targeted sanctions—namely, a travel ban and an assets freeze on designated persons and entities.

North Korea: Effectiveness of Sanctions

As our case study dealing with multilateral sanctions, one might expect North Korea to have been more affected than its rogue counterpart Iran. Economically, it appears that they have indeed been more successful. After both UN resolutions, North Korea experienced two years of negative economic growth.[49] Yet the sanctions failed to achieve the ultimate goal of stopping the DPRK's nuclear proliferation. On May 25, 2009 and February 12, 2013, North Korea reported successful underground nuclear tests.[50]

Analysis: What Went Wrong, and How to Improve

Rogue states are not like other actors: their assertive nature often leads to apparent disregard "when the normal array of political and economic pressures are applied."[51] In both cases, the regimes chose to continue nuclear proliferation and disregard the warnings of their opponents, even in the face of severe damage to their economies and hardship for their populations. Rogues are also unique in that their desire to gain regional predominance leads them to willingly pay high costs and accept major risks. Four suggested approaches could significantly improve the effectiveness of sanctions as applied to pariah states: multilateral sanctions, gradual process, communication and smart sanctions.

Unilateral action, as discussed earlier, is inherently flawed in a globalized world. The sanctions on Iran, though labeled "crippling" by President Barack Obama have been unsuccessful in putting a stop to its nuclear development program.[52] In fact, the International Monetary Fund predicts a positive growth rate and decreased inflation.[53] Though the country's economic situation remains dismal, the crippling measures implemented by the Obama Administration have, if anything, made the regime push harder for nuclear capability. The Islamic Republic and other targets simply have too many opportunities to find loopholes in the sanctions. Sanctions imposed by the international community as a whole exert substantially more economic pressure on a target than a single country (even one with the economic clout of America) is capable

of in today's globalized economy."[54] A UN Security Council report "provides evidence that sanctions have made it more difficult on margin for North Korea to export weapons and to import the items it needs to continue development of weapons of mass destruction."[55] Perhaps the most significant reason for the greater success of the DPRK sanctions is the higher degree of surveillance, particularly concerning the North Korean fleet. UN member states track the DPRK's cargo vessels and otherwise monitor imports and exports to and from the country.[56]

But even multilateral sanctions can fail for two reasons. First, rogue states' leadership can insulate themselves from the effects of the sanctions, deflecting economic hardship onto their people and directing their populations' blame and animosity towards the initiators. Not coincidentally, these regimes are also frequently authoritarian regimes with control of the media. Second, states acting in their own self-interest will preserve their own relations with beneficial trading partners, regardless of what the international community instructs. China's continued relations with both Iran and the DPRK are apt examples of this. Indeed, in North Korea's case it appears that China plays a pivotal role in the success or failure of sanctions. Over the past two decades, Chinese exports to the DPRK have increased from $300 million to over $2 billion.[57] So even while it "has halted significant exports to Pyongyang's nuclear and ballistic missile programs," the bilateral trade agreements between the neighbors allow North Korea to continue to oppose UN demands.[58] This is the single most important reason why the DPRK has managed to continue building its nuclear program.

Rogues, while generally medium-sized with poor economies, still tend to be significant regional players.[59] Due to the balance of power, larger states will attempt to bring medium and small actors under their sphere of influence. This phenomenon, while mostly prevalent during the Cold War, still exists today. Therefore, the interests of the more powerful actors will inevitably collide. This is accurately displayed in the frequent lack of consensus among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Thus, in order for multilateral measures to be effective, there must be consensus among the group of initiators. And, as O'Sullivan notes, "the reality is that America has often struggled to forge the international consensus necessary to impose [multilateral sanctions]."[60] China and Russia have proven particularly problematic in achieving this consensus, retaining trade relations with both Iran and North Korea. The recent story by Mike Richman is promising for broader consensus in sanctioning the DPRK, reporting that Asia-focused analysts predict Chinese support for punitive

49   Marcus Noland, "North Korean Economic Performance in 2011," *Peterson Institute for International Economics*, August 13, 2012.
50   "North Korea's nuclear tests," last modified February 12, 2013.
51   Schake, 220.
52   "Obama: Iran Facing "Unprecedented, Crippling Sanctions," last modified March 6, 2012.
53   Rick Gladstone, "Iran Cites I.M.F. Data To Prove That Sanctions Aren't Working," *New York Times*, October 9, 2012.

54   O'Sullivan, 4.
55   Mark Hibbs, "Assessing UN Trade Sanctions on North Korea", *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, July 3, 2012.
56   Ibid.
57   Ibid.
58   Ibid.
59   Schake, 220.
60   O'Sullivan, 5.

action in the UN Security Council given its backing of resolution 2087 in response to North Korea's December rocket test.[61]

Even when implemented multilaterally, crippling economic sanctions are generally ineffective. When large steps were taken in both cases, targets became less compliant, not more. This is particularly true with rogues. Speaking of the sanctions initiated by the European Union, Ottolenghi asserts, "Stronger sanctions will not persuade the regime to accept compromise over its nuclear program, as they were initially designed to do. A paranoid and oppressive regime is… not likely to act reasonably at the negotiating table."[62] Additionally, instead of provoking domestic pressure on the ruling regimes, comprehensive sanctions incite internationally directed anger. The ensuing rally-around-the-flag effect supports the flawed leadership. It is clear that the greater the economic impact of the sanctions on the day-to-day lives of the people, "the greater the tendency for the sanctioned nation's people to unite in resistance against the sanctions issuer."[63] Instead of comprehensive, crippling measures, negotiations with and demands on rogue states should be broken up "into small steps and reciprocal actions to help build a pattern of cooperation among the parties."[64] This was the intent of the Agreed Framework with the DPRK. Since states are naturally suspicious, steps must be taken to build trust. In this process, communication is crucial.

Communication is important in any conflict, but it appears that it is even more critical when dealing with rogue states. When "clear goals and reciprocal actions were communicated, agreed upon and fulfilled by each side," progress was made.[65] Most of the time, hostilities already exist between initiators and their rogue targets. There is a significant amount of history between the United States and its targets in both case studies. Conflict with the DPRK has its roots in the Cold War, as U.S. troops fought alongside South Korea against the Soviet-backed North. Tensions with Iran began with the 1953 overthrow of Mossadegh's regime by the CIA-backed coup. Relations became increasingly frosty throughout the Cold War, climaxing with the Iranian revolution and hostage crisis in 1979. In these cases, too much historical animosity is on the table to immediately resort to drastic actions. Also, both initiators and targets must worry about appearances. Rogues always wish to portray themselves to the global community as strong, and initiators do not want to be accused of appeasement. There must be some give-and-take arrangement here. Compromise is imperative.

More specifically, targeted sanctions can also increase efficacy. Experts such as

Cortright and Lopez believe smart sanctions maximize pressure on the ruling regime and limit unintended consequences.[66] Currently in the Islamic Republic, "government fat cats are unaffected" while "ordinary Iranians must contend every day" with the effects of the sanctions.[67] "In the case of Iran, therefore, more precise targeted sanctions along with political pressure on the ruling clergy could have been a more effective policy than the comprehensive sanctions."[68] In the case of North Korea, arguably the most effective sanctions were the ones that limited Kim Jong-Il's expensive tastes.

Even with all these elements in place, sanctions may still be ineffective. Their success depends on the presence and absence of key factors, the most important of which is the regime's ability and willingness to change.[69] If rogues do not have the desire to change their behavior, no amount of coercive diplomacy can make them do so. In these cases, the military option is the more appropriate policy tool.

Conclusion

The efficacy of economic sanctions can be disputed, but it is evident that they remain a powerful policy instrument. The poor record of sanctions does not reflect the true character of their implementation. They are rarely, if ever, one-dimensional. Change in policy is not the only objective of coercive diplomacy; it can also be utilized to signal to the international community. Policymakers utilize sanctions to take tangible action without resorting to more extreme tools, like war.[70] Modern developments in sanctioning such as multilateral sanctions and smart sanctions have proven more effective and will inevitably lead to an increase in the statistical efficacy of these measures as a whole. In sum, economic sanctions when applied to rogue states are more successful than they may first appear, and these numbers will only get better as states adapt to new methods such as multilateral and smart sanctions. But are sanctions the best option?

First, the military option—once the prevailing policy choice for the United States—is no longer considered viable for a number of reasons. With technology continuously increasing the deadliness of conventional weapons, the risk to human life is thought to be too great for states to pursue traditional war. The advent of collective security also removes war as an option. In this situation, aggressor nations are punished by a coalition of states that have agreed that an attack on one member is an attack on all. Each member of the UN Security Council has a veto that they may use to block collective action to intervene in a rogue state. War is therefore a slim possibility except in the face of extravagant circumstances, such as 9/11. In sum, sanctions, unlike war,

61   Mike Richman, "Analysts: China Likely to Support New Sanctions Against N. Korea," *Voice of America*, February 9, 2013.
62   Emanuele Ottolenghi, "Toppling Iran's Unsteady Regime," *The Wall Street Journal*, July 23, 2012.
63   Jack Shafer, "The Theater of Economic Sanctions," *Al Arabiya News*, February 8, 2013.
64   Jackson.
65   Ibid.

66   Torbat, 433.
67   Ottolenghi.
68   Torbat, 433-434.
69   Jackson.
70   Van den Berg, 10.

"do not cost lives on the battlefields and are far less politically damaging to the United States than military intervention."[71] Second, diplomacy is generally thought to be too soft, particularly in the case of rogue states. Pariahs disregard international norms and laws. They do not play by the rules, nor can they be expected to. The continued nuclear proliferation by Iran and the DPRK is evidence of such behavior. Sanctions are capable of adequately punishing pariahs and transmitting serious warning without resorting to war. Third, engagement through economic incentives is likewise not useful. "Engagement can be seen as legitimizing the behavior of rogue states."[72] It can also result in making unilateral concessions. Though they may be effective when dealing with allies or even neutral parties, incentives do not succeed in producing compliance from rogue targets.

Punitive economic sanctions—used to the correct degree and in the right capacity—are the best solution for rogue states. "Finding narrowly targeted ways to prevent threats from spreading and to penalize rogue leaders while minimizing the affects on their societies should be a priority in policy development."[73] In the future, the United States should seek to promote and facilitate cooperation in sanctioning targets and should employ smart sanctions more frequently.

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71   Torbat, 433.
72   Schake, 225.
73   Ibid.

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UN Security Council Expansion: An Uncertain Future for U.S. Influence

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ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the implications of increasing membership in the UN Security Council on U.S. global influence. In doing so, it (1) assesses arguments for both increased and decreased U.S. influence in response to UNSC expansion; (2) analyzes the United States' current stance on UNSC expansion in comparison to that of other P-5 members; and, (3) suggests ways in which the United States can act in the expansion debate to maximize the probability that UNSC expansion will enhance U.S. influence. The paper concludes that it is to the advantage of the United States to support permanent membership opportunities to gain diplomatic leverage over aspirant nations while incentivizing these nations to conform to U.S.-influenced standards.

INTRODUCTION

Since its inception in 1945, the United Nations' mission to "maintain international peace and security" has been constrained by its need to balance the interests of its many member states.[1] In order to coordinate this agenda, the UN established the Security Council (UNSC). In recent years, the UNSC has been criticized for an obsolete membership structure that represents a post-Cold War balance of powers, rather than the realities of the current international system. Given the rapid rise of economic powers in the non-Western world, the international community has faced the decision of whether to persist with the Security Council's traditional leadership structure or expand its membership. Despite some international support, the expansion proposal

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1   The United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations: Chapter 1, Article 1* (New York: 1945).

has spurred great controversy in the United States. Some have argued that expansion will decrease U.S. influence by diluting its veto power over UN initiatives and stall decision-making in the Council. Alternatively, others have claimed that it would enhance U.S. influence by facilitating diplomatic ties with aspirant nations while encouraging these nations to conform to international norms.

Ultimately, the dominant position in the United States' will determine whether or not an expansion of the UNSC actually occurs. Accordingly, this article will assess the effect of UNSC expansion on U.S. power in three ways. First, this paper will discuss various reform proposals and assess arguments for both increased and decreased U.S. influence in response to UNSC expansion. Second, this paper will analyze the current U.S. stance on UNSC expansion relative to that of other UNSC permanent members. Finally, this paper will suggest the manner in which the United States should approach the expansion debate to meet its interests.

While the UNSC Expansion debate remains stalled, the paper concludes that it is to the advantage of the United States to support permanent membership opportunities, allowing the United States to gain diplomatic leverage over aspirant nations while incentivizing these nations to conform to American standards. Through this approach, the United States will solidify its position as a leader in the international system and help the UNSC adapt to changes in the international balance of power.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF UNSC REFORM AND EXPANSION EFFORTS

The Security Council's legitimacy rests in its ability to "represent the geopolitical realities of today," as stated by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan.[2] As it was last modified in 1965, the UNSC has been criticized for its failure to adhere to these realities, over-representing certain Western powers and excluding key economic and regional powers in Latin America and Africa. As India's Ambassador Manjeev Singh Puri has stated, membership expansion will increase the Security Council's "credibility and effectiveness for dealing with global issues."[3]

Besides regional representation, the UNSC expansion debate also involves certain financial elements. The United States currently finances twenty-two percent of the UN regular budget and twenty-seven percent of UN peacekeeping operations.[4] In light of U.S. domestic economic challenges and expectations of future federal budget

cuts, it will be increasingly difficult for the United States to maintain this financial burden. Accordingly, admission to the UNSC could pressure new member states to increase financial and military contributions to the UN apparatus and foreign aid to 0.7% of Gross National Product (GNP), the internationally agreed upon threshold for developed nations.[5] On the other hand, if aspirant nations are denied admission into the Council, these nations' frustrations may lead them to reduce their current investments in the organization.[6] Given that aspirant countries like Japan and Germany are the largest contributors to the UN regular budget after the United States, their reductions would be detrimental to the UN's capacity to maintain world order.[7] Because of these regional representation and financial considerations, UNSC expansion has the potential to both increase and decrease U.S. global influence.

UNSC EXPANSION: ARGUMENTS FOR INCREASED U.S. INFLUENCE

Proponents of UNSC expansion argue that the inclusion of aspirant nations would pressure these regional powers to conform to international norms broadly supported by the United States.[8] Similarly, aspirant nations representing non-Western regions have a greater ability to manage regional conflicts due to geographic proximity and political and economic understanding. For instance, South Africa chaired the Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa and strengthened cooperation between the UNSC and the African Union Peace and Security Council in Resolution 2033 during its non-permanent terms in the UNSC in 2007-2008 and in 2011-2012.[9] Similarly, India has increasingly led stabilization efforts in Central Asia, providing the largest source of humanitarian and economic aid to Afghanistan in recent years.[10] As permanent UNSC members, South Africa and India would be able to coordinate their regional initiatives with UN resources in conflict zones that are critical to U.S. interests and world order.

Other proponents of expansion argue that the many of the aspirant nations will support U.S. initiatives in the UNSC given previously existing favorable bilateral relations. These proponents acknowledge that the aspirant nations may have historically opposed U.S. initiatives in the General Assembly because of their affiliation with coalitions of developing countries, such as the G-77 and Non-Aligned

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2   Kofi Annan, "Chapter 5: Strengthening the United Nations, Article 168," In *Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All: Report of the Secretary-General* (New York: The United Nations, 2005).

3   Manjeev Singh Puri, "Report of the Security Council and Agenda Item 117: Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council," India's Mission to the United Nations (2012).

4   United Nations Secretariat, "Assessment of Member States' contributions to the United Nations regular budget for 2012," (2011).

5   The 0.7% target was first established in a 1970 General Assembly Resolution and has been encouraged by the UN Millennium Project. As of June 2005, sixteen out of twenty-two donor countries have met or agreed to meet the 0.7% target by 2015. "Net official Development Assistance in 2005 Preliminary Data," The United Nations Millennium Project, the United Nations (2005): 1.

6   Kara C. McDonald and Stewart M. Patrick, *UN Security Enlargement and U.S. Interests* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2010): 21.

7   See Appendix B for UN contributions by UN member state.

8   The White House Office of the Press Secretary, "Fact Sheet: Advancing U.S. Interests at the United Nations" (Washington, D.C.: 2011).

9   The United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 2033* (New York: 2012).

10   Larry Hanauer and Peter Chalk, *India's and Pakistan's Strategies in Afghanistan* (Arlington: RAND Corporation, 2012): 16.

Movement. However, they argue that India, South Africa, and Brazil have aligned with these coalitions because they have perceived themselves as unrepresented in the UNSC. Accordingly, extending UNSC membership to these aspirant powers would increase the probability that these regional powers support UNSC initiatives due to their membership in the organization.

UNSC Expansion: Arguments for Decreased U.S. Influence

In its current structure, the UNSC gives the P-5 members final say on the passage of resolutions through their exercise of veto rights. While it takes a total of seven votes from rotating members to block the passage of resolutions, a single veto from a permanent power is enough to do so. This leverage to block resolutions causes slow decision-making and difficulty in reaching consensus, which is detrimental to U.S. efforts in the UN. In light of this weakness, even the expansion of permanent members without veto powers in the Council could further slow the decision-making process, decreasing the organization's ability to address pressing issues. Increased membership could cause final decisions to come down to the "lowest common denominator"—that is, the most painless decision to maintain unity in the Council, supporting the status quo rather than adapting to changes in the international system.[11] For example, UN resolutions regarding intervention in Syria have been revised to gain the approval of China and Russia, both permanent members of the UNSC. These resolutions use "watered-down" rhetoric, mentioning political reform rather than regime change, despite the severe human rights violations under Syrian President Assad's. With the addition of more permanent members to the UNSC, resolutions could require more restrained language to gain unanimous support.[12] Furthermore, "the more veto-wielding members, the harder it is to pass [resolutions] and the easier it is to block them."[13] In this light, expansion could weaken the Council's efficacy.

Opponents of expansion also argue that membership reform will instigate a cascade effect, as the inclusion of certain nations will increase the desire of their regional rivals to also seek membership. Accordingly, it will be difficult for the Council to reach an equilibrium in its membership that will satisfy international demands in the long term. For example, the inclusion of the Group of 4 (G-4) powers—Germany, Japan, Brazil, and India—will increase the desire for membership by regional rivals, the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) coalition, composed of Mexico, Italy, South Korea, and Pakistan. Admission of these additional powers would further stall decision-making in the organization and delay U.S. initiatives in the UN.

Since admission into the UNSC is a lengthy process requiring approval by two-thirds of UN member states, it is unrealistic to assume that the addition of one or two new members would allow the admission of others in the near future, thereby further diluting the U.S. vote. In fact, the current structure lends itself to blocking admission into the Council, rather than over-expanding it. For example, if the Council confirms Brazil's bid for permanent membership, Argentina and Mexico will likely oppose the admission in the General Assembly. If Brazil is able to get the two-thirds approval despite Argentina and Mexico's opposition, it would now be a permanent member that would have to approve any future members. Thus, Mexico and Argentina's future bids for membership would face the additional barrier of gaining Brazil's approval.

Although proponents of expansion argue that increased membership in the UNSC would decrease the United States' resource burden, the reality is that UN coalitions supporting expansion emphasize regional representation over resource capacity. For example, the G-4 has proposed to add six permanent seats from Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Western Europe, and four nonpermanent seats from Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America. The UfC seeks to add nonpermanent seats that are also regionally distributed: six from Africa, five from Asia, four from Latin America, three from Western Europe, and two from Eastern Europe.[14] Both of the proposed plans will make UNSC expansion a matter of geographic "entitlement" rather than "resource responsibility," the latter of which would relieve the United States' financial burden in the UN.[15] In an ideal situation for the United States, Germany and Japan would be admitted into the Council, as they are the next largest contributors to the UN regular budget. If these two powers further increase contributions after gaining permanent membership status, they would reduce the United States' resource share. Yet in reality, many UN members oppose the membership of these two powers: Germany's membership would over-represent Western interests in the Council, while Japan's membership would be opposed by China. Unless severe pressure is applied to India and other developing nations to increase their financial resource contributions upon admission to the Council, expansion will likely have no effect on the U.S. resource burden.

Expansion opponents also dispute the argument that aspirant nations would support U.S. initiatives in the Council. Brazil, India, and South Africa have consistently voted against the United States in the UN General Assembly. For example, South Africa weakened UNSC action on Sudan and prevented discussion of human rights abuses in Zimbabwe and Myanmar. Additionally, Brazil voted against the fourth round of UNSC sanctions on Iran in June 2010.[16] Most importantly, in the 2000-2004 period, South Africa, Nigeria, and India voted against the United States' position about eighty

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11   McDonald, 17.
12   Jonathan Marcus, "Why China and Russia rebuffed the West on Syria," *BBC News*, October 5, 2011.
13   Bruce Russett, "Security Council Expansion: Can't, and Shouldn't," in *Reforming the United Nations for Peace and Security: Proceedings of a Workshop to Analyze the Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change* (March 2005): 158.

14   See Appendix B for comprehensive list of UNSC expansion proposals.
15   McDonald, 26.
16   Ibid., 37.

percent of the time.[17] Given this historical voting record, the new UNSC members may hinder U.S. initiatives, rather than support them.

Evolution of the U.S. Position on Expansion

The official U.S. position in the expansion debate has supported non-veto UNSC expansion, with membership based on military, economic, and diplomatic power capabilities rather than regional representation. This focus on resource capacity stems from the fact that the United States far exceeds other permanent UNSC members in financial contributions to the UN budget.[18] As such, the United States seeks to diffuse its resource burden among new members in the UNSC.

Since Secretary-General Annan's call for UNSC expansion in 2004, the United States has gradually become more vocal about reform, but without mentioning specific measures that the Security Council should take in the short-term. Specifically, In 2005, the U.S. Congress dedicated $1.5 million to the U.S. Institute of Peace to establish the UN Reform Task Force to "identify ways to improve the UN for modern day."[19] However, the Task Force failed to reach consensus on UNSC membership reform, instead vaguely recommending that expansion may "enhance [the] effectiveness of the Security Council."[20] This generic stance on UNSC expansion laid the foundation for Washington's inconclusive comments in the following years. In January 2009, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice evaded the reform question, stating that "the Council of today quite logically ought to be something… that looks a little bit different from the Council as it was created sixty plus years ago."[21] Eleven months later, the U.S.' stance in the sixty-fourth plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly was presented as "open in principle to limited expansion in Council seats" on a "country-specific" basis. As it had been previously, this position was inconclusive in demonstrating U.S. support of the expansion of the UNSC.[22]

The U.S. stance became more decisive in November 2010, when President Obama openly endorsed his support for India's permanent member status in the UNSC, although without veto power, in a speech at the Joint Session of the Indian Parliament. U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN General Assembly Rosemary DiCarlo reiterated support for the expansion of permanent and nonpermanent members in the UNSC based on the "ability of the countries to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security of the United Nations."[23] These statements provide evidence that the United States has taken an increasingly affirmative stance in support of expansion, presenting itself as an "enlightened nation" supportive of the new international order. All the while, its decision to endorse particular nations, namely India and Japan, has increased the risk that it will alienate the regional rivals of these aspirant nations, specifically Pakistan and China.

The P-5 Stance on Expansion

Ultimately, the reform of UNSC membership is not the United States' decision alone; amendment to the UN Charter (Article 108) requires a two-thirds approval of the 191 UN member states, as well as final approval by the current permanent UNSC member states. It is therefore essential to understand the other permanent members' positions on expansion. In contrast to the United States' "capabilities" perspective, Beijing has supported a regional representative approach to expansion. Chinese representative Zhang Yesui expressed Beijing's support for increasing "representation of developing countries especially in Africa" in the forty-fifth and forty-sixth UN General Assembly plenary meetings.[24] China's support for African representation is largely driven by its investments in the region's natural resources. Moscow has also recently alluded to its openness for reform; Russian envoy Vitaly Churkin stated that Russia is "ready to consider" any "rational UN Security Council reform proposal" if it does not require giving up current veto rights.[25]

Furthermore, both the United States and Russia have endorsed India's inclusion as a permanent member in the Security Council, while China has not openly publicized its support. However, a top Chinese diplomat, Sitaram Yechury, stated in September 2011 that China does not "object" to India's bid.[26] According to an Indian daily newspaper, *The Hindu*, Mr. Yechury stated that China would only support India's bid if New Delhi disassociated its bid from that of Japan.[27] China's reluctance to support India is likely meant to prevent alienating Pakistan. It is clear that the United States, China, and Russia are all attempting to balance their global reputations while retaining influence.

The aforementioned official statements of the P-5 representatives imply that the permanent member states are most concerned with retaining their veto rights and

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17   Nile Gardiner and Brett D. Schaefer, "U.N. Security Council Expansion Is Not in the U.S. Interest," The Heritage Foundation (2005).
18   The United Nations Secretariat, "Assessment of Member States' Contributions to the United Nations Regular budget for 2012."
19   The Task Force on the United Nations, *American Interests and the UN Reform: Report of the Task Force on the United Nations* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2005): 7.
20   Ibid.
21   Luisa Blanchfield, *United Nations Reform: U.S. Policy and International Perspectives* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Office, 2011): 16.
22   New York Department of Public Information, "UN General Assembly Sixty-fourth General Assembly Plenary 45th & 46th Meetings," The United Nations (2009).

23   Blanchfield, 17.
24   Permanent Mission of the PRC to the UN, "Statement by Ambassador Zhang Yesui, Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, at Debate of the 64th Session of the General Assembly on the Work and Reform of the Security Council" (2009).
25   "Russia supports India's bid for permanent seat in UN Security Council," *The Economic Times,* September 27, 2012.
26   Alexey Panov, "Russia Ready to Consider 'Rational' Security Council Reform," *RIA Novosti*, November 16, 2012.
27   Ananth Krishnan, "China ready to support Indian bid for UNSC," *The Hindu*, July 16, 2011.

influence in the organization. At the same time, they seek to uphold their global reputations by remaining receptive to the G-4 and UfC's demands for expansion. Knowing that the other permanent members are hesitant about expansion, they can afford to make broad comments on this issue without pressure to carry out actionable reform. Accordingly, the United States can utilize these statements to enhance its international image as a progressive power willing to make short-term steps toward reform.

Moving Forward: U.S. Policy for UNSC Expansion

Washington's position in the UNSC membership debate requires a balance between engaging aspirant nations and retaining the support of other P-5 member states. On one hand, if the United States obstructs reform, it will reduce its diplomatic "credit" by alienating aspirant members. On the other hand, the United States is not in a position to unilaterally champion expansion, as that stance would create friction with other permanent members, namely China and Russia. The middle-ground approach is to maintain the prospect of expansion without endorsing the ascension of any specific countries. Accordingly, the balanced approach would require the United States to limit its support for Japan and India.

The United States has stressed that power, or "the ability and willingness to deploy it in service of global security through military, diplomatic, and technological capabilities," is the key determinant of membership status.[28] These criteria diverge from the geographic approach supporting small- and medium-sized states proposed by China. Consolidating these two approaches will be difficult. While the United States and China diverge on the representational question, they are both interested in retaining veto power while preventing its extension to new members. As such, the two nations can compromise on interim solutions such as the Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan's approach to extend non-permanent rotations to four-year seats with renewable terms.[29] This measure would incentivize these states to prove their capacity to cooperate in the UNSC in pursuit of additional terms in the Council.[30] Other approaches to include new powers without veto rights suggest an increase in the percentage of Council membership approval needed to pass a resolution, thereby increasing power in the non-permanent seats. This approach, however, comes at the expense of efficient decision-making.

Scholars have proposed other membership criteria through which states should be selected for UNSC membership. For example, the Council of Foreign Relations proposes that states should be selected based on historical political stability, military and diplomatic capacity, financial contributions to the UN budget and peacekeeping, willingness to use sanctions and international interventions, ability to lead unpopular global and regional solutions, and record for confirming and enforcing global security regimes.[31] While this approach reflects U.S. preference for members with the resources to carry out the Council's mission, its vague definitions of "leading" and "brokering" global and regional solutions suggest that South Africa, India, and Brazil's leadership in the Non-Aligned Movement would make them eligible. However, as mentioned, this coalition tends to oppose U.S. initiatives in the UN, threatening U.S. influence.

The Institute for Strategic Studies Islamabad report stresses U.S.-favorable qualifications to be "GDP, military capacity, contributions to peacekeeping, commitment to democracy and humanitarian rights, financial contributions to the UN, and commitment to fighting nuclear proliferation and terrorism."[32] While these qualifications directly target U.S. policy objectives in the UN, their references to democracy and humanitarian rights would likely be opposed by China and Russia. While it has also been proposed to add democracy as a "precursor" to membership, Beijing and Moscow will likely oppose this concept. However, Russia and China would support these democratic qualifications if it would mean keeping their veto rights and permanent status on the Council.[33]

A common flaw among the policy proposals is their inability to reconcile the interests of the United States and the other P-5 member states. Both groups value military and economic capacity to carry out UNSC missions. Prioritizing these common criteria, the United States can incorporate the normative values of democracy and human rights promotion in other sectors of the UN, such as the Human Rights Council. Since China is keen on regional representation of developing African countries, the membership criteria can balance resource capacity with regional diversity. For example, South Africa and Nigeria present the most promising choices for UNSC membership on the African continent, given their economic power. Of these two nations, South Africa, with its past efforts on humanitarian initiatives, is more likely to uphold U.S. humanitarian interests.[34]

Ultimately, a more constructive action plan for the United States would be to push through a set of membership criteria that encompass both its own demands for resource capability and the demands of other permanent members for regional representation. In this hybrid regional and resource approach, powers will be

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28   McDonald, 19.
29   "The United Nations Security Council: Reforms concerning its membership - An Overview," Center for UN Reform Education.
30   The current framework does not allow consecutive term renewals for non-permanent member states. See Appendix B for full description.

31   McDonald.
32   Nadia Sarwar, "Expansion of the United Nations Security Council," Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (2011): 272.
33   Michael O'Hanlon and Omer Taspinar. "UN Reform Potential," *The Washington Times*, December 16, 2004.
34   "South Africa in the United Nations Security Council, 2007-2008," Permanent Mission of South Africa to the United Nations (2011): 8.

nominated first based on their geographic location, then be offered renewable trial periods in the UNSC, in line with Model B of the Kofi Annan Approach.[35] This trial period will test each nation's ability to cooperate with other Council members and abide by the Council's rules. This period will also test the nation's willingness to use its resources in support of the UNSC and its initiatives. At this point, the United States will have time to engage the rising powers in a more intimate multilateral setting to increase cooperation on global issues. From there, the United States would proceed to collaborate with the other P-5 members in order to decide which powers should be offered permanent member status.

Conclusions

Ultimately, the expansion of the UNSC's membership could have both positive and negative effects on U.S. influence in the United Nations. On one hand, stalled decision-making and difficulties in reaching a consensus could limit U.S. power, and on the other, that power could increase due to enhanced diplomatic relations with aspiring nations and a decreased financial and military burden. In order to protect its interests, the United States must present itself as open to expansion of permanent membership, proactively creating a cohesive set of criteria that would incorporate both resource capability and regional representation. In the long run, Washington should hedge against the risk that the other permanent members will influence the votes of aspiring nations, and should therefore maximize its diplomatic capital.

Cooperation with rising powers seeking admission into the UNSC must be a cornerstone of U.S. strategy; in the contemporary geopolitical landscape, multilateralism is becoming an increasingly important vehicle for promoting U.S. foreign policy objectives. If the United States does not voluntarily recognize these rising powers as leaders in multilateral settings, it will eventually be forced to do so at the expense of its global influence.

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35   Paul Kennedy, "Reconfiguring the UN Security Council," *The Globalist* (2006).

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About the Author

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: General Assembly Voting Record

Security Council Contenders: Average Voting Coincidence with the U.S. in the General Assembly, 1999-2004

*Does not include consensus resolutions.
Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Voting Practices in the United Nations, 2004, at state.gov/p/io/conrpt/vtgprac (August 10, 2005). Averages calculated by The Heritage Foundation.

U.N. Security Council Contenders Ranked by Voting Coincidence with the U.S. on Key Votes, 2000–2004

Rank	Country	2004	2003	2002	2001	2000	Mean
1	Japan	66.70%	63.60%	58.30%	66.70%	75.00%	66.06%
2	Germany	57.10%	66.70%	50.00%	70.00%	77.80%	64.32%
3	Brazil	25.00%	38.50%	38.50%	22.20%	50.00%	34.84%
4	Nigeria	20.00%	36.40%	25.00%	0.00%	33.30%	22.94%
5	South Africa	20.00%	18.20%	18.20%	0.00%	40.00%	19.28%
6	India	20.00%	23.10%	30.00%	0.00%	22.20%	19.06%
7	Egypt	20.00%	15.40%	20.00%	0.00%	22.20%	15.52%

Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Voting Practices in the United Nations, 2004, at state.gov/p/io/conrpt/vtgprac (August 10, 2005). Means calculated by The Heritage Foundation.

Source: The Heritage Foundation[36]

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36   Gardiner, *U.N. Security Council Expansion Is Not in the U.S. Interest.*

Appendix B: UN Security Council Expansion Proposals

Coalition	Supporting Nations	Permanent Member States Additions	Nonpermanent Member States Additions	Veto Powers?	Total Members
Existing Model		5: USA, France, Russia, China, United Kingdom Americas (1), Western Europe (2), Eastern Europe (1), Asia-Pacific (1)	10: Africa (3), Asia-Pacific (2), Eastern Europe (1), Latin America/Caribbean (2), Western Europe and Others (2). Arab (1)—alternatively taken from African/Asia groups. 2- year non-renewable consecutively	Yes, permanent members	15
Group of Four (G4)	Germany, Japan, Brazil, India	6: Asia (1), Africa (1), Latin/South America (1), Western Europe (1)	4: Africa (1), Asia (1), Eastern Europe (1), Latin America (1)	Yes, to permanent members. Offered to defer use for 15 years.	25
Uniting for Consensus (UfC)	Mexico, Italy, South Korea, Pakistan, Canada, Colombia	Do not support permanent membership	Based on current regional representation: **Green Model:** 10: renewable **Blue Model:** 10: 3-4 year terms + 2 year terms (	No	25
Regional	Italy	5: Not assigned to particular countries, but to regions (who independently choose countries)		No	25
Panama	Panama		6: Latin America/Caribbean (1), Western Europe (1), Africa (2), Asia (2). 5 year terms with re-election. If re-elected four times consecutively, then state becomes a permanent member	No	21
African Union	6: Africa (2)	5: Africa (2)		Yes, to the permanent members	26
In Larger Freedom: Annan's High-Level Panel (December 2004)					
Model A	6: Europe (1), Americas (1), Africa (2), Asia Pacific (2)	3		No	24
Model B		8: Africa (2), Asia and Pacific (2), Europe (2), Americas (2)—4 year renewable terms + 1 non-permanent		No	24

Source: Compiled from Center for UN Reform,[37] Council of Foreign Relations[38], UN Website

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37   Center for UN Reform Education, "The United Nations Security Council: Reforms concerning its membership - An Overview."
38   McDonald.

Appendix C: Aspirant Countries and Criteria

	Germany	Japan	Brazil	India	Mexico	Italy
Region	Western Europe	Asia-Pacific	Latin America	Asia-Pacific	Latin America	Western Europe
GDP 2011 (%)	3	-1	3	7	4	0
Contribution to UN Budget 2012 (%)	8	12.53	1.611	0.534	2.356	5
Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Forces 2010-2012	0.26%	0.26%	2.52%	8.2%		1.12%
Corruption Index 2011	8	8	3.8	3.1	3	3.9
Freedom Rating (Political Liberty, Civil Liberty) 2012	1, 1 (Free)	1, 2 (Free)	2, 2 (Free)	2, 3 (Free)	3, 3 (Partly Free)	1, 1 (Free)
Electoral Democracy?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Voting Coincidence with U.S. in General Assembly 1999-2004	58%	55%	30%	22%		

	South Korea	Pakistan	Nigeria	Egypt	South Africa
Region	Asia-Pacific	Asia-Pacific	Africa	Africa	Africa
GDP 2011 (%)	4	2	7	2	3
Contribution to UN Budget 2012 (%)	2.26	0.082	0.078	0.094	0.385
Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Forces 2010-2012 (%)	0.64	9.51	5.81	4.12	2.09
Corruption Index 2011	5.4	2.5	2.4	2.9	4.1
Freedom Rating (Political Liberty, Civil Liberty) 2012	1, 2 (Free)	4, 5 (Partly Free)	4, 4 (Partly Free)	6, 5 (Not Free)	2, 2 (Free)
Electoral Democracy?	Y	N	N	N	Y
Voting Coincidence with U.S. in General Assembly 1999-2004			28%	20%	30%

Sources: World Bank, UN, Transparency International, Freedom House[39]

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39   World Bank, "GDP (Current US)," World Development Indicators (2012), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD; The United Nations Secretariat. "Assessment of Member States' Contributions to the United Nations Regular Budget for 2012"; the United Nations, *The 2011 UN Peace Operations Year in Review* (New York, 2011), 80, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/yir/yir2011.pdf; Transparency International (0-10 scale: 0 = most corrupt, 10 = least corrupt); Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index (2011) http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/; (Political Liberties, Civil Liberties, 0-7 Scale: 0 = Most Free, 7 = Least Free); Arch Puddington, *Freedom in the World 2012, The Arab Uprisings and Their Global Repercussions"* (Freedom House: 2012), 14-15, http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%202012%20Booklet_0.pdf.

Civil Society and Joint Israeli-Palestinian Peace Efforts: The Question of "Normalization"

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the current state of Israeli-Palestinian civil society conflict resolution activities within a stagnant political situation that has raised doubts concerning the efficacy of such collaborative activities. The 1993 Oslo Accords brought about much bilateral peacebuilding activity between members of Israeli and Palestinian civil societies. Yet with the intractability of negotiations and deteriorating political conditions, many of these joint endeavors have faced critics' within the Palestinian community questioning the success and appropriateness of such partnership amid the continuing presence of the Occupation. Such pressure opposing civil society relations spiked in early 2011 with the emergence of an anti-normalization campaign within the Palestinian community, which opposes forms of partnership with Israelis that "normalize" an unacceptable political status quo. This study looks at the patterns of change in the programmatic and organizational structures of joint Israeli-Palestinian initiatives over the last several years in light of anti-normalization. Evaluating past expressions of anti-normalization within the Arab-Israeli conflict and incorporating first-hand accounts from Israeli and Palestinian activists and political analysts, this paper will put forth suggestions regarding the future of joint Israeli-Palestinian partnerships within this changing political context. The conclusions of this paper will raise larger questions concerning the application of conflict resolution methods within protracted and asymmetrical conflicts.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the last few decades, the international arena has witnessed the increased role of non-state actors in mediating conflicts around the world. These civil society attempts at peacemaking—primarily conducted by both international and regional non-governmental organizations—face added scrutiny, particularly in especially precarious contexts such as intractable asymmetrical conflicts. Much attention has been directed within the conflict resolution literature towards the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which became a testing ground for civil society peace building work since the arrival of the Oslo Accords in the mid-1990s. Yet with the prolongation of the conflict and a lack of any true peace agreement, many of these joint endeavors have been forced to respond to critics who question the success and appropriateness of such cooperative programming. Pressure on bilateral activities has spiked in recent years, and an anti-normalization campaign has risen within the Palestinian community that questions the legitimacy of "normalizing" relations with Israelis amid a political context that the Palestinians deem unfavorable to peace. This study will examine the extent to which the recent anti-normalization campaign has jeopardized cross-border initiatives between Israelis and Palestinians. Additionally, using primary Israeli and Palestinian accounts of the situation along with an analysis of previous instances of anti-normalization, it will address whether civil society collaboration is still feasible and which steps, if any, must be taken to uphold its relevancy and validity.

CIVIL SOCIETY CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A THEORY

At the root of this investigation is the questioning of the methodology and efficacy of civil society conflict resolution efforts. The formal field of conflict resolution and peace building has only developed within the last two decades, though a robust discourse surrounding conflict prevention theory and tactical implementation surfaced in the immediate aftermath of World War II.

The initial foundational backbone for the academic study of conflict resolution was the Contact Hypothesis. Additionally, various other extensions of intergroup relations philosophies emerged out of social psychology in the post-World War II human rights movement. This mode of thought—articulated most famously by the psychologists Gordon Allport, Muzafer Sherif, and Henri Tajfel—proposes that increased intergroup contact combats existing prejudices and thereby diminishes group conflict.[1] Yet this framework, while acknowledging the need for non-state actors and person-to-person contact in improving conflict-ridden relations, does not adequately address how to institutionalize such an approach within macro-conflicts.[2]

Instead, much of the conversation surrounding conflict resolution in the international arena traditionally focuses on interstate disputes and does not consider the potential role of non-governmental bodies within the conflict resolution process. In the aftermath of World War II, as van Leeuwen details, "the major actors in the resolution of international conflict were the United Nations, the Security Council, and individual governments."[3] By 1990, the belief emerged that with the absence of the Cold War, many of the world's remaining conflicts were protracted intra-state affairs. These conflicts affected all levels of society, and not merely governments, armies and formal representatives of states. As such, a new position arose within international relations, which asserted that social issues had to be addressed at deeper levels. Not only should conflicts be settled temporarily, but peacemakers should attempt to eradicate the root problems that could contribute to future disputes.[4] This stance expanded the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society entities in peace building work, touching on a multitude of domains including human rights, economics, and religion.

This kind of grassroots peace work also encouraged intergroup partnerships across conflict divides. Herbert Kelman, one of the pioneers of the study of Track II diplomacy, asserts that opposing sides of a conflict must engage in a process that produces mutual recognition, cooperation, and human dignity, creating an environment amenable to problem solving.[5] The kinds of interactive intergroup activities espoused by scholars such as Kelman, Louis Kreisberg, and Paul Lederach include outlets spanning from Track II diplomacy to more dialogue-based educational and cultural exchange programs. This new bottom-up approach to peace building was slowly introduced into the field of international relations and was viewed as a necessary component of a more expansive approach to conflict that ought to complement more traditional methods of mediation. The emergence of these different avenues for civil society's contribution to conflict resolution signals the integration of the core beliefs of the Contact Hypothesis Theory into the formalized study of international peacemaking.

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CIVIL SOCIETY PARTNERSHIPS: A HISTORY

The history of Israeli-Palestinian civilian peace efforts is relatively short, in large part because of the longstanding official stances of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel that prohibited any contact with the opposing party. The PLO allowed for formal communication with Israelis in 1974, whereas Israel did not

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1   Mohammed Abu-Nimer, *Dialogue, Conflict Resolution, and Change: Arab-Jewish Encounters in Israel* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 2.
2   Ibid., 8.

3   Mathjis Van Leeuwen, *Partners in Peace: Discourses and Practices of Civil-Society Peacebuilding* (England: Ashgate Publishing, 2009), 28.
4   Sari Hanafi, "Dancing Tango During Peacebuilding: Palestinian-Israeli People-to-People Programs for Conflict Resolution," in *Beyond Bullets and Bombs: Grassroots Peacebuilding between Israelis and Palestinians,* ed. Judy Kuriansky (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2007), 69.
5   Herbert C. Kelman, "Transforming the Relationship between Former Enemies," in *After the Peace: Resistance and Reconciliation,* ed. Robert L. Rothstein, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 194.

permit such activity with Palestinians until 1993.[6] Cross-border encounters did not start until after 1967. Until the first intifada these encounters were either conducted by fringe organizations such as the Communist Party—the lone advocate at the time of a two-state solution—or were organized by third parties. These third parties held their meetings outside of the country secretly, with no clear political agenda except to create initial channels of communication. Indeed, most civil society peace-minded efforts within Israel focused on promoting Israeli-Egyptian peace and protesting both the Lebanon campaign of 1982 and settlement building.[7]

Neither side placed much weight on contact opportunities until the first intifada in 1987, which for the first time made the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict the priority for all peace organizations. The 1987 uprising, which signaled the first ever organized wave of protests and acts of civil disobedience en masse in the Palestinian community, triggered a new wave of organizations in Israel that promoted collaboration with Palestinians. Some organizations advocated for a human rights-oriented approach to conflict resolution (Physicians for Human Rights and B'Tselem), while others (including Neve Shalom) focused on grassroots dialogue. Other organizations, such as the the Israel-Palestine Center for Research and Information, aimed to mobilize change-makers in both societies in order to address the issues. In parallel, Palestinian activists such as Sari Nusseibeh and Khalil Shikaki created think tanks that began to partner with Israeli institutions.[8]

Moreover, the number of dialogue events at the local and leadership levels increased exponentially at the time. These events had the twofold goal of forming relations between political actors while also creating space for the exchange of ideas concerning a future peace agreement. Track II diplomatic exchanges set the stage for the Oslo Accords of 1993.[9] These exchanges included those convened by Harvard Professor Herbert Kelman and Search for Common Ground, as well as the 1992-1993 talks sponsored by Norway's Institute for Applied Social Science. These unofficial channels were successful in "redesigning the political agenda [and] altering the terms of public discourse," while creating a direct pipeline of ideas from the grassroots to the official leadership.[10] As a result of international donor interest, Oslo witnessed a proliferation of people-to-people initiatives. Between September 1993 and September 2000, an estimated 26 million dollars (USD) were distributed for people-to-people activities

organized by NGOs and civil society groups in Israel and Palestine.[11] Youth and cultural exchanges sprouted up, academic and professional partnerships prospered, and many of the Track II diplomatic relations persisted. In fact, by 2000, there were 133 academic partnerships between universities and research institutions in Israel and the Palestinian Territories.[12]

This progress came to a halt with the arrival of the second intifada in 2000. The extreme violence and suffering endured by both communities engendered an environment in which dialogue and peacemaking were deemed disrespectful. Many of the Palestinian mainstays in collaboration efforts were now key leaders of the resistance. The impact on peace-building efforts was severe. As Chazan writes, "dialogue networks ceased operations, many professionally-based associations folded, and youth initiatives stopped."[13] As Israel enforced movement and accessibility restrictions in and out of the Palestinian Territories, logistical arrangements became more challenging. Remaining efforts on the Israeli side fell into two categories. One strand of peace work was comprised of political-activist groups such as Rabbis for Human Rights and Ta'ayush. The other faction within the rebranded peace camp aimed to change Israeli public policy surrounding the need for peace, rather than focusing solely on building awareness concerning humanitarian causes in the Palestinian Territories. This latter category included groups such as the Peres Peace Center, the Israeli Palestinian Center for Research and Information (IPCRI), and Peace Now.[14] Most of the remaining projects after 2000 were institutionalized and organizationally sound. Moreover, many of the peace activities in Palestine turned inwards, focusing on intra-society concerns, and engaging with issues such as human rights and women's empowerment, as well as democracy and citizenship work. A similar unilateral outlook was adopted by many in the Israeli peace camp.[15]

The second intifada presented challenges to civil society bilateral relations that still linger today. Undoubtedly, the extreme anxiety and complete standstill in cross-border initiatives no longer exists, and many of the dialogue and collaboration activities have reemerged. A worsening political condition, however, has slowed activity from its Oslo-period heyday and has depressed optimism among activists concerning the effectiveness of their joint work. The last several years alone have witnessed an increasingly dire situation in Gaza, highlighted by the repercussions of Operation Cast Lead, the tightening hold of the rightist Likud Party on Israeli national politics, the continued settlement activity, a complete deadlock in negotiations following the 2008 Annapolis Conference, and Palestine's failed bid for UN statehood in September of

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6   Edy Kaufman and Walid Salem,"Palestinian-Israeli Peacebuilding: A Historical Perspective," in *Bridging the Divide: Peacebuilding in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,* ed. Edy Kaufman, Walid Salem, and Juliette Verhoeven (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), 24.
7   Naomi Chazan, "Peace Action and Conflict Resolution: An Israeli-Palestinian Exploration," in *Arab-Jewish Relations: From Conflict to Resolution,* ed. Elie Podeh and Asher Kaufman (Sussex England: Sussex Academic Press, 2006), 285.
8   Ibid., 287.
9   Kaufman and Salem, 31.
10   Chazan, 289.

11   Mohammed Dajani and Gershon Baskin, "Israeli-Palestinian Joint Activities: Problematic Endeavor, but Necessary Challenge," in *Bridging the Divide: Peacebuilding in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,* ed. Edy Kaufman, Walid Salem, and Juliette Verhoeven (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006): 95.
12   Hanafi, 71.
13   Chazan, 300.
14   Ibid., 301.
15   Ifit Maoz, Interiew by Author.

2011.[16]

Anti-Normalization: A History

In recent years, increasing attention has been directed at joint Israeli-Palestinian partnerships, as these types of activities have begun to come under attack by segments of the Palestinian community that advocate for anti-normalization. Anti-normalization is a phenomenon—long a part of Arab-Israeli political trope—that decries interchange with Israelis that "normalizes" an unacceptable political status quo. According to Dajani and Baskin, "normalization in Palestinian political oratory under the conditions of continued occupation has a negative connotation."[17]

In the last two years, many cooperative ventures as well as Palestinian NGOs partnering with Israelis have experienced backlash, received less support within the Palestinian community, and ceased certain operations due to unmanageable opposition. Furthermore, this reenergized anti-normalization campaign has been more vocal and public in its opposition than its previous iterations, garnering more attention and calling into question Israeli-Palestinian civil society's capabilities of and receptiveness to collaboration.

The rise of the anti-normalization movement produces an urgent need to assess the relative force and the reasons surrounding the emergence of the movement. Moreover, we need to consider its effects on joint Israeli-Palestinian activities and, perhaps, reevaluate the validity and relevance of such cooperation. Before considering the current anti-normalization pressures, it is worthwhile to study the progression of such sentiments within the Arab-Israeli conflict. This attempt to uncover recurring patterns in the function and goals of the anti-normalization movement throughout its development over the last decades can help inform our conception of the current environment surrounding bilateral activities.

Much of the scholarly writing on the phenomenon of anti-normalization focuses on the presence of such sentiments within Arab states, especially following the peace deals signed by Egypt and Jordan. Indeed, the first instances of anti-normalization language could be found in Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian political discourse outside of the context of Israeli-Palestinian relations.

The term normalization (*tatbiyeh*) first rose to prominence following the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Accords—the first time that Israel and an Arab state attempted to "normalize" relations for the first time. As such, anti-normalization became the rallying cry for those standing in opposition to this development. As Elliot Colla writes, "while Egyptian citizens cannot erase President Anwar Sadat's signature from the accord, they can ensure by refusing to travel to Israel, by blocking the kind of cultural and professional ties expected of neighbors at peace-that relations between the two countries will remain distinctly abnormal."[18] Indeed, much of the anti-normalization manifested itself in cultural and economic activities, with professional associations and the arts being heavily emphasized. These sentiments have remained fairly present in Egyptian society, partly, as Colla suggests, since Egyptians have viewed the peace accord with Israel and its accompanying promised aid from the United States as signifying Egypt's abdication of national sovereignty in place of kowtowing to the West and Israel. Colla does note that following the demonization of a number of Egyptian intellectuals who took part in an overseas dialogue encounter with Israelis in 1997, several academics began to publicly distinguish between normalizing and non-normalizing acts. Those scholars claimed that "such meetings are unavoidable... once we accept the principle that peace cannot be condemned in principle."[19] For most of its history, the anti-normalization campaign in Egypt held on to clear principles. However, change is afoot. With burgeoning support for anti-normalization outside of intellectual circles and growing disagreements over its defining characteristics, the campaign has become an "inchoate common sense," an almost default term assigned to the conflict with varying implications based on the user.[20]

Similar questions surrounding normalization arose within Jordanian society after the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement and the subsequent attempt at normalizing the political and economic relationship between the two countries. The Jordanian opposition groups at the time—Islamists, leftists, and nationalists—rejected the formula of the treaty, yet few opposed "the notion of peace itself."[21] This contrarian force and the inability on the part of the government to defend normalizing relations with Israel had already increased by April of 1995, when the Israeli government confiscated 500 dunams of land around Jerusalem for settlements. Whereas eighty percent of Jordanians supported the peace agreement immediately following its enactment, by 1995 three fourths of the Jordanian parliament had signed a petition in favor of suspending the treaty and reinstating boycott legislation against Israel.[22] By the mid- to late-1990s, Jordanians repeatedly expressed their perceptions of the disintegrating peace process in polls. In these polls, Jordanians declared Israel as unable to abide by agreements and viewed Israel as the enemy.[23] This political dissatisfaction trickled into dismay over economic, non-governmental partnerships, and in 1997 an Israeli trade show in Amman was successfully boycotted and postponed by many of the major political parties.[24]

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16   That being said, the UN General Assembly did recognize Palestine as a nonvoting member.
17   Dajani and Baskin, 100.

18   Elliott Colla, "Solidarity in the Time of Anti-Normalization," *Middle East Report* 224 (2002): 10.
19   Ibid., 12.
20   Ibid., 11.
21   Russel E. Lucas, "Jordan: The Death of Normalization with Israel," *Middle East Journal* 58, no. 1 (2004): 96.
22   Ibid., 97.
23   Ibid., 108.
24   Ibid., 102.

This analysis of the early foundations of anti-normalization within the broader context of Arab-Israeli affairs offers several suggestions that can inform one's understanding of a similar movement within Palestinian society. First, perceptions of anti-normalization are intimately tied to the political process. Resurgent support for anti-normalization in Arab countries has often been driven by stagnation within the political arena and perceived Israeli political intransigence. Furthermore, these campaigns have rarely displayed a consensus concerning what anti-normalization entails. In short, anti-normalization was a nebulously defined movement that tended to represent different degrees of severity based on the ambient political climate.

The question remains as to how the anti-normalization wave trickled down into the Palestinian community, so that it could be used as a vehicle for displaying frustration with civil society peace efforts. The study of normalization sentiments about collaboration pre-Oslo poses a difficult challenge, as most of the diplomatic and alternative channels of communication between Israelis and Palestinians were conducted furtively. The optimism following Oslo generated a generally accommodating view on partnerships. Nonetheless, until 2000, the Palestinian Authority (PA) lacked a clear legislative policy on NGO registration, and many Palestinian organizations from the start lacked organizational legitimacy within their communities.[25] As the Oslo process deteriorated, rising antagonism towards "normalizing" people-to-people initiatives became more visible. Michelle Gewirc, a researcher of Israeli-Palestinian civil society peace work, recalls returning to the region in 1999 and encountering Palestinians who expressed the "need to take your foot off my head" before engaging in dialogue.[26] Likewise, in 1999, the Gaza coordinator of Windows-Channels for Communication, an organization dedicated to youth encounter programs, was forced to flee Gaza due to violent threats against her life.

The second intifada brought a sharp decline in Israeli-Palestinian activities and an increase in Palestinian hostility towards people-to-people programs. The asymmetry in power relations, reinforced by the security measures enacted in the aftermath of the intifada, led Palestinians to criticize the supposed neutrality and equality induced by dialogue meetings. Former Palestinian participants of Seeds of Peace, an Israeli-Palestinian youth dialogue organization, "interpreted the lack of political action [by the organization] to indicate that the organization was supporting the asymmetric status quo."[27]

Indeed, by 2002 the anti-normalization sentiments had reached a point in which the

Palestinian NGO network had decided to boycott all joint activities unless they actively supported Palestinian statehood and a peace process that recognizes Palestinian national rights.[28] In 2005, the tenor of discourse regarding normalization in the Palestinian community was further demonstrated with the launching of the Palestinian Academic and Boycott Initiative (PACBI), and the accompanying creation of the Boycott Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement. Comprised of Palestinian social leaders, PACBI is dedicated to the academic and cultural boycott of Israel. Since 2005, PACBI has penned several declarations concerning normalization. These publications have formalized an agenda concerning intergroup exchange that banned cultural and apolitical partnerships that did not oppose the occupation and back Palestinian rights. By this time, activists and academics alike were voicing such distinctions in the ensuing conversations concerning the ideology of anti-normalization. Indeed, in a 2005 edition of the *Palestine Israel Journal,* Walid Salem, the director of the Palestinian Center for the Dissemination of Democracy and Community Development, identified a nuanced interpretation of anti-normalization that "might reject normalcy now, but accept negotiations on the official level or dialogue on the popular level."[29]

As the twenty-first century progressed, anti-normalization was no foreign concept to Palestinians. Following the second intifada, Palestinians became more concerned with the apparent decision of certain people-to-people initiatives to mask political imbalances. Importantly, earlier members of the movement were often careful to distinguish between favorable and unfavorable forms of Israeli-Palestinian partnerships. The structure of initiatives, rather than the concept of partnership *per se*, was objectionable. The voices for anti-normalization remained in the background of Palestinian civil society. Still, these voices did not pose a widespread threat, nor was there an exceptionable rise in popular appeal until 2011. Since 2011, however, Palestinian and Israeli activist circles have been abuzz over the quick ascent of anti-normalization rhetoric and subsequent action targeting Israeli-Palestinian collaborative efforts. This development led to a much-needed conversation about the relative influence of this reemerging campaign and its effect on the future directions of Israeli-Palestinian joint activities.

Anti-Normalization: The Current Reawakening

While the current wave of anti-normalization shares several characteristics with previous manifestations of the campaign, there are two distinguishing features that set this iteration apart from its antecedents. Firstly, strains of anti-normalization sentiments are being echoed across many more segments of Palestinian society than ever before. Even activists formerly perceived as moderates and longtime advocates of cross-border activity are increasingly pessimistic about their work and

25   Michelle I. Gawerc,. *Prefiguring Peace: Israeli-Palestinian Peacebuilding Partnerships* (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2012), 52.
26   Gawerc, xii.
27   Edie Maddy-Weitzman, "Coping with Crisis: Seeds of Peace and the Intifada," in *Beyond Bullets and Bombs: Grassroots Peacebuilding between Israelis and Palestinians*, ed. Judy Kuriansky (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2007), 203.

28   Hanafi, 72.
29   Walid Salem, "The Anti-Normalization Discourse in the Context of Israeli-Palestinian Peace Building," *Civil Society* 12.1 (2005): 1.

are keener to take up the anti-normalization trope. The second point of distinction is that there exists amongst Palestinians an unparalleled, indiscriminate vilification of all types of encounters with Israelis that has accompanied this reawakening of the anti-normalization campaign. Numerous forms of partnership within the movement have been equally denigrated, from cultural exchange programs to political anti-occupation demonstrations and, in certain instances, even communication with anti-Zionist Israelis. These compounded factors have generated an atmosphere in which the influence of anti-normalization is all the more potent, forcing us to question the motivating factors for this upsurge as well as the potential impact on civil society bilateral programming.

It is only in the last year and a half that NGOs involved in cross-border partnership have witnessed increased opposition involving actual measures taken to obstruct programming. Sulaiman Khatib, founder of the joint Israeli-Palestinian organization Combatants for Peace and long-time participant in dialogue endeavors with Israelis, admitted that though anti-normalization is by no means new, "the last two years have become more difficult."[30] Many point to the events leading up to the failed UN bid for statehood in September of 2011 as the true trigger of the renewed rhetoric surrounding anti-normalization. The faltering Palestinian efforts in New York capped a period of intransigence on the political front marked by a dearth of negotiations, further settlement activity, and a perceived failure on the diplomatic bilateral and multilateral tracks. Palestinians began to see a trickle-down effect in which a failed status quo prioritizing collaborating with formal channels of diplomacy implied that collaboration on civil society levels was similarly ineffective. Amy Pearlman, the Program Coordinator for Encounter, an organization that brings American Jews to the West Bank to observe life in the Palestinian Territories, reflected on the impression that Palestinians have conveyed to her: "It's just a lack of the peace process moving forward. The last few years of standstill stagnation and settlement construction, the UN vote—I think it's a hopelessness."[31]

This fomenting frustration and resulting sentiments of anti-normalization reached an apex following the UN bid. "It was at the beginning of 2012 [when the current campaign began]," commented Nidal Foqaha, Palestinian director of the Geneva Initiative, a joint Israeli-Palestinian political think tank. A survey of Palestinian media outlets demonstrates increased reference to and discussion of anti-normalization beginning in mid-2011 and continuing until the present. Within the span of one month in January 2012, eleven articles were published in the Palestinian National Authority's daily newspaper *Al-Hayat al-Jadida* addressing normalization in one form or another.[32] Many of the region's periodicals, including *Ma'an, Ha'aretz,* and

The Jerusalem Post have published articles on the topic of anti-normalization since December 2011. From 2005 until late 2011, *Ha'aretz*'s English Online Edition had not published a single article that used the term "anti-normalization" in reference to happenings in Palestinian society; in fact, most references to anti-normalization in the newspaper preceding 2011 addressed the political climates in neighboring Arab countries, not the Palestinian Territories. Yet within the span of seven months, from April 2012 through November 2012, *Ha'aretz* published four articles that used the specific term "anti-normalization" to assess Palestinian viewpoints on collaboration. The main English language blogs documenting the Palestinian cause, namely *972Magazine* and *Electronic Intifada*, also have extensively covered the anti-normalization campaign within the last year. *Electronic Intifada* contains an entire webpage listing various articles on the topic of normalization and features twenty blog posts written about anti-normalization.

Furthermore, the pervasiveness of the campaign becomes apparent once one looks closely at the variety of figures who are pushing for anti-normalization. Unsurprisingly, Palestinian calls for anti-normalization emanate from those that have longed embraced boycott and divestment. In October 2011, the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel issued a statement that berated all joint activities that do not use the structure of resistance. PACBI continues to denounce forms of dialogue that mask the occupation and points specifically to two normalizing entities: One Voice, an international dialogue program for youth, and IPCRI, which is committed to a two-state solution, "advocates an apartheid state in Israel," and includes members of Israeli leadership "suspected of war crimes."[33]

This recent upsurge in anti-normalization rhetoric has also involved members' of the PA, even within the upper echelons of leadership, vocalizing thoughts on normalization. In a January 2012 statement urging Arabs from around the world to visit Jerusalem, PA President Mahmoud Abbas declared, "visiting the prisoner does not mean normalization with the warden."[34] While Abbas does appear to assign explicitly the label of normalization to civil society engagements, his statement came on the heels of a statement made by the PA's Deputy Information Minister who denounced "economic, cultural, and political normalization."[35] Indeed, the PA retains an ambiguous position on civil society collaboration. Several Israeli peace activists claim that their Palestinian partners fear retribution from the PA for engaging in cooperative engagements.[36] Yet the PA also sanctions direct negotiations with Israelis and sponsors certain economic and cultural partnering events. Nisreen Abu

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30   Khatib, Interview by Author.
31   Amy Pearleman, Interview by Author.
32   Translated articles from *Al-Hayat al-Jadida* were obtained from the Palestinian Media Watch website: http://palwatch.org/.

33   "Israel's Exceptionalism: Normalizing the Abnormal," *pacbi.org,* October 31, 2011.
34   Herb Keinon, Kahled Abu Toameh, and Lahav Harkov, "In Qatar, Abbas calls on Arab world to visit Jerusalem," *The Jerusalem Post,* February 26, 2012.
35   Quote obtained from Palestinian Media Watch's translation of a January 18, 2012 *Al Hayit al Jadida* article: http://palwatch.org/main.aspx?fi=971&doc_id=6480.
36   Shaul Judelman, Interview by Author; Pearlman, Interview by Author.

Zayyad, Palestinian director of the Peace NGO Forum, an umbrella group for peace organizations dedicated to cross-border collaboration, believes that "the PA sends a message with double meaning" concerning their position on anti-normalization.[37] Nonetheless, out of this murky public position, Palestinian officials have contributed to the raising of awareness within the Palestinian community concerning anti-normalization.

Interestingly, the extent to which anti-normalization has gripped the Palestinian community is disputed even among those active in Israeli-Palestinian joint activities. Some, such as Dr. Munther Dajani, Al Quds University Provost and longtime participant in Track II diplomatic efforts, find that "anti-normalization is all over Palestine—nobody wants anything to do with an Israeli project. It is nationwide."[38] Others such as Khatib and Abu Zayyad feel that the campaign is comprised of a small group of left-wing activists, mainly affiliated with the Popular Front, who manipulate social media and convey a false impression of the numbers in their ranks. While a number of Facebook pages with several hundred members have lambasted the joint work of the Geneva Initiative, the director, Foqaha, minimizes the actual weight of the anti-normalization campaign, claiming that protests at organized events rarely amass more than a half dozen people.

While the makeup and relative strength of the anti-normalization campaign may be unclear, the movement unquestionably has pressured and disrupted the programming of joint partnerships. Riman Barakat, co-Director of IPCRI, acknowledges that the Palestinian NGO Network and other bodies who promote cutting ties with Israel have convinced many NGOs that previously were unopposed to collaboration to commit themselves to the cause of anti-normalization. In light of this exerted pressure on NGOs to desist from collaborative ventures, the Peace NGO has lost several members in the last several years and "is boycotted by a lot of people."[39]

In addition, several bilateral events have been forcefully obstructed by the campaign. While Palestinians partnering with Israelis always had to be mindful of sensitivities within the Palestinian community when recruiting for and publicizing their activities, there were infrequent uses of force or pressure tactics rarely kept events from occurring. Yet in the last year, force and pressure have been factors in multiple instances. When Munther Dajani, along with Al-Quds President Sari Nusseibeh and noted Israeli peace activists Shlomo Ben-Ami and Uri Avneri, organized the first meeting of a grassroots body of opinion-makers called the Israeli-Palestinian Confederation on December 12, 2011, they faced a line of protestors outside the Ambassador Hotel in East Jerusalem and were forced to cancel the event.[40] Similar pressure derailed a conference hosted

by the bilateral *Palestine-Israel Journal* on December 21, 2011, when threats leveled against the hosting hotel forced the organizers to cancel the event.[41]

Perhaps the most surprising evidence for the popularization of anti-normalization is the receptiveness to anti-normalization ideas expressed by the very targets of the campaign—the peace activists, themselves. Many peace activists express a deep pessimism about the purpose of their work amid a broader political context that is not amenable to productive change. But beyond this frustration lies a sensibility that the anti-normalizers are partially right: activism must be framed so as not to "normalize" the occupation; furthermore, certain forms of Israeli-Palestinian exchange should be protested as counterproductive. The Israeli occupation is viewed as the supreme reason for the prolongation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, thereby making the cessation of the occupation the main strategy for attaining peace. The Geneva Peace Initiative takes the position that "some of the initiatives between Israelis and Palestinians are meant to normalize the occupation—something we are against."[42] Abu Zayyad remarks that there are cultural exchange programs and other forms of normalization through which the Palestinian branch of the Peace NGO Forum "advises our Israeli partners about the use of such activities."[43] Hebrew University Professor Ifat Maoz, a longtime analyst of dialogue programs between Israelis and Palestinians, admits that she finds it hard to understand why Palestinians would continue to participate in joint initiatives given the great despair that the political situation has engendered.[44]

The second distinguishing component of this revitalization of the Palestinian anti-normalization campaign is its growing radicalization and, at times, blanket opprobrium for forms of collaboration and contact that were not characterized previously as "normalization." The expanding list of activities targeted as "normalization" has generated a greater sense of ambiguity hanging over the actual categorization of anti-normalization. While most critics isolate cultural, youth, and apolitical dialogue activities for critique, a growing number of political initiatives, such as the Geneva Initiative, aimed at directly influencing the political process have faced resistance as well. More surprisingly, adamant anti-occupation direct action and protest efforts have also been targeted.

Moriel Rothman, an American activist affiliated with Rabbis for Human Rights and the International Solidarity Movement, took part in demonstrations in the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Beit Hanina. In Beit Hanina, Palestinian co-resistors ceased communication with the Israelis in response to pressure from members of

37   Nisreen Abu Zayyad, Interview by Author.
38   Munther Dajani, Interview by Author.
39   Abu Zayyad, Interview by Author.
40   Dajani, Interview by author.

41   Aziz Abu Sarah, "Anti-Normalization shuts down Israeli-Palestinian event," *972Magazine*, December 21, 2011, Online.
42   Nidal Foqaha, Interview by author.
43   Aby Zayyad, Interview by Author.
44   Maoz, Interview by Author.

Fatah. Rothman also was aware of a planned conference in Ramallah organized by the leftist human rights organization Yesh Din, which had to be cancelled due to protests against normalization.[45] The ambiguity surrounding what should be classified as normalization usually stops when it comes to non-Israelis. Indeed, PACBI, as well as many other groups who advocate the boycott movement, very carefully states that anti-normalization is a political complaint, rather than a religious one. These factions have no problem interacting with non-Israeli Jews. Pearlman acknowledges that the Encounter program faces less resistance from Palestinian collaborators because its makeup consists of American Jews instead of Israelis.[46]

Anti-normalization has reemerged as a potent force within the Palestinian community and, because of to its more vocal and expansive opposition, has jeopardized the functioning of joint Israeli-Palestinian activity. This new social reality begs for an earnest consideration of the greater implications for bilateral civil society efforts.

The Effect of Anti-Normalization on Joint Civil Society Relations

The renewal of anti-normalization claims calls into question to what extent collaborative Israeli-Palestinian programming will be affected. Additionally, this renewal touches on the larger issue of the future direction of civil society peace building activities among Israelis and Palestinians. It is too early to discern the concrete changes in the organizational structure of these initiatives. Still, the integration of lessons from previous episodes of anti-normalization, with insights gleaned from discussions with activists and organizers on the ground, allows us to suggest a possible path that these bilateral activities may take in light of the recent developments.

Reflecting on the trajectory of the anti-normalization movement, we can extract a few guiding principles for navigating the current sociopolitical reality. First, the anti-normalization campaign responds to the surrounding political climate. Just as Jordanian support for the Israeli boycott fluctuated with perceived Israeli abnegation of the Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement, Palestinian backing of anti-normalization has increased with perceived intransigence throughout the peace process. If negotiations remain at a standstill, Israeli partners in joint organizations will probably continue to come across opposition. It would be in the best interests of these Israeli partners to acknowledge the changing political realities shaping the power dynamic between Israelis and Palestinians. Following the second intifada, many facilitators of people-to-people dialogue initiatives were hesitant to recognize that political conditions had created a certain asymmetry in relations between the two sides—and subsequently, they lost the trust of their Palestinian members. It would be wise for today's organizers to learn from that mistake. In fact, the widespread disapproval of apolitical cooperation, such as cultural exchange and dialogue programs, suggests

45   Moriel Rothman, Interview by Author.
46   Maoz, Interview by Author.

that organizations of neutral dialogue molds are quickly losing clout. Dialogue for the sake of dialogue will no longer attract the mainstream activists and social movers and shakers. Professor Maoz of Hebrew University asserts that simple people-to-people exchange will remain a way to get certain segments of the population such as youth and extremists to the table. However, these exchanges no longer appeal to the committed activists and social elite that have long participated in joint programming.[47]

Furthermore, even those organizations that work to solve political issues, such as the Peace NGO Forum and IPCRI, are considering the need to embrace an anti-status quo political position in order to solidify their legitimacy. An anti-status quo public stance would signal that organizations recognize that the current political reality is unbearable. Proponents of this stance advocate for particular political positions to end the Occupation and restart peace negotiations. Lior Finkel, Israeli coordinator of the Peace NGO Forum, remarked that her umbrella organization is trying to rebrand itself to serve as a political mouthpiece for the Israeli peace camp. In fact, Finkel claims that Peace NGO Forum will look to be vocal in its political positions in order to allay concerns about Palestinian partners.[48] Similarly, Barakat, the co-director of IPCRI, admits "the only way to do [dialogue] is through a change in paradigm."[49] Barakat and her co-director, Dan Goldenblatt, published an article in early 2012 in which they assert that IPRCI, other Track II diplomacy entities, and dialogue efforts should shift their attention to an "anti-status quo" agenda that promotes specific anti-Occupation and pro-peace positions. Meanwhile, this agenda should mollify critics and shift the Palestinian discourse away from an anti-normalization outlook that decries contact with Israelis.[50]

A second recurring pattern within the anti-normalization camp is its receptiveness to joint activities that are expressed as forms of direct action against the occupation. Many of the collaborative initiatives that remained after the second intifada, such as Ta'ayush and Rabbis for Human Rights, were engaged predominantly in nonviolent oppositional activities. Khatib underscores that organizations like Combatants for Peace are particularly popular because they combine dialogue with solidarity actions.[51] For Palestinians, resisting alongside Israelis allows "humane forms of interaction with other types of Israelis and prevents further dehumanization."[52] While specific instances of joint protests may come across as anti-normalization, these appear to be few and far between. Tarabut, an organization of Israelis that works closely with Palestinians in the South Hebron Hills to resist demolitions, rarely encounters Palestinian resistance to partnership. As Itamar Haritan, an activist with

47   Maoz, Interview by Author.
48   Lior Finkel, Interview by Author.
49   Riman Barakat, Interview by Author.
50   Riman Barakat and Dan Goldenblatt, "Coping with Anti-Normalization," *Palestine-Israel Journal* 18.23 (2012).
51   Khatib, Interview by Author.
52   Abu-Nimer, 135.

the organization, claims: "We've never been refused collaboration. [And that is] because of the kind of work we do."[53]

Lastly, we can expect that the anti-normalization campaign will succeed in stopping some of the cross-border activity, thereby causing many organizations to concentrate on either the Israeli or Palestinian community alone. Following the second intifada, many joint groups such as IPCRI, Seeds of Peace, and the Middle East Children's Association turned to internal work within Israeli and Palestinian societies as "a way of managing the normalization taboo on the Palestinian side."[54] This allows organizations to remain true to their missions without jeopardizing the success of their programs. In light of the distrust and lack of legitimacy surrounding their work, Barakat and Goldenblatt at IPCRI feel that it is worthwhile to "adopt the policy of coordinated but separate."[55] Moreover, working independently to create shared goals among the two sides may facilitate later attempts at bringing together Israelis and Palestinians for dialogue.

CONCLUSION

Much of the discourse surrounding mediation and resolution practices within international conflicts poses the question: how do organized efforts at conflict resolution alter political dynamics? A less analyzed and, at times, more provocative question asks: how do changing political realities alter the effectiveness of conflict resolution activities? This analysis answered the latter question and evaluated how anti-normalization has had an impact on civil society peace-building efforts between Israelis and Palestinians. With anti-normalization emerging as an obstacle to cross-border partnerships at an ostensibly faster pace than has been evident in recent years, it remains to be seen what the exact repercussions will be for Israeli-Palestinian collaboration. Based on past features of the anti-normalization movement over the course of its history, integrated with first-hand accounts from Israeli activists, Palestinian activists, and experts on peace building, this paper has suggested several potential routes that joint civil society programming can take in light of the current situation.

Future researchers would be wise to consider a closer analysis of any financial or programmatic changes that specific organizations take in the coming months in light of the current normalization pressures. Given that the anti-normalization resurgence took place so recently, such research could not be included in this paper. Another prospective inquiry into this matter could incorporate the efficacy of and responses to civil society conflict resolution efforts in other intractable ethnic conflicts such as those in Ireland and South Africa.

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53   Itamar Haritan, Interview by Author.
54   Gawerc, 80.
55   Barakat and Goldenblatt.

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Chaos, Pure and Simple: Examining the Complexities of the 2001 Economic Crisis in Argentina

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Abstract

The Argentine Economic Crisis of 2001 brought on a period of severe financial turmoil within the state. The catastrophic event led to nearly half of the country's population living in poverty, as well as a total contraction of ten percent of GDP. In the academic analysis of the crisis, many scholars make a rather one-sided assessment, ignoring the vast complexities and interconnectedness of international and domestic factors. While one school of thought relies on the role of international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, as well as Wall Street banking giants, the opposing side offers the argument of a rich history of Argentine domestic economic instability emanating from a culture of dysfunctional political weaknesses. Rarely does the literature combine both of these explanations and delve into why these theories are reliant on one another, not simply competing schools of thought. By first looking at the history of Argentine economics, and then analyzing its implications, we can determine just how reliant the concepts are on one another. This paper seeks to thoroughly explain both arguments and to make the case that they are both essential to explaining the 2001 crisis, and to the economic and political developments in Argentina today.

Introduction

The 2001 Argentine Economic Crisis continues to puzzle political scientists and economists worldwide. Many wonder how Argentina went from being a rich country with the fastest growth rate in Latin America in the 1990s, to declaring, at the time, the largest debt default in world history at the turn of the century. When arriving at conclusions over the causes of the crisis, however, competing theories sometimes focus so narrowly on methodology that the complexity of the Argentine political economy is often misunderstood. Today, similar complexities are evident in Argentine politics. With high inflation and the still-looming national debt, the country may be facing some serious troubles ahead.

Many critical scholars blame the actions and intent of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the interference of foreign powers for these recent economic failures. International pressures undoubtedly contributed to misplaced funding and unrealistic economic guidelines. However, certain factors indicate that this international explanation fails to take into account the history of Argentina and the impact of the political culture. Along with the counterproductive actions of the IMF, domestic developments served to escalate an inevitable recession into a full-blown crisis. Among these factors, the most notable is the looming Argentine debt that has grown to new highs since the 1990s. This increasing debt has served as one of the central dilemmas in Argentina's relations with global financial institutions, and continues to strain the country's economy.

Another prominent discourse argues that Argentina's wealth began to dissipate gradually over a sixty-year period of economic and political uncertainty beginning with the depression of the 1930s. This argument looks to the relationship between cycles of instability within the political system and periods of economic turmoil. This model follows a more traditional approach than does the behaviorist account's blaming the IMF, but it still ignores the importance of global neoliberal influences. When studying a country like Argentina, culture—as it relates to economics—should not be understated. But the social roots of the crisis have received substantially less attention than the other explanations.

All of these theories must be considered in order to fully grasp the financial turmoil of 2001. Rather than embarking on oversimplified analyses of the event, this paper will delve into the crisis's complexities, generating a comprehensive assessment of Argentina's past and future economic woes. The goal is to break the international and domestic dichotomies that tend to categorize the IMF or the Argentine government as good or evil. The conclusions will prove particularly relevant to the condition of the Argentine political economy today in predicting whether the country is drifting towards another cycle of crisis.

Menem and the Globalized Nineties

As we examine Argentina's crisis from a strictly international lens, multiple academic viewpoints must be considered in order for the event to be fully explained. While

there is reason to blame the IMF specifically, as well as Argentine fiscal policies, the context of the early 1990s demonstrates how the domestic circumstances of the times allowed for such a catastrophe to occur. Toxic policies that led Argentina astray during the 1980s precipitated the IMF's involvement, demonstrating how important it is to understand Argentine fiscal policies in their relation to IMF prescriptions.

Coming out of the Cold War, global capitalism had begun to take hold as the world's dominant economic framework. In order to expand its economy, Argentina had little choice but to implement neoliberal reforms that would draw support from the IMF and increase the inflow of foreign capital. In order to open up trade relations with prominent Western nations, strict IMF-backed policies were prescribed and followed. During this period, rampant government spending caused hyperinflation that persisted throughout the 1980s.[1] On top of this, Argentina's labor laws remained politically untouchable, creating an obstacle for any effective economic remedies. Without any meaningful industrial exports, the country was reliant on imported goods from abroad, requiring it to turn to the global market and the IMF.[2] In 1991, after a number of unsuccessful fiscal repairs, President Carlos Menem appointed Domingo Cavallo as the nation's Minister of the Economy, the fourth person to fill the position under Menem's administration.[3]

To ease debt woes, Menem initiated sweeping reforms that privatized many state-run entities.[4] It was at this point that Cavallo implemented the "convertibility plan," pegging the Argentine peso to the U.S. Dollar (USD). This measure required the central bank to keep enough dollars in reserve to back the amount of pesos in circulation.[5] However, it also meant that in order to maintain this exchange rate, the government could not print money in the event of a recession, an implication that would prove detrimental throughout the 1990s.[6] Cavallo saw the rigid plan as necessary to instill some fiscal discipline into the Argentine economy, as past habits had tended to increase the consistent problem of inflation.[7] Initially, the plan was a great success, driving down the inflation rate from eighty-four percent in 1991 to just 4.2 percent by 1994.[8] Argentina began to make its way out of the severe inflationary period. In theory, convertibility was a logical plan, as the stable currency regime would attract foreign investment and put an end to the inflationary spiral. It also caught the attention of the IMF, who praised the neoliberal fiscal policies enacted by the Menem administration.

However, the plan was essentially doomed from the start, as the country had a national debt that grew to nearly half of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during the 1990s.[9] On top of this, Menem used his political power to rule by presidential decrees, ignoring many constitutional constraints and leading to an overall deterioration of the rule of law.[10] Many provincial legislators followed suit and failed to control their budgets, fueling the country's further descent into financial disarray.

Even given the potential risk factor of the plan, convertibility was dogmatically followed as a way to avoid any inflation that would cause the economy to slide back to the fiscal chaos of the 1980s.[11] The extreme policies put in place were the "carnal embrace" of the Washington Consensus—a set of neoliberal policy prescriptions backed by Western economists in order to introduce developing nations to international markets. By adhering to these policies, Argentina had a ticket to enter new growing foreign markets.[12]

Convertibility met its first test with the Mexican "Tequila" crisis of 1995, a series of market shocks due to the devaluation of the peso. The events in Mexico triggered bank runs in Argentina that grew out of a lack of confidence in the new developing economies.[13] This crisis pointed out the weaknesses in the Argentine economic system, namely the lack of liquidity and fiscal flexibility to protect against sudden market shocks.[14] To combat these adverse shocks and large capital outflows caused by the bank runs, Argentina held fast to convertibility, even though investors were losing confidence in Latin American economies. Interest rates rose and new tax increases were introduced—developments that were not taken lightly.[15] And by some indications, these policies worked. In 1996, Argentina's economy grew by a promising 5.5%, and even further the following year at 8.1%.[16] This trend continued for a brief time, enabling the IMF to negotiate a "precautionary" debt program to insulate the country from further external market shocks.[17]

During this time, however, Argentina's imports rose dramatically while exports remained level, creating a significant trade imbalance. Since 1991, the country had imported goods at a rate of $1 billion each month.[18] This began to increase the national

1   Paul Blustein, *And the Money Kept Rolling In (And Out)* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 18.
2   Pamela K. Starr, "Argentina: Anatomy of a Crisis Foretold," *Current History* (2003): 67.
3   Blustein, 19.
4   J.F. Hornbeck, "The Argentine Financial Crisis: A Chronology of Events," *Congressional Research Service*, (2002): 1.
5   Blustein, 20.
6   Martin Feldstein, "Argentina's Fall: Lessons From the Latest Financial Crisis," *Foreign Affairs* 81 (2002): 10.
7   Blustein, 20.
8   Ibid., 237.

9   Ibid., 239.
10   Andrés Gallo, et al, "The Role of Political Institutions in the Resolution of Economic Crises: The Case of Argentina 2001-05," *Oxford Development Studies* 34 (2006): 198.
11   James E. Mahon and Javier Corrales, "Pegged For Failure? Argentina's Crisis," *Current History* (February 2002): 73.
12   Ibid., 73.
13   Augusto de la Torre, Eduardo Levy Yeyati, and Sergio L. Schmukler, "Argentina's Financial Crisis: Floating Money, Sinking Banking," *World Bank* (2002): 3.
14   Ibid., 3.
15   Blustein, 28.
16   Ibid.
17   Ibid., 237.
18   Jorge Schvarzer, "The Costs of the Convertibility Plan: The Economic and Social Effects of Financial

deficit to a point where the debt could only be maintained by further financing. Shortly after, in 1999, Brazil suffered a financial crisis and was forced to devalue its currency. This led to the depreciation of commodities and an increased value of the USD, making Argentina's goods and labor even less competitive within the Southern Cone region.[19] Importers turned towards cheaper Brazilian goods, which cut Argentine exports and led to decreased revenues. Argentina suffered from sharp decreases in growth as well as a debt burden that was becoming unmanageable. Because of the drastic economic turn of events, support for Menem decreased, paving the way for Radical candidate Fernando de la Rua to win the presidency. With a right-wing candidate occupying the Casa Rosada, serious loan negotiations with the IMF began.

As a recession deepened, large capital outflows persisted. At this point, the IMF agreed to several loan packages, all under the strict conditions of spending cuts in order to manage the deficit.[20] These loans also projected GDP growth that never occurred. While the country was under great pressure to initiate substantial political reforms, institutional realities prevented them from taking effect. With convertibility in place, any fiscal remedy remained out of the question because it would require spending money that the country could not afford, rendering the IMF loans essentially useless. In the early 2000s, the economic crisis began to take full swing. The unemployment rate swelled to twenty percent, while the poverty rate expanded to include sixty percent of the population.[21] Riots broke out in the streets, calling for the resignations of President De la Rúa and Minister of the Economy Cavallo. This period saw rampant political instability, and the public seriously questioned their faith in politicians and public servants. The chaos embraced a slogan, "Que se vayan todos," or, "Let's get rid of them all," to express the anger and frustration of the public towards politicians.[22] Amidst the rioting, five interim presidents were chosen in just two weeks. The fifth president, Eduardo Duhalde, officially dismantled convertibility and the Argentine peso devalued, giving way to the country's default on its debt obligations and severed ties with the IMF.[23]

ARGENTINA AND THE IMF: AN INCONVENIENT PARTNERSHIP

The most critical claim about IMF policies is that they did not consider the political realities of Argentine politics. Throughout the years of political turmoil, the IMF favored policies that would reform labor laws in the country, often granting loans when countries would comply.[24] Given Argentina's labor history and strong welfare

state, this was a political impossibility. The Argentine government could not, in the middle of financial turmoil, simply cut workers' wages and take away massive benefits. The result would have been further civil unrest and, by all accounts, an increase in the poverty rate, which already included more than half of the Argentine population.[25] The IMF supported convertibility and privatization because they allowed for a stable currency and opened borders to businesses and corporations. These developments fell in line with the Washington Consensus and made the country another marketable outlet for capitalist expansion. If the IMF was guilty of anything, it was the failure to call the neoliberal reforms what they were: *unsustainable*. The devout loyalty to IMF-backed convertibility pushed Argentina toward inevitable slip into crisis.

Although global institutions are important in explaining the crisis, equally important developments were brewing on the Argentine home front that rendered the IMF policies unsustainable. In order to keep up global expansion, technocratic solutions of the IMF were necessary to mend the institutional problems of Argentina's political and economic system. The federal government and the provinces traditionally drove up deficits through rampant social spending. This debt increased as revenues dwindled from downturns throughout the 1990s. Reinforcing this was the inability to effectively retain tax revenue.[26] Unfortunately, these problems were essentially impossible to deal with due to the constrictive dollar peg. The fiscal straightjacket of convertibility was just as popular with the Argentine people as it was with the IMF and officials back in Washington up until as late as the 1990s.[27] To end the plan would have been a poor political decision and would have required substantial congressional support. Institutional barriers in the congress thus prevented the implementation of any sound fiscal policies.

Adding to these factors was President Carlos Menem himself, who took advantage of the economic situation coming out of the 1980s and used it as political capital during his presidential campaign. Menem secured unique legislative powers to rule by decree and turned over large portions of the economy to groups of private business moguls from abroad.[28] These bold maneuvers led to a wider deterioration of the rule of law, in turn enabling provincial governments to simply avoid adhering to the fiscal constraints crucial to the success of convertibility.[29] These effects were lasting, with the Brazilian recession serving as the nail in the coffin for the dollar peg. In 2001, the Argentine banking system suffered from a lack of confidence, which triggered a massive run on the banks, eroding ten percent of the country's commercial deposits.[30]

Hegemony," in *Broken Promises?* ed. Edward Epstein, et al (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006): 77.
19　De la Torre, et al, 5-6.
20　Hornbeck, 2.
21　Blustein, 242.
22　Edward Epstein and David Pion-Berlin, "The Crisis of 2001 and Argentine Democracy," in *Broken Promises?* ed. Epstein, et al (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006): 3.
23　Blustein, 242.
24　Ibid., 44.

25　Carol Graham and Paul Masson, "Between Politics and Economics: The IMF and Argentina," *Current History* (February 2003): 73.
26　Ibid., 74.
27　Ibid.
28　Jose Nun, "The Democratic Process in Argentina," in *Broken Promises?* ed. Edward Epstein, et al (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006), 34.
29　Gallo, et al, "The Case of Argentina," 198.
30　Ibid.

To remedy this harsh effect, the Argentine government initiated the "corralito," which barred citizens from withdrawing cash from their personal accounts. The run on the banks and illiquidity of cash led to the creation of quasi-currencies throughout the country, leaving the monetary system in shambles. The subsequent devaluation of the peso worsened the situation: deposits were transferred at 1.4 pesos to 1 USD.[31] As Argentina scrambled to restore normalcy in the wake of its default, this rate decreased even further. From this point, Argentina was left with political and economic instability and a fractured party system, paving the way for Peronist rule for the next decade.[32]

The international analysis of the 2001 crisis argues that because of the expanding capitalist markets and urgency of the IMF's Washington Consensus, Argentina was forced to comply in order to sustain a growing economy. But because of the realities of the Argentine political structure, the reforms sought by the IMF were quite incompatible with labor laws and the culture of rampant state spending. This argument, when viewed alone, concludes that the turmoil endured in 2001 was brought about by the unique nature of the events that occurred during the 1990s. However, as we will see, the situation may be more complex than that. In the next section, we will delve into the historic instability of Argentina's economic culture, and examine how these developments appear to be cyclical in nature.

PERONISM AND THE CYCLES OF ECONOMIC INSTABILITY

In contrast to the international approach, a historical analysis traces Argentina's economic disequilibrium all the way back to the effects of the Great Depression during the 1930s. Until sluggish growth appeared for the first time during the Great Depression, no serious signs of future economic problems had emerged. In response, the government moved towards heavy state involvement in the economy, resulting in what one author labels the "precocious" development of industry.[33] In 1935, the *coparticipación* was developed in order to centralize revenue at the federal level with semi-institutionalized, rule-based distribution to the provinces. Prior to this scheme, the federal government and the provinces each had their own sources of revenue. The laws were renewed almost yearly throughout the 1940s and 1950s, and were enhanced in the 1970s and 1980s in an attempt to fix the issues that emerged from the sharing of federal and provincial revenues. The *coparticipación* scheme proved to be a highly unstable mechanism for revenue generation, creating a cycle of institutional weakness. This weakness contributed to the extreme volatility of the economic cycles in Argentina, foreshadowing a bleak future for the country.

Another major factor in evaluating Argentina's economic failures emerged with the election of Colonel Juan Domingo Perón to the presidency in 1946. Perón continued the policies of the 1930s, which relied heavily on imports and a strong domestic industry. Along with his wife, Eva, Perón and his regime served as the catalysts of what would prove to be a long Argentine tradition of populism, trade-union power, and the empowerment of a "national bourgeoisie" in support of industrialization.[34] Labor and industry came to dominate the country with Perón's support and wielded the most influence on economic policy. The "Peronization" of Argentina established a welfare state with universal benefits, and, in exchange, unions subjected themselves to government control. This led to drastic changes in fiscal policy, as the traditionally conservative country saw an increase in public expenditures. To an extent, the massive trade deficits and rising inflation rate of Perón's second term expedited change in economic policy. Perón's public spending continuously exceeded ordinary public revenue, as a result of the shared revenue between the federal government and the provinces. Soon, fiscal deficits became the norm.[35] Some argue that since Perón's reign, Argentina has suffered long-running volatility in its public finances because of the public sector spending that substantially exceeded the level of taxation.[36]

During these precarious economic conditions, the unions gained power politically and socially, polarizing society. Perón's regime ceased to favor industry because of the increasing inability to import capital goods at a rate necessary to support growth. As the state nationalized much of its private industry, the labor unions took on a more significant role in domestic economic policy. As a result, the traditional clashes between the agricultural groups of the countryside and the industrial population of Buenos Aires increased. Meanwhile, new hatred materialized between labor unions favored by Perón on one hand and middle-class professionals on the other.

This paper does not suggest that Perón single-handedly destroyed the Argentine economy; rather, it argues that this split in society caused the true hindrance to stable economic development. The link between Peronism and the trade unions created a bureaucratic network that remained a powerful political movement for decades to come. The legacy of Peronism proved to be an economy that devoted much of its budget to state subsidies. This meant that the government was obligated to keep up with these subsidies in the future in order to avoid the negative political consequences, even if that meant foregoing rational and effective economic policy. Strong and influential labor codes make Argentine economic reform difficult even today, leaving political power dispersed between the various labor unions.

Argentina after 1955 can be categorized into "fiscal cycles" of permanent deficits,

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31   De la Torre, et al, 11.
32   Enrique Peruzzotti, "Argentina After the Crash: Pride and Disillusion," *Current History,* (February 2004): 90.
33   James P. Brennan, "Prolegomenon to Neoliberalism: The Political Economy of Populist Argentina, 1943-1976," *Latin American Perspectives* 34 (2007): 50.

34   Brennan, 55-56.
35   Vito Tanzi, *ARGENTINA: An Economic Chronicle How one of the richest countries in the world lose its wealth*, (New York: Jorge Pinto Books, 2007), 15.
36   Ibid., 30.

which are never solved within the volatile and rapidly shifting political economy.[37] These cycles are characterized by the existence of credit policies and tax evasion that proved rampant after Perón's presidency. Perón needed the support of these labor unions and thus sought to avoid any internal unrest at all costs. As a result, these unions were granted public credit policies that served as massive subsidies to nationalized industries.[38] The nationalized banking system lacked the economic oversight to regulate public spending, and reliance on tax evasion and credit policies soon developed. Failure to retain tax revenue has led to insufficient public funds, which in turn hinders growth. As one author explains, Argentina never "learned to tax."[39] While this tax evasion may indicate how institutional weakness contributes to Argentina's economic incoherency, it is only one contributing factor explaining the inflation of the 1970s, hyperinflation of the 1980s, and economic crisis of the early 2000s. Despite an increase in the already excessive public spending from tax credits, the international debt soon became too large to ignore.

Under General Aramburu's government in the late 1950s, Argentina negotiated entry into the IMF and the World Bank and began to accept international loans. From 1959-1962, the ambiguities between domestic and international economic policies began to merge when President Frondizi accepted the economic principles promoted by the U.S. government while doing very little to implement them.[40] Following the trends initiated by Perón's regime, the contradictions of the Frondizi government set the stage for political and economic instability.[41] Argentina's various business groups remained greatly divided through the 1960s. This political stalemate blocked any attempt to form effective institutions able to oversee economic activity. The excessive national spending and increased industrial subsides, with the added international loans and principles, created a huge problem for balancing payments. The only solution to these issues required the increase of exports in the Pampean region that would have boosted GDP, international trade, and federal revenue. Instead, the demand for imports rose rapidly while the exports themselves rose at a much slower pace throughout the decade.[42] As a result, the country suffered a trade imbalance, furthering its reliance on foreign trade.

Connecting the Dots: A Domestic Disaster

From 1966-1971, a military dictatorship led by President Onganía attempted to break free of the economic cycle by a capitalist restructuring program, following neither a liberal nor a national-capitalist model.[43] Instead, Onganía used the military to implement moderate economic policies aimed at restructuring the previous political culture of Argentina. The policies did not favor the agrarian sectors, the nationally owned industries, or the regional economies. With none of these groups satisfied, the heightened tensions between the country's business groups escalated to political violence. Terrorist groups like the Montoneros and the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP) emerged in 1969. With the assassination of former President Aramburu, these groups became daring with their use of violence.[44] Although Perón was exiled from the country at the time, he used these leftist movements as both a counter-weight to the dominance of the military and as a way to fragment his opposition. The social protest of the time period, rather than the economic situation, brought Perón back into power in 1973 as a means to calm the storm. Due to this civil unrest, virtually no economic progress had been made, inflation was beginning to take off, and the country had just elected back into power the very man that turned the Argentine economy into such a mess in the first place. These conditions put Argentina in a poor position to confront its growing economic woes. The restoration of Peronist rule also marked the restoration of national-capitalism, which characterized the Argentine political economy for the next thirty years.

Given the political tensions in the early 1970s, Perón abandoned platforms of socialism and liberation and accepted the national bourgeoisie's economic program.[45] The "Plan Trienal" called for effective regulation of foreign capital and investment, but ignored the domestic problems with maintaining wages and prize freezes. Ultimately, the plan suffered from many of the same weaknesses as previous Argentine economic programs that had similar business-state relations. Credit continued to be dispersed in an arbitrary fashion, and no meaningful institutions were formed to regulate it. By 1975, the rate of inflation had risen to 183%, while the fiscal deficit had reached a total of fourteen percent of the nation's GDP.[46] It soon became evident that Perón's regime had finally lost control of the economic and political situations of its country. The second half of Perón's term was marked by an abandonment of all policies from the "Plan Trienal."

The military staged a coup in March of 1976, at a time when the inflation rate had reached a staggering one thousand points.[47] Most of the volatility from 1955-1976 boils down to a struggle for power between corporative groups with conflicting economic interests. Unsatisfied political factions supported the coup as a means to break the tensions forming within society, and the inconsistency of the Peronist regime became evident. A pattern soon emerged after the fall of Perón's regime. A

37　Tanzi, 15.
38　Brennan, 57.
39　Melo, 115.
40　Brennan, 55.
41　Ibid., 55-56.
42　Guillermo O'Donnell, *Counterpoints Selected Essays on Authoritarianism and Democratization*, (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), 9.

43　Brennan, 59.
44　Tanzi, 17.
45　Brennan, 60.
46　Tanzi, 17.
47　Ibid., 19.

government that favored the domestic market, industry, and regional economies would be ousted by the military, and then alternated with a more liberal government favoring peso devaluation, increased exports, and income redistribution.[48] The violent shifts from one regime to another never allowed for the stability necessary to either form meaningful institutions capable of monitoring economic activity or grant enough time to actually implement a fiscally responsible plan.

As a military "junta" seized control of the country, the Argentine economy began to plummet at an alarming rate. The new economic team immediately turned to the IMF to negotiate a financial assistance plan. The IMF failed to fully comprehend the political realities brought on by the conflicts between the military and terrorist groups at that time.[49] Due to the heightened conflicts between these groups, accountability on behalf of the government was virtually non-existent in terms of economic regulation and oversight. An article written in the 1977 *IMF Staff Papers* argued that Argentina needed to make economic changes domestically, because the printing of more money to fund public spending would simply increase the rate of inflation.[50] However, the changes to domestic economic policies were the least of Argentina's worries, as the country descended into the darkest period of its history. In order to put an end to the violent political conflict occurring throughout the country, the military government declared a state of "La Guerra Sucia," or the Dirty War. This resulted in the torture and execution of thousands of union leaders, writers, students, and political activists by the military regime.[51] The government never accounted for the loss of these individuals and simply referred to them as "The Disappeared." The impact of political and social repression from during the Dirty War (1977-1982), combined with the continuation of decades of bad fiscal and taxation policies, sent the economy of Argentina into a wave of even higher inflation.

Economically, the absence of regulatory institutions caused the state to finally abandon taxing income altogether in the 1980s.[52] To combat the expenses of the Dirty War and the payment of international debt, the Argentine state chose to rely on custom taxes and the printing of more currency, adding to the inflationary value of the peso. After the military's embarrassing defeat in the Malvinas War of 1982, Argentina returned to democracy in a time marked by the political instability.[53] The elected government, in essence, made a deal with the military to dismiss human rights violation charges in exchange a return to presidential elections and democratic rule.

At a time when Peronism was outlawed, radical candidate Raúl Alfonsín won the

first democratic election held since the military dictatorship. He began his term in the middle of an economic crisis in 1983 as hyperinflation took hold, creating economic instability and social unrest. All the while the federal government carried on the Argentine tradition to distribute resourses bilaterally with the provinces. Tax revenue reached an all-time low in 1989, provoking a civil movement that forced the president to resign six months before the end of his term.[54] After the ousting of Alfonsín, Carlos Menem rose to power with virtually no serious opposition, allowing him to reform the agenda drastically. Confronting the serious economic problems of the time soon proved a futile task for the Menem regime. Instead of attempting to reform the economy domestically, Menem and his advisors soon made the decision to seek financial help internationally. The issues of the past consistently reemerged throughout Argentina's economic history, and Menem continued to exacerbate and ignore the domestic problems that had plagued the country for centuries.

Conclusions

Over years of scholarly analysis, the problems faced during the 2001 crisis have been condensed into one-dimensional theories. These theories explain that the problem lies either with the IMF or with the historic lack of fiscal discipline of Argentine economic institutions. To fully grasp the situation, academics must entertain the question: *can we attribute blame to either side for the crisis*? Certainly the international context presents an explanation as to why Argentina needed the Washington Consensus if the state were to stand a chance in the global economy. New relations between Latin America and U.S. and European backed institutions emerged as the international markets expanded. The balance of power tipped so heavily on the side of Western nations that global capitalism became the dominant force in the international political economy. The IMF was simply the only actor available to assist the developing nation, coming out of a tumultuous period of hyperinflation and general financial disarray.

For a country as vulnerable as Argentina at this time, the partnership would be understandable. To maintain the growth and strong stable exchange rate of the 1990s that neoliberal reforms led to, convertibility was to be followed at all costs. As it turns out, those costs proved quite high. This strict devotion to the currency peg exposed internal problems with Argentine economic institutions. Fiscal discipline was nonexistent, and the national debt rose to extreme levels. Convertibility left Argentina unable to finance its debt. When the country defaulted, its debt obligations never went away, something international critics point out as a tolling problem affecting developing nations in need of foreign credit. There is no international bankruptcy tribunal that allows debt forgiveness for sovereign nations.[55] This, combined with questionable domestic policies, allowed for what was essentially the "perfect storm" for an economic crisis. Looking at the facts from an international

48   Brennan, 55.
49   Tanzi, 20.
50   Ibid., 38.
51   Blustein, 18.
52   Melo, 127.
53   Ibid., 132.

54   Ibid., 132.
55   Graham and Masson, 72.

perspective, Argentina and the IMF were both victims of circumstance. The flaws of the Argentine political structure were largely catalyzed by the blind policies of the IMF. The international viewpoint prompts us to look at the crisis and its causes not as single detrimental factors, but as an unfortunate development originating from two dysfunctional parties.

In studying the economic history of a country plagued with military and civilian violence, a lack of accountability, and a low level of institutionalization, some argue that a social analysis is required to understand the social causes of Argentina's unstable political economy. Critics of this argument concur that the 2001 crisis unfolded from the economic realm, and that economic instability caused the social turbulence, rather than the other way around.[56] These social explanations reveal that external factors often have interrelated effects on the loose accountability and lax fiscal policies of the government. The middle class upsurge of protest in December of 2001 sought to provide accountability and institutional representation from the corrupt regime.

According to this perspective, the events beginning in late 2001 represent a culmination in a phase of cycles in a "process of social struggles" against the unsuccessful policies of neorealism.[57] The influence of social groups—starting with the creation of powerful labor unions in the 1940s under Perón, followed by the demands of the middle class amidst the recent economic crisis under De la Rúa—has historically impacted the economic climate. The social protests eventually marked the collapse of the Argentine economy and the beginning of a drastic recession.

The overriding conclusions of domestic discourse between several historical analyses hold particularly relevant to the status of Argentina's modern political society and economic situation. Many of the tensions of democratic governance that contributed to the 2001 crisis persist in Argentina today, and the country still has difficulties building democratic institutions. The trend for increased executive power and state involvement in the economy originated with Perón and is still evidenced by the unilateral executive actions of the current Peronist president, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner. Argentina has suffered from this trend in executive power for over sixty years— an occurrence some have labeled "superpresidentialism".[58]

The division of social groups into political parties maintained a bipolar relationship that both prevented the establishment of meaningful institutions and maintained a stable election system. De Kirchner's victory was rooted in the continued strength of the Peronist party, which has recently fragmented and revolted against their Peronist

ruler in organized protests. Since the 1940s, the Peronists and the Radicals (UCR) have been the only parties to build national organizations and gain large memberships.[59] In recent years, the Radicals have fragmented and lost influence to a level beyond repair and the Peronist party has divided over ideological differences. The inconsistency of populist leaders and weak institutions combined with the lessons learned from the 2001 economic crisis may be mobilizing Argentina's political society in a way that predicts a forthcoming crisis.

A look into the international factors of the Argentine financial crisis helps to clarify the persistent obstacles facing developing nations and their interactions with the international financial system. We can also question what these relationships mean for the future in cases of high national debt and institutional instability. The domestic issues paired with fiscal policies and restraint doomed the loan packages of the IMF from the start. Inconsistency and lack of regulation economically in the country prevents any real accountability. With social movements demanding unsustainable economic policies and the restructuring of the international debt, Argentina faces difficult times. As a result, a country that seemingly recovered from the severe recession of the early 2000s may now be on the verge of another economic blunder.

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56   Ariel C. Armony and Victor Armony, "Indictments, Myths, and Citizen Mobilization in Argentina: A Discourse Analysis," *Latin American Politics and Society* 47 (2005): 29.
57   Ibid., 33.
58   Hector E. Schamis, "Argentina's Troubled Transition," *Current History* 107 (2008): 71.

59   Steven Levitsky and María Victoria Murillo, "Argentina: From Kirchner to Kirchner," *Journal of Democracy* 19 (2008): 23.

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Luck of the Irish: Applying the Northern Ireland Peace Agreement to the Cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kashmir

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the extent to which the principles outlined in the 1998 Northern Ireland Peace Agreement are applicable to the cases of cross-border ethnic conflict in either Bosnia or Kashmir. These three cases share the unique challenges of militarized conflict and ties to multiple neighboring sovereign states. In particular, the paper considers the factors surrounding the creation of the Agreement and the specific elements of the Agreement itself. In spite of significant similarities between these cases, however, the unique factors that led to an agreement for Northern Ireland in 1998 are not seen in Bosnia or Kashmir, which require their own unique power-sharing solutions.

Introduction

Northern Ireland's 1998 peace agreement was a landmark in international political history and now stands as a successful example of the merits of consociation and power-sharing governments.[1] In addition to basic consociational elements, the Agreement included several key innovations designed to resolve specific challenges faced by its framers.[2] Like many deeply-divided places in conflict, Northern Ireland was home to ongoing violence by hardliners, so methods for decommissioning society figured significantly in the Agreement. Perhaps more unusually, Northern Ireland faced the challenge of competing internal claims to two different sovereign states as a national homeland. Since neither of these challenges is unique to Northern Ireland, however, it is worthwhile to consider whether the particular methods and factors used in developing the Agreement can be successfully replicated with other divided societies. Sumantra Bose takes this tack when he makes the qualified suggestion that a peaceful resolution of the international conflict over the Kashmir region should follow the pattern established in Northern Ireland.[3] Donald Horowitz, on the other hand, argues that the Agreement was possible only under a specific set of circumstances that are "unlikely elsewhere."[4] The case of Bosnia seems to be another possible candidate, given recent armed conflict among three major ethnic groups, tied to two neighboring sovereign states. In neither of these two cases has a permanent resolution as successful as the 1998 Agreement been reached.

This paper will analyze the extent to which the Agreement is applicable to either the case of Bosnia or Kashmir by considering factors surrounding the creation of the Agreement and the specific elements of the Agreement itself. After outlining the specific conditions that made the Agreement possible and the elements of the Agreement designed to resolve the particular challenges mentioned above, I will consider the Agreement in light of these two comparative cases. First, I will analyze the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which segments of the population would prefer the partition of the state in favor of territorial accession to either Serbia or Croatia. Although the international powers that created the Dayton Peace Accords ended immediate conflict in Bosnia, this peace agreement is far from satisfactory and has yet to establish a self-sufficient, democratic government. Second, I will consider the more recently violent case of Kashmir, where various politically, regionally, or ethnically defined groups can be characterized as pro-Pakistan, pro-India, or pro-independence.

While the cases of Northern Ireland, Bosnia, and Kashmir are certainly distinct, their similarities make Bose's suggestion to apply the lessons of the 1998 Agreement compelling. Each of these difficult cases has a long history of ethnic violence. Each region is home to groups identifying most closely with one of two neighboring sovereign states. Each has been the scene of significant international attention, especially during violent flare-ups over the past half-century. The Agreement approached these problems in Northern Ireland by including all groups, even extremists, establishing cross-border institutions to connect Northern Ireland and its two sovereign neighbors, and outlining a program for decommissioning violent

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1   Hereafter referred to as "the Agreement"
2   These include executive power-sharing, autonomy, proportionality, and veto-rights for competing parties. See McGarry and O'Leary, 2004.

3   Sumantra Bose, *Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003): 215.
4   Donald L. Horowitz, "Explaining the Northern Ireland Agreement: The Sources of an Unlikely Constitutional Consensus," *British Journal of Political Science* (2002): 220.

parties.[5] Could the mechanisms used to achieve these goals in Northern Ireland succeed in Bosnia and Kashmir? In order to entertain this question properly, we must first thoroughly examine the Agreement itself.

Factors Facilitating the Creation of the Agreement

Although 1998 did not mark the first attempt at a resolution to the Northern Ireland conflict, the Agreement was the only attempt that found clear success. During the previous two decades of British direct rule, Westminster attempted to impose, coerce, or encourage numerous settlements for home rule that were deemed unacceptable by one party or another. Before that, the Sunningdale Agreement had constructed a power-sharing government that lasted only a short time. Because of the complexity of political arrangements, no single factor exists to explain the unique success of the 1998 Agreement. Rather, a web of interacting elements converged to allow for a working agreement acceptable to enough parties that power-sharing institutions could be established. These interacting elements can be broadly categorized as either conditions incidental to the negotiation of the Agreement or as aspects of the Agreement itself.

Conditions

By 1998, militant groups, worn down by decades of fruitless violence, became willing to negotiate with their opponents for a peace agreement at a politically critical moment. Sinn Féin, a party with connections to the Irish Republican Army (IRA), agreed to join the 1998 Agreement in spite of its perpetual refusal to cooperate politically in the past. An earlier step toward agreement, Sinn Féin's 1994 ceasefire, proved hardliners had begun to desire a negotiated peace given the meager prospects of complete victory. On the other side, according to Horowitz, "among those who were most war-weary were representatives of loyalist parties, those whose roots were in the Protestant paramilitaries."[6] Simultaneously, the Labour Party, whose leader, Tony Blair, "was committed to achieving a settlement," came to power in 1997.[7] Since Westminster no longer supported a unionist agenda, a political settlement appeared to be unionists' best option as well.

Sovereign governments, including the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom, which were intimately involved in the conflict, as well as the United States, played a crucial role in facilitating a peace agreement. Although Ireland and the United

Kingdom have a turbulent history, several generations had passed without serious violence between the two states. Both wanted an agreement and were committed to permitting the self-determination of the citizens of Northern Ireland, while neither demanded a particular outcome. The Clinton Administration in the United States took a special interest in the resolution of the Northern Ireland conflict and employed top policymakers to facilitate talks by establishing impartial and cordial relationships with leaders from both sides of the dispute. Since both sides found U.S. pressure to forge a working agreement acceptable, U.S. involvement contributed heavily to the Agreement's success.[8]

Additionally, by this time, past negotiations and agreements had established a foundation for a new agreement, making a political settlement easier. Although the Agreement expanded and further developed the consociational aspects of power-sharing in Northern Ireland, it followed the basic pattern of the Sunningdale Agreement, which included a power-sharing executive and rules for proportional representation. Even the most controversial feature of the Sunningdale Agreement, its establishment of the Council of Ireland, an inter-ministerial institution coordinating efforts between the North and South Ireland, foreshadowed the creation of the North-South Ministerial Council (NSMC) in 1998. A decade after Sunningdale, the British and Irish governments signed the Anglo-Irish Agreement in order to formalize inter-state cooperation. As an assurance to unionists and nationalists that neither group would be able to unilaterally force its designs on the other, the agreement produced the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, which, like the British-Irish Intergovernmental Council (B-IGC), acted as a consultative body between the two sovereign states. O'Leary explains that this agreement established "a framework which permits other constitutional settlements to be built on top of it."[9] Indeed, following the 1994 ceasefire and the 1997 Labour victory, the stage was set for fleshing out just such a constitutional settlement.

Significantly, the Agreement included all relevant political parties, even extremists, although the negotiations were effectively carried out between only a few. Sinn Féin's willingness to participate permitted the conclusion of a more than perfunctory agreement that could meet the approval of a majority of nationalists. Unionists, whose strikes against the Sunningdale Agreement had precipitated its downfall, feared predictions that nationalist populations were growing more quickly and might surpass the unionist majority on which they relied. They had once viewed a consociational, devolved Northern Irish government as a precarious first step toward the unification of Ireland, but to at least the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), consociational home rule became a forward-thinking protective measure to confirm unionists would continue

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5   Bose only explicitly proposes applying the first two of these three lessons from the Agreement to the case of Kashmir. Since I identify decommissioning, however, as a crucial element in the Agreement's success, I thought it fitting to investigate its applicability in the cases of Bosnia and Kashmir as well. See Bose, *Kashmir*, 215.
6   Horowitz, 206.
7   John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, *The Northern Ireland Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004): 6.

8   McGarry and O'Leary, 6-8.
9   Brendan O'Leary, "Complex Power-sharing in and over Northern Ireland," in *Settling Self-determination Disputes: Complex Power-sharing in Theory and Practice*, ed. Marc Weller, Barbara Metzger, and Niall Johnson (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008): 68.

to have a voice in Northern Ireland if they became a minority. Although talks were inclusive, now that major players on both sides expressed willingness to cooperatively formulate a peace agreement, they avoided the complexity of excessively multilateral negotiations because relatively few players were actively involved in constructing the details of the Agreement. The representatives of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland were not closely involved in the power-sharing details, but focused their energies on the cross-state institutions to which they would be party.[10] Sinn Féin remained a reluctant participant and "played an inert role in the negotiations" but the mere representation of this party led the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the United Kingdom Unionist Party (UKUP) to leave the negotiations.[11] Thus, "the UUP and the SDLP [Social Democratic and Labour Party] largely negotiated the details of internal power-sharing."[12] This simplified the debate and made a successful conclusion more feasible.

Key Aspects of the Agreement

No long-term success would have been possible without two key elements of the Agreement: (1) institutions linking the nascent democratic organs of Northern Ireland with Westminster and Dublin; and, (2) procedures for decommissioning. First, the NSMC guaranteed long-term connections between the governments of North and South Ireland, and second, the B-IGC balanced the first inter-ministerial council by solidifying a cooperative relationship between Ireland and Great Britain, thereby meeting unionists' "concerns for reciprocity in linkage."[13] These cross-border institutions endorsed the legitimacy of claims from both sides by permitting governmental connections with both sovereign states to which the Northern Irish lay claim. The Agreement also established oversight procedures governing decommissioning, a particularly heated issue throughout the dispute. First, negotiating parties had to agree on a timeline for demilitarization. In accordance with the proposals of the Mitchell Commission, appointed as an impartial body to resolve the seemingly intractable disagreement, decommissioning figured as a central issue during negotiations rather than as a precondition to cooperation.[14] Second, all parties confirmed "their intention to continue to work constructively and in good faith with the Independent Commission," an international committee overseeing decommissioning.[15] Through this provision, the Agreement took on the form of a comprehensive peace agreement, another significant factor contributing to its success.

Application to Bosnia-Herzegovina

During the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and soon after Bosnia received its independence in 1992, the state collapsed into a conflict now recognized as one of the decade's bloodiest bouts of ethnic violence. Bosnian Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks (Muslims) all engaged in ethnic cleansing, which did not produce a complete ethnic partition of Bosnia because North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops intervened. The Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) ended the conflict and established the complex power-sharing structure still visible in Bosnia today. The Accords established two different entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Federation) and the Republika Srpska (RS). Both possess power-sharing executives, which require ministerial representation from each of the three major communities, minority veto powers, and requirements for proportional representation in parliament and the civil service. These same measures are repeated in a similar fashion at the state level.[16] This complex structure has required considerable external force and oversight and has yet to develop into a self-sustaining democratic government. In many ways, Bosnia is a "simulation or a phantom state," as David Chandler critically labels it.[17] Bosnia faces enduring violence by radical factions and ethnic claims that cross state borders as its greatest state-building challenges, just as Northern Ireland did.

Conditions Compared with Bosnia-Herzegovina

That being said, Northern Ireland's recent history cannot compare with the violence that rocked Bosnia between 1992 and 1995. Violence in Northern Ireland was been carried out by a relatively small group of extremists, even if their actions have been more broadly accepted or supported. During the Bosnian war, however, "38% of all Serbs, 30% of all Croats and 26% of all Muslims fought as combatants, including the vast majority of able-bodied men in all three communities."[18] No Bosnian could escape the atrocities or rhetoric of the war, and the state has yet to escape the memory of them today. This fact alone has radically impacted the possibility of a long-lasting power-sharing agreement. The International Court Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) continues to try alleged war criminals and still seeks some of its most wanted, including Ratko Mladic, one of the men responsible for the massacre at Srebrenica, one of the worst episodes of the war.[19] Initial optimism that the similarities between Northern Ireland and Bosnia will lend themselves to similar results for Bosnia any time soon quickly dims in the face of the traumatic reality of a devastating war.

10   Horowitz, "Northern Ireland Agreement," 200.
11   Ibid., 202.
12   Brendan O'Leary, "Complex Power-sharing," 71.
13   Brendan O'Leary, "The Nature of the Agreement," in *The Northern Ireland Conflict: Consociational Engagements*, ed. Brendan O'Leary and John McGarry (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004): 276.
14   O'Leary, "Complex Power-sharing," 70-71.
15   "The Agreement," *Northern Ireland Office,* April 10, 1998.

16   Florian Bieber, *Post-War Bosnia: Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006): 44-6.
17   David Chandler, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton*, (Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press, 1999): 74.
18   Sumantra Bose, *Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention (*New York: Oxford University Press, 2002): 20.
19   "Karadzic arrest: Reaction in quotes," *BBC News,* July 22, 2008.

International intervention proved indispensable in ending the conflict and promoting (or imposing) peace. But the sovereign states involved, Croatia and Serbia, have not yet reached the level of cooperation necessary to enable Bosnia to follow Northern Ireland's model. Northern Ireland benefitted from diplomatic pressure, not military intervention, and although the United States played a key role leading up to the Agreement, only limited political support has been necessary in the decade since. Instead, "political progress started to decline when it became clear that Bosnia was not a priority for the Bush administration" and NATO withdrew, replaced by a European Union (EU) force.[20] Although it is clear that international involvement prevented what would have been continued ethnic cleansing and horrific violence, the political benefits have been uncertain. The High Representative, an extra-constitutional office held by an appointed international, has arrogated sweeping oversight powers to himself, which still appear necessary in order to curb corruption and violence in Bosnian politics. Regionally, the policies of Croatia and Serbia in no way resemble the positive influence of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland leading up to the Agreement. Militaries from both states were entangled in the war, and, since that time, neither state has completely withdrawn irredentist claims to Bosnian territory.

As just one example, Serbia has been slow to recognize the extent of crimes committed in the Bosnian War, so much that a resolution that would have condemned the massacre at Srebrenica failed in the Serbian parliament.[21] Serbia's "ultranationalist" security forces, among the primary agents of ethnic violence during the war, have remained "largely unreformed" and "are institutionally opposed to cooperation with the ICTY and to reforms aimed at tackling corruption and strengthening the rule of law."[22] Even with the support of the EU or other international organizations, far-reaching policy goals shared across states of this region will remain impossible without calculated external coercion. As two authors wisely noted, "We do not think that exogenous forces can promote stable consociational settlements when endogenous forces are strongly unfavourable."[23]

Like Northern Ireland did, however, Bosnia has the benefit of a framework on which to build effective power-sharing institutions, which should facilitate the inclusion of hardline parties, although this, too, may not be as simple as it appears. The DPA, signed in 1995, has tenuously provided a fifteen-year peace and the outward trappings of a consociational power-sharing system. Even radical parties like the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), which was the face of ethnic cleansing in RS, have willingly participated politically within the Dayton structure. The SDS supported Dayton at the outset

because it guaranteed regional autonomy, but this support must not be interpreted naively. The NATO powers openly coerced hardline parties at the creation of the DPA, but these parties continue to oppose a unified Bosnia and resist international efforts to enforce Dayton. Since a revised agreement constructed under international aegis would likely seek to consolidate Bosnia as a single sovereign state, hardline parties would be unwilling participants. Among Serbs, over seventy percent identify primarily by their ethnic identity, and thirty percent do not identify themselves as citizens of Bosnia at all.[24] Allowing the frequently unstable system to fumble along may be in the best interest of Serb parties, including moderates, who may still hold out hope for the partition of the RS after some renewed Bosnian crisis.

Bosnia: Prospects for a Parallel Agreement

Some aspects of the Agreement, like the decommissioning debate, lack relevance in light of the DPA, which established a long-term process for demilitarization. Although its goals have not yet been fully realized, programs instituting the re-training and integration of police and military forces have made significant progress, and the armies once controlled separately by each entity now belong to a single state-wide military. Were Bosnians or members of the international community to seek a new agreement, clauses related to decommissioning may seek to ensure long-term security and stability through the creation of a semi-permanent international oversight body, like the organization supervising decommissioning in Northern Ireland.

Unlike decommissioning, however, the cross-border arrangements that featured prominently in the Agreement remain highly salient in Bosnian politics but also pose a greater risk to Bosnia's stability. The Bosnian War erupted precisely because the SDS was emphatically opposed to independence, which separated Bosnian Serbs from other ethnic Serbs who remained within Yugoslavia.[25] Establishing stronger ties between RS and Serbia would effectively legitimize the role Serbia played in the war by granting exactly what Serbs sought to achieve through ethnic cleansing. Since serious violent conflict ended only within the last generation, trans-state institutions might be a risky proposal, encouraging Serbia or Croatia to hold on to irredentist dreams. In any case, conservative critics highlight "that the Croatian areas of Bosnia are de facto part of Croatia," so cross-border coordinating councils may merely formalize already significant foreign involvement.[26] In Northern Ireland on the other hand, these councils were helpful because they assuaged both sides' fears of being forcibly isolated from Ireland or Britain, respectively. While many of the same issues present in the case of Northern Ireland can be seen in the Bosnian case, Serbia's and Croatia's recent direct involvement in armed conflict in Bosnia presents too great a difference

20   Richard Holbrooke, "Lessons from Dayton for Iraq," *The Washington Post*, April 23, 2008.
21   Lionel Beehner, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Decade After Srebrenica," *Council on Foreign Relations,*
July 7, 2005.
22   Amela Branczik and William L. Nash, "Council on Foreign Relations: Council Special Report,"
Forgotten Intervention? What the United States Needs to Do in the Western Balkans, June 2005.
23   McGarry and O'Leary, 6.

24   Paula M. Pickering, "Explaining Support for Non-nationalist Parties in Post-conflict Societies in the
Balkans," *Europe-Asia Studies* 61, no. 4 (2009): 578.
25   Bieber, 24.
26   Chandler, *Bosnia*, 169.

for the mechanisms of the Agreement to find easy application.

Application to Kashmir

The ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity contained within Kashmir stands out as the most complex of these three cases. The disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir is divided between Pakistan, which controls "Azad" Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), and India, which controls Indian Jammu and Kashmir (IJK). IJK, where most of the violence of the past fifty years has occurred, includes three distinct regions: the Kashmir Valley, Jammu, and Ladakh. The Valley is the most populous region and contains a strong Muslim majority. Jammu is only one-third Muslim and contains instead a Hindu majority, divided into various ethnic and linguistic groups, and includes a strong Sikh presence. Ladakh is a sparsely populous region bordering China to the north, divided into two regions—one Shi'a Muslim and the other Tibetan Buddhist. Although ethnic, linguistic, and religious divides play a significant role in the politics of the region, conflict occurs along other fault lines. At the partition of India, Muslims and Hindus fought as both sides suffered the result of massive displacement. The oppressive policy of the Indian government since that time, however, has lessened this aspect of the conflict. Instead, three political groups, mostly unorganized, have emerged: Indian nationalists, Pakistani nationalists, and Kashmiri nationalists—those favoring the independence of Kashmir.[27]

Conditions Compared with Kashmir

The territorial dispute over Jammu & Kashmir has been characterized by war, oppression, and terrorism. When India and Pakistan declared their independence from the British Empire in 1947, the princely states, like Kashmir, were permitted to accede to either state. Kashmir, although a predominantly Muslim state, was ruled by a family of ethnic Dogras, upper-caste Jammu Hindus. Although it initially seemed possible that the state would join Pakistan, a revolt in Western Kashmir, which the Hindu regime blamed on Pakistan, led to war. The ceasefire line at the end of conflict nearly matches today's "Line of Control" (LOC) dividing the territory. Yet again in 1965, 1971, and 1999, fighting between the two states sought to alter this boundary with little effect. Starting in the early 1990s, violence in the region became increasingly defined by guerilla warfare between a diverse insurgency and the Indian government. Just this summer, the Indian military killed over one hundred civilians, mostly students, involved in pro-Independence demonstrations.[28] This ongoing violence, with few clear sides, presents a more muddled picture than did Northern Ireland in the 1990s.

India and Pakistan have taken limited steps toward establishing a basis for agreement, but their efforts and commitment remain unconvincing. In 1972, the two governments jointly issued the Simla Agreement, which stated in vague terms "that the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means."[29] Later, in 1999, the Lahore Declaration reiterated these same principles, and recognized their increased seriousness now that both states had developed nuclear capabilities. Since that time, little progress has been made. India has refused to negotiate with Pakistan because it blames Pakistan for fomenting terrorism within IJK.[30] To make matters worse, Bose has suggested that majority elements on both sides perceive the conflict as a zero-sum game and may desire to prolong the conflict if they cannot guarantee absolute victory.[31] Unfortunately, no agreement yet has come close to laying groundwork for a permanent constitutional solution to the Kashmir question.

This conflict also lacks the international support necessary to develop a Northern-Ireland patterned peace. The United Nations has criticized human rights violations and conflict in Kashmir but has been ineffective in facilitating a resolution to the conflict. UN peacekeeping forces have policed the LOC since 1949 but the forty-two military observers are nothing compared with the massive guerilla and military operations that have flared up intermittently for the past two decades.[32] Among other possible sources of international support, the United States has a mixed background in the region. Historically, "the objectives and strategies adopted by Washington in South Asia have fluctuated widely over time" and seem equally uncertain today, when Washington's expedient military alliance with Pakistan limits U.S. policymakers' ability to play the role of an impartial mediator.[33] China, a regional power with ascendant international influence, has itself played a minor role in the territorial dispute, disqualifying it from a role as a peace-broker. With few apparent options, any international support for conflict resolution would have to take a different form than it did in Northern Ireland.

The inclusion of Kashmir's diverse interests and especially of hardline parties' using terrorist tactics presents the most controversial hurdle to assembling a successful agreement over Kashmir. Regional diversity may be an even more insoluble problem than it first appears because the sham democracy propped up by New Delhi in IJK has prevented the formation of parties representing these diverse interests. Few parties even exist that would be capable of approaching the bargaining table, and pro-independence groups have specifically avoided political organization involvement because India has used the existence of political processes, such as they are, to

27   Bose, *Kashmir*, 8-12.
28   Jim Yardley and Hari Kumar, "India Calls for Easing of Security in Kashmir," *New York Times Online*,
September 25, 2010.

29   "Simla Agreement." Kashmir: Legal Documents, July 2, 1972.
30   Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Kashmir Dispute: Background*, 2009.
31   Bose, *Kashmir*, 219.
32   *United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan*, October 31, 2010.
33   Leo E. Rose, "South Asia and the Outside World," in *The States of South Asia: Problems of National Integration*, ed. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson and Dennis Dalton, 313-328. London: C. Hurst & Company, 1982.

legitimize its claims to the territory.

Thanks to the independence movement, India has exercised only tenuous control over IJK since independence, which has grown shakier since the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) began a grassroots insurgency against harsh oppression by the Indian military in 1990. By 1994, however, the JKLF had been so depleted by attacks from both the Indian military and competing pro-Pakistan insurgents that it was forced to agree to a ceasefire. Currently, pro-Pakistan militants, like Hizb-ul Mujahideen (HM), dominate the conflict. HM has alleged connections with Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, and Sudan[34] and holds a place on the EU Council of Ministers' list of terrorist organizations.[35] India, even more than any international body, would balk at the inclusion of any terrorist organization in talks, which it refuses to begin seriously until Pakistan ends its alleged support of these groups.[36] India's poor track record in dealing with even moderate pro-independence or pro-Pakistan groups, which it has typically prevented from obtaining political power by rigging elections, compounds this problem.

Kashmir: Prospects for a Parallel Agreement

Replicating the Agreement's use of cross-border institutions and decommissioning procedures would call for enormous international resources. India and Pakistan have not resolved their disputes enough to convincingly negotiate, let alone establish an inter-ministerial council. Furthermore, an agreement would be complicated by the creation of an independent or autonomous Kashmir, an idea neither country would particularly relish. India, which currently exerts control over the most sizable and populous region of Kashmir, would need considerable incentive to give up power over the region it uses to define itself as a multicultural, secular state. Human rights issues and associated decommissioning could prove even more difficult to resolve. Violence, characterized locally by the term "gun culture," has been widespread and long-lasting.[37] Without international support and considerable resources, no decommissioning will take place, especially since both the Pakistani and Indian militaries are implicated in training local fighters and carrying out violence. Unlike in Northern Ireland, where major political leaders like Gerry Adams held some influence over paramilitaries, it is unclear to what extent Pakistan could influence or control the terrorist organizations allegedly connected to it. If some or all of the terrorist organizations operative in Kashmir were unwilling to give up their weapons, an intensive anti-guerilla campaign would be necessary to diminish the effectiveness of these groups. This, in turn, makes

it extremely difficult to include extremist parties, as was done in Northern Ireland. While the principles of the Agreement initially appear to be viable options for a permanent solution to the conflict in Kashmir, an honest appraisal of the hardened opposing sides and recent history of violence shows that these principles would not be effective in the current situation.

Conclusion

Scholars and diplomats will and should continue to debate the merits of varying schools of thought designed to resolve disputes in deeply-divided places. At best, this debate will produce general principles guiding individual policy applications. The cases of Northern Ireland, Bosnia, and Kashmir, although facing similar challenges of cross-state loyalties and ongoing violence, demonstrate the singularity of every ethnic conflict. In the cases discussed, these guiding principles may include providing for international cooperation and cross-border institutions, including all possible parties within the region of conflict, and seeking a comprehensive peace agreement. In the end, due to the complications added by recent violence in both Kashmir and Bosnia, Northern Ireland's power-sharing agreement can be no more than a limited model. More recent and more extensive violence in Kashmir and Bosnia makes effective cooperation of the relevant sovereign governments unlikely and decommissioning— at least in the form it took in Northern Ireland—a pipe dream. Since these essential conditions have not yet been fulfilled in either Bosnia or Kashmir, a successful replication of the 1998 Agreement in either of these divided regions remains implausible.

While applying the three distinctive features of the 1998 Agreement (i.e. inclusion of extremist parties, establishment of cross-border institutions, and decommissioning) to the cases of Bosnia and Kashmir initially appears promising, upon closer inspection, none of these principles can be applied in the way they were in Northern Ireland. Extremist parties, like the terrorist organizations operating in Kashmir, may have no clear leadership or connections to significant political actors. Cross-border institutions cannot be established while, as in Kashmir, the pertinent states remain hostile or, as in Bosnia, cemented connections between the contested region and irredentist neighbors could counterproductively promote greater division. Although decommissioning must clearly be a goal of any permanent solution in Bosnia or Kashmir, the model seen in the Agreement is also not directly applicable. One hopes that enough progress will be made in Bosnia and Kashmir to place them in a position where the lessons of the Agreement may be more directly applicable. But for now, these regions must look elsewhere and inwards for innovative solutions suited to their unique political environments.

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About the Author

Joseph Cloward is a senior at the University of Pennsylvania, studying international Relations and German Studies. A native of Salt Lake City, Utah, he has spent time abroad as an intern in China and as an exchange student in Germany, during which time he was able to visit Bosnia. His studies have focused primarily on international organizations (particularly the European Union), democracy, and immigration policy. Joseph is Vice President of the Epsilon Chapter of Sigma Iota Rho Honor Society of International Relations.

Ontological Survey and the Responsibility to Protect: The United Kingdom and Rationalizing the 2011 Intervention in Libya

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Abstract

A meteoric and geopolitically game-changing Arab Spring was one of the most important events of 2011. The Arab Spring, which involved varying levels of violence across the Middle East and North Africa, would lead to a humanitarian crisis in Libya, consisting of a violent civil war between Muammar Qaddafi's forces and Libyan rebels. The crisis in Libya was great enough to warrant international intervention. Rather than taking a realist perspective, this research paper applies ontological security theory to explain the motivations for the United Kingdom's House of Commons' support for the no-fly zone established over Libya. An analysis of ontological security theory in international relations and how it applies to the responsibility to protect and humanitarian interventions is provided. The research paper concludes that the United Kingdom's self-identity, which includes a commitment to the responsibility to protect doctrine and a fear of engaging in an invasion similar to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, provided the primary incentive for intervention.

Introduction

The overwhelming geopolitical magnitude of the 2011 protests in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), colloquially called the Arab Spring, cannot be understated. Violence predictably followed the protests, but the vehement humanitarian atrocities committed by Muammar Qaddafi's forces in Libya were great enough to warrant

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international military intervention. On March 17 of that year, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1973, which authorized states to "to take all necessary measures" in Libya in order "to protect civilians and civilian populated areas" from Qaddafi's forces.[1] The resolution was co-sponsored by France, the United States, Lebanon, and the United Kingdom (UK).[2] Earlier that year, the Arab League had approved of a no-fly zone in Libya.[3]

This article explores why the UK House of Commons supported military intervention in Libya in 2011. In doing so, the research relies on ontological security theory, part of a relatively new body of literature in international relations, as a framework to answer this question. The article consists of six sections, with the first two providing a thorough literature review and the next three applying ontological security theory to answering the research question by reviewing the content discussed and debated in the House of Commons germane to whether or not to intervene in Libya. The final section concludes with a discussion of the importance of ontological security theory in answering the research question and proposes a future for ontological security theory research in international relations.

ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY THEORY

Ontological security, according to Alexandria J. Innes and Brent J. Steele, is a pursuit for a continuous self-identity and ensuring others respect and confirm to what is warranted by that self-identity.[4] Through such adoption, there needs to be clarification as to what is meant by *self-identity*. Steele considers the self as a point of which one perceives everything and acts, not as a biological being.[5] The self-identity is understood as one's perception of the self. Contrasting ontological security from traditional understandings of security, Steele explains that insecurity in the former is a matter of discomfort with the self-identity, not a matter of physical survival.[6] Ontological security also explains phenomena in international relations, using states as units of analysis. According to Innes and Steele, the state has two levels. The first level is the state acting as the social bond and providing the structural mechanisms which create ontological security for a society, and the second level is the state acting in a global or regional setting seeking to ensure ontological security.[7]

Regarding state behavior, Steele makes three claims. First, decision makers (what he refers to as "agents")[8] of powerful and allied states understand that their states' capabilities are relatively great, even when external "forces" otherwise constrain them.[9] Atomically, this claim does not differ from traditional, material-centered realist explanations. Second, according to Steele, states will only act in their self-interests or self-identity.[10] Ostensibly, this claim also does not differ from explanations made by realists; however, the inclusion of a state's self-identity extends its self-interest into a more emotional and identity-centered realm than realism permits. Steele's third claim is that the apparent moral behaviors of states are actually rational actions, because such behaviors are executed in order to protect that state's self-identity.[11] This may be what most sets ontological security theory apart from realism: the former revolves around states' rational behaviors in regards to preserving order and consistency for identity purposes, but the latter's application of rationalism is primarily in regards to material factors.

Two other important elements included in ontological security theory are the self-narrative of states and critical situations. Steele posits that states understand their self-identity through language. Everything a state does in international relations must be justified through this self-narrative, which will prompt it to articulate what a policy means for its sense of self-identity.[12] Steele defines critical situations as events which "disturb the institutionalized routines of states."[13] Steele notes three criteria agents need to identify to establish a critical situation. First, a situation must be recognized as "unpredictable." Second, the situation has to affect a large number of individuals. Third, agents have to identify the state as capable of averting the situation.[14] Wars, sudden economic collapses, and humanitarian crises alike have the potential of being identified as critical situations and axiomatically pose threats to the ontological security of individuals.

Steele explains why, although states seek to protect their physical security, ontological security is more important than a more traditional realist perspective. To jeopardize ontological security causes the individuals of those states to feel "shame," or distress about maintaining the state's narrative in having "a coherent biography" of itself. Shame is unlike "guilt" (disobedience of some sort of general rule or law). In order for observers to identify shame, states' agents must either vocally regret past behaviors or perform "counterfactual exercises" to extrapolate information about how a particular course of action would be incompatible with a state's self-identity. A state's shame

1　United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1973," *United Nations,* March 17, 2011.
2　"UN authorises no-fly zone over Libya," *Al Jazeera,* March 18, 2011.
3　Edward Cody, "Arab League condemns broad Western bombing campaign in Libya," *The Washington Post.* March 20, 2011.
4　Alexandria J. Innes, and Brent J. Steele, "Memory, Trauma and Ontological Security," in *Memory and Trauma in International Relations*, ed. Erica Resende and Dovile Budrtye, (Routledge, 2012).
5　Brent J. Steele, *Defacing Power: The Aesthetics of Insecurity in Global Politics*, Ann Arbor (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 2010): 76.
6　Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-Identity and the IR State* (New York City, New York: Routledge, 2008): 51.
7　Innes and Steele, 4.

8　Brent J. Steele, "Ontological Security, Shame, and 'Humanitarian' Action," (PhD Diss., University of Iowa, 2005) 93.
9　Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations*, 70.
10　Ibid., 38.
11　Ibid.
12　Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations,* 10-11.
13　Steele, *Ontological Security and Humanitarian Action,* 91.
14　Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations,* 12-13.

can be "retrospective" insomuch as it is a disapproval of past actions, or it can occur when agents are currently considering how possible actions' relate to the state's self-identity.[15]

Given the possibility for states to act on moral grounds in order to fulfill their ontological security, scholars have analyzed many supposed moral actions to better understand the motivations of such states. Specifically, humanitarian actions have received some attention from ontological security theorists. For example, Steele performs a case study regarding why various member-states in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) supported intervention in Kosovo. He proposes that ignoring the welfare of the Albanian people would have threatened the ontological security of NATO's member states. Steele notes that a state considers two factors when something threatens its ontological security. First, the state ponders how the critical situation could compromise the self-identity. Second, the state takes into account its capabilities in producing a solution to address the critical situation.[16] These factors assume agents apply practicality when deciding to intervene in humanitarian crises, with hegemonic states at a greater likelihood (assuming the first criterion Steele poses is met) to intervene than weaker states.

The application of practicality in ontological security theory is different when compared to a more materialistic approach to security studies, which typically focuses on how all situations, like humanitarian interventions, are threats to a powerful state's material interests. Ontological security theory, in contrast, considers powerful states, because of their capabilities, as also privy to ontological insecurity when a humanitarian crisis arises because they recognize that their capabilities give them the power to end such a crisis.[17] Leaders of weaker states may be, in critical situations, less ontologically insecure because they may realize that their lack of capability bars them from effectively handling such situations effectively.

By reviewing statements made by British political leaders in the context of Kosovo, Steele recognizes two sources of shame for the United Kingdom: first, the UK's pre-World War II policy of engagement, often commenting on the appeasement policy and associating Milosevic with Hitler. Second, the UK's failure to act early enough to the Bosnian conflict a few years ago provides further ontological insecurity.[18] The shame felt by the British, essentially, was a motivating factor in its support for intervention in Kosovo.

The Responsibility to Protect and Ontological Security

When considering more recent humanitarian crises, it is helpful to consider the role of the responsibility to protect doctrine in understanding state behaviors. The doctrine was created for the purpose of creating international solutions to such humanitarian crises which occur in a domestic environment. The doctrine was first adopted as a resolution by the United Nations General Assembly during the 2005 World Summit. First, the resolution states, "Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means."[19] An inalienable duty for every state to avoid the occurrence of great atrocities to their own denizens is recognized in this resolution. It is implied that no state has the right to allow large-scale atrocities to occur within its borders on the basis of sovereignty alone. Second, the resolution explicitly affirms that the responsibility to protect is a global—not simply a state-centric—duty. In the resolution, the "international community" is called upon whenever a humanitarian crisis occurs to collectively apply non-violent means in order to help the victimized population in the crisis. If nonviolent collective actions fail to adequately protect the population, intervention for the purpose of such protection is warranted, as approved by the Security Council and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations.[20] On April 26, 2006, the Security Council approved the World Summit's resolution's paragraphs regarding the responsibility to protect in Resolution 1674.[21]

What could the World Summit's resolution mean for states' self-identities and the study of ontological security? Although it involves more than militaristic answers to extreme humanitarian crises, the responsibility to protect doctrine is applicable to humanitarian intervention. The responsibility to protect doctrine provides a constructed framework of understanding state sovereignty in which the international community can invalidate a state's sovereignty in order to revert or prevent the greatest offenses to humanity. According to Anthony Burke, this doctrine's origin, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty's report *The Responsibility to Protect*, chaired by Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, purposely sought to reinterpret state sovereignty and security. The chairs identify the Commission's actions as "efforts to redefine basic concepts of sovereignty and international community [that] are highly relevant to international security."[22]

Indeed, the responsibility to protect doctrine is highly relevant to *ontological security* because states which adhere to the doctrine could use it to contribute to their narratives. It is important for proponents of the doctrine to utilize an actor's self-

15   *Ibid.*, 52-55.
16   Steele, *Ontological Security and Humanitarian Action*, 131 and 140.
17   Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations,* 70.
18   Steele, *Ontological Security and Humanitarian Action*, 143-44.

19   United Nations General Assembly, "2005 World Summit Outcome," United Nations, October 24, 2005.
20   Ibid.
21   United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1674," United Nations, April 28, 2006.
22   Anthony Burke, "Against the New Internationalism," *Ethics & International Affairs* (Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs) 19, no. 2 (2005): 76-77.

identity through a process Steele refers to as "recall," which refers to the past in order to motivate actors to continue to behave in a particular manner.[23] Rhetoric which reminds actors of humanitarian crises in the past and/or prior commitments to the responsibility to protect doctrine are important because they may help ensure that states uphold their legal responsibility to intervene when necessary.

Agents and other political actors, both domestically and internationally, can find utility with recall, which is one technique related to what Steele calls "reflexive discourse." When discussing states acting in a humanitarian crises, Steele explains that "both capabilities and 'principles'" contribute to the state's self-identity. In considering what actions the state should take, being offended by a humanitarian crisis cannot itself mobilize the state. To avoid acquiescence, agents must recognize the state's capabilities in addressing the crisis.[24] If a state is to commit to the responsibility to protect doctrine, then discourse must reach the identity of that state, both in terms of capabilities and principles. An agent's reference to a state's commitment to some moral or international obligation is not sufficient if the state's agents believe it to be incapable of fulfilling such a principle. An example of reflexive discourse (not regarding the responsibility to protect), is John McCain's criticism of the treatment of prisoners in Abu Ghraib, iterating that the United States must employ "humane standards of treatment" towards other people, regardless of how "evil" those people are. Anything inhumane, according to McCain, is unbecoming of what it is to be an American.[25] McCain's criticism is a powerful reflexive discourse because it refers to the American self-identity of "exceptionalism," creating shame for what happened in Abu Ghraib.

Reflexive discourse must remind states not only of the norms it values, but also of how those norms are understood. Take, for instance, how the responsibility to protect relates to states which respect the norm of state sovereignty but are concerned about a humanitarian crises happening within another state's borders. As stated before, the responsibility to protect interprets state sovereignty as no longer a free pass to perpetrate violations of human rights. The principle of sovereignty, in the context of the responsibility to protect, cannot trump the principle of human rights in extreme cases. As Steele mentioned before, the international community struggles to reach some sound *via media* between human rights and sovereignty.[26] This *via media* can be further recognized through the responsibility to protect doctrine because the doctrine provides the circumstances under which humanitarian intervention cannot be avoided on the basis of state sovereignty alone.

23   Steele, "Ontological Security in International Relations," 126.
24   Brent J. Steele, "Making Words Matter: The Asian Tsunami, Darfur, and 'Reflexive Discourse' in International Politics," *International Studies Quarterly* (Blackwell Publishing) no. 51 (2007): 906.
25   Brent J. Steele, "'Ideals that were really never in our possession': Torture, Honor and US Identity," *International Relations* (Sage Publisher), no. 22 (2008): 254-55.
26   Steele, "Making Words Matter," 913.

The responsibility to protect can improve a state's capabilities in addressing humanitarian crises because it provided avenues of legitimizing intervention. The UN Security Council approval of interventions, for example, may make states more capable of addressing humanitarian crises. The responsibility to protect doctrine, when used in reflexive discourse, is utilized for the purpose of persuading states' agents, to behave in a manner which is consistent with their self-identity.

Without any empirical evidence to confirm or deny the role of the responsibility to protect doctrine in understanding states' behaviors in regards to their ontological security, such a role would be simply a prolix hypothesis. Using a case study of the UK's rationalization of intervention in Libya, we can see that the responsibility to protect doctrine is useful in understanding the British self-identity.

THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

The violence in Libya can easily be identified as a critical situation for the United Kingdom, as it meets all three of Steele's criteria. First, the humanitarian crisis in Libya, just like the Arab Spring itself, was a wholly unexpected development. As Jennifer Welsh puts it, "Libya was on no one's watch list in terms of being at risk of mass atrocity crimes."[27] Second, the violence in Libya affected a large number of people (mostly the Libyans); the physical security of various British and other peoples was also in jeopardy.[28] Finally, the United Kingdom was capable of addressing the situation in Libya in such a way as to secure its self-identity.

The UK's state-level narrative in relation to the Libyan crisis is integral in understanding why the country intervened. This article will specifically focus on the narrative of the members of the House of Commons (HoC). Although Prime Minister David Cameron could individually make the decision to intervene militarily in Libya, he presented the issue to the House of Commons for a vote.[29] This vote made the HoC members the UK's decision makers—and, thus, agents—during the crisis. Questions, answers, and general statements made by its members provide examples of reflexive discourse, particularly should they refer to the narrative of the UK's self-identity to justify intervention. To navigate the statements made in debates, expressed sources of shame for past behaviors relevant to the situation in Libya, discussions regarding the responsibility to protect, and other justifications for intervention are identified. Possible material interests and their relation to interests pertaining to British self-identity are also noted.

27   Jennifer Welsh, "Civilian Protection in Libya: Putting Coercion and Controversy Back into RtoP," *Ethics & International Affairs* (Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs), 2011: 7.
28   British Parliament, "House of Commons," *Parliament,* February 28, 2011.
29   Robert Stevens, "British Parliament overwhelmingly endorses war," *World Socialist Web Site,* March 23, 2011.

In the discourse regarding intervention, there was consistent moralistic framing of the Libyan crisis. Members of Parliament (MPs) were quick to identify the Qaddafi regime's atrocities as inhumane. As Andrew Love from Edmonton said:

Is not the dilemma in Libya that left to its own resources the least likely option is that the Gaddafi regime will be brought to a quick end? Gaddafi is already enforcing his position in Tripoli, the capital, and, as we have heard from hon. Members on both sides, there are real worries that there will be not only a humanitarian disaster, but a human rights disaster. The Prime Minister has indicated some areas that he is examining, but will he redouble efforts…to ensure that we do not stand by and see that happen?[30]

Cameron's response to Love's question framed the intervention as a duty which the United Kingdom was obligated to fulfill. The Prime Minister, in agreement with Love, could not accept restraint on the part of the UK and other members of NATO.[31]

Before discussing the role of the responsibility to protect doctrine itself in rationalizing the UK's decision to intervene in Libya, it should be noted that British leadership was familiar with the doctrine. Adèle Brown, for a case study on the doctrine, references then-MPs David Cameron and David Miliband's invocation of the doctrine regarding the 2008 cyclone which led to a humanitarian crisis in Burma. The military junta in Burma forbade foreign humanitarian aid to enter, which prompted outrage from the UK. Cameron asked, "Will the Prime Minister make it absolutely clear that, in our view, the responsibility to protect should be extended to Burma and to Burmese people at this time?" Brown explained that the Labour government's interpretation of the doctrine was accepted by both the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats.[32] Prime Minister Cameron also recalled, in a question regarding the need to expand the Security Council's role in order to improve the international community's responsibility to protect, his role as the opposition leader when he asked "whether it should be invoked" to address the crises in Burma.[33] As noted before, recalling is a method useful in reflexive discourse because it can promote a continuation of previous behavior. By recalling past willingness to apply the responsibility to protect doctrine, a note of a contradiction should the UK ignore the situation in Libya is being taken by Cameron and others.

With Burma in mind, it is clear that utilizing the responsibility to protect doctrine was not an unfamiliar narrative in the United Kingdom. The Burmese crisis figured in the debates regarding the conflict in Libya. MP Edward Miliband, the opposition leader, said:

Many will ask one additional question: why are we intervening in Libya, but not in other countries around the world? …What is happening in Yemen is deeply troubling, and what is happening in Bahrain is equally troubling. Historically, the cases of Burma, Rwanda and other countries live on in our conscience, and yet here I do agree with the Prime Minister: the argument that because we cannot do everything we cannot do anything is a bad argument. In the world that we live in, the action that we take depends on a combination of principle and pragmatism—what is right, and what can be done.[34]

Miliband's statement is important for two reasons. First, it explains that past humanitarian disasters still are parts of the UK's "conscience" and argues for a need to, when possible, address such disasters because of "principle." Second, while the UK's agents recognized the finite capabilities in addressing similar atrocities, the statement recognizes the United Kingdom's capacity to address Libya's situation. Miliband addresses both parts of self-identity: principle and capability. This statement emphasizes that the situation in Libya, while containing a certain moral appeal, was certainly rationalized. The emphasis on "pragmatism" makes it clear that were the UK incapable of intervening in Libya, it would be irrational for it to do so. Similarly, the lack of intervention would also be irrational because the UK would be threatening its self-identity by ignoring the responsibility to protect.

Sources of Shame for the United Kingdom

The importance placed on the responsibility to protect in the House of Commons was a potential source of shame should the UK and international community fail to protect the Libyan people. MP Stephen Twigg from Liverpool, West Derby expressed the importance in acting in Libya when he said:

Two decades on from Bosnia, Europe has again been hesitant and divided. I would say to the Minister and to the Foreign Secretary as a matter of some urgency, that the British Government have [sic] an opportunity to lead a debate on making the responsibility to protect a practical, operational reality. Otherwise, it will simply be fine words on paper. We must also press our European partners to give practical support to help achieve democracy and self-determination across the region.[35]

Twigg's statement identifies a source of prior shame: the Bosnian conflict in the 1990s. The Bosnian conflict has been identified as a source of shame by Steele, who describes how the UK, in order to address its ontological insecurity, sought to correct its delayed actions in Bosnia by supporting the 1999 intervention in Kosovo.[36] Twigg's reference to the Bosnian conflict demonstrated the British agents' anxiety of the possibility of horrific outcomes in Libya should the appropriate international response come too

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30   British Parliament, "House of Commons," *Parliament,* February 28, 2011.
31   Ibid.
32   Adèle Brown, "Reinventing Humanitarian Intervention: Two Cheers for the Responsibility to Protect?" *Soft-@.* June 17, 2008.
33   British Parliament, "House of Commons," *Parliament,* March 14, 2011.

34   British Parliament, "House of Commons (pt. 2)," *Parliament,* March 21, 2011.
35   British Parliament, "House of Commons (pt. 3)," *Parliament,* March 17, 2011.
36   Steele, "Ontological Security in International Relations," 129-31.

late.

Another source of shame identified in the parliamentary debates was the 2003 conflict in Iraq. Indeed, as MP Richard Burden from Birmingham, Northfield put it:

[T]he spectre [sic] of Iraq haunts us all. I was opposed to the invasion of Iraq… but I also hold the view that the issues [in Libya] are very different…. There have been no off-the-shelf neo-con theories in which the answer was clear in advance and all that remained was the question that allowed that answer to be put into effect—the answer being that we would end up going to war.[37]

Ultimately, however, the responsibility to protect outweighed such concerns regarding the supposed mistake of going to Iraq. Burden said, in regards to why to intervene in Libya, "[T]he United Nations, as a result of the experience of Bosnia, Rwanda and other places, agreed that the international community did and does have a responsibility to protect. That is right and this is a test of our willingness to do that."[38] The Iraq war and the general revulsion of it is part of the UK's self-identity, but Burden's statements engaged in reflexive discourse by framing the situation in Libya and the application of the responsibility to protect as dissimilar to the Iraq War. What happened in Iraq, to follow his logic, was based on neo-conservative dogma invested in finding whatever justification to invade non-democracies. Even though the UK is ashamed of this adventurism in Iraq, being a legitimate human rights tragedy and not a neo-conservative ploy to invade an autocratic state is what makes the crisis in Libya different. This preserves both an anti-neo-conservative narrative and a responsibility to protect narrative for the self-identity of the UK.

Likewise, Cameron framed the situation in Libya as unlike Iraq:

I want to deal with the way in which we will ensure that this is not another Iraq. … The UN resolution, which we…helped draft, makes it clear that there will be no foreign occupation of Libya…. It excludes an occupation force in any form…. However, I would argue that the differences from Iraq go deeper. It is not just that this time, the action has the full, unambiguous legal authority of the United Nations nor that it is backed by Arab countries and a broad international coalition, but that millions in the Arab world want to know that the UN, the US, the UK, the French and the international community care about their suffering and their oppression. The Arab world has asked us to act with it to stop the slaughter, and that is why we should answer that call.[39]

Cameron's statement further distances Libya from the Iraq War by emphasizing that intervention in Libya was authorized by the Security Council and had already

garnered regional support, whereas Iraq procured neither conditions. Such statements ultimately recalled the mistakes in Iraq so that Libya would not generate ontological insecurity. Had the narrative been different—should Cameron and other political leaders have presented the invasion of Libya not as a duty to enforce the responsibility to protect doctrine but rather as another neo-conservative invasion—the shame of Iraq could have disincentivized MPs to support the intervention.

It needs to be noted, however, that the British general public was not as supportive as the House of Commons. Kev Boyle cites an opinion poll from the Financial Times which showed an ITV/ComRes poll finding only thirty-five percent of people agreeing it was right for the UK to use military action in Libya. On the other hand, ninety-eight percent of the House of Commons voted in favor of the intervention.[40] This is a disparity of popularity between the government and the population which should not be ignored in international relations theory, including the scholarship for ontological security theory and the responsibility to protect doctrine. As Alanna Krolikowski puts it, there are various observations which are compromised when ontological security theory is applied at the state-level. Factors which pertain to the self-identity and ontological security of individuals may be overlooked.[41] This is not meant to invalidate the state-level of analysis in ontological security theory, but it does identify limitations to this approach.

Physical or Ontological Insecurity?

An alternative explanation for the UK's intervention in Libya focuses on physical, not ontological, security. Conway Waddington argues that British involvement in Libya was a "political intervention" with the goal of ousting the Qaddafi regime, rather than a humanitarian one to protect Libyan citizens. Waddington argues that the responsibility to protect doctrine was misused as a cover for political motives. If NATO was genuinely intervening because of the responsibility to protect and normative values of humanitarian intervention, it would have negotiated with Qaddafi when he was willing to enter a peaceful settlement in June of 2011.[42]

The British were indeed interested in regime change in Libya, as Cameron argued that security concerns would persist should Qaddafi remain in power. He said, "To take people with us we have to make the arguments both that it is wrong to stand aside as this dictator massacres his own people and it is in our interests to act, and also that it is in [British] national interest, because [the British] do not want this pariah state on

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37   British Parliament, "House of Commons (Pt. 3)," *Parliament,* March 21, 2011.
38   Ibid.
39   British Parliament, "House of Commons," *Parliament,* March 21, 2011.

40   Kev Boyle, "35% of British public, 98% of British parliament support attack on Libya," *No One to Vote For*, March 21, 2011.
41   Alanna Krolikowski, "State Personhood in Ontological Security Theories of International Relations and Chinese Nationalism: A Sceptical View," *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 2 (2008): 133.
42   Conway Waddington, "Taking the moral high ground: A critical analysis of humanitarian-inspired international intervention in Libya," *British International Studies Assocation,* Edinburgh, 2012, 6.

our borders."[43] In another statement, Cameron explained:

As I have said, I think that what we see coming together here is Britain acting with others in favour [sic] of international law and international governance and the UN and all that is right and fair and decent in our world, yet, at the same time, I believe, very much acting in our national interest, because it is not in our national interest for this man to lead a pariah state on the southern banks of Europe with all the problems that that could entail.[44]

Cameron asserts that there are threats to the UK's physical security should Libya remain a recalcitrant pariah, but he does not advocate for regime change as an end itself. It should not be misconstrued as ontological security's supplanting any argument regarding physical security, but it is difficult to conclude regime change as the primary factor in the UK's decision to invade Libya. It is worth noting that this alleged plan follows a "series of moves the Libyan leader's officials portray as concessions" which many powerful states in the West deemed to be deceptive "ploys."[45]

Furthermore, the UK found regime change and humanitarian intervention in Libya to be co-constitutive. In a joint statement, President Barack Obama, Prime Minister David Cameron, and President Nicolas Sarkozy said, "Our duty and our mandate under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973 is to protect civilians, and we are doing that. It is not to remove Qaddafi by force. But it is impossible to imagine a future for Libya with Qaddafi in power."[46] Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams recognize that not engaging in regime change can be quite difficult when protecting civilians. They say, "When the principal threat to civilians comes from the regime, those demanding strict separation need to explain how peacekeepers or coalitions authorized to use force to protect civilians can do so effectively without facilitating regime change."[47]

Ontological security theory provides deep insight into the UK's rationalization to support intervention in Libya. Clearly, the responsibility to protect doctrine and adherence to it on the part of the UK in garnering global and regional support for intervention is crucial in comprehending this rationalization. There are concerns about materialistic and geopolitical reasons for intervention, but evidence in favor of material interests' taking precedence over ontological ones is lacking.

CONCLUSION

As demonstrated by the analysis of debates in the House of Commons, the UK's decision to intervene in Libya was rooted in ontological security concerns regarding the responsibility to protect doctrine. The narrative successfully recalled the UK's past commitment to the responsibility to protect. Simultaneously, the narrative circumvented the Iraq War as a potential source of shame which could derail efforts to support intervention. The intervention enjoyed overwhelming support in the House of Commons; however, popular support for the intervention was lukewarm. The gap of support for intervention between the House of Commons and the general public implicates the state as a divided, not unified, actor. Multiple MPs referenced the responsibility to protect as a justification for intervening in Libya.

What could explain such popular support in the House of Commons while mediocre support characterized the general public? Answering this question can be beneficial for the further development of ontological security theory because it presents scholars with a situation in which the same conflict which threatened a government's ontological security failed to do the same for the majority of its citizens. The disparity of support may reflect a difference in understanding the Iraq War, but research to validate or invalidate this assumption goes beyond the scope of this paper. The Iraq War is associated by the British with neo-conservatism, and its unpopularity can have the potential to create ontological insecurity with any future crisis seemingly obligating international intervention. Perhaps the British public did not understand the responsibility to protect as well as its political elite; therefore, this doctrine and the shame associated with it was not integrated into the British populace's self-identity. This should be discussed in future research, for it is outside the scope of this paper.

Ontological security theory can have other important insights into other situations still developing in MENA, post-Arab Spring. For example, the international community has been anxious about events occurring in Syria. Ontological security theory should be applied in future research regarding the crises in Syria. Such research may help scholars better understand the influence and limits which the responsibility to protect may have amongst the states in the international community, especially given the current debates about what the international community is to do about the Syrian civil war.

Ontological security theory has been insightful in helping researchers better understand the behaviors of states through its examination of non-material factors in their decision-making processes. As has been shown in this case study, scholarship regarding the responsibility to protect can benefit from ontological security theory's understanding of international relations and self-identity. Ontological security theory has the potential for identifying the shortcomings the understanding of the responsibility to protect doctrine currently faces in being applied by the international

43   British Parliament, "House of Commons," *Parliament,* March 21, 2011.
44   Ibid.
45   Nick Carey, "Rebels dismiss election offer, NATO Pounds Tripoli," *Reuters,* June 16, 2011.
46   Barack Obama, David Cameron, and Nicolas Sarkozy, "Libya's Pathway to Peace," *New York Times,* April 14, 2011.
47   Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, "The new politics of protection? Côte d'Ivoire, Libya and the responsibility to protect," *International Affairs* (Blackwell Publishing) 87, no. 4 (2011): 849

community (including in the case of Syria's ongoing civil war). Even more important, this theory's contribution to the field of international relations is the solutions it might uncover for overcoming global and regional conflicts.

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Ethnicity, Regime Type, and Civil Conflict

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ABSTRACT

Civil war is a source of enormous instability around the world, particularly in developing countries. Ethnopolitical power configurations are a main causal factor in many of these conflicts. Thus far, existing scholarship fails to capture how ethnopolitical power configurations at the central state level and regime type affect the onset of civil and ethnic conflict. This paper explores the relationship between these two variables to investigate ethnicity as a causal factor in the onset of internal conflict. Using the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset, this paper conducts a quantitative study of ethnicity, regime type, and civil conflict and discovers that ethnopolitical power configurations are indeed a strong factor in the onset of domestic conflict around the world.

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, academics have debated the relevance of ethnicity in determining the roots of civil conflict. In the eruption of civil conflict worldwide after the end of the Cold War, many social scientists believed in a primordial explanation of ancient hatreds between different ethnic groups. Ethnicity was viewed as the source of numerous civil wars. Researchers felt that as ethnicity was a part of human nature, it would be difficult to overcome this primordial instinct and prevent future civil conflicts. As research evolved, the debate shifted to economic factors, dismissing ethnicity. Yet, new research conducted using the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset has

once again changed the direction of the debate. Ethnicity can be a major causal factor in onset of civil conflict and should not be dismissed.

I seek to further analyze the role ethnicity plays in the onset of civil war, focusing on domestic political institutions and regime type as intervening variables between ethnicity and civil conflict onset. Ethnopolitical power configurations are vital to understanding what causes frustrations to erupt into civil war. I posit that when large portions of a population are excluded from central state politics on the basis of ethnicity, there is a higher probability of civil conflict onset, regardless of regime type.

This paper will first review the literature on the subject of ethnicity and civil war and introduce the new Ethnic Power Relations Dataset. This will be followed by an analysis of how regime type affects the probability of civil conflict onset. I will then introduce my methodology and run statistical tests to substantiate my theory on the relationship between ethnopolitical power configurations, regime type, and civil conflict onset.

Literature Review: The Role of Ethnicity in Internal Conflicts

The role of ethnicity in the onset of civil war is extremely contested. Literature on the subject can be categorized into three main schools of thought: greed and opportunity, diversity breeds conflict, and minority mobilization. In each school, ethnicity plays a drastically different causal or non-causal role in the onset of civil war.

The *greed and opportunity* school is headed by Collier and Hoeffler's work and focuses primarily on the role of economic factors in the generation of civil conflicts.[1] Authors in this school take an instrumentalist approach, viewing ethnicity as a tool used by individuals, groups, or elites motivated by economic prospects to organize a rebellion.[2] In this model, ethnicity is not a causal factor, but merely an organizational tool. Further, this model suggests that conflict is a calculated move to maximize material profits; this is the *greed* component of the school's argument.[3] Leaders decide to engage in open rebellion and conflict to maximize material utility and may use ethnicity and ethnic grievances as a flag around which they rally the troops if the material benefits are insufficient motivation.

This first school also focuses on *opportunity*. Rebels, so the argument goes, fight militarily weak governments for looting purposes.[4] Again, this derives from the

school's emphasis on economic motivators rather than ethnic or political ones. Fearon and Laitin's work on insurgency shows that wars erupt when rebels have ample opportunity to hide from troops.[5] Collier and Hoeffler also show that civil wars will occur where the rebellion is most feasible—*not* necessarily where actors are motivated by ethnic grievances.[6] Researchers in this school of *greed and opportunity* often use the ethnic fractionalization index to measure ethnicity. By looking only at the demographics of a society using this index, however, researchers are not fully investigating the role of ethnic politics that is so often an integral part of civil war. This first school of thought touts the central role of economics and material greed as the causal factors, largely dismissing ethnicity as a potential causal factor in the onset of civil conflict.

On the other hand, the *diversity breeds conflict* school does not entirely dismiss the role of ethnicity in instigating civil conflict. This theory rests upon the assumption that more ethnically diverse states are more likely to see civil conflict.[7] Like the greed and opportunity school, this theory analyzes the demographics of a population to measure the causal role of ethnicity in civil conflict. Many researchers also use the ethnic fractionalization index for their studies. Fearon and Laitin's work is well known for disproving this school of thought.[8] Fearon and Laitin found that the estimates for the effect of both ethnic and religious fractionalization are substantively and statistically insignificant in the onset of civil war.[9] Despite this literature contesting its validity, the *diversity breeds conflict* school remains a viable alternative for explaining the role of ethnicity in civil conflict onset.

The final school of thought is the *minority mobilization theory*. Essentially, this theory proposes that when minorities are discriminated against, they are inclined to rebel.[10] This theory rests on the sociobiological argument that humans tend to favor kin and co-ethnics over others. Based on this theory, researchers created the Minorities At Risk (MAR) Dataset, a central source for data collection used in numerous studies. Problematic in this theory, however, is its discounting of the possibility of majority ethnic groups' instigating conflict. Empirical evidence shows that both ethnic minorities and ethnic majorities have instigated civil wars. The MAR excludes numerous cases of ethnicity's generation of conflict by limiting the analysis to only discriminated-against minorities.

Shortcomings in the Current Literature

1   Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56 (2004): 563-595.
2   David A. Lake and Donald S. Rothchild, *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Scalation*, (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1998): 5.
3   Collier and Hoeffler.
4   Andreas Wimmer, Lars-Erik Cederman and Brian Min, "Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Dataset," *American Sociological Review* 74, 2 (2009): 317.

5   James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 79-80.
6   Collier and Hoeffler, "Greed."
7   Wimmer, Cederman and Min, "New Global Dataset," 317.
8   Fearon and Laitin, 83.
9   Ibid.
10   Wimmer, Cederman and Min, "New Global Dataset," 317.

There are several shortcomings in the existing literature that the new Ethnic Power Relations Dataset (EPR) hopes to fill. The first main shortcoming is the limited understanding of the role of the state in ethnic conflict. Most academics treat the state as an ethnically neutral actor rather than an active participant in such conflicts.[11] In many cases, the state is actually the source of ethnic discrimination. The state's role as a perpetuator of ethnic discrimination could be key in analyzing ethnicity's role in civil war. Furthermore, ethnic conflicts result from interactions between the state and ethnopolitical movements that challenge the state's authority, not everyday encounters between individual civilians.[12] Again, the role of the state is essential to understanding how ethnic politics provoke the onset of civil conflict.

Additionally, the literature fails to adequately analyze the role of ethnic politics. Ethnopolitical relationships in state-power configurations are very important in understanding conflict. Ethnicity influences all levels of state power. Simply measuring ethnic demographics of a population using measurements like the ethnic fractionalization index limits any analysis of ethnicity and conflict. In order to accurately capture the role of ethnicity in civil conflict, it is necessary to analyze what role ethnicity plays in power configurations, particularly in the central government. The EPR distinguishes itself from similar datasets in that it looks specifically at ethnopolitical power configurations rather than measuring the ethnic demographics of a state. The Dataset addresses these two major shortcomings—accurately analyzing the ethnic bias in the state and looking at ethnopolitical power configurations rather than ethnic "demographics"—to re-analyze the vital role that ethnicity plays in civil conflict.

THE ETHNIC POWER RELATIONS DATASET

The Ethnic Power Relations Dataset is revolutionizing the way that academics are analyzing the role of ethnicity in the onset of civil conflict. This dataset measures all politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to executive state power in each year from 1946-2005.[13] This comprehensive dataset extensively uses expert input to carefully code each country. The findings from original research using the EPR are remarkable.

Cederman, Min, and Wimmer, the primary creators of the Dataset, have published several articles using the EPR. The first major conclusion these authors have come to is that ethnic politics are central to explaining the dynamics of war and peace.[14]

Furthermore, the likelihood of armed conflict increases as the center of power in a state becomes more ethnically segmented and greater proportions of a population are excluded from power due to their ethnicity.[15] Armed conflicts are driven by ethnic competition over state power rather than other factors like high degrees of diversity or economic greed. These researchers effectively challenged the assumptions of the first two prominent schools—*greed and opportunity* and *diversity breeds conflict*. Additionally, they brought ethnicity back into the analysis as a major causal factor of civil conflict.

While their findings are extensive, the role of regime type was largely overlooked. Though regime type did receive a paragraph acknowledging it as a potential factor in explaining civil conflict, researchers have not yet fully investigated regime type as a determinant variable in explaining the onset of civil war. As such, this paper uses this new dataset and builds off of the research done by Cederman, Min, and Wimmer to investigate the role of regime type as an intervening variable between ethnic exclusion from power and the onset of civil conflict.

THE ROLE OF REGIME TYPE IN CIVIL CONFLICTS

Extensive research has been conducted on the role of regime type and the onset of civil conflict. However, the relationship between ethnicity, regime type, and onset of civil conflict is still yet to be established. Hegre is perhaps the most prominent scholar on democracy and civil war. In his work, he discovered that there is an inverted "U"-shaped relationship between civil war and democracy.[16] That is, the stronger the democracy—or, conversely, the autocracy—is, the less likely it is that there will be an outbreak of civil conflict. However, in transitioning semi-democracies and anocracies, there is a significantly higher chance of civil conflict. Many other researchers have also shown that the democratization process itself can be a catalyst of instability and war.[17]

Much of the literature follows general democratic civil peace theory, which states that democracies are less likely to experience civil conflict. There are numerous explanations for this theory. Generally, democracies are more accountable, legitimate, and transparent governments, which decreases the likelihood of rebellion.[18] Citizens in a democracy are consulted on a regular basis through elections, and within the upper levels of the government, there are usually ample institutional checks and balances on power. Therefore, it is assumed that the outbreak of violent conflict is less

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11   Ibid., 318-319.
12   Lars-Erik Cederman and Luc Girardin, "Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity onto Nationalist Insurgencies," *American Political Science Review* 101, no. 1 (2007): 175.
13   Lars-Erik Cederman, Brian Min, and Andreas Wimmer, "Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel?" *World Politics* 62, no. 1. (2010): 13.
14   Wimmer, Cederman and Min, "New Global Dataset," 335.

15   Ibid., 334.
16   Havard Hegre, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates and Nils Peter Gleditsch, "Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992," *American Political Science Review* 95, no. 1 (2001): 38.
17   Judith Vorrath and Lutz F. Krebs, "Democratisation and Conflict in Ethnically Divided Societies," *Living Reviews in Democracy* 1 (2009): 5.
18   Ibid., 4.

likely.[19] Auvinen posits that since democratic political institutions enjoy high domestic legitimacy, discontent does not lead to serious challenges to democratic regimes.[20] Another explanation is that by granting citizens civil and political rights, democracies decrease the likelihood of discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, race, religion, language, or politics.[21] In addition to protecting civil and political rights, democratic regimes normally grant greater economic rights to their citizens, thereby reducing the likelihood of frustration and subsequent rebellion.[22] Because conflict often erupts over the unequal distribution of state resources, if a democracy distributes these resources equitably rather than along ethnic or other fractious lines, there is a lower chance of civil conflict.[23] All of these are plausible explanations supporting democratic civil peace theory.

While much of the literature seems to support democratic civil peace theory, other researchers show that when it comes to ethnic cleavages, political institutions are not enough to stem the flood of violence inspired by discriminatory ethnopolitical power configurations. The research team of Collier and Hoeffler, as well as that of Fearon and Laitin, each found independently that the level of democracy is non-significant in the onset of ethnic conflict.[24] Sambanis' earlier work found that democracy is generally non-significant in the study of ethnic conflict.[25] This literature contradicting the democratic civil peace theory is persuasive, but not all-inclusive.

Methods

The research carried out in this study seeks to bridge the gap between ethnopolitical power configurations, regime type, and civil conflict by using the EPR to show that if a portion of the population is excluded from central state power on the basis of ethnicity, then regardless of regime type, the likelihood of civil conflict increases. I present two separate hypotheses using two similar, yet distinct dependent variables to test my theory:

H1: As greater proportions of a state's population are excluded from power because of ethnic background, the chance of internal conflict in that state increases, regardless of regime type.

H2: As greater proportions of a state's population are excluded from power because of ethnic background, the chance of ethnic conflict in that state increases, regardless of regime type.

Exploring the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset

The Ethnic Power Relations Dataset is relatively new and is intended to replace older datasets such as the Minorities At Risk (MAR) dataset. The EPR identifies all politically relevant ethnic categories worldwide and measures access to executive-level state power for members of those ethnic categories in all years from 1946 to 2005.[26] Ethnicity was defined in the Weberian tradition: a subjectively experienced sense of commonality based on a belief in common ancestry and shared culture, including ethnolinguistic, ethnosocomatic (racial), and ethnoreligious groups, while excluding tribes and clans that conceive of ancestry in genealogical terms.[27] The EPR considers an ethnic group "politically relevant" if at least one significant political actor claims to represent the interests of that group in the national political arena, or if the members of the group are systematically and intentionally discriminated against in the domain of public politics.[28] Discrimination is defined as political exclusion directly targeted at an ethnic community.[29] This excludes indirect discrimination based on factors like educational disadvantage or discrimination in the labor or credit markets, focusing only on *de jure* discrimination.

The EPR focuses solely on access to executive power and purposefully ignores other branches of government.[30] Executive power refers to the representation in the presidency, cabinet, and senior posts in the administration, including the military. The EPR researchers used country experts to weigh the executive institutions and the countries' individual power constellations to accurately capture where the real executive power is held. Country experts focused on executive institutions that were the most relevant in each country. So for example, in a military dictatorship, power over the army was deemed important; this is in contrast to a democratic presidential regime, where the emphasis is more on the office of the president.

This approach to the role of ethnicity in conflict is drastically different than that of the traditional literature. In the past, researchers used different ethnic diversity indices, such as the linguistic, ethnic, or religious fractionalization indices to measure ethnicity's role in the onset of civil wars. Still other databases measure only the ethnic backgrounds of heads of state, or only investigate minority ethnic groups, disregarding ethnic groups that may be in the majority. However, these methods fail to accurately

19   Ibid.
20   Juha Auvinen, "Political Conflict in Less Developed Countries," *Journal of Peace Research* 34, no. 2 (1997): 180-181.
21   Tanja Ellingsen, "Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches' Brew?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44, no. 2 (2000): 236.
22   Ibid., 235.
23   Ibid.
24   Havard Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis, "Sensitivity Analysis of the Empirical Literature on Civil War Onset," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 4 (2006): 521.
25   Nicholas Sambanis, "Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 3 (2001): 272.

26   Wimmer, Cederman and Min, "New Global Dataset," 324.
27   Ibid., 325.
28   Ibid.
29   Ibid.
30   Ibid.

capture how ethnicity determines access to political power. The EPR is a far more direct means of measuring ethnic politics. The creators of the Dataset found robust evidence that it is political exclusion—not diversity—along ethnic lines that breeds ethnic conflict.[31] This innovative approach to ethnicity and civil war by measuring ethnic categories' access to central state power is central to this research as well.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE

The main independent variable is ethnic access to central state power. The model used by Cederman, Min, and Wimmer is used to measure ethnopolitical configurations of power. Specifically in the EPR, the variable is represented by a logged version of excluded population size. I use the logged variable of excluded population because increases in the share of the excluded population have a greater effect on the likelihood of conflict at lower levels of exclusion than at higher levels.[32]

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

As this study explores two main hypotheses, it utilizes two distinct dependent variables. The first dependent variable is the onset of civil war. This came from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts Dataset used in the EPR. Internal conflict is defined as "any armed and organized confrontation between government troops and rebel organizations or between army factions that reaches an annual battle death threshold of twenty-five."[33] This definition excludes one-sided conflicts, such as massacres, genocides, communal riots, pogroms, and other non-state conflicts, because the government is not directly involved in these types of unrest.[34]

The second dependent variable is the onset of ethnic conflict. Ethnic conflicts are distinguished by the aims of the armed organization and their recruitment and alliance structures.[35] Ethnic aims include: self-determination, more influence for one's group over government, autonomy, and language and other cultural rights.[36] Ethnic wars are further defined as those "fought by armed organizations which predominantly recruit fighters among their leaders' own ethnic group and who forge alliances on the basis of ethnic affiliation."[37]

Both variables are dichotomous dummy variables; either a civil war, or an ethnic war, began, or not, in each given year.

CONTROL VARIABLES

There are many credible explanations for the onset of civil and ethnic war. In order to control for these alternative explanations for conflict onset, I use several control variables. Cederman, Min, and Wimmer found that income level is one of the most robust explanations for the onset of internal conflict.[38] Impoverished countries are more prone to internal conflict than affluent ones. Sambanis and Hegre confirm this finding—the risk of war decreases as average income increases.[39] In order to control for this income effect, I use gross domestic product (GDP) per capita as a control variable. Population size is another probable factor in the onset of internal conflict. As the size of a country's population decreases, the risk of war also decreases.[40]

Ross proposed a theory of conflict brought on by resource competition. Oil in particular can be the source of many conflicts. To control for the oil effect, I use an oil production per capita variable based on data from Wimmer and Min.[41] Geography can also be a potential source of conflict. Fearon and Laitin found that mountainous countries have higher risk of internal conflict than other countries.[42] The theory is that mountains provide rebels with natural sanctuaries from which they can conduct rebellions. I use the same mountainous terrain data from Fearon and Laitin's dataset to control for this factor. Along with Fearon and Laitin's mountainous terrain data, I also use their ethnic fractionalization index as a control variable. While these authors found that the effect of ethnic fractionalization is substantively and statistically insignificant, there have been other authors who found differing results using the same fractionalization index depending on the definition of the dependent variable.[43] Due to the mixed results of the ethnic fractionalization index, I have elected to use it as a control variable to eliminate ethnic demographics as a causal factor. In this way, I might show a more robust causal pattern linking ethnic politics to the onset of conflict rather than one linking ethnic demographics to the onset of conflict.

Political instability is another causal factor for internal conflict. The EPR contains a variable that measures political instability. I use this variable as the control. Finally, colonial legacy and imperial past may together be a factor in the onset of internal conflict. The EPR dataset also included a variable that measured the countries' colonial history to control the effect of imperial past.

MODELS

31   Ibid., 329.
32   Ibid., 327.
33   Cederman, Min and Wimmer, "Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel?" 16.
34   Wimmer, Cederman and Min, "New Global Dataset," 326.
35   Cederman, Min and Wimmer, "Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel?" 16.
36   Ibid.
37   Ibid.

38   Wimmer, Cederman and Min, "New Global Dataset," 329.
39   Hegre and Sambanis, 508-509.
40   Ibid.
41   Andreas Wimmer and Brian Min, "From Empire to Nation-State: Explaining Wars in the Modern World, 1816-2001," *American Sociological Review* 71 (2006): 867-897.
42   Fearon and Laitin, 85.
43   Wimmer, Cederman and Min, "New Global Dataset," 318.

I created six different models in order to explore the role of regime type as an intervening variable in ethnic exclusion and conflict. I began with my two different dependent variables: the onset of civil war and the onset of ethnic war. For each of these two variables, I created a base dataset where I dropped all cases in which there was an ongoing civil war for the civil war cases, or an ongoing ethnic war for the ethnic war cases. I only examined the cases where either civil war or ethnic wars *began*, rather than investigating cases where there was a continuous war. I then used these datasets as a basis for three regime-specific models.

My first model exclusively tests democracies. As such, I dropped all cases that were coded as either anocracies or non-democracies for both the civil war and ethnic war datasets. In this way, I could isolate democracies to see if there was a statistical relationship between the onset of either types of conflict and ethnopolitical configurations of power. I then created a civil war and an ethnic war model for anocracies, where I dropped all cases coded as a democracy or non-anocracy. Finally, I generated a civil war and an ethnic war model for authoritarian countries, where I dropped all cases coded as a democracy or anocracy. With these six different models, testing both dependent variables in all three regime types, I ran logistic regressions to test the statistical relationship between ethnopolitical configurations of power and the onset of civil and ethnic wars, respectively.

Results

The results of the logistic regressions are fascinating (see tables 1-6 in the appendix). Ethnic exclusion from power had a very strong, statistically significant relationship for both dependent variables in authoritarian regimes. The other two regime models were similarly interesting. In democratic regimes, ethnic exclusion was not statistically significant with the onset of civil war; however, it was borderline statistically significant with the onset of ethnic war, with a P value of 0.053. Anocracies had the exact opposite relationship; ethnic exclusion was highly significant in the onset of civil war, but not in the onset of ethnic war. This finding was surprising, as it is contrary to much of the literature on the subject of anocracies and civil war.

After running the logistic regressions, I investigated the substantive significance of each model to see what the probability of conflict onset was at different levels of ethnic exclusion (see tables 7-12). I kept all control variables at their mean values and changed the values of my independent variable, ethnic exclusion, in intervals of 0.5. The resulting values represent the chance of conflict onset each year. Originally, the ethnic exclusion values went from 0 to 1; however, since I used the logged version of the variable, the values went from -11.51294 to 0. As such, the value -11.51294 represents the smallest level of ethnic exclusion and the values closest to zero represent the highest levels of ethnic exclusion.

Consistent throughout all of the models and for both internal conflict onset and ethnic war onset, as levels of ethnic exclusion increased, the probability of the onset either form of conflict increased as well. While the levels of statistical significance varied, the overarching trend revealed by the various regressions is self-evident.

Discussion

This research has numerous applications, particularly to the study of democracy and the importance of domestic political institutions. The relationship between ethnic exclusion and the onset of ethnic war in democratic regimes is intriguing. It offers an answer to the question of whether or not democratic institutions are the panacea for internal instability, as democratic civil peace theory posits.

Democratic civil peace theorists champion democratic institutions as a cure for internal instability in many developing countries. In previous research, Sambanis found that a lack of democracy is a significant predictor of the onset of ethnic war.[44] Other research seemed to show similar results. Academics advocated the installation of democratic regimes and the promotion of democracy as a solution to defuse ethnic conflict and prevent the escalation of ethnic grievances into war.[45] However, these researchers used different sets of data and different independent variables to measure the role of ethnicity in the onset of conflicts. This new approach—investigating ethnopolitical power configurations—may question the validity of a democratic panacea.

The representation system in a country may be more important than the level of democracy. The level of representation and therefore degree of inclusiveness is crucial.[46] Therefore, the *type* of democratic regime may play a pivotal role in multiethnic societies in determining the onset of domestic conflict.[47] Theoretically, more inclusive democracies will enjoy a lower probability of the onset of civil conflict than will their less inclusive counterparts.[48] There are two main schools of thought on the type of democracies best for pluralistic societies. Horowitz proposes that in plural societies, the majoritarian system is better because it necessitates the creation of coalitions among minorities in the government.[49] In this view, minorities are forced to negotiate with other ethnic groups to create cohesive coalitions in the government. This semi-forced cooperation and cohesion between minority groups and majority groups in government leads to a smaller chance of conflict onset. Furthermore, these coalitions prevent the solidifying and deepening of divisions between different ethnic groups.

44   Sambanis, 260.
45   Ibid., 280-281.
46   Marta Reynal-Querol, "Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, no. 1 (2002): 35.
47   Jose G. Montalvo and Marta Reynal-Querol, "Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars," *American Economic Review* 95, no. 3 (2005): 245.
48   Reynal-Querol, 35.
49   Ibid., 36.

On the other hand, Lijphart wrote several pieces about the concept of consociational democracy. Lijphart proposes that consociational democracies better fit fragmented societies than a majoritarian, winner-takes-all political system.[50] Consociational democracies emphasize the importance of power sharing amongst the different segments, or ethnicities, in a society.[51] According to Lijphart, the proportional system is better for pluralistic societies because it allows for the autonomy of segmented societies and does not artificially force the establishment of larger, less representative parties.[52]

Both sides of the democratic-model debate provide convincing evidence for their proposed models of democracy. Nonetheless, it seems that consociational systems may be better for ethnically divided societies. Proportional representation systems in democracies could provide a means of defusing the political frustrations of traditionally marginalized minorities. Consociational systems provide a way for disgruntled minorities in fragmented societies to participate democratically and to be adequately represented in government. This could lessen the chance of the onset of civil conflict, as minorities may choose to take the peaceful, political route rather than the violent one when provided with an adequate, democratic means of channeling political frustrations, Furthermore, with minority representation, the state apparatus may more equitably distribute political and economic rights amongst the population, rather than just to the majority demographics.

This research also produced an unintentional finding: the importance of the ethnic fractionalization index. While it was not statistically significant in the onset of civil wars, it was statistically significant in all three regime models for the onset of ethnic war. Fearon and Laitin showed that this index could not be used as an explanatory factor for the onset of conflict.[53] Cederman, Min, and Wimmer also dismiss the ethnic fractionalization index as an explanatory factor, insisting instead that researchers look to ethnic politics as the driving force behind conflict onset over demographics.[54] They argue that once ethnic politics is measured correctly, ethnic diversity loses its significance, pointing towards exclusion along ethnic lines as the leading cause of ethnic conflict.[55] I contend that analysts should not be so hasty in throwing out ethnic diversity as a causal factor in ethnic conflict. The continued statistical significance of the index should not be discounted in analyzing the causal factors of ethnic conflict.

Conclusions

50   Helga Binningsbo, "Power-Sharing and Postconflict Peace Periods" (Paper presented at the Power-sharing and Democratic Governance in Divided Societies workshop, August 21-22, 2006): 6.
51   Ibid., 2.
52   Reynal-Querol, 36.
53   Fearon and Laitin, 83.
54   Wimmer, Cederman and Min, "New Global Dataset," 329.
55   Ibid.

I first explored the existing literature on the role of ethnicity, regime type, and the onset of civil conflict. While the literature is quite extensive, there is a gap between the use of the new EPR, adequately analyzing ethnopolitical power configurations in the state, and the regime type on the probability of civil conflict onset. My six different models revealed via logistical regressions that there is a strong relationship between ethnic exclusion and ethnic conflict in democratic and authoritarian regimes. Likewise, the logistical regressions showed a statistical relationship between civil conflict onset and ethnic exclusion in anocracies and authoritarian regimes. Further testing revealed that as levels of ethnic exclusion increased, the substantive significance increased in all regime types for the onset of ethnic conflict. This questions both the validity of democratic civil peace theory and the democratic panacea for internal instability.

While these findings are fascinating, there are several limitations to this research. A major limitation is that the EPR only looks at access to executive level power. It would be interesting to analyze access to other levels of state power, legislative power among them. Since there are few positions of power in the executive branch of most governments, there are limited opportunities for any individual to gain a post in the executive branch. Perhaps ethnopolitical frustrations could be adequately vented via appropriate representation in the legislative branch. In many countries, including the United States, the legislative branch is far more representative of the state's ethnic demographics than is the executive branch. Different levels of ethnic exclusion could have a powerful effect on the legislative branch as well as the executive branch.

Further, this analysis is limited by the definition of democracy used. While many in academia accept the Polity project as a good measure of democracy, there are various types of democracy that could dramatically affect the probability of civil conflict. Some, like the majoritarian models of democracy, might lead more readily to conflict, whereas other types of democracy, such as consociational systems, may help decrease the chance of conflict in ethnically divided societies. In further research, it would be best to separate these different types of democratic models to analyze if ethnopolitical power configurations and ethnic exclusion are causal factors in all types of democratic regimes or only in majoritarian democratic regimes.

Civil wars are devastating to all countries. Civil war prevents economic and political development, leaving societies in perpetual states of poverty. In order to overcome this source of internal instability, research must accurately decipher the various causes of civil conflict to see which one has the strongest predictive capabilities. As we move forward to pursue alternative solutions to diffuse ethnic frustrations and prevent the eruption of internal conflict, we must be able to isolate and identify the root of the frustrations. Ethnic exclusion is an important and statistically significant factor leading to conflict, even in democratic regimes. This research needs further analysis and testing. Still, it does elucidate the problems many developing countries strive to overcome. By retaining ethnopolitical power configurations in the central

state as a causal factor and investigating how members from various ethnic groups access that power, we can look to see if we can potentially prevent untold suffering in potential civil conflicts.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Arielle Badger Newman obtained a BA in International Relations from Brigham Young University and a MS in International Affairs and Global Enterprise (MIAGE) from the University of Utah where she serves as the current MIAGE Student Body President. After working for the European Parliament in 2008, Arielle focused her undergraduate studies on Europe and the Balkans. Her independent research about territorial integrity in the Balkans has been published in academic periodicals at the UC-Claremont Conference on the European Union. At BYU, Arielle was a senior research assistant with the WomanStats Project, the largest database in the world on the status of women. In graduate school, Arielle worked as an economic analyst at an international investment firm, where she focused on European currencies for investment. After graduation, Arielle hopes to obtain a PhD in political science and eventually work for NATO. She loves politics and dance, especially ballroom dance with her husband, Cliff.

APPENDICES

Logistic Regression: Democracy Model

Table 1: Democracy Model, DV as Civil War Onset

New Civil Conflict Onset	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[99% Conf.	Interval]
GDP Per Capita Lagged	-0.2678543	0.0061622	-3.87	0	-0.431.8	-0.1222989
Population	4.94E-06	1.00E-06	4.67	0	2.87E-06	7.01E-06
Oil per capita lagged	0.0970509	0.0273741	3.55	0	0.0434059	0.1507106
Political Instability	0.2089743	0.4539409	0.59	0.555	-0.8207889	1.188688
Ethnic Fractionalization Index	1.09889	0.0071376	1.42	0.134	-0.4129605	2.610761
Mountainous Terrain	0.0209479	0.0077736	2.71	0.007	0.0057904	0.0361055
Imperial Past	1.139739	0.5648002	0.25	0.505	-0.9672341	1.248742
Excluded Population Logged	0.0735151	0.0448327	1.65	0.1	-0.0139656	0.1600935
_cons	-3.363557	0.7081065	-4.75	0	-4.751865	-1.975332

Table 2: Democracy Model, DV as Ethnic War Onset

New Ethnic Conflict Onset	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[99% Conf.	Interval]
GDP Per Capita Lagged	-0.1560592	0.0044451	-1.85	0.069	-0.3215647	0.0094665
Population	2.19E-06	8.74E-07	3.51	0.011	6.73E-07	3.90E-06
Oil Per Capita Lagged	0.0555094	0.0455262	1.23	0.22	-0.0334208	0.1480391
Political Instability	0.4417250	0.0010064	0.82	0.413	-0.606175	1.869725
Ethnic Fractionalization Index	2.461855	1.252751	1.96	0.049	0.00569	4.916982
Mountainous Terrain	0.0129599	0.0129709	1	0.318	-0.0124687	0.0383744
Imperial Past	0.7259604	0.8591702	0.84	0.398	-0.9578021	2.409905
Excluded Population Logged	0.1766262	0.0914433	1.93	0.053	-0.0025999	0.3558517
_cons	-5.229845	1.217975	-4.29	0	-7.617031	-2.842058

Logistic Regression: Anocracy Model

Table 3: Anocracy Model, DV as Civil War Onset

New Civil Conflict Onset	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[99% Conf.	Interval]
GDP Per Capita Lagged	-0.1007069	0.0525641	-1.92	0.055	-0.2036033	0.0022737
Population	4.44E-06	1.73E-06	2.58	0.01	1.07E-06	7.83E-06
Oil per capita lagged	0.0338047	0.0234000	1.45	0.148	-0.0120099	0.0767189
Political Instability	0.0614792	0.2999101	0.20	0.832	-0.4673609	0.5900071
Ethnic Fractionalization Index	0.5129073	0.4083833	1.26	0.209	-0.287429	1.313904
Mountainous Terrain	-0.0056001	0.005613	-1.01	0.312	-0.016613	0.0053211
Imperial Past	0.5767661	0.366522	1.57	0.116	-0.1416018	1.295138
Excluded Population Logged	0.0084209	0.0330098	2.76	0.006	0.0036839	0.431159
_cons	-2.511697	0.430822	-5.85	0	-3.558073	-1.467321

Table 4: Anocracy Model, DV as Ethnic War Onset

New Ethnic Conflict Onset	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[99% Conf.	Interval]
GDP Per Capita Lagged	-0.0484373	0.0665792	-0.73	0.468	-0.1799532	0.0810555
Population	2.65E-06	1.35E-06	1.96	0.05	-2.51E-09	5.31E-06
Oil Per Capita Lagged	0.0195065	0.0291364	0.67	0.503	-0.0375999	0.0766129
Political Instability	-0.4280799	0.4200086	-1.02	0.309	-1.37251	0.3960969
Ethnic Fractionalization Index	1.545489	0.0055014	2.25	0.026	0.1815517	2.555446
Mountainous Terrain	0.0033986	0.0073600	0.46	0.643	-0.0108888	0.0177889
Imperial Past	1.079529	0.5061262	2.14	0.033	0.084057	2.069584
Excluded Population Logged	0.0772006	0.0480555	1.61	0.108	-0.016626	0.1713855
_cons	-4.517056	0.6465407	-7	0	-5.781981	-3.252212

Logistic Regression: Authoritarian Model

Table 5: Authoritarian Model, DV Civil War

New Civil Conflict Onset	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[99% Conf.	Interval]
GDP Per Capita Lagged	-0.0742843	0.0438010	-1.7	0.089	-0.1602397	0.0116651
Population	7.88E-08	8.57E-07	0.01	0.993	-1.67E-06	1.69E-06
Oil per capita lagged	0.0096799	0.0143175	0.68	0.499	-0.0188819	0.0377416
Political Instability	0.861696	0.2783075	3.1	0.002	0.3160055	1.407326
Ethnic Fractionalization Index	1.269493	0.4452916	2.85	0.004	0.3967396	2.14228
Mountainous Terrain	0.0075561	0.0061914	1.34	0.006	-0.0006189	0.0197311
Imperial Past	0.6096094	0.4870422	1.25	0.211	-0.3381817	1.207994
Excluded Population Logged	0.0792042	0.0394622	1.47	0.014	0.0149192	0.1560091
_cons	-4.044341	0.474880	-8.52	0	-4.774341	-3.114882

Table 6: Authoritarian Model, DV Ethnic War

New Ethnic Conflict Onset	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[99% Conf.	Interval]
GDP Per Capita Lagged	-0.1898044	0.1102117	-1.72	0.085	-0.4058134	0.0262057
Population	8.40E-08	1.22E-06	0.07	0.945	-2.38E-04	2.47E-06
Oil Per Capita Lagged	0.0154688	0.043514	0.36	0.723	-0.0696302	0.0007517
Political Instability	0.7373206	0.3796136	1.94	0.05	-0.0010184	1.47966
Ethnic Fractionalization Index	2.066543	0.7647740	2.7	0.007	0.5676123	3.565474
Mountainous Terrain	0.0185691	0.0076129	2.44	0.015	0.0036479	0.0334893
Imperial Past	1.181909	0.624543	1.89	0.058	-0.0422727	2.405891
Excluded Population Logged	0.1656062	0.0591695	2.77	0.006	0.0476565	0.279570
_cons	-5.561575	0.8556925	-6.5	0	-7.23878	-3.883970

Democracy: Substantial Significance

Table 7: Democracy Model. DV as Civil War Onset

Value Inverlpop	Margin	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
-11.51293	0.0014848	0.0014686	1.76	0.081	-0.000306	0.0052156
-4	0.0042569	0.0020057	2.1	0.036	0.0002865	0.0082271
-3.5	0.0044156	0.0021862	2.1	0.036	0.0002874	0.0085437
-3	0.0045862	0.0021946	2.09	0.037	0.0002764	0.0088815
-2.5	0.0047508	0.0022914	2.07	0.038	0.0002597	0.0092419
-2	0.0049279	0.0023973	2.06	0.04	0.0002293	0.0096264
-1.5	0.0051114	0.0025127	2.03	0.042	0.0001866	0.0100362
-1	0.0055818	0.0026865	2.01	0.044	0.0001307	0.0104728
-0.5	0.0054992	0.0027768	1.98	0.047	0.0000667	0.0109376
0	0.0057039	0.0029236	1.95	0.051	-0.0000242	0.0114322

Table 8: Democracy Model. DV as Ethnic War Onset

Value Inverlpop	Margin	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
-11.51293	0.0006447	0.0006084	1.06	0.289	-0.0005477	0.0018357
-4	0.0024258	0.0013425	1.81	0.071	-0.0002058	0.0050657
-3.5	0.0026493	0.001453	1.83	0.068	-0.0001903	0.0054869
-3	0.002893	0.0015811	1.83	0.068	-0.0002101	0.0059962
-2.5	0.0031598	0.0017371	1.82	0.069	-0.0002454	0.006364
-2	0.003454	0.0019186	1.8	0.072	-0.0003105	0.0072185
-1.5	0.0037673	0.0021325	1.77	0.077	-0.0004199	0.0079466
-1	0.0041130	0.002389	1.73	0.084	-0.0005688	0.0087843
-0.5	0.0044919	0.0026758	1.68	0.093	-0.0007525	0.0097362
0	0.0047044	0.0030165	1.63	0.104	-0.0012075	0.0108164

Anocracy: Substantial Significance

Table 9: Anocracy Model. DV as Civil War Onset

Value of Inverlpop	Margin	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
-11.51293	0.0309791	0.0091529	3.38	0.001	0.0130376	0.0489103
-4	0.0058317	0.0071353	8.52	0	0.044837	0.0748063
-3.5	0.0635011	0.0072931	8.72	0	0.0492671	0.077055
-3	0.0664156	0.0075923	8.75	0	0.051906	0.0012961
-2.5	0.0693086	0.0080585	8.62	0	0.0536103	0.0851669
-2	0.0724868	0.0086777	8.35	0	0.0554760	0.0894923
-1.5	0.0757069	0.0094792	7.99	0	0.0571299	0.0942839
-1	0.0790906	0.010451	7.56	0	0.0585771	0.0995443
-0.5	0.0825496	0.0115921	7.12	0	0.0598254	0.1052898
0	0.0861781	0.0128974	6.68	0	0.0609996	0.1114566

Table 10: Anocracy Model. DV as Ethnic War Onset

Value of Inverlpop	Margin	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
-11.51293	0.0130611	0.0088123	2.29	0.023	0.0016691	0.0344823
-4	0.022386	0.0090606	5.5	0	0.0143900	0.0303077
-3.5	0.0231578	0.004108	5.64	0	0.0151503	0.0312093
-3	0.0239951	0.0042299	5.67	0	0.0157046	0.0322856
-2.5	0.024862	0.0044157	5.61	0	0.0161883	0.0335537
-2	0.0257595	0.0047306	5.45	0	0.0164875	0.0350312
-1.5	0.0266683	0.0051164	5.21	0	0.0166598	0.0367165
-1	0.0276695	0.0055926	4.94	0	0.0166885	0.0386103
-0.5	0.0286485	0.006156	4.65	0	0.0165759	0.0407011
0	0.0296742	0.0068099	4.36	0	0.0163388	0.0430097

Authoritarian: Substantial Significance

Table 11: Authoritarian Model, DV as Civil War Onset

Value of IsmdJpop	Margin	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[99% Conf.	Interval]

Table 12: Authoritarian Model, DV as Ethnic War Onset

Value of IsmdJpop	Margin	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[99% Conf.	Interval]

Letter to the Reader: Applying to Professional Schools of International Relations

BY LEIGH SLOANE
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (APSIA)

In the following article, Leigh Sloane provides some excellent insights into the world of Professional Schools of International Affairs. This is a must-read for anyone interested in pursuing a career in International Relations by getting an advance degree in the field. This article contains important tips on the admissions process, and more broadly underscores the increasing relevance of these degree programs in today's ever-globalizing world.

If you are interested in building a career in the international affairs field today, you will need to pursue a graduate degree. Graduate degrees no longer help a candidate stand out in today's job market; they are often the baseline for simply starting the conversation. Those who feel the calling to continue their studies in a graduate program in international affairs most often derive their motivation from a place of passion and commitment to the greater good. They have a sense of their place in the world and want to have an impact and make a difference. However, this passion and commitment must be accompanied by a well-developed plan. In order to be a competitive candidate for graduate school, you need to present a clear and compelling picture of why you are going to graduate school at the given time you are choosing to apply and of how graduate school fits into your overall career trajectory.

It is also important to distinguish between professional degrees and academic degrees. If you are looking to build a career in the international affairs arena, then you most likely want to look at the professional Masters degrees in international

affairs and/or public policy, such as those found at member schools of the Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs (APSIA). Unlike academic graduate degrees (Masters or PhD)—which are based in university departments and focused primarily on a specific discipline (political science, history, economics, etc)—a professional graduate degree (Masters) in international affairs or public policy is interdisciplinary and found within a school of international affairs and/or public policy with its own dedicated faculty and courses or a university center/institute that pulls its curriculum from several departments. In addition, these degree programs prepare students for the workplace with relevant career development programs and coursework.

APSIA member schools are characterized by their dedication to the study of international affairs, academic rigor, and commitment to professional development. Programs are generally two years in length and provide a core foundation in the international political system, international economics, and policy analysis. Programs also often require students to specialize in a functional topic (such as national security, international development, or international trade), and to emphasize a geographic region. Faculty members include both scholars and practitioners with distinguished careers in the field. This combination ensures that students receive both the theoretical underpinnings and practical knowledge necessary to address the world's most demanding and complex issues.

APSIA member schools have a broad portfolio of resources geared toward ensuring the success of their graduates. Today, graduates from APSIA's member programs are divided almost equally in the public, private, and non-profit sectors. APSIA schools have dedicated career offices that provide a variety of services ranging from professional development seminars to assisting students with identifying internships and post-graduation employment. Students are generally expected to complete an internship during the summer between their first and second years—opportunities that often allow students to put into practice what they learned during their first year courses and explore career options. APSIA schools maintain extensive networks of contacts which students can access in order to connect with a vast array of government offices, corporations, and NGOs working around the world.

To be a competitive candidate for a graduate program, you must first identify the program that will best fit your needs and goals, not simply the programs with the highest rankings or name recognition. If you are interested in, say, a career in disaster response/relief and apply to a program with no such specialization or faculty who teach in this area, then your application is likely to end up in the reject pile. Admissions committees want to see that you understand what their program has to offer and have matched that program with your career goals. It will be obvious if you are just chasing a name or haven't done your homework.

In order to find the right program, you must have a fairly developed sense of what you want to focus on in graduate school and generally have an idea of what kind of career you want after graduation. Not all programs offer the same bredth of study in all the regions of the world or all the functional topics. Thus, you must really research each program to determine such things as what core courses are required, what specialties are offered, how many courses are taught in your areas of interest, whether there are faculty members who have expertise or professional background in your area of interest, if there is a language proficiency exam in order to graduate, and the size of the alumni network working in your field of interest. Applications are time-consuming and cost money: you don't want to waste your time or your money applying to a program that ultimately won't be a good fit. I cannot stress this enough: *you need to do serious homework first to make sure you are applying to programs that will help you achieve your long-range career goals.*

Once you have a sense of your desired career path, you have researched programs, and you have developed a shortlist, you are ready to evaluate yourself and determine if your basic background has prepared you to be a good candidate for admissions to those particular programs. I believe in going in this order because it is important to have a list of all the programs that could potentially fulfill your interests and career ambitions and not prematurely write-off programs because you assume you do not stand a chance of being accepted. The admissions process for graduate programs in international affairs takes a holistic approach in reviewing candidates. Unlike many law or business schools, international affairs schools do not automatically reject people who score under certain numbers on the GRE or who have a certain GPA. All candidates are given a fair review. The admissions committees consider each piece of the application in constructing a full picture of the candidate. In addition, schools are interested in creating diverse classes that represent a wide range of backgrounds, experiences, areas of academic and professional interests, and perspectives. In general, you will be evaluated on the following:

- ✓ Strength of academic record
- ✓ International experience
- ✓ Professional experience
- ✓ Foreign language exposure
- ✓ Writing skills
- ✓ Quantitative proficiency

Of course, each program will weigh each of these factors differently. Now you can review your list of preferred programs and determine how your background in these factors compares to their ideal candidate. For example, some programs will put a stronger emphasis on demonstrated quantitative skills (e.g., undergraduate course work in economics or statistics). Some programs will want to see a candidate have full-time work experience before coming to graduate school, while others will accept

more students coming straight from their undergraduate program. And programs that require students to pass a language proficiency exam will obviously weigh foreign language competency higher than programs that don't have a language requirement. Also, having international experience does not necessarily mean having lived/ worked/traveled abroad. While these experiences might be preferable, schools know that for a variety of reasons, those interested in an internationally focused degree and career might not have had such opportunities yet. However, they will look to see if a candidate has found ways to engage in internationally focused activities within their community (such as volunteering with a local program that works with immigrants or participating in programs at a local organization like the World Affairs Council).

Most application packages to professional international affairs graduate programs will require the following:

- ✓ Academic transcript(s)
- ✓ Resume
- ✓ Essay/personal statement
- ✓ Recommendation letters
- ✓ GRE and/or TOEFL

Each of these items is a piece of the puzzle that should create a complete picture of you, the applicant. Thus, each piece should provide information that is unique and distinct from the other pieces. For example, your personal statement or your recommendation letter should not parrot your resume. The recommendation letter is essentially a letter of evaluation: your recommender should be able to speak to your strength in relation to your peers and explain why you will be successful in graduate school and your future career path. The essay and/or personal statement is not just a place to share more information about yourself but also a demonstration of your writing ability.

The personal essay is your opportunity to tell *your* story. You have a limited space, so do not waste it speaking of other people or discussing what you think about a given topic. Rather, show the admissions committee who you are. Explain why the school you are applying to is the best fit for you and also what you will bring to the school that no one else can. Use the personal statement to tie together all the other pieces of your application and tell a coherent story of how your past experiences and interest have led you to this point and how graduate school will fit into that story and move your forward on your path. Additionally, be sure you answer the question, stay within the word limit, proofread, and have a friend or two review and edit. Lastly, be sure you send the right essay to the right school!

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Leigh Sloane is the Executive Director of the Association of Professional Schools in International Affairs, managing services and programs among and developing new initiatives for the member schools. Prior to her work with APSIA, Ms. Sloane has worked at the Civic Education Project, the Council on Foreign Relations, and Harvard University.

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